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Abstract: This project takes up the old question of the nature of truth by seeking to say, at one stroke, 
both what enables truth and falsity and what lets them matter to us so centrally. Somehow, we as human 
beings are fundamentally connected to a world in which the truth of statements and the genuineness of 
things can matter to us deeply and coherently. And yet, I try to show, this coherent unity between being 
and thinking can also be radically (if not always permanently) broken in the experience of psychosis. I 
argue that the source of that vulnerable unity must be a contingent event in which I find myself disposed 
trustingly toward the world, and therein find the world disclosed as trustworthy. Such primitive trust is 
phenomenally related to trusting a person, and Freudian psychoanalysis shows us that it develops 
psychologically through relation to a person. As what fundamentally structures self and world, however, 
this kind of attunement transcends psychology. Our very access to the being of things, i.e., to their 
compelling importance and organized significance, depends upon it. 
 
Thus, I support Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth as what first makes accessible the 
comparisons (between word and thing, for example) on which more traditional theories of truth are based. 
Yet I also confront Heidegger’s phenomenological version of trust by highlighting what is at stake 
ontologically in our interpersonal psychic development, which psychoanalysis reveals to take place by 
way of seduction. Heidegger assumes that being must show itself, even if in a concealed way, and thus 
always takes absence as withdrawal or absencing, rather than as a radical break. By attending to the 
meaningful phenomena of psychosis, I defend the thesis that our relation to the world is instead opened up 
and sustained by a fundamental affective attunement (trust) that can dramatically fail. In other words, I try 
to show that we are exposed to a more radical kind of concealment than Heidegger’s thinking of truth 
seems able to do justice to, a failure of being that can thoroughly overwhelm us. 
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I. Troth, Trust, and Truth 
It seems evident that trust between people opens up a certain kind of discursive space for 
the first time. Trust makes room for and encourages truth-telling, in two ways. It raises an 
expectation of honesty, and it provides a context in which defensive patterns of relating can be 
relaxed or suspended. But such trust also gives a new force or importance to falsity, since it is 
within that same new context that a lie can be felt as a personal betrayal rather than as an abstract 
falsehood. Interpersonal trust thus opens us up both affectively and normatively to the difference 
between truth and falsity: it makes that difference matter in a new way, even if only on the level 
of human relationships. Of such things are moral conversions made. 
 But what if something like this enabling relation between trust and the true/false 
distinction turned out to be the case much more fundamentally, as well? What if our ability 
consistently to differentiate truth from falsehood at all, even when we are relatively bad at doing 
so, were enabled by a more basic or more global kind of trust? And what if that same ability to 
differentiate true from false also opened up the central importance that the difference has for us, 
along with our (sometimes tragic, sometimes comic) sense of being situated at some negotiable 
distance from the truth? 
If we could make sense of this much, then the analogy would suggest a reasonable further 
question: how is that more fundamental kind of trust related to the interpersonal trust that opens 
up truth-telling between people? Is it similar? Or would this basic trust be more like assuming 
that a systematically structured whole will continue functioning as it always has? (Day will 
follow night, occasional eclipses notwithstanding; the seasons will continue giving way to one 
another, allowing for some year-to-year modifications and even for long-term climatic variation.) 
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Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, has spoken of a kind of “perceptual faith,” an 
“unjustifiable certitude of a sensible world common to us.”1
Just as we automatically expect the ground to support us when we take a step, we count on the 
subsistence of the whole of beings in our every act. Plato’s word for our relation to corporeal 
things is also the right word for our prephilosophical relation to all things: pistis (Republic 511e), 
which is best interpreted neither as belief nor as faith, but as trust.
 Despite being “the seat of truth 
within us,” this confidence that we share the world, “entirely irresistible as it may be, remains 
absolutely obscure; we can live it, we can neither think it nor formulate it nor set it up in theses.” 
Our sense of being together in a shared reality is thus clearly not something that we could ever 
reason our way into. On the contrary, Merleau-Ponty’s thesis is that this faith opens up our very 
reasoning activity – “that it is by borrowing from the world structure that the universe of truth and 
of thought is constructed for us.” When we dig back to the sources of our shared existence, he 
claims, we find simply that “our assurance of being in the truth” – of having access to things as 
they are – “is one with our assurance of being in the world.” But this is an insight already at work 




If Merleau-Ponty and Plato are right, how should we characterize the trusting relation we 
bear to the kosmos, to the very structure of the world of things in which we find ourselves? At 
stake here is the nature of our fundamental integration into that world, the shape of our belonging 
to the structuring whole: belonging with people and with things, in such a way that getting them 
right, being faithful to them by telling the truth about them, can grip us as being of central 
importance, can be difficult to achieve, and can be sidelined when we want to deceive.3
                                                 
1 For this quotation and the remainder of this paragraph, see Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the 
Invisible, tr. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968), pp. 3, 11-13. 
 
2 Richard Polt, The Emergency of Being (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 24. The passage to 
which Polt refers is the divided line discussion in book 6 of Plato’s Republic, which discussion is itself an 
explanation of Socrates’s analogy between the sun and the good. Allan Bloom is one who translates pistis 
as trust in this passage – see The Republic of Plato, tr. Allan Bloom (Basic Books, 1968), 511e, 534a. 
3 The problem elided in this paragraph – whether the kosmos should be thought as the structured world (an 
entity), the structure of the world (perhaps an entity, perhaps not), or the structuring of the world (the 
opening of the ontological difference between structure and structured, one might say) – is taken up in 
some detail in chapters 2-3, below. 
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 These are the questions with which our investigation will be concerned. Broadly 
speaking, they form one way of posing a familiar philosophical question about the nature or 
essence of truth: in virtue of what do certain things (usually assertions or beliefs) count as true or 
false? What is it for something to be true? Articulating this question in terms of trust is new, but 
is not simply foreign to our pre-theoretical experience. In fact, it picks up on an English 
etymological connection between truth and trust: tréowe, from which derive ‘truth’ and ‘trust,’ as 
well as ‘troth,’ the pledge of trustworthiness (as when I ‘plight my troth’).4
But my way of posing the question about the essence of truth already inflects it toward a 
second question, one that is less often asked than simply taken for granted: why do we care 
whether something is true or false? As Friedrich Nietzsche puts it in defining his own task of 
thinking, “the value of truth is tentatively to be called into question… .”
 
5 It is not by chance that 
in the same passage he names the will to truth (the overwhelming desire for it, which he takes to 
be one of the most central features of humanity up to now) – names it precisely a faith (Glaube) 
in the divinity of truth.6 Modifying very slightly, we could say: the will to truth is a peculiar 
trusting,7
                                                 
4 Joseph J. Godfrey has attended to this connection in Trust of People, Words, and God: A Route for 
Philosophy of Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), chapter 6. Also see the 
entry for “truth” in the Oxford English Dictionary. 
 one within which truth shows up as of the highest importance – perhaps even as the 
very criterion of importance. 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, tr. Carol Diethe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 3rd Essay: §24. 
6 Ibid.; see also Nietzsche, The Gay Science, tr. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), 
§344. Again, it is not accidental that Nietzsche speaks here of the will to truth as a mode of piety; we will 
later see Martin Heidegger, too, employ the term ‘piety’ to name the fundamental receptivity at issue here 
(chapter 7, section 7.B.2). 
7 Nietzsche contrasts both believing (Glauben) and confidence (Zutrauen) with mistrusting (Misstrauen). 
See Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, §344, in volume 5.2 of G. Colli and M. Montinari (hrsgs.), Nietzsche 




II. Betrayal: Despair Over the Truth 
 This Nietzschean question has to some extent, albeit indirectly, been brought to the fore 
in Anglo-American philosophy by the recent preponderance of what are called deflationary 
accounts of the nature of truth. These are really theories about the expression ‘is true’ (i.e., the 
truth-predicate), since they typically claim that truth has no nature: there is no single property (no 
unified essence) that is expressed by all or most such predications. 
One way to motivate a deflationary project is to point out the difficulties with traditional 
correspondence views of truth. At least as they have been presented in the last century, such 
views set out to explain truth as a real property of assertions (whether propositions, statements, or 
sentences) that relates those assertions in a specifiable way to the world (whether states of affairs, 
facts, situations, events, etc.).8
Above all, if assertions or beliefs are somehow maps or pictures of the world of objects 
(i.e., something that can correspond to states of affairs), and truth is this correspondence of the 
assertion or belief to the thing, how could we ever know what is true? And why would we care? 
Either we do not have access to the world independently of these assertions or beliefs, so we 
cannot possibly check the correspondence – this is the claim of many theories that take truth to be 
 This way of approaching the problem lends itself to several 
possible objections: on one side, it is hard to give an ontologically appropriate account of the 
nature of assertions (insofar as they are ‘truth-bearers’): this is a problem of language. On another 
side, one might ask whether we can make sense of positing states of affairs as entities (insofar as 
they are ‘truth-makers’): this is a problem of being. Thirdly, the difficulty of the relation between 
language and being shows up in semantic pathologies, beginning with something like the Liar 
Paradox: ‘All Cretans are liars,’ when said by a Cretan. 
                                                 
8 As a rough account: “The truth of a proposition is constituted by a state of the world such that, were the 
proposition stated, it would state the world to be that way.” Gerald Vision, Veritas (Cambridge, MA: MIT  
Press, 2004), p. 1. 
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a matter of the internal coherence of one’s beliefs – or we do have such access, in which case it is 
unclear why we would need the assertions in the first place. (Maybe, in the latter case, we need 
the assertions so as to communicate states of affairs to others. But according to the hypothesis, 
would these others not also have language-independent access to the world?9
Incipit deflationary posings of the question. Perhaps truth is simply a disquotational 
function of language that cancels semantic ascent, so that when we affirm of a quoted sentence 
like ‘The world is a mystery’ that it is true, we generate the same sentence without quotations: 
The world is a mystery. Or perhaps truth is a kind of semantic pretense that allows expression of 




                                                 
9 Maybe we could claim that we care about the truth of propositions when we communicate to people who 
are or were absent from, and thus unable to witness, the relevant state of affairs. But such a claim hardly 
seems consonant with our actual experience of speaking. It is much more as if we lived in speech the way a 
fish lives in water, for we talk about everything, whether our conversation partner was absent for the event 
or not. And it is precisely in light of this constant speaking that truth and falsity matter to us. It hardly 
makes sense of this experience to say that we encounter a state of affairs first, then translate it into language 
(‘propositionalize’ it) afterward. 
 There are several other proposals. But they seem to have in common something like 
the following attitude: ‘why can we not just say that what is important about the predicate ‘is 
true’ is the logical or expressive shortcut it grants us, whereas assigning it explanatory force is a 
bizarre abstraction? If I believe that the grocery store is open now and consequently succeed in 
obtaining groceries, then my success is in virtue of the conjunction of my belief with the grocery 
store’s being open. Why try to attribute some efficacy to the mysterious truth of that belief?’ On 
the other hand, it seems very hard to say why the content of my belief about the grocery store 
mattered, unless we appeal to something more substantive about the truth-predicate. 
10 See James A. Woodbridge, “Truth as a Pretense,” in Fictionalism in Metaphysics, ed. M.E. Kalderon 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2005). 
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I do not wish to play out the whole debate here.11
 While I think we should interpret deflationary accounts as lodging an appropriate 
complaint about certain ways of thinking about the essence of truth, I do not think we should 
simply follow their analysis and have done. We should rather recognize that setting up the 
problem of the nature of truth in this particular way not only yields a false problem (as the 
deflationists typically claim) but also covers up the really interesting problem (as they typically 
would not claim). In other words, we could say that the deflationists’ despair is really an odd kind 
of distress, one that Martin Heidegger has diagnosed as characteristic of modern Western 
philosophy: a failure to be troubled about the self-evidence of the given.
 I merely want to register two 
observations. First, this deflationary trend contrasts with our everyday sense that truth and falsity 
make all the difference, even once we allow (with Nietzsche and with Sigmund Freud) that this 
does not mean we want only the truth. Second, this contrast should be no surprise, since we have 
just seen that mostly what these accounts deflate is the ‘problem of truth’ as construed in a very 
particular way – namely, as a question about the semantic function of the truth-predicate. But this 
is a far cry from what we might, in an everyday sense, mean by the importance of truth or 
truthfulness. 
12
                                                 
11 For a recent, broad-based defense of correspondence against deflationary objections, see Vision, Veritas. 
For a collection of the most important papers on all sides, see The Nature of Truth: Classic and 
Contemporary Perspectives, ed. Michael Lynch (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
 The problem with 
ignoring the givenness of things is that we take as obvious what in fact could and perhaps should 
be given in another way. But if Heidegger is right in his diagnosis, we need not give in to this 
12 Cf. Søren Kierkegaard: in despair, to will to be oneself. The Sickness Unto Death, trs. H.V. and E.H. 
Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 67-74. On the distress of the lack of distress 
(Not der Notlosigkeit), see Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trs. R. Rojcewicz 
and D. Vallega-Neu (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2012)/GA 65. Since this is arguably not 
only a concern about foundationalism, it is broader than but related to what Wilfrid Sellars calls ‘the myth 
of the given.’ See Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, vol. I, eds. H. Feigl & M. Scriven (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1956), pp. 253–329. 
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despair. We must instead attend to the problem of truth as such, seeking out what in it might be 
really worthy of question. 
 
III. Heideggerian Questioning 
 To do this, we would have to remain a bit longer with the difficulties of the 
correspondence theory, hearing in them precisely what is worthy of philosophical pursuit. 
Correspondence theories tend to run aground on their positing of truth as a kind of rightness: a 
match, an adequation, etc.13 It is hard to say in what this rightness might consist. How might 
saying match up with the world? But what we can do is ask more basically about the access that 
enables this adequation: how might the world be given to us in our speaking about it? Or: how 
might the world be given to us as already articulated so that we can speak about it?14
 That is the project I take Martin Heidegger to be carrying out when he locates the essence 
of truth in the ancient Greek word alētheia, which he hears as a-lēthē-ia, the abstract noun form (-
ia) of the verb alētheuein, to remove from (a-) concealment (lēthē). I will follow his analysis in 
detail in chapter 2, but let me here at least indicate his unusual approach. 
 
 Heidegger’s thinking about truth is, we might say, manifestly inflationary, although not 
in the sense that he works out a complicated theory of just what it is for something to be true. 
Rather, he asks above all about being, truth, and language as fundamental to our existence. Thus, 
he claims that “[t]he nature [Wesen] of truth is no mere concept that people carry about in their 
heads; rather, truth essences [west]: in the temporary [jeweilige] shape of its essence it is the 
determining power for everything true and untrue, what is sought, fought over, and suffered 
                                                 
13 This includes non-correspondence theories that project into the future the object to which the assertion 
must correspond: e.g., certain pragmatist theories on which truth is whatever science turns out to hold once 
it is complete, or Hegelian theories on which the true is the whole when fully developed. 
14 In other words, what enables us ever to link up truth-bearers with their truth-makers at all, regardless of 
what we take to play those roles? 
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for.”15 Here he reads the essence of truth verbally, that is, as an essencing, which we can 
provisionally gloss as ‘coming to prevail’, or ‘coming to structure our outlook on the world by 
shaping what we take as self-evident’. This is why he adds that “[t]he ‘essence’ of truth is a 
happening [Geschehen],”16 one which we might characterize as an event in which human beings 
are integrated into a coherent, shared world. It is only within this world – which is a world of 
everyday action just as much as one of beliefs or sentences – that things (including assertions) can 
show up as correct or incorrect, genuine or ungenuine: true or untrue. But if he is right that the 
essence of truth is the shape of our stance in the world, the pattern according to which things can 
become accessible to us in their importance – things to be sought, fought over, or suffered for – 
then he can appropriately raise the existential question: “should we not maintain […] that the 
conception [Auffassung] of the essence of man depends upon the conception of truth at any 
particular time?”17
Already we can recognize, then, that our self-understanding as human beings – the 
question of our own being – will be centrally at issue in any Heideggerian investigation of truth. 
Who are we, that we are so preoccupied with truth? Indeed, this is central to what it is to exist as a 
human being, in his technical sense of ‘exist’: to have one’s own being as a matter of concern, 
and hence to be open to whatever is (including truth) in terms of its being or nature.
 
18
                                                 
15 This and the next quotation from Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected 
“Problems” of “Logic”, trs. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
1994), p. 41. (Hereafter: Basic Questions.) See also volume 45 of Heidegger’s “Collected Edition” 
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann), p. 44. Hereafter, I will refer to these German volumes as GA (for 
Gesamtausgabe). The first citation of a text will always include bibliographic information for the English 
translation, if there is one, followed by the GA citation. All subsequent instances will be formatted: ‘GA 
[vol.]:[page]/Translation [page].’ 
 His account 
will therefore be a helpful guide into the matter at hand in this project, namely, just how our 
trusting relation to being (our own and that of other things) lets truth and falsity emerge in their 
16 GA 45:44/Basic Questions 41. 
17 GA 45:21/Basic Questions 20. 
18 See Heidegger, Being and Time, trs. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 
1962), pp. 12ff (marginal page numbers in the English translation, cf. the German 18th edition [Tübingen: 
Max Niemeyer, 2001])/32ff (English page numbers). Hereafter, BT, always with German pagination first. 
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importance. Heidegger does not often concern himself with trust as such, but I hope to show that 
attending to it as a way of thinking phenomenality itself in terms of mood can fruitfully open up 
his work. 
 Because of the centrality of Heidegger’s work for our investigation, we should address in 
a preliminary way two concerns about his account before proceeding (see chapter 2, part II, for 
more detail). First, it might seem like his move to understand the essence of truth as something 
that first grounds or opens up any relation of adequation would be a move to discredit 
correspondence views of truth. If truth is really a matter of a more basic disclosure, we might 
think, then claiming that a belief is true in virtue of its being correctly adjusted to things as they 
are is just missing the point. But this is not what Heidegger is saying, as Dan Dahlstrom has 
shown at length.19
Overcoming metaphysics never meant for Heidegger thinking without heeding the requirements of 
adequation; it never meant not reasoning, the denying of the realm of presence. […] His enterprise 
is more subtle, aiming not at the ‘impossible,’ but rather at responding to the injunction 
concerning possibilities yet reserved (thinking what adequation presupposes, what presence covers 
up, naming what up until then had no name, unfolding the appropriation of the originary).
 Dominique Janicaud sums up a more reasonable way to understand what 




In other words, we could say that Heidegger wants to sort out how things can be given ‘as 
they are’ in the first place, so that we can then adjust ourselves to them or let them be the standard 
of our speaking and believing. This certainly does not mean that he wants to leave our ordinary 
conceptions of things just as they are, but it does mean that he wants to articulate (and be faithful 
to) how things really are, which is how they show themselves to us. 
 Secondly, then, we might worry that when Heidegger claims that we are only open to the 
world on the basis of our own concerns or investments, this issues in a kind of idealism. Although 
                                                 
19 Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
20 Dominique Janicaud and Jean-Francois Mattei, Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought, tr. Michael 
Gendre (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995), p. 10. 
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we should not too quickly pass by his close relations to the German Idealist tradition, we can 
initially respond to this concern by drawing a crucial distinction. Saying that there is no truth 
without the human being is not idealism: ‘truth’ just means for Heidegger a certain kind of human 
relation to things, whether it is applied to actions (as appropriate/inappropriate to the way things 
are), beliefs (as holding things to be a certain way), or statements (as thematically articulating the 
way things are). Even if we interpret him to be making a stronger claim, namely, that the way 
things are depends in part on the human being, this is still not the same as saying that things are 
dependent on the human being. Indeed, in Heidegger’s later work, things are as various ways of 
gathering human beings into the world, letting us belong, just as much as we let them belong in 
their context. So, at least temporarily, we can conclude that Heidegger’s account does not 
necessarily entail idealism, and we can recognize that whether it turns out to do so or not, on 
further consideration, is going to depend on how we understand being. (Of course, how we can 
understand being is the question for Heidegger, and far from easily answered.) 
 
IV. Questioning Heidegger 
 In the course of the investigation, we will go a long way with Heidegger, so there will be 
time to sort out such matters in more detail. But eventually, I will want to ask whether 
Heidegger’s account of our relation to being does not interpret that relation as proceeding too 
smoothly, in a way more guaranteed than is really warranted by the range of human experience. I 
will try to show, in fact, that he understands our being in the truth as the kind of trust that lets us 
belong to an institution or a structured whole, and that there is something troubling about this. We 
have already seen (part I, above) that there is at least an analogical reason to think that our most 
basic investment of trust in the world might instead have the character of trusting a person, and I 
will try to establish that more firmly in what follows. 
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But my argument is not merely an analogy; the task is, rather, to show that the matter at 
stake is genuinely one of trusting, and to use a phenomenological investigation of various types of 
trusting to help appropriately interpret the matter in question. But to carry out this project, we will 
need a field of experience within which we can catch sight of the obscure relations between 
trusting and our fundamental integration into the shared world. 
 For that we will turn to the field of Freudian psychoanalysis, seeking philosophical 
lessons in both its thoughtful encounter with extreme mental illness – what diagnostic categories 
label the psychoses – and its attention to the complex trusts and mistrusts at work in all human 
psychic development. Why psychoanalysis? And especially, why Freud? It is a well-established 
Heideggerian strategy to bring into view obscure phenomena by attending to their moments of 
rupture or failure. In consulting Freudian analysis, I follow this strategy in two ways. 
In general, it seems to me that Freud is philosophically helpful primarily because of his 
sensitivity to interruptions. Not that, like Kierkegaard or Derrida, he philosophically thematizes 
interruption as such. Rather, probably because of his habit of listening primarily for gaps or 
interruptions in his patients’ speech, he often begins his theorizing with the simplest possible 
explanation, positing it as functioning completely smoothly, then attends to what gets in the way 
of such functioning and thus to how the description will have to be complicated in order to be 
faithful to the phenomena at issue. This can be fruitful phenomenologically as a kind of 
imaginative variation, one that highlights the structural necessity of including certain things 
within our interpretations so as to remain with the phenomenon. 
In particular, if it is possible for our basic trust in the world to be betrayed – for our very 
being in the world to undergo a serious rupture – this would at least have to show up as a 
significant mental breakdown, and psychoanalysis concerns itself primarily with plumbing the 
depths of psychic distress. Yet it does so, by contrast with general psychiatric medicine, for 
example, in a manner oriented by interpretation, seeking what meaning is to found in our brushes 
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with the abyss. This orientation already accommodates it to philosophical questioning. Freud, 
especially, has an eye for detail and a boldness in thinking that open his accounts to inferences 
beyond the realm of the merely psychological, while his own worries about philosophy as a 
discipline keep his thinking at a certain provocative distance. 
It must be admitted that Heidegger was not especially familiar with Freud’s work; it must 
also be admitted that what familiarity he did have, he largely regretted. Medard Boss, the 
psychotherapist who persuaded Heidegger to read some of Freud’s writings, reports that the 
philosopher grew almost physically ill in going through Freud’s theoretical work, although he 
found the practical papers on psychoanalytic technique far more promising.21
 Setting aside what Heidegger himself had time or inclination to do, is there even the 
possibility for such a Heideggerian reading? From what he says in the Zollikon Seminars, it seems 
as if the gap might be too wide to bridge. Heidegger there advances two methodological 
criticisms of Freud that it will be worthwhile to confront here at the outset of our investigation. 
 Indeed, Heidegger 
was so struck by the contrast between clinical goals and theoretical assumptions in Freud that for 
10 years, toward the end of his life, he gave regular seminars to psychiatrists in an effort to help 
them see the human being more clearly. What he did not do, as far as I can tell, is read Freud with 
anything like the care that he gave to the interpretation of the great philosophers and poets. 
The first of Heidegger’s concerns is that Freud fails to remain faithful to the phenomena 
because of his scientific commitments to causal explanation. Heidegger insists that one must have 
the lived phenomenon adequately in view, as a whole, before turning to questions of causality. 
“What goes unnoticed is that an acquaintance with the phenomenon must be presupposed if 
physico-psychological explanations are not to be totally unfounded. […] Science becomes blind 
                                                 
21 As quoted in Richard Askay, “Heidegger’s Philosophy and Its Implications for Psychology, Freud, and 
Existential Psychoanalysis,” a “Translator’s Afterword” to Zollikon Seminars: Protocols – Conversations – 
Letters, trs. F. Mayr and R. Askay (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), p. 309. 
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to what it must presuppose and to what it wants to explain in its own purely genetic way.”22 His 
point seems to be that we should seek to understand the essence of, say, hysteria before trying to 
figure out how it comes about, since we first need to know what it is we are investigating.23
Heidegger specifies this objection more clearly by distinguishing three meanings of 
‘assumption’ (Annahme). One meaning is simply ‘to expect or to assume’ (Annehmen), but the 
other two are crucially different. ‘To be supposed or posited’ (angenommen), taken for granted, 
pertains to a hypothesis. Heidegger designates it this way: “to suppose something as a condition, 
that is, as something which actually is not and cannot be given in itself.” This is what he takes 
Freud to be doing. By contrast, phenomenology attempts to accept (Annahme, acceptio) what has 
been given as given, to attend to it in its givenness, or “to keep oneself open for a thing” itself.
 
24
There are at least three responses possible here. The first is largely a factual matter: it 
seems to me that Freud is often doing something much more like accepting what is given than he 
is simply hypothesizing and proving, if his frequent appeals to what shows itself in the experience 
of psychoanalysis are any indication. But the second response is more philosophically 
substantive. Causality is a complex issue in psychoanalysis – and one which Heidegger admits in 
a letter to Boss that he does not understand.
 
This is how one recognizes fundamental principles; it is close to the perceptual faith to which 
Merleau-Ponty addresses himself. Seeking to show causation is seeking to prove a hypothesis 
(acceptance in the second sense), whereas the simple evidence of what is given cannot be proven 
but can only be seen and accepted (or received: vernommen). 
25
                                                 
22 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars, p. 75 / Zollikoner Seminare, 3. Auflage, hrsg. M. Boss (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2006), p. 97. Hereafter: Zollikon Seminars [German page number]/[English 
page number]. 
 But in probably the most important book yet on 
phenomenology and Freudian psychoanalysis, Paul Ricoeur has defended the thesis “that 
23 Cf. Zollikon Seminars 266/212-13. 
24 Zollikon Seminars 5-6/5. 
25 Zollikon Seminars 319/254. 
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Freudianism exists only on the basis of its refusal of [the following] disjunction: either an 
explanation in terms of energy, or an understanding in terms of phenomenology.”26 This is to say 
that the very power of the Freudian approach, which at first glance simply proceeds on two 
incompatible levels – one a matter of forces and drives, the other a matter of meaning and 
motivations – in fact thereby opens up ways to address the problems of mind-body unity and of 
language (which is also both bodily and meaningful) that we would not otherwise have. It is in 
virtue of its practical concern to heal through speech, along with its self-reflexive concern with 
analyzing the transference relations involved, that psychoanalytic theory can sometimes move us 
through philosophical barriers that had otherwise seemed impenetrable.27
 It is worth noting, thirdly, that at the very time when he was beginning to give the 
seminars in Zollikon, Heidegger was hard at work reading Nietzsche.
 
28 Although the latter is 
more clearly engaged with the philosophical tradition than Freud, Nietzsche also focuses on the 
relation between forces and meanings, and he, too, often tends toward a kind of biological excess 
that frustrated Heidegger. But in Nietzsche’s case, this frustration did not prevent Heidegger from 
working out a multi-volume philosophical interpretation that circumvents the biologism in favor 
of a thoroughly ontological reading.29
                                                 
26 Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, tr. Denis Savage (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 
66. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Question of Proof in Freud’s Psychoanalytic Writings,” in On Psychoanalysis, vol. 1 
of Writings and Lectures, tr. David Pellauer (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), pp. 11-49. 
 Surely this suggests that something similar could be done 
for Freud. 
27 Heidegger, for example, claims that the human body is the most difficult matter to think. See his 
discussions of bodiliness (Leiblichkeit) in Zollikon Seminars, especially 292ff/231ff, as well as Heraclitus 
Seminar, tr. C.H. Siebert (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 146/GA 15:236. 
28 In 1960. See Zollikon Seminars 320/255. 
29 See Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4 vols., tr. D.F. Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). This is a 
translation of Günther Neske’s 1961 Nietzsche, 2 Bde., which was reproduced as GA 6.1 and 6.2. For 
clarity, I will give the relevant GA citation, followed by the translation volume number (in Roman 
numerals) and page number (they are numbered separately). 
The correspondences in general outline are as follows: The first three English ‘volumes’ (“The 
Will to Power as Art,” “The Eternal Recurrence of the Same,” and “The Will to Power as Knowledge and 
as Metaphysics”) translate all of GA 6.1, but the second volume includes a translation of a 
contemporaneous essay from GA 7, Lectures and Essays, entitled “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?”, while 
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 Heidegger’s second major concern about Freud’s work is closely related to the first. It 
has to do with scientific rank and the status of the questions Freud opens up. The objection here is 
simply that Freud is making a category mistake (in the full Aristotelian sense): he is a 
departmental scientist using methods and principles appropriate to the investigation of 
psychological entities (and perhaps therapeutic enterprises) to make claims about first principles. 
Or, at best, Freud is assuming a particular set of such principles, which it is the proper domain of 
first philosophy to investigate, and the principles from which Freud in fact proceeds are not very 
good.30
I think not. Especially as concerns the human being, Heidegger himself is consistently 
concerned to find ontological significance in ontic phenomena. Richard Polt is helpful once more, 
in this case by marking out the stakes for an ontological interpretation of psychoanalytic 
experience: 
 This seems to me for the most part correct, except that I think Freud is much more 
tentative about the principles he assumes than Heidegger notices. The real question is about what 
follows from the objection. Is it the case that, for a philosophical reader, nothing ontological – 
nothing concerning the phenomenality by which particular phenomena show up – can be entailed 
by Freud’s largely ontic investigations? 
The challenge […] is to avoid reducing the human way of being to a set of ontic facts, while at the 
same time showing that our understanding of being emerges from the ontic domain. / One point on 




                                                                                                                                                 
the third volume also contains two parts taken from GA 6.2 (“The Eternal Recurrence of the Same and the 
Will to Power” and “Nietzsche’s Metaphysics”). The fourth English ‘volume’ (“Nihilism”) comes from GA 
6.2 and includes “European Nihilism” and “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” while 
excluding “Metaphysics as History of Being,” “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,” and 
“Recollection in Metaphysics.” The latter three parts can be found in translation by Joan Stambaugh in a 
volume called The End of Philosophy (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1973), along with another 
piece from GA 7, titled “Overcoming Metaphysics.” 
30 Zollikon Seminars 35-39/28-32. 




When we turn to Freud (in chapters 5-7) for evidence of radical failure in the understanding of 
being, we will have to keep this point in mind. 
One final consideration relevant to engaging Freud in a discussion with Heidegger, 
especially a discussion oriented by questions about trust, is that these two interpreters seem to 
give rise to the same kinds of complaints. Both invest themselves in letting what is hidden show 
itself, and both are accused of unfaithfulness or misunderstanding as a direct result. Heidegger is 
infamous for his aggressive readings of the history of philosophy, while Freudian analysis is 
routinely confronted with its own ability to abuse its patients. We will have to return to these 
concerns later (see chapter 5, section II.C, and chapter 7, section II.B), but the striking part is that 
both men claim to be interpreting more faithfully (or, at any rate, understanding better) just at the 
moments when the people speaking might seem to be most betrayed by the interpretation. We can 
write this off as towering arrogance, but there may also be something philosophically important 
that emerges here. 
 
V. Plan of the Investigation 
 Having addressed some initial objections, let us turn to a characterization of the path our 
investigation will pursue. Most generally, we will try to think through the philosophical 
consequences of madness, especially what it can show us about the centrality and character of 
trust in our relation to being. I will defend the thesis that in psychosis a person can cease to be 
being-there (Dasein) as Heidegger has described it, without ceasing to be either alive or human. 
Furthermore, this shows us something about Heidegger’s account of our belonging to being: that 
account seems unable to admit the possibility of such a radical betrayal. A psychotic break is a 
failure of this belonging, an expropriation (Enteignis) that is not interwoven with appropriation 
(Ereignis). One does not then belong to the shared world at a distance or across a phenomenal 
field; one just no longer belongs. It is, at the same time, not impossible that such a person can be 
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reintegrated into the world, but usually only through trusting another person, and never with any 
guarantee of success. The kind of trust that can be radically betrayed, and for which there 
subsequently remains some hope but no guarantee, is personal trust. So, I will maintain that our 
fundamental relation to being, what Heidegger means by originary truth, is a primitive kind of 
trusting that is most akin to trusting a person. Although I cannot yet say what character of being is 
presupposed by truth when it is understood as this kind of trust,32
 The project as a whole is divided into seven chapters, collected into two major parts. 
Chapters 2-4 are a detailed reading of Heidegger’s philosophy, while chapters 5-6 draw on 
Freudian psychoanalysis. These two roughly equal parts are bookended by an initial chapter on 
trust and a final chapter bringing Heidegger and Freud explicitly together. Because the argument 
relies on some crucial preliminary distinctions if it is to make any sense, in this overview I will 
say rather more about the first chapter than about the others. 
 if I am right, then we are faced 
with the task of rethinking originary truth on the basis of trust-phenomena. 
Trust usually becomes visible when it is tested, threatened, or broken. So, in chapter 1, I 
articulate three broad phenomenological unities to be found in the experience of trusting, 
distinguishing them by attending to the different levels of complexity involved in discovering 
oneself to be betrayed. I try to show that the most basic level, straightforward fulfillment or 
disappointment of specific expectations, belongs to the explicit decision to rely on someone or 
something. It differs essentially from a second level, on which my specific expectations may 
variously be met or disappointed, but I can be betrayed either way. Thus, my community may be 
meeting most of my specific expectations and still exploiting me; the theory I eventually 
formulate about a topic may be very disappointing to my expectations but ultimately true. This 
second level designates our relation to systems, institutions, theories, and basic frameworks of 
                                                 
32 Dahlstrom points out that an adequate analysis of truth “must give an account of itself and the sense of 
being that it presupposes” (Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, p. xvii). 
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assumption. When my assumption-trust in such abstract things is betrayed, I find myself 
disoriented. 
Both of the first two levels, then, differ once more from a third level, on which betrayal is 
radical and always possible, yet not able to be remedied in advance by building checks and 
balances into the system. This kind of betrayal belongs to trusting in its fullest, personal sense: 
being given over to the discretion of another person. Such trust is not directly voluntary, and 
despite being vulnerable to betrayal at every point, nevertheless does not primarily concern itself 
with this vulnerability. It is directed toward the other person, who is thereby revealed as 
trustworthy, not toward the possible harms that person could do me. 
Finally, I try to show that our primitive or basic trust in the world as a whole – our sense 
of being safe or basically supported despite any number of particular disappointments, 
disorientations, or even betrayals by other people – belongs to the third level rather than to the 
second. That is to say, our most fundamental engagement with the shared world is more like 
trusting a person, which admits of radical betrayal at any moment, than it is like assuming a 
framework or belonging to an institution. If it were more like the latter, then it would be possible 
to build into our belonging to the world a kind of distance, in which we recognized that betrayal 
was likely and took that into account in advance. 
The first of the two major parts of the project constitutes a confrontation with Heidegger. 
In chapter 2, I give several reasons to think that what I outlined in chapter 1 as primitive trust is 
an interpretation of the same phenomenon that Heidegger describes when he speaks of originary 
truth. This phenomenon is phenomenality itself: that on the basis of which anything shows up as 
either true or false, as well as the peculiar pattern according to which truth centrally matters to 
me. My argument here rests on both a consideration of the matter itself – our most fundamental 
belonging to an organized world – and an appeal to Heidegger’s texts, especially a section on 
faith and knowledge in the Contributions to Philosophy. 
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I then work through Heidegger’s essay “On the Essence of Truth,” attending to the 
various levels of concealment involved in the truth-phenomenon and addressing them as 
betrayals, from which one recovers by seeing them within a phenomenological unity. For this I 
take as a model Heidegger’s move from Being and Time, in which it is quite disorienting that the 
meaning of being has not even been adequately asked about in the whole history of Western 
philosophy, to his accounts of the history of being, in which we recover our balance through the 
phenomenological insight that this forgetting is not so much our fault as it is inherent to being 
itself. We constitutively wander in errancy in part because being only gives itself in what is 
(beings), which is to say by withdrawing. 
If I am right about both parts of the argument in chapter 2, it begins to be plausible to say 
that Heidegger’s interpretation of our most basic relation to being inclines toward the second 
level of trust, assuming a framework, rather than the third. In this case, the framework or unified 
structure would be originary truth, understood as unconcealment that presupposes concealment. 
In chapter 3, I focus more closely on the history of being as a way of checking this 
inference about Heidegger’s understanding of the unity between being and the human essence, 
thinking. I first interpret Heidegger’s objection to the metaphysical tradition as a concern that 
metaphysics misplaces its trust when it assumes the givenness of being and relies on reason to 
secure its possession of that being. On his reading, truth in the history of Western philosophy thus 
looks more and more like self-assurance, until it reaches explicit self-certainty in Hegel (and soon 
after finds itself betrayed in Nietzsche). But Heidegger’s proposal for rethinking the unity of 
being and thinking involves recognizing that we always already belong to being, which shows 
itself (and calls for thinking) precisely in its withdrawing. This phenomenological insight that 
being must appear (even if only complexly) then seems to be a way for the Heideggerian thinker 
to reassure himself, similar to the move made with originary truth: being is not simply given once 
for all (we are in some sense betrayed), but we nevertheless belong ineluctably and essentially to 
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its history (so we can recognize that it does not and will not fully abandon us). Our being-in-the-
truth (and thereby always also in the untruth) turns out to be quite safe. 
Since one obvious response to my question about Heidegger’s own brand of self-assuring 
is to point to his discussions of danger to our essence, the rest of the chapter is devoted to an 
examination of his concern that our possibilities of disclosure might be irreparably lost. Here I 
contrast his apocalyptic language about the potential annihilation of the human essence with his 
insistence on Hölderlin’s dictum that the possibility of salvation is always to be found in the same 
place as the growing danger. By considering various interpretations of Heidegger’s work – some 
more phenomenological, some more apocalyptic – and identifying an ameliorating factor in each 
of his especially dire texts, I try to make clear an important tension internal to his thinking. As a 
sort of slogan, I propose understanding this as a pulling apart of the hermeneutic and the 
phenomenological strands of his hermeneutic phenomenology. 
After this immanent critique, in chapter 4 I focus on some openings in Heidegger’s 
thought toward a more radical, more genuinely apocalyptic danger that threatens our relation to 
being. These point in the direction of madness, understood as something more and something 
other than merely the extreme form of inauthenticity that Heidegger takes it to be. I then propose 
that Heidegger’s phenomenological distinction between death (my finitude that faces me here and 
now) and demise (my physical cessation that will one day happen) offers a possible location in 
his thinking for madness as a traumatic break with being-in-the-world, a radical betrayal of 
originary truth. 
That proposal brings to a close the body of my interpretation of Heidegger by calling us 
back to the matter itself: how are we related to being, integrated into a shared world organized 
along lines of (ontic) truth and falsity? Can the primitive trust that lets me belong to the world be 
radically betrayed? If it can, that would suggest that our belonging to being has a different 
21 
 
character than the one Heidegger seems to find in it. Primitive trust would be more like personal 
trusting than like dwelling within an assumed essential structure. 
The second major part of the investigation concentrates on insights into madness gleaned 
from Freudian psychoanalysis. In chapter 5, I work out a structural account of psychosis as an 
initial rejection of full integration into the shared, organized world, followed by a subsequent 
complete break with that world in response to an overwhelming demand. In other words, it 
involves an initial (partial) failure of primitive trust, which the person only fully experiences, in a 
delayed way, if he later undergoes a radical betrayal of that weakened trust (a psychotic break). 
Such a break is not predictable, since it is never possible to say in advance what will constitute an 
overwhelming demand for that particular person. Nor is it predictable, once the break has taken 
place, whether the person will be able to recover. The only way back into the shared world is 
through rebuilding primitive trust, and when this turns out to be possible, it seems to take place 
through the mediation of building trust in a person (often, the analyst). 
If this is right, it serves as further evidence that primitive trust shares the characteristics 
of personal trusting, both because of the character of the betrayal involved and because of the 
transference between trust of a person and a rebuilt global trust. But it also opens up a difficult 
problem: how can the sufferer from psychosis trust a person when he lacks the support of 
primitive trust, and in what way can (or should) the analyst trust her analysand if he is psychotic? 
How can a transference relation work here? The remainder of chapter 5 thus attends to the 
complexities of trust in psychoanalytic transference generally, as a foundation for thinking about 
work with psychotics. The philosophical emphasis, with an eye to Heidegger, falls on my claim 
that it is in large part Freud’s personal trust in his patients that justifies his inference to the 
dynamic unconscious. 
In chapter 6, I try simultaneously to work out a reading of Freudian metapsychology that 
would allow him to deal more adequately with psychosis, and to make his metapsychology a bit 
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more intelligible to Heideggerian philosophy. This is accomplished, first, by showing that the 
drives are in part responses to the world, rather than merely internal conflicts in a Cartesian 
container. Second, by tracing the psychogenesis of the individual, so as to mark out more clearly 
the role of primitive trust in integrating us into the shared world. Third, by articulating the close 
relationship between the infant’s personal trust of her parents (or parental figures) and her 
primitive trust in the world they represent. The investigation thus clarifies the universal conflicts 
at the root of our vulnerability to psychosis, shows that we are all susceptible to such a break in 
virtue of our exposure to things as mattering (i.e., in virtue of our very being in the truth), and 
emphasizes the fragility of psychic development against Heidegger’s apparent confidence that we 
are all constantly open, more or less, to being. 
Finally, having provided in chapters 5-6 several reasons to think that primitive trust both 
arises in conjunction with and continues to bear the characteristics of personal trusting, rather 
than assumption-trust, in chapter 7 I return to Heidegger to consider both his criticism of Freudian 
analysis and his own practice of trust. The latter takes place in the context of his conversations, 
either with the philosophical tradition or when he writes dialogues. I raise a concern that 
Heidegger overlooks the role of the concrete other person, in her peculiarity, as the one trusted, in 
favor of a generalized trust in the givenness of being. This is hardly a new concern, although the 
inflection in the direction of trust is unique, but it further supports my broader thesis, which I 
have not seen argued anywhere else: namely, that Heidegger’s interpretation of our relation to 
being is inappropriately self-assured, not because he does not question (which he consistently and 
thoroughly does), but precisely because he tacitly understands that relation on the model of 
assumption-trust rather than personal trusting. If we need particular other persons to seduce us 
into more fully belonging to the world, then originary truth should perhaps be rethought from the 
phenomena of trusting, and our relation to being should be understood on the same basis. 
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I conclude chapter 7 with some provocations to further research, in which I propose that 
Freud’s struggle with the question of truth in psychoanalysis, out of which arises his thinking of 
originary fantasy, can help us make sense of the event of integration into the world, the happening 
of truth, that was Heidegger’s central preoccupation. 
To put the whole thing extremely schematically, we could say that the investigation 
traces out the following, more or less chiasmic path: trust (chapter 1) and trust in its relation to 
truth (chapter 2); then truth for Heidegger (chapter 2), trust for Heidegger (chapters 3-4), trust for 




A Preliminary Phenomenological Investigation 
wherein Trust and Related Intentional Acts are examined 
in their Unity and Distinction from One Another 
 
Introduction 
 At its heart, trusting is a kind of self-investment, a founding mode of givenness in which I 
myself am made manifest as bound up with or given over to whatever is the object of my trust. 
Within this mode, the world as a whole may be given, as may other persons, systems or 
situations, and even individual concrete things, for trust is essentially outwardly oriented – it is a 
particular way of experiencing something other than me (or the self as something other) in the 
strength of its claim on me. Insofar as the things and people around me claim me, I am disclosed 
as belonging to them or distant from them (invested in them or not). 
Anthony Steinbock has put this well in the course of working out a static phenomenology 
of trust.33 He contrasts trust (as “essentially interpersonal”) with commitment (which is entirely 
on the side of the self), since I and no one else can break my commitment, whereas only someone 
or something else can betray my trust.34 Günter Figal, too, emphasizes that trust is “essentially 
relational.”35
                                                 
33 Anthony J. Steinbock, “Temporality, Transcendence, and Being Bound to Others in Trust” in Trust, 
Sociality, Selfhood, eds. A. Grøn and C. Welz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), pp. 83-102. I shall try to 
round out – and occasionally contest – his account, both by distinguishing a third sort of trust (assuming: 
see section II) and by attending to the standpoint of genetic phenomenology (section IV). Cp. his brief 
mention of the role of the place and of the past in generating trust, p. 91. 
 Hence, in what follows, I will distinguish some varieties of trust (and closely related 
phenomena) on the basis of their distinct objects. 
34 What goes for committing goes also for promising. And either party can break a covenant. Thus there is 
something unique about the phenomenon of trusting (i.e., that it can only be broken by its object), a feature 
shared by the various modes of self-investment I will discuss here, although only two of them are 
“essentially interpersonal” (see section III). (The term and the argument are from Steinbock, “The 
Experience of Trust in the Phenomenology of Personal Emotions,” unpublished MS.) Hence I make no 
claim to exhaust the possible modes of self-investment in what follows; I want merely to trace a few that 
share a common phenomenal feature and that, together, mostly account for our ordinary-language 
references to trust. 
35 Günter Figal, “Trusting in Persons and Things,” in Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, pp. 103-112 (quotation 
from p. 104). From the same page: “With trust, the correlation between oneself and others, between oneself 
and the world in general seems to be concerned.” 
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But when disclosed in trusting (or distrusting), these objects are only given to me along 
with myself as invested in them.36
The status of that ‘always already’ is phenomenological: i.e., it is an essential structure of 
the experience itself, one not to be removed through any tracing back (phenomenological, causal, 
or game-theoretic) of the genesis of a particular instance of trusting. Such instances will of course 
have their own histories, to be traced out through a narrative, and indeed I try below to open the 
field for an account of the structural geneses of trust, as discovered through transcendental 
reflection. Yet the possibility of working out a genetic phenomenology here ought not be taken to 
compromise the ‘always already’ quality of the experience: even if I have never met this person 
before, in the moment I experience myself as already trusting her (or not) in the terms supplied 
by the relevant context.
 (Thus, both self and object are given only through the higher-
order unity of a relation, even if this relation can be phenomenologically analyzed back into 
constituent elements.) I shall call this a self-investment, without wanting to suggest thereby that 
trust always involves willfully investing oneself. To the contrary: I will show that the experience 
of trusting in its fullest forms is an experience of the self as always already given over to a person 
(or to a lived-world). It is only in the less intense forms of self-investment that I consciously and 
actively give myself over. 
37
There is much more to be said about this temporal aspect of the phenomenon,
 I may be wrong about who she is, including her trustworthiness, but my 
relation to her is already one of trust or distrust, prior to more reflective considerations. 
38
                                                 
36 In a nice phrase, J.M. Bernstein calls trust “a primitive and original relation to the other, [...] part of the 
original physiognomy of social interaction.” See J.M. Bernstein, “Trust: On the Real but Almost Always 
Unnoticed, Ever-Changing Foundation of Ethical Life,” Metaphilosophy 42.4 (July 2011): 395-416, p. 405. 
 but 
perhaps it will serve for the moment simply to illustrate why I find phenomenology to be a 
37 I am indebted to Steinbock for emphasizing this point: “Temporality,” p. 89. Gry Ardal’s account of trust 
as a kind of Kantian aesthetic judgment is also quite helpful in this context (Ardal, “Judging About 
Trustworthiness,” in Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, pp. 115-133). 
38 It is this feature of the phenomenon that makes habitual, inappropriate prejudice so difficult to eradicate 
in oneself. One’s reflective beliefs always come too late to the game. I may talk myself into relying on a 
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helpful way to approach the question of trust. The problem,39 at least as it shows up through 
reading the recent surge of literature on the topic, could be put this way: if we try to explain trust 
from the third-person perspective (either causally, game-theoretically, or in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions), we end up in an irresolvable mess of particular reasons pertaining to 
particular examples, without feeling like we have given a satisfactory general account.40
                                                                                                                                                 
person who seems questionable, but the very seeming is already evidence of my distrust: in fact, he seems 
to me untrustworthy, although I have never exchanged two words with him. We might be inclined to regard 
this structure as a predisposition to (dis)trust, rather than as already (dis)trust, but in such situations there is 
no further step of beginning to trust – there is only a subsequent decision to rely or not to rely, as informed 
by one’s lived trust or distrust, and perhaps later a growing trust. We may be able in general to describe a 
person as predisposed to distrust others with particular characteristics, but the first-person experience in a 
concrete situation is that of already trusting or distrusting. 
 But if we 
characterize trusting, from the first-person perspective, as an intentional act (a way of comporting 
ourselves), we can describe its essential structures, various possible modifications, and often-
intertwined but essentially distinct acts, without the necessity of working all the precise details of 
lived examples into one common set of necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e., into one theory). 
By giving a careful description of the essence of intentional acts, we can in a way have our cake 
and eat it, too: we find both a theory of the essential structures of a certain kind of experience and 
an opening onto the limitless empirical experiences of it. We can, for example, coherently claim 
a) that trusting is lived as always already given – that is its peculiar temporality – and b) that there 
are some essential ways according to which it is genetically constituted, and c) that we may be 
able to adduce some causal factors for any particular instance without invalidating (a) or (b). 
39 Joseph Godfrey has avoided this problem in a recent book by defending a ‘core’ sense of trust that can be 
found in each of four “dimensions” of trusting activity. See especially chapters 2-3 of Godfrey, Trust of 
People, Words, and God. This is the most important book-length treatment of trust available in English. 
40 This seems to me, as it seemed to Aristotle, an inevitable feature of central moral phenomena. 
Knowledge about them cannot come through the precision of mathematical symbolization or fully 
generalizable rules, since such accounts falsify the very phenomena they attempt to explain (cf. 
Nicomachean Ethics I.3). Annette Baier, for example, who has a distinct feel for the complexities of real 
situations, apologizes for the somewhat anecdotal nature of her account (“Trusting People,” in Moral 
Prejudices: Essays on Ethics [Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1994], p. 194) by appeal to the nature of trust as 
able to show up only through such anecdotes. I would add that in moral matters, examples and 
counterexamples tend toward the infinite. 
27 
 
I said above that I would distinguish various modes of self-investment according to their 
objects, but this is not quite sufficient. For this would yield only a list: descriptive, but lacking the 
essential structure of the phenomenon. Since we mostly live through the phenomenon itself, 
rather than being directed toward it, I propose in a Heideggerian vein that this structure can best 
be made visible by attending to its possible modes of betrayal.41
 
 Here we must not attempt an 
exhaustive taxonomic survey – which could go on indefinitely – but attend instead to how the 
experience of betrayal differs in complexity in each case. This yields three levels of complication 
of the phenomena of self-investment insofar as they pertain to trust: 
(1) relying, which is deciding to give oneself over in a limited context to a particular 
individual (person or thing) on the basis of concrete expectations which can be 
straightforwardly fulfilled or disappointed. (I rely on x for y.) Included here is all 
entrusting of particular items to another person or to a system (I rely on x for y regarding 
z), though the decision to entrust may be grounded in some other form of self-investment; 
 
(2) assuming, which is being given over to something at one level of abstraction, like a 
system, a set of principles, a theory, or some other context of comportment. The system 
may function adequately for some time without my recognizing either that it is 
functioning as my ground or that it is ultimately inadequate as ground. For this reason, 
my being given over to it can only be changed through a kind of leap into another set of 
assumptions. Included here is the child’s sense of being at-home in certain contexts, upon 
which its various relyings are founded, although these are also closely bound up with its 
interpersonal trusting of the caretaker and its basic trusting of the world; 
 
(3) trusting, which is a disclosure of the self as always already given over, more and more 
completely, to a person who is simultaneously disclosed as trustworthy in a mood-like 
orientation that binds up my emotional state and well-being with that of the other person. 
Included here is primitive trust, which involves a participant stance of openness to the 
world42
                                                 
41 I suppose one could also call these defeasibility conditions. Approaching through attention to betrayal is 
by no means foreign to the literature, although such an approach is mostly used to decide whether particular 
examples count as trusting (would I feel betrayed if… ?), rather than systematically, so as to make visible 
the structural relations. The straightforward point that we mostly only notice trust the way we notice an 
atmosphere, when it is “scarce or polluted” (to use Annette Baier’s phrase), is widely recognized. See 
Baier, “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Ethics 96.2 (January 1986): 231-260, p. 234. 
 in which the latter is disclosed in its fundamental trustworthiness or 
42 For the meaning of ‘participant stance’ as one in which I am implicated in the fate of that toward which I 
stand, see P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” Proceedings of the British Academy 48 (1962): 1-25. 
For trust as openness or self-transcendence, see Claudia Welz, “Trust as Basic Openness and Self-
Transcendence,” in Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, pp. 44-64. 
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I should say up front that these three levels are normally interwoven in any lived self-
investment (and often only distinguishable from within the phenomenological step back).44
It is crucial to recognize, however, that while the foreground experience of self-
investment in each case is affected by the background, the latter does not simply determine the 
 That 
should become evident in my consideration of examples, as I will switch between levels just by 
imaginatively varying the terms of those examples. My genetic considerations at the end of this 
chapter will explicitly address the interrelations between levels. Nevertheless, it is possible to see 
in a preparatory and general way the interaction between these phenomena: it is analogous to the 
interplay of background and foreground in perception. Thus, any act of relying (1) has as its 
backdrop the valence of my attitude of basic trust (3), my trust (or lack thereof) in the persons 
relevant to the situation (3) – including those who have attested to the present object’s reliability 
– and an assumed context in which I may feel fairly confident or not at all safe (2). (At the level 
of relying, these could all be data used in an explicit judgment.) Likewise, my act of trusting (3), 
though experienced as always already accomplished, discloses the other person as trustworthy 
against a background of previous acts of reliance (1), within a specific context of comportment 
(say, as a janitor, or as my spouse), and on the basis of primitive trust in the world (3). (At the 
level of trusting, these are reasons that may be used to justify myself after the fact, or implications 
contained in the emotion itself.) 
                                                 
43 Relying is obviously similar to Godfrey’s reliance-trust; assuming involves in part what he calls security-
trust; trusting proper, I will argue, includes both his I-thou trust and his openness trust, although as distinct 
modes. See Godfrey, Trust of People, ch. 2. 
44 There may also be a fourth level of self-investment, one suggested by D.Z. Phillips in “On Trusting 
Intellectuals on Trust” (Philosophical Investigations 25.1 [January 2002]: 33-53): religious trust, which 
according to Phillips cannot be betrayed since it is a trust in the humanity of the other (made in God’s 
image), who cannot cease to be human. I think this may just be personal trusting in God, albeit worked out 
in terms of its implications for other people. If I am right, then it would still be able to be betrayed by God, 
but I am not sure. If it really were impervious to betrayal, such trust would constitute a fourth level of self-
investment not dealt with here. 
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former. Just as the character of the horizon (bright, dark, wide, narrow, etc.) makes possible and 
to an extent characterizes my perception of foreground objects but yet does not sufficiently 
determine what those objects are, so all of the levels of self-investment are involved in making 
possible any particular experience of such investment, without thereby sufficiently determining 
its valence. (Implied in this claim is that any lived experience of self-investment will contain a 
level of complexity to which it primarily belongs, even if this is often only fully disclosed in the 
experience of being betrayed.) 
 
I. Relying 
The first and most superficial level of “betrayal” – which, as we will see, is far from 
unimportant – is not yet betrayal properly speaking, but rather the disappointment of 
expectations. Such expectations are always concrete, meaning that they are restricted not only to a 
specific context but to a specific situation within that context, and the feeling of disappointment, 
though it may have other ramifications, is centered on that situation. What does the disappointing 
– i.e., the objects of one’s trust in these cases – is primarily particular individuals, whether things 
or persons. But just as the “betrayal” at this level does not quite warrant the full sense of the 
word, so this kind of trust is only loosely to be labeled ‘trust’ at all In keeping with the literature 
and with a fair number of ordinary language situations, it could be called reliance-trust; 
nevertheless, the experiential phenomenon I wish to describe is relying.45
                                                 
45 The term “reliance-trust” is from Godfrey, Trust of People, ch. 2. 
 
Nearly everyone writing on the subject of trust, at least since J.N. Horsburgh inaugurated the 
contemporary Anglo-American discussion in 1960, has distinguished between trust proper (Horsburgh calls 
it ‘confidence’) and reliance (or ‘mere reliance,’ or ‘reliability’ – Steinbock’s term), which latter is 
sometimes taken to count as a kind of trust and sometimes not. I am willing to go either way on that, given 
the imprecision of everyday language, so long as we can get the structure right. For relying is a 
phenomenon closely tied to trusting, and I shall try to say how. At the very least, it must be the case that 
some relying is oriented toward trust and some is not. Cf. Horsburgh, “The Ethics of Trust,” The 
Philosophical Quarterly 10.41 (October, 1960): 343-354. 
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This kind of self-investment includes all those cases in which we are disclosed to 
ourselves as the subjects of a decision whether or not to trust. Thus it includes all instances of 
what we call entrusting, in which I trust you with something (possibly including myself under 
some limited aspect, for example my physical health).46
Richard Holton takes as an obvious but helpful example the trust-fall game,
 It also includes all calculated trusts that 
could legitimately be modeled game-theoretically, including the majority of what is dealt with in 
the sociological and philosophical trust literature. 
47
In such a moment, the sense of actively giving myself over is quite strong, and it seems 
that I genuinely do have a choice whether or not to rely on my comrades. Should I opt to fall, the 
conditions for disappointment are quite clear because the expectation is quite straightforward: my 
comrades either succeed or fail at keeping me off the ground. Or, more precisely (in case we want 
to include things like getting accidentally punched in the ribs but not entirely dropped as partial 
disappointments), the result can be fit unproblematically onto a continuum stretching from 
success to failure. 
 popular at 
team-building workshops, in which one person stands (either on a bit of a height or simply on the 
ground) within arm’s length of her team members, who have their arms extended, perhaps 
interlocked, to catch her. She is told to close her eyes and let herself fall (more or less rigidly – 
just crumpling in place works less well), trusting her team members not to let her hit the ground. 
                                                 
46 Such three-term relations are the focus of Baier’s “Trust and Anti-Trust,” meaning that although her 
examples and some of her analyses go beyond relying toward interpersonal trusting, her theoretical 
apparatus is to just that extent insufficient to deal with them. For example, the test that she proposes for 
deciding whether trust is pathological or healthy involves being able to express the reasons why I trust 
(hence, rely) on someone. See also the end of the article, where Baier quite openly lays out her own 
misgivings about her account, one of which is precisely that in some cases we would “want to say that 
unless we first trust [the people involved] we will not trust them with anything” (pp. 258-9, original italics).  
 Godfrey’s analysis of reliance trust extends this to a five-term relation “to take account of two 
ranges of discretion: the range of what one cares for, and the range of what counts as a good outcome”: I 
trust someone/something with something for some purpose (i.e., with a certain expected outcome) on some 
basis (reliability, necessity, the other’s good will, etc.). Godfrey, Trust of People, p. 39 and n. 22. 
47 Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72.1 
(March 1994): 63-76. See p. 63 for the example. 
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Similarly, if I am running down a steep trail and make a split-second decision to rely on a 
particular root to hold my weight briefly, the intentional act of deciding contains a concrete 
expectation – whether explicitly worked out or not – based on a practical judgment informed by 
experience, beliefs, an assessment of the immediate situation, and so on. If the root snaps and I 
tumble, I will certainly be disappointed, but it will be hard to be indignant with the root for 
betraying me, as this would require attributing to the tree a kind of cognizance that I have 
delivered myself into its care. 
In fact, it is essential to the phenomenal structure of expecting (as distinct from, say, 
hoping or anticipating) that expectations be concrete, and so they will necessarily be met 
somewhere on a continuum of fulfillment and disappointment. They need not be so 
straightforward as in the examples above in order to remain within this structure, since, as many 
have noticed,48 I might go ahead and rely on my teammates to catch me without expecting that 
they in fact will or even believing that they can. So perhaps my expectation will only be that they 
try hard, or that they refrain from kicking me once I am on the ground. I may rely in this 
unconfident – ordinary language might also say, “untrusting” – way for any number of reasons: 
maybe I have been trained how to fall and am being paid to entertain them with pratfalls; maybe I 
wish to educate them about the importance of knowing the team’s collective limits before 
beginning projects; maybe I am simply generally cynical but need to impress the boss who 
organized this particular adventure.49
                                                 
48 Horsburgh, Holton, and Baier included. 
 Perhaps, like Dostoevski’s underground man, I just wish to 
horrify them out of spite. As Holton points out, regardless of the particular content of my 
49 Horsburgh is particularly interested in the educative or ‘therapeutic’ motivation. Holton, too, includes an 
example oriented toward the morally educative: “Suppose you run a small shop. And suppose you discover 
that the person you have recently employed has just been convicted of petty theft. Should you trust him 
with the till? It appears that you can really decide whether or not to do so … [and] that you can do so 
without believing that he is trustworthy” (Holton, “Deciding,” p. 63). 
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expectations (i.e., beliefs), I can choose to rely or not to, and my expectations will be either 
fulfilled, disappointed, or some combination. 
The example of educative or therapeutic or even cynical “trust” brings to light a further 
distinction within the phenomenon of relying. Choosing to rely varies somewhat independently of 
my confidence in that on which I rely. So, although we shall see later that genuine, interpersonal 
trust is built and sustained through reliance of a kind that is oriented toward trust – relying in the 
moment for the sake of trusting more completely in the future – there is also a kind of ‘mere’ 
reliance that remains suspicious or even mistrustful.50
Such mistrustful reliance is probably most frequently met with in situations of social 




The phenomenon of mistrustful reliance indicates that there are a variety of possible 
presentational modes in which the decision to rely is couched. It may show up simply as a 
 This could be pathological, in a context of mistaken assumptions or insufficient 
strength of character, or it could be simply an unchangeable fact of my situation, social or 
physical. (Notice that this is not only true for reliance on people: I may be caught in a 
thunderstorm while mountaineering and have to rely for shelter on something I judge to be 
woefully inadequate. I still encounter myself as given over to it, though in the attitude of distrust.) 
                                                 
50 Here it may be helpful to point out that there are at least four possible attitudes, though these should not 
be thought of on a continuum. One can trust (that is, have confidence in, be given over to more and more 
completely); one can neither trust nor distrust (i.e., be indifferent toward, unacquainted with, or otherwise 
unaffected by); one can distrust (i.e., harbor suspicions about the object’s trustworthiness); or one can 
mistrust (i.e., be positively convinced of the object’s untrustworthiness and deal with it accordingly). 
Reliance is compatible with any of these attitudes, although of course it will be modified by whichever one 
characterizes the relation. Assuming is only incompatible with mistrust. Full-blown trusting is only clearly 
compatible with the first attitude, although it may also be compatible with some level of distrust. 
51 Baier has emphasized, against a model of trust as disguised contract, that historically, most situations of 
entrusting for most people in the world have been of this necessary reliance variety. In a happy phrase, 
Godfrey calls this “accepted dependence” (Trust of People, p. 33). Such dependence does not yet determine 
whether or not the relying is done within a situation of trust, however; one can also trust someone upon 
whom one is forced to rely. Cf. Baier, “Trust and Anti-Trust,” passim. 
Nor, for example on J.-P. Sartre’s account, would such reliance ever lose the essential character of 
a decision, since suicide would always be another option. Such a consideration need not prevent us, 
however, from distinguishing between necessary and unnecessary reliance. 
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decision to continue relying on someone I have trusted for a long time, or on someone whom I 
have not yet trusted (in the full sense) but on whom I have been relying gradually more and more, 
and who has now come up again for further review. It may be a decision about relying on a 
stranger in a wholly new situation, or in a context where I feel at home. It may, as in the case of 
dependence, present itself as a decision made beyond my control, although I remain subjected to 
it, and it retains (from a transcendental perspective) the contingent character of a decision.52
Because it has the intertwined character of deciding in each case and involving concrete 
expectations, however, relying is essentially functionally oriented. This can be seen, as Godfrey 
points out, when that on which I rely fails me: it is in principle replaceable.
 
53 If I rely on your 
medical opinion and it disappoints me, I can find a new doctor. If I am relying on you to help me 
move house, and you sleep in too long, I will call someone else. This feature is what allows 
Niklas Luhmann to analyze trust generally as a problem-solving function: it reduces complexity 
through a voluntary, affective, risky generalization across time. In Luhmann’s analysis, self-
control over how much I rely substitutes for control over the object on which I rely, and the 
voluntary generalization across time allows me to leap over my inherent information deficit with 
regard to the future.54
Luhmann’s analysis also brings into view two essentially distinct modes of relying. He 
distinguishes between ‘familiarity’ and ‘trust’; since I am reserving ‘trust’ for a different 
phenomenon, I shall distinguish between ‘familiarity’ and ‘probability.’ Luhmann takes trust to 
require risk, a kind of voluntary leap into the unfamiliar, and he recognizes that in it we have (at 
least sometimes) to deal with the freedom of the other as alter ego, as one who can disappoint me 
 
                                                 
52 In each of these cases, as mentioned above, the context (of trust or one of the other possible attitudes) is 
crucial but not sufficiently determinative, since, for example, I can choose not to rely in a certain situation 
on someone whom I generally trust (and hence is generally given to me as trustworthy). 
53 Godfrey, Trust of People, p. 40. 
54 Niklas Luhmann, “Trust,” in Trust and Power: Two Works, tr. G. Poggi (Chichester: John Wiley, 1979). 
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despite my best predictions.55 In other words, we have to deal only with probabilities of action, 
not certainties.56 Diego Gambetta expresses the situation nicely when he extracts from his 
manifold and interdisciplinary study the following definition: “Trust [is] a particular level of the 
subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will 
perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such an action … and in a context in 
which it affects his own action.”57
On the other hand, there is also a mode of relying characterized by something more like 
certainty, or rather characterized by the putting out of play of probability. Luhmann calls this 
‘familiarity,’
 To put this into the terms I have been using: relying in the 
mode of probability has the structure of an assessment that issues in a decision, in which I am 
disclosed as given over to the object on which I rely, in principle independently of my certainty as 
to its ability to fulfill my expectations. Here disappointment may be in my calculations as well as 
in the object relied upon. 
58 while Steinbock refers to it as ‘reliability,’ but the phenomenon is the same. Here 
reliance is lived as a straightforward act of believing, motivated by previous experience with the 
object (or its kind), which object is thus experienced in a kind of “temporal density” or continuity. 
There is, as Steinbock puts it, an unruptured concordance of the present with the past, and on this 
basis I rely unproblematically for the future.59
                                                 
55 Ibid., p. 21. This is also true of interpersonal trusting as I shall characterize it below, but Luhmann’s 
insight falls victim to his own presuppositions. In looking for the problem that trust functions to solve, he 
ends up with trust as a primarily self-protective function of systems, which does not accord at all with the 
phenomenon of being given over to the other. 
 When I sit in the same reliable chair in which I sit 
every day, there is no expectation that ‘it will probably hold me’; I just decide to sit in it. If it lets 
56 This is the kind of self-investment with which most of the literature deals, trying to sort out the various 
considerations involved in relying: promises, coercion, incentives, expectation of the other’s goodwill 
(Baier), and recognition that my decision about relying affects the other’s decisions about fidelity, as well 
as concerns about the other’s view of the relevant material, her competence (in reasoning and acting), the 
relation between my values and hers, her care for me, and her beliefs about the circumstances. Cf. Edward 
S. Hinchman, “Trust and Diachronic Agency,” Nous 37.1 (2003): 25-51. 
57 Diego Gambetta, “Can We Trust Trust?” in Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations 
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 217, original italics. 
58 Luhmann, “Trust,” pp. 19-20. 
59 Steinbock, “Temporality,” p. 85. 
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me down, my calculations are not to blame, for I have not really made any; only the object has 
disappointed me.60
Finally, as should be clear by now, reliance is a decision involving expectation and 
fulfillment/disappointment because it relies on (what is experienced as) an individual object. 
Thus, although the tree root is made of many parts, if it nearly snaps but manages to hold on long 
enough for me to safely shift my weight, it as a whole has proved reliable, and I am not 
disappointed. Likewise, in the trust-fall example, either the group will catch me or not. If one 
strong woman jumps out and catches me by herself, the group has still caught me, functionally 




“Can’t an assertoric sentence, which was capable of functioning as an hypothesis, also be used as a 
foundation for research and action? I.e. can’t it simply be isolated from doubt, though not according to any 
explicit rule? It simply gets assumed [wird hingenommen] as a truism [Selbstverständlichkeit], never called 
into question, perhaps not even ever formulated.”61
 
 
But with the question of the object of reliance, we find an opening onto another level of 
possible “betrayal.” Staying with the trust-fall situation: it could be that I expect the group to 
work together to catch me. If one heroic woman does all the work, maybe I will still be 
disappointed, even though part of my expectation was fulfilled (being caught). This much 
remains functional; I have only included a higher-order goal in my expectations when I rely on 
the group for teamwork as well as catching. If, however, regardless of whether or not I expect 
such teamwork, I make my decision to rely while assuming that it is only by virtue of the group’s 
unity as a group that I could be caught, then there is a more complicated level of trusting going 
on. I shall call it assumption-trust, and the phenomenon to be explored assuming. In this case, 
how am I to know whether I have been “betrayed”? 
                                                 
60 This analysis of familiarity is heavily indebted to Steinbock’s account of reliability in “Temporality,” pp. 
84-86. 




Let’s say that I merely expect to be caught (without further specification) and, choosing 
to rely, I am caught, but only or primarily by the heroine. My concrete expectations have been 
beautifully fulfilled. But has my assumption been borne out? Was it by virtue of the group’s unity 
that she was able to catch me? Perhaps. Maybe the best expression of the group’s unity was to be 
found in this single act, performed by this single person, empowered by the confidence of the rest 
of the group members. Maybe if they had all tried at once, they would have dropped me – say, by 
accidentally pushing me back over the other direction. On the other hand, maybe this was an act 
of supreme selfishness by someone who thereby sabotaged the group’s (somewhat tenuous) sense 
of unity. Either of these could turn out to have been the case,62
The kind of “betrayal” that belongs to this mode of self-investment, then, might be called 
disorientation.
 as revealed by further events, but 
the point is that determining whether my assumption is right or wrong – whether or not I was 
right to trust the unity of the group to save me – is at a categorically different level of complexity 
from determining the fulfillment or disappointment of my expectation. 
63
                                                 
62 I use the cumbersome future anterior because there might be situations, more complicated than that of 
this example but still within the structure of assuming, in which neither scenario simply was the case, but 
(based on things still to happen) one of them may yet turn out to have been the case. See chapter 6, below. 
 It lacks the immediacy of being dropped by a team of people trying to catch me, 
or of tumbling when the tree root gives way under my foot. Rather, discovering that inappropriate 
assuming has delivered me over to unstable ground is an experience not unlike that portrayed by 
cartoon character Wyle E. Coyote, who often runs out over the edge of a cliff in a cloud of dust, 
continues running for some moments before discovering that the ground has disappeared from 
beneath him, pauses in dismay, and only then plunges earthward. The coyote’s moment of 
stunned immobility upon his discovery is typical of disorientation. This kind of “betrayal,” unlike 
disappointment, implies a previous motion. Expectations can be disappointed before I ever get 
anywhere. But disorientation implies that one was both already oriented in a certain direction (via 
63 Or perhaps, a là Heidegger, ‘having-the-rug-pulled-out-from-under-me.’ 
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expectation), and also already moving in that direction (buoyed by concrete assumptions). Even 
being-oriented is given in terms of the system of landmarks by which one is oriented (i.e., in 
terms of assuming). 
The word ‘disorientation’ also connotes being lost, having taken a path that turns out in 
some way never to have been quite right. Yet that ‘in some way’ is not fully specifiable in the 
experience of being disoriented, precisely because any specification would be with reference to a 
context, and it is the context that is disclosed as untrustworthy here.64 It is as if the rug has been 
pulled from under my feet without my noticing until somewhat later – and when the chasm 
eventually appears, yawning beneath me, I am stunned for a bit (never mind that I am 
metaphorically hanging in the air) before any other response becomes possible.65
The further irony of the cartoon situation, of course, is that the coyote has only run off the 
cliff because he was chasing Roadrunner (a flightless bird), who himself never looked down to 
realize that he was off the cliff and so made it safely to the next cliff, running on air, held up by 
speed, confidence, and a cloud of dust. This physics-defying metaphor presents the complexity of 
revelation and concealment held together, wherein both the lack of support (running over the 
edge) and continued standing (without falling) can be co-given.
 
66
                                                 
64 Moreover, ‘to disorient’ is rarely if ever used as an active, transitive verb in English, unlike ‘to 
disappoint’ or ‘to betray.’ This fact of usage corresponds to the phenomenal differences under discussion 
here, since assuming is the only one of these three kinds of acts that cannot take a person as its object. At 
most, I could say that I “betray” myself when I am disoriented, having discovered that I assumed wrongly, 
but even here the temporal delay makes this awkward. Better to say that in disorientation, I am disclosed to 
myself as having-been invested somehow inappropriately, and the world-as-assumed is disclosed as 
somehow untrustworthy. 
 
65 My remaining in the air until I get my bearings sufficiently to fall in fact indicates that this kind of 
“betrayal” is not wholly basic. There is some other self-investment, some other more fundamental way of 
belonging, which enables the delay involved in disorientation. My assumptions are and have been 
inadequate, but something prior to them maintains my stance in the world. This something is what 
psychologists call ‘basic trust,’ which I work out in section III under the label ‘primitive trust.’ If it is 
betrayed, there is no place for me to stand in the world anymore. 
66 This and the following discussion of reorientation will be crucial in the reading of Heidegger carried out 
in chapters 2-4. 
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We could say, in fact, that this is precisely the experience of disorientation: I am betrayed 
(there is no solid ground here), and yet in the midst of that I am somehow justified (for I yet 
stand). On the other side, one’s assumptions can be given as justified (it’s working!) in their very 
“betrayal” – as when a system works both for my purpose and, sometimes precisely thereby, 
against it. In other words, the phenomenon of disorientation demands a dialectical weaving 
together of the terms ‘fulfillment’ and ‘disappointment’, with one present in the other, rather than 
simply locating a point somewhere on the continuum between them. 
Such interweaving points to one of two ways of resolving disorientation. When I find my 
expectations disappointed and myself still (somehow) standing, with no ground underneath me – 
that is, when my assumptions are shown to be inappropriate – I can sometimes reinterpret the 
whole situation within a larger systematic context. This reorients me by allowing me to account 
for my previous assumptions, their “betrayal,” and the very possibility of my own reorientation. 
If, for example, I do not realize that I am in a funhouse, and my expectations that water will not 
run uphill are repeatedly disappointed, leading to a sense of disorientation about my more basic 
assumptions, I can recover by recognizing the nature of the building I am in, even if I do not learn 
the specific tricks used. I come to recognize them as tricks by reestablishing the context in which 
my disorienting experiences belong. Thus, in such a reorientation, I do not give up standing on 
air; rather, by assuming a larger context or a different system, I interpret air, too, as a substantial 
surface, and thus find myself back on solid ground. 
The other path to reorientation is more like fleeing back to the cliffs around me, which 
now, once I have found myself “betrayed,” show themselves more clearly as safe ground. This 
could mean leaping into a new set of assumptions at the same level as the previous set – 
embracing a rival theory, for example. Or it could mean entrenching myself with renewed vigor 
in my previous set of assumptions. In the latter case, I would have to refuse to engage with the 
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disorienting information – or defend excessively against it – so as to insist against all odds that 
my assumptions must be correct. 
 
A) Foreground and Background Assuming 
The necessary delay in sorting out whether or not my assumption-trust was well-placed 
corresponds to the temporal structure of assuming as a mode of self-investment. Relying is 
oriented to the past (to the familiar reliability or the necessity of the object – or of objects like it, 
in new situations) and to that past’s smooth continuity into the future (to the expectations that 
arise on the basis of such reliability). It thereby has the temporal meaning of already having 
checked-up on the object of my “trust.”67 Assuming, by contrast, is oriented to a kind of extended 
present, and thus it has the temporal meaning of a necessarily deferred check-up.68 That is, one 
can become disoriented with regard to even the most fundamental assumptions, but such 
disorientation occurs only across a temporal gap. So while both kinds of “betrayal,” 
disappointment and disorientation, have a temporal density, they differ in their fundamental 
temporal orientation.69
The delay is easiest to see in the kind of assumptive trust that occurs in proceeding by 
hypothesis. We could call this foreground assuming: the conscious, willed taking-up of an 
account of something, bracketing my doubts about that account. I give myself over to a certain set 
of assumptions, which giving over requires at least temporarily putting on hold any possible 
verification processes (whether out of necessity or by choice). For example, say that I formulate a 
hypothesis and build an experiment to test it. Here there can be a significant amount of self-
investment required (there is structurally at least some) before any verification of my hypothesis 
 
                                                 
67 Along with its possible modifications: wishing that I had had the chance to check more thoroughly (in 
situations of unchosen reliance, e.g.), or feeling the moral weight of responsibility for not having checked 
when I did have the chance – i.e., for being gullible. 
68 This deferral of accounting or reckoning is what Baier means by trust quite generally. 
69 By contrast to both, we will see that interpersonal trusting has no comparable temporal density, but rather 
a kind of opening onto an ongoing relation. 
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is even possible. Yet, all of my activity to enable verification depends on my holding onto the 
hypothesis, however tentatively – otherwise, I am not designing a test for anything.70
But with assuming, I can also be disclosed as already given over to a set of assumptions – 
what we might call background assuming. In the posthumously published On Certainty, 
Wittgenstein distinguishes between what I am calling background and foreground assuming by 
differentiating between a world-picture (Weltbild) and the empirical propositions structured by 
that picture. The Weltbild is “the substratum of all my enquiring and asserting.”
 
71 He describes it 
as “a kind of mythology,” and the propositions constituting it as “rules of a game” (presumably a 
language-game), which game “can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit 
rules.” Then he differentiates the “riverbed of thoughts” (i.e., the rules of the mythology) from the 
flowing of the river’s waters (the various propositions governed or tested by the rules). Either 
may shift, but their shifting is not the same. And even the riverbed is not uniformly susceptible of 
movement, since it “consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an 
imperceptible one, and partly of sand.”72
Foreground, voluntarily adoptable assumptions are the river in this analogy, changing 
with relative swiftness, while background assuming forms the riverbed, which need not ever have 
been explicitly adopted.
 (I will argue later [part III] that even such background 
assuming is to be distinguished from truly basic or primitive trust, which is the existential 
investment allowing me to adhere to any set of assumptions as stable and real.) 
73
                                                 
70 There are of course a great variety of ways that experiments come about; some of them are largely 
accidents. But if what I am doing is testing a hypothesis, even if that hypothesis is only that some bit of 
technology will work if I construct it in this particular way, I have to assume that it is the right way for at 
least a while (sometimes an expensive while) before I can verify whether or not it will work. Without such 
a starting assumption, construction (or testing generally) will never begin. 
 Indeed, we can say that such background assumptions have the form of 
71 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §162. 
72 Wittgenstein, §§95-99. 
73 For example, a child “doesn’t learn at all that that mountain has existed for a long time: that is, the 
question whether it is so doesn’t arise at all. It swallows this consequence down, so to speak, together with 
what it learns” (Wittgenstein, §143). Similarly, what is assumed as part of the Weltbild can be discovered 
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believed propositions only from a third-person perspective. I live them in the first-person simply 
as ways of comporting myself as confident or as unsure.74 That is to say, “When a child learns 
language it learns at the same time what is to be investigated and what not.”75
For example, before I ever adopt a particular hypothesis and start formulating an 
experiment, I have been instructed in a more or less modern scientific environment, structured by 
the set of assumptions guiding that endeavor (taking measurability, verifiability, objectivity, and 
so on as standards).
 
76 I did not, presumably, choose to be born into such an era and inspired by 
such standards.77
As we can see, one reason for the delay inherent to either mode of assuming is that 
assumptions can only be modified via a complex maneuver: I must somehow step back from 
whatever part of my life is built on them in order to thematize them as such; I must decide that 
 How am I to discover whether this self-investment is well-placed? It does seem 
like, in principle, I could eventually find myself “betrayed” by this whole fabric of assumptions – 
probably such a disorientation is roughly what pre-modern scientists experienced when Galileo 
finally convinced them that he had not rigged his telescope, or what it felt like to be deeply 
convinced of Newtonian mechanics when Einstein started turning the tide of learned opinion. But 
such a “betrayal” could only be encountered eventually. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“subsequently, like the axis around which a body rotates. The axis is not fixed in the sense that anything 
holds it fast, but the movement around it determines its immobility” (§152). 
74 This point is from Lars Hertzberg, “On the Attitude of Trust,” in The Limits of Experience (Helsinki: The 
Philosophical Society of Finland, 1994), p. 62. 
75 Wittgenstein, §472. 
76 Here Wittgenstein agrees: “One cannot make experiments if there are not some things which one does 
not doubt” (§337). He goes on in the same paragraph to distinguish in another way what I am calling 
foreground and background assuming, pointing out that those undoubted things (the existence of the 
experimental equipment, the constancy of the numbers in a calculation, etc.) are not explicitly taken up 
(hinnehmen) as particular presuppositions (Voraussetzungen). Rather, I assume (annehmen) a system that 
makes possible what I expect to happen in a particular case. 
 Elsewhere, he acknowledges that this sounds strange (§411): “If I say, ‘We assume [nehmen an] 
that the earth has existed for many years past’ (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that 
we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the 
foundations. The assumption [Annahme], one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, 
of thought.” 
77 Suppose we could construct a situation according to which I did choose. Then we are in a larger version 
of the hypothesis situation, where the set of modern scientific standards are the hypothesis. 
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they are in need of changing; then I must (to a greater or lesser extent) leap into a new set of 
assumptions. In foreground assuming, this can be relatively easy – as when I change design plans 
for my backyard shed partway through construction – since the step back is not difficult. Even 
though I am living through my assumptions toward the work that they make possible, they do not 
(obsessions aside) ground a very large part of my life, so that I have plenty of ground to stand on 
(at the kitchen window, say) while I interrogate them. Furthermore, since I consciously took them 
up, I know their structure pretty well, and it has not yet been deeply sedimented into my way of 
life. On the other hand, of course, background assumptions are notoriously difficult to change, 
and even to recognize.78
The problem of recognition forms a second reason for the necessary delay. For not only 
must I step back so as to recognize (thematize) my assumptions, I must appropriately diagnose 
the “betrayal.” And, as I began this section by saying, that is no simple task. Unlike with relying, 
a disappointment of expectations here does not yet equate to disorientation, since it could 
reasonably be explained in various, hard-to-eliminate ways. To remain with the example of an 
experimental set-up for the sake of simplicity: the disappointment could be due to a problem with 
my interpretation of the results, could be due to equipment failure, could be from user-error in the 
design of the experiment, or it could be due to my global misunderstanding of the problem I am 
researching. None of these would necessarily entail the falsity of my assumed hypothesis (i.e., 
entail disorientation), although some of them would point to the instability of other assumptions. 
 
Or we could use as an example the system of gender relations in which the woman works 
in the home and raises the children while the man goes out into the community to win the bread. 
Not only was this fairly deeply assumed (sometimes with a very strong feeling of confidence) in 
various Western European communities since at least the Industrial Revolution (if not ancient 
                                                 
78 Even in foreground assuming, changes can also be extremely difficult, if a lot has been invested in the 
current hypothesis. One thinks of the Social Security program in the United States. 
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Greece and beyond), it was structurally quite difficult to know what constituted a failure and 
whom or what to blame for it. If I am a wife and mother in Britain in the year 1900, and I am 
unhappy with my lot… what follows? Am I “betrayed” by a system that I trusted, or is the system 
fine and I am failing to be a good enough wife and mother, or is there no failure at all because 
nobody was ever promised happiness in the first place? 
Or, staying with the existential problem of happiness, let us say that I am deeply invested 
in the background assumption embedded in my culture that money and prestige are the twin 
gateways to happiness. This assumption and its corollaries orient my desires, actions, 
expectations, emotions, and habits. The world is given to me as ordered in this way, and that 
ordering is not so much explicitly attended to as displayed in my way of living. If I am 
moderately successful and yet unhappy, it will be unclear whether my assumption is at fault – 
most likely, my assumption will not even come up for review. I will enjoy parts of such a life and 
be oppressed by others, and if I can tell that I am unhappy, I will assume that moderate success is 
simply insufficient. But if I become ever more successful and remain unhappy, and if I can gain 
the clarity to notice this (both are significant conditions), I may realize only then, with an insight 
that is at the same time clear and utterly confusing, that the structure of my world does not fit the 
structure of the shared world. 
It is unlikely to be clear what follows from this, or how to regain my footing, since I feel 
both lied to by those from whom I absorbed my assumptions and displaced from my cultural 
home. Is it the case that happiness is impossible or illusory? That it is a private state of mind 
rather than a worldly achievement? That I am somehow uniquely cursed to be excluded from it? 
The possibilities under consideration will depend on what is available as I cast about for some 
new set of assumptions or broader perspective by which to reorient myself. 
As we can see, the temporal structure of assuming is one of deferring but not simply 
abandoning any checking on one’s assumptions. This feature is necessary, since the very 
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complexity of checking implies the delay. This also distinguishes assuming from relying, which 
is structurally oriented to the past: in relying, I have to some extent already checked things out, 
since I make a decision based on past experience, and if I am nonetheless forced to rely on 
someone I have discovered to be unreliable, I will build as many recurring check-ups into my 
reliance as possible. 
We have seen, then, that both the temporal structure and the complexity of “betrayal” 
differ categorically between these first two levels of self-investment. To emphasize that 
distinction once more, we should notice that assumptive trust phenomenally underlies my 
decision to rely. That is, assuming is not reducible to a further expectation: it is not just that I 
expect to be caught in my trust-fall, and I additionally expect that this will occur in virtue of the 
group’s unity. If this is the character of the experience, we are still at the level of functionality 
(i.e., of relying). Nor can I always consciously decide to assume certain things and not others. 
Rather, it is my being given over to certain assumptions that first makes possible both my being 
presented with a decision about reliance at all and the specific options between which that 
decision appears to me to be laid out. 
Assuming is really an experientially distinct kind of self-investment, then. Accordingly, 
in it I also find myself given over to a different category of object. I rely on a concrete individual 
(or a group taken as an individual) to meet concrete expectations; I assume a system of 
interactions, a group taken as a web of relations, a set of norms or principles, a social institution, a 
structuring narrative about the world, etc. Assuming has as its objects whatever sets of relations 
are sufficiently given as abstract unities-across-difference to provide contexts for living.79
                                                 
79 Luhmann designates a similar kind of trust in systems, and his examples are interesting. He interprets the 
monetary system as a substitute for trusting people, and he takes the system of truth to be something 
resembling Foucaultian knowledges – i.e., the system substitutes for my own information processing by 
making certain for me and assuring me that the matter has been verified by experts. See “Trust,” pp. 50ff, 
as well as Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. 
 From 
the present cultural suspicion of marriage as a social form, for example, it is clear that getting 
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married requires investing oneself in an institution (a more or less stable social unity of many 
rather different relationships), in addition to trusting one’s spouse. 
Godfrey helpfully distinguishes a kind of trust that is localized to particular contexts (his 
term is “embodied”) without being a reliance on anything in particular.80 He calls it “security 
trust,” though it is not a matter of security from or against particular threats; nor is it even a 
general confidence that my particular projects will work out. Rather, as befits the more abstract 
nature of assuming, it is a kind of feeling at-home in particular contexts, an assurance that things 
will be alright even if my projects do not go well, or if particular dangers do get through the 
defenses. It is a sense of belonging to the places or situations from which all such things can be 
dealt with, comparable to the infant being held in its parent’s arms.81 It is not global – he 
explicitly points out that it permits of other distrusts on the same level, perhaps of the kind that 
maintain such contexts (e.g., if I feel at-home in the country, maybe I will just refuse to go to the 
big city) – but nor is it limited to individual objects.82
Godfrey sketches here the contours of what I take to be a well-known phenomenon. It is, 
in fact, precisely the “trust” that we have in certain contexts, marked by a feeling of general 
confidence. This does not make it infallible: as a mode of assuming, it too can be misplaced, and 
indeed Godfrey points out that it is conceptualized on the basis of infant-behavior for a reason: 
the same level of confidence that is perfectly appropriate for the infant would be infantile in an 
 
                                                 
80 Godfrey, Trust of People, pp. 45-8. 
81 This kind of trust is not only comparable to the held infant; rather, this is where we should locate at least 
some structural component of an infant’s trust in its primary caretaker. We shall see later (chapter 6) that 
such trust is by no means as absolute and unproblematic as much of the literature on trust might suggest. 
Nonetheless, the child does have some implicit trust in its context, and that kind of trust seems to partake of 
the phenomenon of assuming. As the infant individuates from its mother, of course, its trust in her will 
become gradually more and more completely an interpersonal kind of trust (what I am calling trusting 
proper). But, as the phenomenon of adolescent rebellion suggests, a certain amount of any child’s trust in 
its parents is really a kind of assumption-trust in its milieu. 
82 I take this limitation to specific contexts to differentiate such security trust from what R.D. Laing means 
by ontological security, which has to be global, and which I link with primitive trust. (See chapter 5, below, 
for more on Laing.) Godfrey, however, includes ontological security within security trust (Trust of People, 
p. 46), since the latter can be of varying extents. It is thus not clear to me how ontological security relates to 
his claim that security trust “can be regressive, nostalgic, and narcissistic” (p. 48). 
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adult.83 Nevertheless, it makes clear that assuming is precisely a way of “trusting” a context, and 
as such is more like trusting proper than reliance is.84
The way in which I am given over in assuming is different, however, than the one we will 
find in the phenomenon of trusting proper. For assuming is not necessarily given in the mode of 
the ‘always already’; it can be entered into through a moment of commitment, as in the case of 
adopting a hypothesis, which as a foreground assumption may then gradually become integrated 
into my habitual ways of conducting myself, until it has faded into the background and I no 
longer notice it anymore. On the other hand, being given over to an assumption is also not the 
same as relying, since in the former I need only make one commitment (with perhaps occasional 
renewals). But since assuming does not have the character of deciding in each case, and since we 
saw that in fact it underlies any such deciding to rely, we should ask what kind of character it 
does display. 
 For although a context is not a person, still 
the experience of assuming a certain context essentially includes its being given as trustworthy, 
and discloses me as given over to that context, neither of which is consistently true of relying. 
 
B)  Triangulation: Assuming in the Context of Emotion and Habit 
Assuming (especially but not only in its background form) structures the way in which 
the world is given to me. This is an intra-worldly structure – assuming is not the kind of primitive 
trust that grants me a world at all, and coherence as such does not crumble for me when I am 
disoriented – but in assuming I am disclosed as given over to things within a more or less 
coherent context, and those things show up for me at all as more or less coherent. That is, 
                                                 
83 Godfrey, Trust of People, p. 48. 
84 The distinction for which I am arguing here between background assuming and trusting is not to be found 
in, for example, Karen Jones’s nevertheless coherent account of “basal security.” See Jones, “Trust and 
Terror,” in Moral Psychology: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory, eds. P. DesAutels and M.U. Walker 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), pp. 3-18, especially pp. 7ff. She defines basal security as 
“an unarticulated, affectively laden, implicit, interpretive framework [which is] a set of dispositions of 
salience, interpretation, motivation, and affect” (pp. 8-9). 
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although what I assume can appropriately be said to be my assumptions, they nevertheless present 
themselves as the ways of being of the things that belong to the relevant contexts. (Recall 
Wittgenstein’s example of assuming that the world has existed for many years prior to my 
memory of it.) Assuming thus occupies a curious middle-ground between self and world that 
brings it closer than relying to the essential relationality of trusting proper, a position that also 
requires more disentangling. It will be helpful, then, to draw this part of the discussion to a close 
by distinguishing assumption-trust from two other modes of relating to the world with which it 
shares certain characteristics. As my assuming, this way of being-given over arises and is 
maintained like a habit, but it aligns me to the world somewhat like (and in conjunction with) 
emotions. As coming from the side of the world, however, such assuming differs from emotion as 
something given differs from adjusting oneself in response to the gift. 
Assuming seems to arise in a manner resembling the development of habits. Like a habit, 
it cannot come about all at once, and yet it can be initiated by a conscious commitment. It need 
not be, of course. Certain assumptions may also simply be absorbed from my community, without 
any willed commitment on my part, in which case they become background almost immediately 
and the gradual change as they become more ingrained (more “habitual,” we might say) is one in 
which they gain influence over more of my projects. But that unnoticed influence on my projects 
and relationships, which is essential to assuming, indicates in another way that it is similar to 
habit, since habits govern how decisions (about relying, e.g.) show up for me: in what terms, with 
what options, and so on. Habits themselves, as oriented by my assumptions, provide the context 
in which something announces itself as a “live” decision, as a decision already made (out of 
habit) but subject to review, or as not up for decision at all.85
                                                 
85 Cp. Francis Fukuyama’s argument that the functioning of communities and systems requires “certain 
premodern cultural habits,” such as trust. He explicitly differentiates such habits from rational calculation. 
See Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: The Free Press, 
1995), pp. 10-11. 
 Furthermore, although (background) 
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assuming is prior to habits as providing the milieu in which the latter arise and can make sense, 
the maintenance of a network of assumptions involves certain habits of interpretation. Like 
habits, then, assuming gives determinate shape to my freedom for worldly things and people by 
organizing possibilities. 
But to say that assuming simply is a habit would be insufficient. For in assuming, I am 
given as aligned with – or as gradually being brought into alignment with – the object of my 
assumption. That is, I experience it in terms of sides: I (or we) am for it or against it, and it is for 
me or against me (or us). I am thus disclosed as belonging to (for good or ill) the things about 
which I make assumptions. One of the things that bring us into alignment with the situations we 
encounter in the world is emotion, and it is certainly not hard to observe that some assumptions 
are invested with deep emotional intensity. This, in fact, is how I can encounter my own self-
investment in a set of assumptions (although usually only when the object of my assuming is 
endangered or questioned); it is why disorientation can bring with it such emotional distress. The 
emotional intensity of trust in religious systems or systems of government is empirically and 
experientially evident.86
Primarily, then, emotions respond to the way the world is given in a particular event or 
situation by bringing the self – including its character and habits – into alignment, or harmonizing 
it, with the world.
 One can certainly develop an emotional investment in, for example, a 
therapeutic protocol on which a psychologist habitually relies to deal with tough situations, or an 
electrical code that standardizes procedures and allows an electrician to work safely while 
repairing something she did not build. (Even a certain office culture eventually comes to be 
strongly affectively invested. Just try to change it.) 
87
                                                 
86 We shall soon see (section III) that this emotional investment goes for the most basic level of trust, as 
well: if something central to one’s existence proves untrustworthy, one can come apart entirely. 
 But they do so according to their own, pre-judicative “style of cognition and 
87 The following account of emotions is heavily indebted to Karen Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” 
(Ethics 107.1 [October 1996]: 4-25), especially pp. 11-12; Bernd Lahno, “On the Emotional Character of 
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… of evidence.”88 They play their cognitive role, in other words, as modes of perception. As 
such, they direct reason and reflective judgment by guiding our attention (i.e., disclosing things in 
terms of salience, so that we are inclined to focus on particular lines of inquiry), by calling up 
certain associations and suggesting patterns of interpretation, and by shaping the field for desire, 
which in turn motivates action.89 Thus, an emotion is not characterized by specific content but by 
how the world tends to be given through it – in what light things are perceived, and what thought-
associations are called up by it.90
Emotions differ from habits in that the latter involve a direct relation to being, whereas 
emotions are modalizations of being, filtering it through (broadly speaking) pleasure and pain.
 This is why, in specifying for example that fear takes an object, 
the most we can say in general is that it presents some object as fearful. 
91
                                                                                                                                                 
Trust” (Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4.2 [June 2001]: 171-189), esp. pp. 174-177; Steinbock, 
“Temporality” and private discussions; and Erin Stackle, who suggested the harmonization thesis and 
helped make sense of the emotions’ relation to assuming. 
 
That is, habit involves simply doing or not doing something, while emotion takes up a stance 
toward that doing or not doing. Nevertheless, the repetition of similar emotional responses gives 
rise to a predisposition to feel just those emotions in similar situations, and such a predisposition 
toward (or consistent openness to) trust might be thought of as a habit of trusting. All three of the 
88 Steinbock, “Temporality,” p. 84, following Max Scheler. 
89For the effect of the pathē on judgment, cf. Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1378a. This is cited by Lahno, p. 175, who 
then lays out the three modes of this effect on judgment, listed above. For much more on desire, including 
the role of both fantasy and emotion in shaping its field, see below, chapter 7. 
90 Here a crucial question arises: how are we to interpret this filtering of the world through emotion? Jones 
compares affective trusting to “blinkered vision: it shields from view a whole range of interpretations about 
the motives of another and restricts the inferences we will make about the likely actions of another” (Jones, 
“Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 12). I think it is right to say that there is restriction here, but the analogy 
to blinkered vision suggests that one could see more if one removed the blinders. (I do not know if this is 
the correct implication with regard to horses, but it is the implication assumed by Jones, as the discussion 
about the dangers of trust in the rest of the paragraph shows.) Is this the case here? Or is trusting more like 
shading my eyes against the sun’s glare, perhaps using sunglasses, which allows me to see much better than 
I otherwise could? Maybe the proper analogy would be to a telescope, using which I can see much further, 
but only by blocking out the light of what is nearby? I will return to the question of the appropriateness of 
emotion at the end of this discussion (part IV). 
91 This distinction was suggested to me by Steinbock in private conversation. For example, while a habit 
involves either going running in the morning or not doing so, an emotion takes a stance toward going 
running: I desire to go (even if I cannot), or I fear it (even if I make myself do it), or I rejoice over having 
done it, etc. 
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ways in which emotions direct reason and reflective judgment (i.e., with regard to attention, 
interpretation, and action) can yield these predispositions toward further such direction. 
Moreover, although emotions are not directly controllable – and our recursive emotional 
responses to them often show them to be unwelcome – they are nevertheless reciprocally affected 
by our habits, and thus can be altered indirectly. 
As modes of perception, emotions are voluntarily alterable in a way and to an extent 
similar to that of perceptual capacities. I cannot directly change my ability to hear, since it is not 
itself a habit, but I can, with difficulty, change my habits of listening, and this will eventually 
improve or destroy my ability to hear. Similarly, if I want to learn to become angry in certain 
situations, I can make a habit of focusing on the frustrating and upsetting qualities of those 
situations, acting as if I were angry, and interpreting the situation in anger’s terms (e.g., 
expressing anger I do not necessarily feel). This may even summon up the emotion itself in the 
moment (like actors who can cry on cue), but over time, my whole emotional response to such 
situations will change, and the habits may lose their ‘as if’ character. 
Likewise, just as my capacity to hear may become better if I am deprived of sight for a 
time, since relying on my ears becomes more habitual, so I will feel more strongly emotions with 
which I am familiar, and be less capable of feeling emotions that are strange to me. Thus, 
although emotion is not itself a habit so much as a manner of interacting upon which habits are 
articulated, nevertheless there can also be habitual patterns of engaging certain emotions and not 
others, just as there are habits of engaging certain senses and not others. These higher-order 
habits are articulated on sense-perception as a unity of all the specific senses – i.e., my way of 
sensing the world is heavily sight-driven because my habit is to attend first to what I see – just as 
higher-order habits of feeling (predispositions to emotion) are articulated upon my whole capacity 
to disclose the world emotionally. 
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If assuming is a mode of self-investment that lets me belong to a particular context, albeit 
from the side of organizing that context, then it is similar to and works with my emotions. We 
could say that emotions are self-adjustments to the world as given through assumptions, and that 
disorientation arises as a significant mismatch between my assumptions as disclosing the world 
and my emotions as adjusting to that world. If that is right, then assumptions tend to settle into 
the background in the way habits do (without assuming itself being a habit), and they tend to 
align us to the world somewhat like emotions do (without assuming itself being an emotion). 
But we may add one more specification: assuming is especially directed toward – and can 
reciprocally modify – a certain non-personal emotion called confidence. (Non-personal emotions 
are those that do not essentially contain a reference to another person in their structure. In them, I 
can simply be related to things, or, as in the present case, systems.92) The character of assuming is 
essentially habitual in a way that it is not essentially emotional (e.g.: in my current milieu, I do 
assume that getting on the bus without a gun for self-defense is appropriate; I do not necessarily 
feel one way or another about it), but assuming has as an essential complement the emotion that I 
call confidence.93
                                                 
92 The distinction is Steinbock’s. In the present case, ‘confidence’ in ordinary language can also mean the 
personal emotion of trusting, since I confide in someone about whom I feel confident. This linguistic 
identity obscures, for my purposes here, the following lived difference between being confident about 
things and being confident about persons: I cannot confide in a system, though I can feel confident about it. 
So, purely on the terminological level, I shall respect this distinction by referring to the non-personal 
emotion as confidence and the personal one (which involves being able to confide in the other) as trust. 
 
93 Luhmann, for example, distinguishes confidence from what I am calling ‘reliance’ (he calls it ‘trust,’ as 
was explained above): “If you do not consider alternatives… you are in a situation of confidence” (i.e., 
confidence does not have the structure of being decided in each case). But since Luhmann does not 
consider confidence as an emotion (i.e., as felt confidence), he does not distinguish it from assuming. Thus, 
his example of confidence is (in my terminology) really an example of background assuming: “every 
morning you leave the house without a weapon!” Quotations from Luhmann, “Familiarity, Confidence, 




“Perhaps what has been characterized here [as trust] is a fundamental category of human conduct, which 
goes back to the metaphysical sense of our relationships and which is realized in a merely empirical, 




 Let us return to the initial example of the trust-fall activity, borrowed from Holton. It 
could be the case that I trust this group as I would trust a person. In that case, I place my concrete 
expectations within a kind of suspension95
 
: it seems best to me that I should be caught when I fall, 
but I trust their collective judgment and leave it up to their discretion. Perhaps there is something 
about the situation that I have not recognized, and really it is better for them not to catch me. 
Regardless, I trust them to make the right decision (which is not to say that I abdicate my right 
and responsibility to discuss with them what the right decision might be, both before and after the 
event), whether that be fulfilling my expectations and catching me or letting me fall. Here I am 
evidently even further given over to their freedom. In some cases, I may not even trust my own 
assessment of the situation (including my expectations) as much as I trust these people. 
A)  Personal Trusting 
At this level, finally, we may speak simply of the experiences of trusting and of betrayal, 
with no scare-quotes, for now it is to these phenomena as such that we turn. But something 
curious arises. In trusting as such, it seems that the possibility of betrayal is not taken into 
account.96
                                                 
94 Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, translation of Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die 
Formen der Vergesellschaftung (1908), ed. K.H. Wolff (New York: Free Press, 1950), p. 318. Quoted on 
page 407 of Guido Möllering, “The Nature of Trust: From Georg Simmel to a Theory of Expectation, 
Interpretation, and Suspension,” in Sociology 35.2 (2001): 403-420. 
 That is not to say that one has anything like absolute certainty about what the other 
person will do, or even about her trustworthiness. Instead, the point is that my trusting is not 
oriented toward the possibility of betrayal, even if this possibility is acknowledged. Trusting turns 
95 The term, although not the example, is from Möllering, Ibid. 
96 Hence, I shall begin with a positive characterization of the phenomenon of trusting, waiting until later to 
justify taking it as a third level of complexity in betrayal. Cf. Welz, “Trust as Basic Openness,” p. 52: 
“Trust simply rules certain possibilities out of consideration, for instance the possibility of being betrayed.” 
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me away from this possibility and toward the person trusted. So although I do experience myself 
as vulnerable in trusting him, my searching for criteria of betrayal in a particular context (e.g., 
how can I know whether he has been unfaithful?) would indicate a turn toward relying. 
Consider experiences such as this one (from Karen Jones): 
If I trust you, I will, for example, believe that you are innocent of the hideous crime with which 
you are charged, and I will suppose that the apparently mounting evidence of your guilt can be 
explained in some way compatible with your innocence. Of course this resistance to evidence is 




Here I, as the one trusting, recognize the evidence that others take to entail your guilt (i.e., the 
possibility of my having been betrayed) and yet I find myself trusting you. The experiences are 
distinct, and one is phenomenally founded on the other. You are given to me as trustworthy, and 
on the basis of this givenness, I encounter the evidence against you as misinterpreted, or 
maliciously invented, or over-emphasized, or something similar. Insofar as I trust you (and such 
trust admits of degrees), the evidence feels somehow external to the situation. The more that I 
start actively attending to boundaries – you will be guilty of having betrayed my trust if I hear x 
about you – the less I trust you.98
Let me clarify. I do not mean to deny the following: that vulnerability is essential to 
trusting; that experiencing betrayal is a real possibility, and one frequently lived out, in 
interpersonal trust; that we make decisions about whether or not to rely on people while oriented 
by the real possibility and even probability of being betrayed (in the sense of disappointed). 
Nonetheless, the experience of trusting properly speaking is a kind of emotional insight: I am 
 
                                                 
97 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 16. 
98 This does not completely determine my decision about whether to rely on you or on the evidence (i.e., on 
the testimony of others, perhaps including my own observations). I may trust you but know myself to be 
bad at trusting; the feeling of trust will not go away, however, if I decide to rely on others in this case. I will 
not (yet) feel betrayed by you, though I will likely feel deeply conflicted. And regarding entrusting, 
Godfrey reminds us that “I may and should actually refrain from relying on my friend [i.e., one I generally 
trust] in some matters,” namely, those in which she is not competent or reliable. See Joseph J. Godfrey, 
“The Phenomena of Trusting and Relational Ontologies,” Bulletin de la Société Américaine de Philosophie 
de Langue Franҫaise 7.1-2 (Spring 1995): 104-121, p. 110. 
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disclosed as always already bound to or given over to another person (or group taken as a person), 
and simultaneously the other person is disclosed as trustworthy. (The cases of distrust or mistrust 
are parallel.) This ‘always already being bound’ (at whatever level of trust or distrust) is then the 
space within which I either make a leap to rely or prudently refuse to jump. 
That such a moment of insight is essential to it could be named the absolute character of 
interpersonal trust. It seems to be structurally distinct from both the decision character of relying 
and the momentary or gradual taking on of assumptions. Such trust may have boundaries – it may 
be limited to certain contexts – but (as Jones points out) what is qualified here is not my trust as 
such but the domain over which my trust extends. I am fully given over to the other person’s 
discretion insofar as she is an electrician, say, or insofar as he is an expert in obstetrics, or a 
teacher, or a fellow train passenger.99
From the coherence of examples like the one cited above, we learn two further things 
about trusting. First, it does not simply follow from reliability. I do not first ascertain your 
reliability, then trust you; instead, your reliability is given as a component (or even a 
consequence) of your trustworthiness, which is disclosed equiprimordially with my being given 
over to you (i.e., with my trust in you). The unity of both disclosures (my being given over, your 
trustworthiness) in a moment of (fallible) emotional insight is the essential experience of personal 
trusting. Thus there is something right about Niklas Luhmann’s claim, commenting on the 
quotation from Georg Simmel that appears as an epigraph to the present section, that “[a]lthough 
the one who trusts is never at a loss for reasons ... in this or that case, the point of such reasons is 
 
                                                 
99 Cp. Steinbock’s discussion of modalization, “Temporality,” p. 100, and Baier, “Trust and Antitrust.” 
This ‘insofar as’ covers a multitude of different extents to which one can be given over. I am much more 
thoroughly given over to a good teacher, for example, than to an electrician, but again this has to do with 
the scope of the object, not the extent of my trust strictly speaking. I take up a more internal boundary in 
terms of one’s values just below. 
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really to uphold his self-respect and justify him socially.”100 I think that sometimes we are at a 
loss for reasons – we say, ‘I don’t know why I trust him, I just do’ – but the thesis here is right. 
Reasons or explanations can be given, but they do not suffice to justify my trust.101
One reason for trusting’s lack of ground is that it is simply a richer way of seeing than is 
reliance. Luhmann claims that trusting simplifies decision-making by allowing certain 
possibilities (e.g., betrayal) to be excluded from consideration.
 Even in 
principle, we can give only accidental and fragmentary justifications for trusting, although by 
contrast we may be able to give complete justifications for relying (since the reasons are involved 
in the decision itself). 
102 We saw above, with regard to 
assuming, that such ‘simplification’ comes by way of habits of interpretation that narrow down to 
a sharper focus the realm of what might be salient – and that this can be a strengthening of sight, 
rather than a blinding of it. We can also add here, following Childress, that trust is typically 
oriented to the limits of another person’s actions.103 Thus, at least in cases where I am bound to 
another as a friend, experiencing the world in part through her, I have a sense of her boundaries, 
and so I am free to appeal to her freedom – i.e., I am disclosed as free precisely in finding myself 
subject to her discretion, remaining confident that the limits imposed by who she is will not 
require additional watching-over by me.104
                                                 
100 Luhmann, “Trust,” p. 26. (Also cited in Möllering, “Nature of Trust,” p. 409.) Luhmann takes this to be 
an extrapolation from available evidence – in other words, his analysis makes it the ‘probability’ mode of 
reliance trusting described in my section (1) above. 
 
101 Although I do not agree with Figal that trust is certainty, compare his claim that there is no fundament 
for trust, since it is a relation to another’s possibilities (“Trusting in Persons,” p. 109). Cf. also Welz’s 
claim that “[i]n trust we lose our ground(s)” (“Trust as Basic Openness,” p. 56). 
102 Luhman, “Trust,” p. 25. 
103 James F. Childress, “Nonviolent Resistance: Trust and Risk-Taking,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 1 
(Fall 1973): 87-112. Cf. esp. the characterization of trust on p. 89. The fact that it aims at limits of action 
means, for Childress, that those who wish to call into question society’s boundaries can nevertheless render 
themselves trustworthy – in the sense of reliable – through self-imposed limits on action (e.g., commitment 
to nonviolence). 
104 Steinbock emphasizes this in describing trust as a free relation to another free person, which appeals to 
her transcendence (her discretion). I find my freedom in the very experience of being bound to her, and she 
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Notice, however, that there are limits imposed by who the other person is, and that these 
come to light with particular clarity in finding oneself betrayed. In Jones’s example, one can 
discover oneself as betrayed “if there is enough evidence.” In terms of the phenomenon, that 
would mean something like ‘if I discover you have done something sufficiently transgressive of 
the boundaries of who you are’, where ‘who you are’ is how you are (or were) disclosed to me in 
the moment of insight that constituted the trusting encounter. This is to say that trusting somehow 
tracks shared worldly orientation; in a disclosure of someone as trustworthy, the central orienting 
principles of her world and those of mine overlap, and this overlap will determine the extent of 
the realm in which I trust. This emotional insight is not a calculation on my part but an index of 
my genuinely being given over to the person as I fallibly perceive her. 
I said earlier (section II.B) that the habits of interpretation involved in assuming are 
directed toward the non-personal emotion of confidence, although assuming is not an emotion. 
Trusting, by contrast, is itself what Steinbock calls a personal emotion, or what Jones calls an 
affective attitude. But it is a peculiar emotion. For it is not merely a particular emotional 
investment in (i.e., a particular kind of adjustment to) what is trusted, although such confidence 
can also be felt at this level. Rather, it is essential to trusting that it shifts my very capacity for 
emotion. Trusting someone alters my empathic abilities. Like love, it puts my emotional life to 
some extent at the mercy of the other person’s emotional life. Trusting is not only a disclosure of 
the world through feeling, but a disclosure of the self as somehow bound to the feelings of 
another. My attunement to the world is now also being tuned to (and to some extent by) the 
other’s harmonization with the shared world. Probably there never is such a thing as simply my 
isolated attunement to the world; regardless, any particular experience of trust will include the 
mediation of my experience of that world through this particular other person (or group). 
                                                                                                                                                 
experiences that binding as some level of imposition, an appeal to which she must respond. Cf. 
“Temporality,” pp. 87-89, 97-99. 
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A second reason for trusting’s lack of ground is that, unlike relying, trusting is only 
indirectly voluntary.105 I can will to accept someone’s promise (i.e., to rely), but I cannot simply 
decide to trust someone. Nor can I begin to trust someone by committing to do so (unlike 
assuming). I can commit myself to someone, but that means committing to be reliable and 
perhaps trustworthy. Receiving another’s commitment will already be on the basis of an 
experience of trust or distrust: the extent to which I take your word will be heavily influenced by 
the extent to which I find myself already trusting you. Committing or receiving another’s 
commitment may ultimately deepen that trust or distrust, but coming to trust is never like 
assuming a hypothesis. Just as I can only change my mood by changing my surroundings (or the 
focus of my attention) and then waiting, so I can only bring myself to trust by meeting someone 
in a safe context, willfully restricting the scope of my attention, choosing to rely – and then 
waiting.106
The other thing to notice from Jones’s example of trusting in spite of evidence – as well 
as from the modified trust-fall case – is that to find myself given over to the discretion of the 
other person is to find that trusting and my control over the situation are mutually exclusive.
 So, trusting proper is unlike relying (and cannot directly follow from it) because 
trusting is both a richer way of seeing and is only indirectly voluntary. 
107
                                                 
105 Welz emphasizes that trust is not at our disposal and, except perhaps at the limit, is not a deliberate 
action (“Trust as Basic Openness,” pp. 49-50). 
 At 
this level, checking-up is in principle impossible (what would be the standard against which to 
measure?), though again without eliminating the possibility of finding myself betrayed. 
106 I may also learn to be generally more trusting by improving my overall character. For a parallel account 
of indirect self-alteration that involves belief coming about through chosen reliance, cf. Holton, “Deciding 
to Trust,” pp. 73-76. What he takes to be trust, I take to be relying, and what he takes to be belief 
(confidence in another), I take to be parallel to trusting, except that trusting is pre-judicative. 
107 It remains an interesting question whether knowledge and trust are similarly exclusive. I am inclined to 
think they are not – that, for example, God could trust human beings despite knowing what they will do, or 
that I could know you well enough to find you totally reliable in some particular field and still experience a 
more basic level of trust independent of that reliability judgment – but the implied question of what counts 
as knowledge would take me too far afield here. 
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In the accounts of relying and of assuming, I characterized this checking-up in terms of 
temporality, and that seems to be appropriate here, as well. Trusting is oriented to the present 
(i.e., the moment of insight is here and now), but its temporal meaning is futural. Trusting means 
that I stand open to the future in what Holton (following P.F. Strawson) has called a “participant 
stance”108 and Steinbock refers to as “intersubjective temporalization.”109
Not only, then, am I disclosed as given over, but I find myself given over indefinitely. 
That is, I do not trust ‘until I can come back and see how things are going.’ Although I will likely 
attend to how things are going (in a friendship, say), this will not be experienced primarily as 
checking-up but as a different kind of interest in what is happening.
 That is, my future 
comes toward me in part through the mediation of the other person, similar to the way that my 
emotional life is now to some extent bound up with the emotional life of that person. What she 
feels affects me particularly deeply. (Hence, the world is disclosed for me in part through her 
world-disclosure.) This also means that personal trusting is intrinsically moving toward the 
deepening of that trust. 
110 Godfrey emphasizes that 
what I attend to in such situations is the “self-disclosure of the other,” and that this “has an 
openness which is not the same as allowing for possible error in reckoning.”111
                                                 
108 Holton, “Deciding to Trust,” pp. 66-67. This is a helpful term, although defined in an un-illuminating 
way: roughly, as a readiness to take a reactive attitude to the actions of a person. The point, at any rate, 
seems to be that I am involved with the other in an appeal to her freedom, in such a way that my emotions 
are responsively invested in how she takes up my appeal. Karen Jones also tries to take this into account in 
her theory of trust as counting on the other’s responsiveness to my dependency. Cf. esp. pp. 70-76 of Jones, 
“Counting on One Another,” in Trust, Sociality, Selfhood, pp. 67-82. 
 This indefinite 
temporal openness also forms a third reason why trusting is not fully determinable by reasons in 
each case: trusting, unlike entrusting and relying, is not primarily about ‘this or that case,’ even 
109 Steinbock, “Temporality,” p. 91. 
110 Similarly, if I trust a car mechanic as a car mechanic (not just to fix my car, although the former would 
likely lead to the latter), what could checking-up on this ever mean? Tracking down the people who trained 
him to see if they were good mechanics? How would I decide that? At any rate, although I might rely on 
my mechanic more confidently after such an examination (if it turned out to be possible), I would certainly 
no longer be trusting him, regardless of how good his teachers turned out to be. 
111 Joseph J. Godfrey, A Philosophy of Human Hope (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p. 185. 
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though it is essentially given in the present and has as a limit example trusting a stranger whom I 
have never seen before. 
Such indefinite openness, in which I am given over to another more and more thoroughly, 
cannot but be felt by her as an imposition.112 That is to say, trusting demands a response from its 
object – at minimum, that of remaining trustworthy – and this may be deeply unwelcome. But 
trusting also brings a gift of encouragement, for the other person has been already disclosed as 
trustworthy, which vision will probably energize and reassure her (though it may oppress and 
overwhelm her).113
As an extension of this generativity, Steinbock adds, trust is transitive between people. If 
you trust Megan, and I trust you, I can also trust Megan, whether or not I have a direct encounter 
with her.
 The negative side of imposition notwithstanding, trusting seems to contain an 
impulse toward generating further trust, both in the sense of sparking it at the beginning of a 
relationship and of sustaining it later on. 
114 This structural characteristic of trusting is crucial for its genesis – since it can be 
passed from person to person – and also for knowledge, as shown by John Hardwig.115
Finally, it turns out that the above description of trusting fits the experience of trusting 
two different kinds of objects, hence that there are really two modes of trusting proper. As in 
assuming, they are related to each other as foreground and background, and in their psychological 
development, but they are distinct experiences with similar characteristics. As Godfrey explains, 
“developing trust moves both beyond trust in specific individuals and more deeply into trust of 
 I shall 
return to it at more length a little later (section IV). 
                                                 
112 As Steinbock makes clear, pp. 97-99. 
113 For an emphasis on the encouragement side, see Victoria McGeer, “Trust, Hope, and Empowerment,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86.2 (June 2008): pp. 237-254. 
114 Steinbock, unpublished MS. 
115 John Hardwig, “The Role of Trust in Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy 88.12 (December 1991): 
693-708. See also the response by Jonathan Adler, “Testimony, Trust, Knowing,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 91.5 (May 1994): 264-275. Hardwig’s article is the more convincing, since Adler is mostly 





 Thus, one mode is the deeply interpersonal trust of which I have been 
speaking, in which I trust particular persons (or groups taken as persons). The other mode is a 
global, primitive trust in the world as a whole, beyond any given individual. 
B) Primitive Trusting 
Primitive trust takes as object the world as a whole, or better: what may come. It 
discloses me as given over to the world, and it does so in line with trusting’s temporal meaning of 
extension indefinitely into the future.117 Being given over in this sense, however, is twofold. First, 
basic trust is the kind of trust that we have in language as such, since this is how the world is 
given to us, i.e., the necessary mediation for there to be a world (structured and differentiated 
from me) at all.118 That primitive trust allows us as infants to respond to language-speakers 
without a crippling skepticism; this is the only way we can eventually find ourselves no longer in-
fans, but now submitted to language, bound to it by the same kind of trust that animates our 
relation to the concrete linguistic community.119 If such primitive trust is broken, it is not that I 
have made a particular mistake in trusting; rather, I do not inhabit the linguistic world (on the 
basis of which reasons, explanations, mistakes, and successes are sorted out) adequately for 
‘making a mistake in trusting’ to have any meaning.120
                                                 
116 Godfrey, A Philosophy of Human Hope, p. 181, original italics. A prima facie reason for interpreting 
them as modes of the same phenomenon emerges if we compare Godfrey’s description of I-thou trust – “I 
am open in my whole person to the whole person of this other” – to his description of openness trust as “the 
human spirit’s extended hand of greeting and exploration” (Trust of People, pp. 42 and 50, respectively). 
 
117 This is founded on Dasein’s ekstatic structure. Thus, what may come includes the past as requiring some 
determinate adoption on our part – i.e., the past as approaching in terms of one’s own future. 
118 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1977), Part A.1: “Sense-Certainty.” See also Alphonse De Waelhens and Wilfried Ver Eecke, 
Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia, After the Decade of the Brain (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven 
University Press, 2001), pp. 143-149. 
119 This also means that primitive trust is founded on nonverbal communication, as Baier considers at 
length in “Sustaining Trust,” (in Moral Prejudices, pp. 152-182), p. 176. For much more on the difficulty 
of accepting language, see below, chapter 6, section II.A.4. 
120 This point is from Phillips, “On Trusting Intellectuals,” p. 44. 
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Thus, this second kind of trusting also goes beyond assuming. It functions similarly to 
assuming – as a background condition that enables particular, foreground trusts – but it does not 
share the character of deferred checking-up. It is something beyond the phenomenon of being 
able to delay an accounting when I am in a familiar context and so am confident that I can deal 
with however things may turn out. Instead, this kind of trusting partakes of the openness to the 
future and attentiveness to self-disclosure (in this case, of the world as a whole) that belong to 
interpersonal trusting proper. This is no accident, since both basic trust and interpersonal trust 
develop psychologically out of the relation to the primary caregiver.121
Earlier, I followed Wittgenstein in distinguishing a foreground mode of assuming from a 
background mode (i.e., empirical propositions from the Weltbild, or world picture). Now we need 
a second distinction to set apart background assuming from primitive trusting. Doubt, 
Wittgenstein claims, cannot be global without losing its sense; it is an essentially derivative 
phenomenon. “The child learns by believing the adult. Doubt comes after belief.”
 
122 But this 
means that even the Weltbild (which is the basis for doubting) is learned from somewhere. How 
exactly is the “inherited background against which I distinguish true and false” inherited?123 How 
is the river’s very bedrock shaped, prior to being worn by the river itself? “I learned an enormous 
amount and accepted it on human authority” – note that this accepting could not yet have had the 
full complexity of a judgment, since what I was learning just was the language-game of judgment 
(“From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.”124
                                                 
121 Cf. Erik Erikson, Childhood and Society, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), esp. chapter 7, along 
with Welz’s careful criticism of Erikson in “Trust as Basic Openness,” p. 48. See also part II of chapter 6, 
below. 
), and yet there was nevertheless 
also the possibility of rejection: “and then I found some things confirmed or disconfirmed by my 
122 Wittgenstein, §160. 
123 Wittgenstein, §94. Cp. §150, where he asks, “Must I not begin to trust somewhere?” But this 
‘beginning’ is only a limit to doubting, not an experienced initiation of trusting. 
124 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §128. 
62 
 
own experience.”125 That account seems basically right. I learn language through primitive trust – 
i.e., “the groundlessness of our believing”126 – and language structures my Weltbild. The 
particular rules of my language-game then can be called into question (confirmed or 
disconfirmed) by experience without destroying the whole thing. Primitive trust is the atmosphere 
within which I can first take on the assumptions that structure my world.127
The second concrete way in which I am given over to the world in primitive trust is that it 
is the kind of trust that allows me to relate to myself in a stable way. In the experience of being 
given over to the world, I am given as both in relation to the world – i.e., I am a self and there is a 
world – and bound to the world – i.e., I am myself by being in that world, trusting in the 
consistency of its linguistic structure and in its self-disclosure to me as part of a community. On 
the basis of that primitive being-bound, I (as part of a shared world) can break the infinite regress 
of suspicion that otherwise threatens with every experience of betrayal. The snowball effect of a 
betrayal may extend to various networks of trust, I may wander in the disorientation brought on 
by ill-founded assumptions, my choices to rely may be reduced mostly to the mistrustful variety, 
and yet there can remain a backdrop of trust from which other trusts can again grow.
 
128
Primitive trust, then, is the foundation for all other trusts and mistrusts. Although it 
begins in infancy, unlike assuming (or Godfrey’s security trust) it can never become “infantile” 
because psychic development is only possible on its basis. Godfrey calls it openness trust: a 
 I do not 
have to regressively and fruitlessly question my own inclinations to trust, searching for a non-
existent criterion by which I could know whom to trust. I am a self only as trusting the world 
through concrete others. 
                                                 
125 Wittgenstein, §161. Cf. the discussion of Lavoisier drawing conclusions based on the Weltbild that he 
“learned as a child” (§167). 
126 Wittgenstein, §166. 
127 Cp. Bernstein’s claim that “trust is the condition through which we come to have a world in general, and 
to be without trust is to lose one’s place in the world” (“Trust,” p. 404). 
128 Cp. Baier, “Sustaining Trust.” She claims that trust can only be built upon, not created, since it must be 
there in the first place. 
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readiness to receive from and be affected by the world.129 It is the confidence that I can ask things 
of the world – above all: of others – and not simply be refused (though I may be disappointed).130
There are thus two modes of trusting proper, differentiated by their objects and by their 
phenomenological priority. Nevertheless, I maintain that both are experienced at the same level of 
complexity of betrayal. For although both can be betrayed, as indicated above, neither contains as 
a structural moment attention to that possibility of betrayal. Instead, there is necessarily a 
direction toward the object trusted. But what would be the experience of betrayal? How can we 
describe this third level of complexity? 
 
But such trust is not simply an optimism, neither about my projects within the world, nor about 
the world itself. As regards my projects, basic trust is compatible with frustration, with 
disorientation, and even with some levels of despair. As regards the world, it is possible to 
embrace the world in suffering, to be given over to it in trust while recognizing the situation as 
not at all optimistic. (This is the tragic view of the world, the amor fati toward which Nietzsche 
and some of Dostoevski’s characters urge us, among others.) On the other side, refusal (or 
foreclosure) of the world is not simply pessimism about it: it is, for example, possible to refuse to 
trust out of fear that the world is too good for me. 
 
C) Betrayal 
First, although trusting another person is essentially an imposition, and thus calls for a 
response that takes up or takes into account my trust, I am not yet betrayed simply because the 
other person chooses to do something I do not like (or if the world counters my assumptions 
about it). If my trust did not weigh in her consideration at all, then I likely experience betrayal. 
But if in her consideration she merely took something else to outweigh my trust, then so long as 
                                                 
129 Godfrey, Trust of People, pp. 49-51. 
130 St. Thomas Aquinas points out that asking is only possible on the basis of trusting. Cf. In Ps. 39, quoted 
in Marie George, “Aquinas on the Nature of Trust” (The Thomist 70 [2006]: 103-23), p. 104. 
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that weightier matter is not radically beyond the values that stabilize my world, the other person 
can still appropriately be experienced as trustworthy.131
Secondly, Baier observes that not only is disappointment of expectations not necessarily 
betrayal, one who disappoints may be much more trustworthy than one who is mechanically 
reliable, particularly if the latter evidently confuses reliability with trustworthiness. She uses a 
short story by John Updike, called “Trust Me,” as an illustration. In the story, a three-year-old 
boy is persuaded by his father to jump into the deep end of a pool, where his father will catch 
him. The child decides to rely on his father, whom he also trusts, but the father drops him, and the 
boy feels himself to be drowning before the father pulls him out again. The boy’s mother, 
indignant, comes up and slaps his father. After this incident, the boy’s trust in his father continues 
unabated (although he may not rely on him in that particular way again), whereas he begins to 
distrust his mother, “her swift sure-handed anger.”
 So, being disappointed or even 
disoriented is not yet being betrayed. 
132
Baier sums up this complication elsewhere, writing that “one must be able to use 
discretion not as to when the promise has been kept or not but, rather, as to when to insist that the 
promise be kept, or to instigate penalty for breach of promise, when to keep and when not to keep 
one’s promise.”
 The story shows that part of trusting, as also 
part of trustworthiness – it is unsurprising that the two go together – is recognizing when to 
forgive and when not, when to distrust because of a broken promise and when not. 
133
As an example of the latter case, consider someone who blackmails me by fulfilling a 
promise even though circumstances have changed. Say that because I trust him, I rely on him 
tactfully to spread the word to relevant people that I have broken off my marriage engagement. 
But then we get back together and the wedding is on again. He, however, knowing this, decides to 
 
                                                 
131 This example is from Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 8. 
132 Quoted in Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” in Moral Prejudices, p. 135. 
133 Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” p. 251. 
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continue telling people that my engagement is broken, that I and my fiancée are separately 
available, and so on. Word gets back to my fiancée, and now she has trouble trusting me. In this 
case, I am betrayed and can no longer trust my friend, even though he has done just what I 
initially relied on him to do. Thus, part of trustworthiness involves using discretion to know when 
to keep a promise, and part of trusting is finding oneself submitted to the other’s discretion. 
If such things as disappointing me, contradicting my assumptions, or making decisions 
that run counter to my judgment do not necessarily count as betrayal, what kinds of things can 
count? Some famous candidates: a kiss (Judas); kneeling bootless with a knife (Brutus); 
encouragement about an apple (Eve’s serpent); an island that seems to satisfy all one’s desires 
(the Lotus eaters or Calypso); mutual shelter inside a cave (Dido’s Aeneas). Most of these, like 
the examples of keeping a promise reliably or of angrily defending one against incompetence, are 
remarkable precisely for their seeming harmlessness. Following Baier, we may add some less 
famous ones, organized as vices on either side of virtues. For the truster: demanding an account at 
the wrong time or too often (failing to rely) at one extreme, or fearing to request an explanation or 
to question the trusted person’s discretion at all at the other. For the trusted: being “too 
adventurous” with discretionary powers, or on the other hand refusing to use discretion at all by 
simply reacting on the basis of a rule.134
With these examples in mind, let me outline some essential structures of personal 
betrayal. Since trusting someone is a gift of the self (albeit not directly voluntary), anything 
significant enough to be experienced as betrayal is felt as rejection of that gift. But the self-gift 
consists a) in being given over to the discretion of the other person and b) in being bound to the 
 In other words, almost anything could count as betrayal, 
since the ability to betray requires a twisting of what would normally confirm or promote trust, 
but almost nothing necessarily will count that way. 
                                                 
134 Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” pp. 136-39. It would not be excessive to say that much of my 
investigation in the first three parts of this chapter works out hints and suggestions from Baier that can be 
found in this essay and its companion piece, “Sustaining Trust.” 
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other’s emotional life. Hence, betrayal is felt a) as an abuse of discretionary power, whether by 
exceeding the limits of action (toward which trust is oriented), or by entirely refusing to use that 
power. Betrayal is also experienced b) as a separation from the other person that confuses the 
world, since my basic attunement and patterns of attention, which were partially organized by that 
person, now must change. That separation breaks the bond and throws me back on myself, 
leaving me on my own. But instead of severing it completely, betrayal refashions the bond into a 
fetter, so that my solitude is lived with reference to the other person, turning it into loneliness. 
Furthermore, since trust is an involuntary gift, betrayal is experienced as unintegrable 
with my intentionally unified self. That means, on one hand, that the other person shows up as 
primarily at fault, as Lars Hertzberg points out.135 But, on the other hand, part of the experience 
of world-confusion is a kind of helpless indication that maybe I should blame my own way of 
living (e.g., Why was I stupid enough to trust? Why do I always do that?). This inclination to 
blame some uncontrolled part of me, since it is a temptation not to trust anyone else, ever, is also 
a manifestation of the separation in which I show up as ultimately on my own. Thus, betrayal by 
one person can (though it need not) snowball, as Baier recognizes, into destroying a whole 
network of trusting relationships.136
Moreover, although primitive trust usually allows me to halt the snowball effect by 
recognizing that I am not ultimately alone, still it is possible for it to become so global an 
avalanche as to constitute a betrayal of primitive trust. For despite the latter’s resilience, it too can 
be betrayed, and the experience of betrayal, although much worse, has characteristics close to 
those just described. 
 
                                                 
135 “When someone’s trust has been misplaced… it is always, I want to say, a misunderstanding to regard 
that as a shortcoming on his part. The responsibility rests with the person who failed the trust…” Hertzberg, 
“On the Attitude of Trust,” pp. 128-9. Also quoted in Phillips, “On Trusting Intellectuals,” p. 47. Cf. 
Steinbock’s claim, cited at the beginning of the present chapter, that only another can betray my trust, and 
Luhmann’s characterization of betrayal as crossing a threshold, which shows up as the other’s fault 
(“Trust,” pp. 74-75). 
136 Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” p. 149. 
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As Wittgenstein points out,137
Any significant modification of such fundamental rules of the language-game (which 
were learned from caretakers on the basis of primitive trust) would require what might be called a 
change of grammar. For particular language-games, as we saw in the case of assumed contexts, 
such a change is possible, though it involves a moment of disorientation – this is what religious 
conversion or political radicalization are like. But for language as such, there is no other game; 
agreement and disagreement, indeed truth itself, will not be possible for the child who refuses to 
trust the language-speakers around it. This failure of trust opens the doors to psychosis.
 there are certain matters within any language-game that are 
constitutive for the use of that language-game; we do not ask for reasons for assuming these, and 
we would be confused by someone who asked for such reasons. We would wonder whether the 
person had understood what was being said; if he persisted, we would be concerned for his sanity. 
If, somehow, I were to become convinced that he was right to ask, this would summon questions 
(including from myself) about my sanity. 
138
Hence, when Wittgenstein notes that “if someone gives sign of doubt where we do not 
doubt, we cannot confidently understand his signs as signs of doubt,”
 
139
                                                 
137 My discussion of Wittgenstein in this section draws on the considerations of D.Z. Phillips, “On Trusting 
Intellectuals,” although the main burden of Phillips’s argument in that paper is to show that primitive trust 
is not what trusting God is like. See esp. pp. 42-46. 
 we can recognize the 
experience of the psychotic, who cannot make herself understood because she does not play the 
shared game. For example, the paranoiac: “If someone said that he doubted the existence of his 
138 That is, refusal of language at the level of the structure of the subject. I do not mean that people with low 
mental capacities or the speaking-impaired are psychotic; they may still accept the structuring of language, 
even if their capacities for expression or understanding are out of the ordinary. The following 
characterizations of psychosis are from Alphonse de Waelhens’ account in La Psychose, translated by W. 
Ver Eecke in Phenomenology and Lacan on Schizophrenia, After the Decade of the Brain. Cf. my 
discussions in chapters 5 and 6, below, for more detail. 
139 Wittgenstein, §154. 
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hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn’t ‘all done by mirrors,’ etc., 
we should not be sure whether we ought to call that doubting.”140
Since, as indicated earlier, primitive trust is twofold, so also is its betrayal. Psychosis is, 
on one hand, a foreclosure of language, in which instead of accepting and responding to what my 
caretakers said, I refuse speech as that which both structures the world and necessitates the appeal 
to a third for confirmation of truth-claims.
 
141 Thus the experience of betrayal as an abuse of 
discretionary power is felt much more intensely here: there is no linguistic mediation between me 
and the world, or between me and my ego-ideal, so that the discretionary power granted by 
language is not available for my use. This may repeat the lack of mediation between my 
caretaker’s desire and mine, in which my desire was slave to her whim. Regardless, in both cases, 
I am bound to that which I refuse as to a fetter: hence I may make use of language but only in the 
manner of imitation or simulation, in which words are used more or less correctly but their 
materiality is not lived through toward their referents.142
On the other hand, psychosis is also a refusal of myself as distinct from but related to the 
world, perhaps because my own rage is too terrifying to be endured. Thus the experience of 
betrayal as unintegrable with my unified self is pushed all the way to the splintering and 
foreclosure of that self. There is no center to who I am; my body is fragmented and alien, a set of 
 
                                                 
140 Wittgenstein, §255. Cp. §217, where we would call crazy someone who supposed that all our 
calculations were in error; §420, in which others enter the author’s room and give him ‘proofs’ that he is 
not in England, where he knows himself to be, with the result that either he or they must be mad; and 
§§570-572, where being wrong about one’s own name implies insanity. (Indeed, many psychotics take 
themselves to be someone else.) In §74, he distinguishes a mistake from mental disturbance by saying that 
the former has a reason or ground (Grund) as well as a cause (Ursache), whereas the latter is only caused. 
141 De Waelhens follows Lacan in seeing schizophrenia as the refusal of language’s law-like structure and 
paranoia as the refusal of the third as witness in my imaginary relation to myself. See Phenomenology and 
Lacan, chapter 6.  
142 One advantage of the distinctions developed here: the psychotic’s relation to language could be 
characterized as mistrustful reliance, what I earlier called ‘mere’ reliance, the kind that discloses the subject 
as given over in the sense of dependence, but not necessarily in the sense of freely choosing, since the 
psychotic may not experience herself as a sufficiently distinct subject to permit free choice. 
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objects in the world like other objects.143 The bond joining me to the world has here, too, become 
a fetter, since there is no longer any separation. Not only am I inclined to blame myself, but I do 
so to such an extent that I do not trust myself at all and so must be constantly suspicious.144
It may be objected that, once formed, primitive trust cannot really be betrayed. It can only 
fail to form in the first place. But I think this is not quite right. The psychotic break often comes 
toward the end of puberty, suggesting that, whatever constitutional or infant-environmental 
factors may be necessary, they are not always sufficient. Something happens later that drives a 
person into what Baier has characterized as “sustained self-protective self-paralyzing generalized 
distrust of one’s human environment.”
 This 
is why trusting oneself (having been shaped by others) as a kind of Wittgensteinian bedrock, as 
capable of halting the suspicious regress, is necessary for mental health, so long as it does not 
turn over into paranoia’s perfect self-trust, in which the possibility of error (hence also of 
intersubjective truth) is refused. 
145 Jones makes a helpful distinction along these lines in 
her account of basal security: in disappointments, in some disorientations, and to some extent in 
interpersonal trusting, the tendency to blame oneself and distrust one’s own inclinations to trust 
can be remedied by changing one’s habits of self-investment. “Thus, I might resolve never to tell 
John my secrets again, never to tell colleagues my secrets, or to be more circumspect in the 
telling of secrets, period.” But some betrayals (or profound disorientations) leave us with no clear 
possibility of modifying our habits of trusting. “These are the betrayals that, if serious, shatter 
basal security.”146
                                                 
143 De Waelhens, Phenomenology and Lacan, pp. 153-179 and 233-4. 
 In such situations, my ability to stop the suspicious regress – the snowball 
144 This may also manifest (in paranoia) as simply identifying myself with the truth. That could look like 
complete self-trust, but it is not a trust of oneself that could survive any let-down at all, however minor. If I 
have no possibility of speaking anything but the truth, on pain of the world’s collapse, I am not trusting 
myself in any sense that involves being given over to (as resting in) my own freedom. 
145 Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities,” p. 145. 
146 Jones, “Trust and Terror,” p. 11. 
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effect – may fail globally, not only for a certain context (which latter would be disorientation), 
and so the shattering constitutes a betrayal of my primitive trusting.147
Because trusting (primitively or personally) is capable of forgiving or overlooking so 
many wrongs, and because one cannot determine beforehand what particular event or non-event 
may be felt as a betrayal – although I have tried to sketch the essential structure of the experience 
of such a betrayal – we have now reached the highest level of complexity. It may be some simple 
disappointment that is felt as the last straw, by reference to a whole (real or imagined) history; it 
may be a violent attack from someone previously trusted. It could be almost anything, and yet it 
is essential to trusting that one is not constantly checking-up, and that the one trusted is not 
constantly waiting for the hammer to fall. Together, these characteristics mean that betrayal at 
this level is analogous to what Aristotle says about a corpse in regard to the human body. That is, 
a corpse comes after a living body temporally but is not structurally part of it. The corpse marks 
an end in the sense of a limit, but not an end in the sense of a goal. The corpse indicates a break, 
but it is located already on the far side of the break.
 
148
If I am right about this last characterization of betrayal, however, then we must turn to an 
examination of the genesis of trusting (and so also of distrusting) if we want to understand what 
factors are involved in the experience of that betrayal, beyond simply the emotional recognition 
that I have trusted this person previously and no longer can. 
 Just as trusting is experienced as always 
already being given over, so distrusting (to say nothing of mistrusting) is lived as always already 
being broken apart or distanced from one another. That is why, as I said above, trusting does not 
essentially take into account the possibility of betrayal. 
                                                 
147 Cp. “the end of the world” for Senatspräsident Schreber, emphasized in Freud’s analysis (SE 12:68ff.) 
and discussed below, chapter 5, sections I.B and I.E. 




IV. Genesis and Conclusion 
 The final section of this chapter can be brief, since it mostly ties together things said 
along the way. I have emphasized the nonvoluntary and not-fully-justifiable character of trust in 
the previous section, but that does not mean that there is nothing to be said regarding how it 
comes about. So, I would like at least to break the ground for a genetic phenomenology of trust, 
one that would attend to the passive syntheses involved in what I have so far focused on as a 
momentary emotional insight. Moreover, perhaps showing the generative relations between the 
phenomena distinguished above can also serve as a kind of justification, before the tribunal of 
ordinary language, for privileging as the phenomenon of trusting only one experience among 
many that English-speakers would be inclined to name ‘trust’. 
I begin with another example from Karen Jones, who uses it to illustrate the point that 
“we are generally not aware of our trusting and seldom bring it sufficiently clearly before our 
minds to endorse or reject it”149
Suppose I have a friend who is particularly charming and particularly irresponsible. Time and time 
again she lets me down, and time and time again I forgive her and resume the relationship, 
promising that this time I will be more cautious, this time I will not count on her, [etc.]. I won’t 
trust her again. For all my resolution, I might nevertheless find myself trusting her. It’s true that 
whenever I become aware of doing so, I will resist the impulse and will once again be on my 
guard. At one extreme, I might only become aware of my having again trusted when I am again let 
down. I would say of myself that I find myself trusting her, even though, when I think about it, 
I’m aware that I shouldn’t.
 – in other words, that it remains mostly unthematized. (Whether 




Here we have, I think, a rather common situation that points to three things. First, it makes clear 
the role of habit in the generation of what I have called ‘the experience of trusting’, not only in 
that of assuming. Part of being bound to someone is that it shapes the way the person is given to 
                                                 
149 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 14. Anecdotal evidence of failing to attend to one’s own trust 
clearly: when I mentioned to a casual acquaintance that I was thinking about trust, she immediately claimed 
not to trust anyone, to have given up on it. Her very volunteering of that information, along with the story 
she shared to justify it, showed that she could not be right about not trusting anyone. 
150 Jones, “Trust as an Affective Attitude,” p. 13. 
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me in the future. Thus, unless it is fully betrayed – and sometimes even by overcoming such 
betrayals – trusting proper builds on itself. Similarly, since repeated reliance on someone can also 
become habitual, despite having the essential character of deciding in each case, relying that is 
minimally disappointed also builds trust, even if I do not initially trust the person on whom I rely. 
This is especially true in the cases in which I do trust the person and primarily on that basis 
choose to rely (what I earlier called ‘reliance oriented toward trust’ [section I]), for here it most 
directly reinforces my habit and supports the way I already see the other person and the world. 
 The second thing indicated by the example is a corollary of the first: my character deeply 
affects when and whom I will trust, as well as how deep that trust will run. Thus, in the example, 
the narrator wants not to trust and cannot help herself; she is not sufficiently self-restrained and is 
therefore likely to experience untrustworthy people as trustworthy (i.e., to trust them), even if she 
can occasionally catch herself and refrain from relying on them in particular situations. 
 Like any attunement to the world (including sense-perception), trusting discloses persons 
in a way filtered through my habits – that is, in light of my character. Just as I can be better and 
worse at hearing (either in my capacity or in my concrete practices, and the latter can change the 
former), so I can be better and worse at trusting. I claimed earlier (section II.B) that emotion 
harmonizes me with the world as I perceive it. Nonetheless, my emotion may be more or less 
appropriate; I may be generally out of tune, and so the attempts at harmony may still be jarring. 
Similarly, as St. Thomas Aquinas points out, if I am not very trustworthy, I will not be very 
trusting. More specifically, if I have treated another person badly, I am unlikely to trust her 
because I feel the effect of my previous actions on her motives.151
                                                 
151 St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Ioan. 13, lect. 5; 19, lect. 3. Quoted in George, “Aquinas on the Nature of 
Trust,” pp. 112-114. George comments (p. 114): “At this point we are able to understand why people 
mistrust those who mistrust them. Those who are mistrusted surmise that the other’s mistrust may well be 
the result of a projection made because of the other’s bad character. Alternately or additionally, they may 
regard the other’s mistrust as a kind of injustice … and people do not trust those they think are unjust.” 
 This distrust is not a direct 
decision on my part (since trusting never is), but it is founded on many other direct decisions 
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about dealing with other people’s trust, because of which the world now shows up for me 
affectively as an increasingly suspicious and suspect place. 
 Thirdly, Jones’s example points to a distinction between momentary trusting and a 
trusting relationship. In the latter, the experience of trusting, while still not directly voluntary, 
tends to be more explainable. The other person’s reliability, character, trust in me, and so on play 
a non-determinative but important role in whether or not I trust. So does our history of mutual 
trust and distrust, of built, rebuilt, and sustained trust, of many decisions to rely or not to rely – 
put simply, our intimacy. I say that this history is important but non-determinative because there 
is no calculation that could yield either the probability of, or ethical imperatives for, whether or 
not I trust this person. (I should be loyal to him, but that moral requirement cannot presuppose my 
trusting.) Nonetheless, when he is disclosed to me as trustworthy in the momentary experience of 
trust, that history will be included as a sedimented background in my insight. Thus, if asked, I 
could after the fact give real reasons for why I trust him, and they would not be either wrong or 
irrelevant. But they would be fragmentary and post hoc, since I would be analyzing out what was 
given as a whole in the insight. 
 Attending to the generative role of a trusting relationship should further remind us that 
formalized or public relationships weigh heavily in generating interpersonal trust. They do not 
guarantee it, as many a marriage has discovered, but they certainly aid it. Vows, whether blood-
oaths or marriage vows, announce before witnesses a commitment to being trustworthy and to 
relying on the other person in some capacity. Although I may deeply mistrust the person even at 
the moment he swears, and thus not put much stock in his oath – think of peace treaties or pacts 
to oppose a common enemy, for example – the weight of his public commitment may still inspire 
in me some genuine trust. And although I indicated earlier that one can really only commit to be 
trustworthy or to rely, not to trust someone, it is still the case that one’s own act of pledging plays 
a role in generating and maintaining one’s trust of the other person. That role, it seems to me, 
74 
 
includes but also transcends the power of repeated decisions to rely in generating trust. Finally, in 
a different way, part of trusting one’s parents seems to be the very publicity of that relationship. 
This is in part why being acknowledged as son or daughter of… is so important, even if one’s 
parent is in other ways untrustworthy, and why being disowned is so devastating. It is thus clear 
that, even if not precisely how, acts of commitment or acknowledgment can help found the 
affective attitude of personal trust. 
 What I have followed Steinbock in calling the imposition character of trusting also plays 
an important role here, since the mutuality that is an essential moment of trusting shows up most 
clearly in an extended relationship. There are two well-attested, interrelated phenomena: first, my 
trusting tends to bring about the other’s trusting, and vice versa (and similarly for distrust). 
Trusting demands a response, as I claimed earlier, but it does not only call for being trustworthy; 
it calls forth a response in kind. Second, my trust in myself, my self-confidence, presents me to 
others as trustworthy, and so helps to summon their trust. Furthermore, part of trusting myself is 
trusting the effectiveness of my trust, i.e., that it is likely to be reciprocated because others can 
hear and understand the call contained in it. 
 We saw that within the usual context of an ongoing relationship, personal trusting 
involves a disclosure of who the other person is, especially with regard to both her freedom and 
the central orientation of her assumptions. As I said earlier, it thus presupposes a certain amount 
of overlap in the values that anchor those assumptions and the values orienting my own, even if 
that overlap is primarily disclosed as such only in betrayal. This means, however, that undergoing 
a “betrayal” of my assumption-trust – my own disorientation and subsequent reorientation, which 
could be broadly labeled conversion – often precipitates a weakening of my trust in another 
person whose orientation in the world is now quite different from mine. This may show up as a 
betrayal, if he does something in line with his own assumptions that now looks quite different 
from my new perspective, or it may simply involve a waning of my feeling of trust in him. 
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But even if we grant the centrality of trusting relationships in generating further trust, we 
can still ask what is happening in the extreme case of momentarily trusting a complete stranger. 
Such a limit situation brings more sharply into view the other genetic components at work in the 
static experience of trusting or distrusting. For surely I can trust a stranger, and frequently I do 
genuinely trust (not only rely), although usually it is restricted to certain domains – say, I trust (or 
not) the homeless gentleman as a beneficiary of my money.152 That very restriction to certain 
domains, in fact, indicates that part of what allows me to trust this person is my assumption-trust 
in the context, which both serves as a background to my encounter with the person and 
determines the domain of my trust. (I trust or distrust a person as a carpenter because I encounter 
her in the context of needing a carpenter – being introduced at a cocktail party leads to different 
modal restrictions.) There is a transitive relation between background and foreground trust here, 
by which my assumption-trust in the context can be transferred to the person (though presumably 
it undergoes a change in the level of self-investment corresponding to the shift in object).153
If trust is essentially transferable from the context to a person, it can also go the other 
way: trusting a person can carry over into assumption-trust of the contexts in which she belongs, 
or which she herself assumes as trustworthy. And, similarly, each experience in a given context 
can modify my assumption-trust in that context. I may feel perfectly confident on city buses until 
I see a man shot as he gets off of one; whether this constitutes a disorientation depends on the 
 But I 
can have no very robust confidence in contexts if I am not free for the world through basic trust, 
so that, too, is at work here as a kind of ur-background. 
                                                 
152 This does not require that I expect him to do anything in particular with it, nor that I am entrusting him 
with it in any strong sense like an investment (though either or both of these could also be the case); it 
merely requires that I have some cash and somehow feel that he is trustworthy. 
153 Fukuyama argues that the very basis of communal functioning (what he calls “social capital”) is like this 
genetic relation between assuming and personal trusting. That is, a context of “prior moral consensus” – 
commonly shared ethical norms – “gives members of the group a basis for mutual trust,” as well as a good 
reason for mutual reliance. My feeling of confidence in the organization contributes directly to my 
experience of you (who are part of it) as trustworthy; my self-investment in the group can move me to 
being invested in the individual. See Trust, chapter 2: “Scale and Trust,” esp. pp. 26-27. 
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strength and specificity of my assumptions, as well as the possibilities for explaining the situation 
within their specific structure. 
 Furthermore, it has frequently been noticed in the literature that very surprising things 
present themselves as crucial, either in the insight that comes in (dis)trusting or in the decision to 
rely that is in creative tension with that (dis)trust. The person’s deep or superficial resemblance to 
other (dis)trusted persons, her degree of correspondence to the context (out of place or 
belonging), the color of her clothing and level of self-confidence, where and how she stands, etc., 
all may be involved in the insight and the subsequent decision. 
Hence it makes sense to say that the experience of trusting or distrusting really does 
disclose a relation between the stranger and me, one in which I – in who I am, with my assumed 
prejudices, history, and character – am given over to her, in who she presents herself to be; or 
perhaps I am not so given over, for I find her untrustworthy in the way the world shapes itself for 
me around her. Whichever way the situation shows up for me in my emotional insight, it remains 
for me to decide (on the basis of that insight or in the teeth of it) whether or not to rely on her for, 
say, directions to the bus station. 
 
 In this chapter, then, I have shown that the phenomenon of self-investment splits itself up 
into at least three levels, which in turn are both made visible through, and distinguished from one 
another by, the different kinds of betrayal belonging to each of them. Relying has the character of 
deciding in each case and the temporal structure of prior and future checking-up on its objects, 
which may be people, things, or statements. It may be carried out in the mode of being oriented 
toward trust, or in the mode of mistrustful, mere reliance. To it essentially belong concrete 
expectations, which are “betrayed” by being disappointed. Assuming, by contrast, has the 
character of habitual interpretation of the contexts in which I belong (or fail to belong), directed 
toward a feeling of confidence, and the temporal meaning of deferred checking-up on its objects, 
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which are systems, institutions, sets of rules, and other such abstracta. It may be carried out in the 
mode of explicitly taking up some assumption (foreground) or in that of displaying a set of 
assumptions in my life and speech (background). To it essentially belong particular forms of 
coherence for various contexts, which are “betrayed” when I find myself disoriented. Finally, 
trusting proper has the character of a personal emotion that yields an insight into myself and the 
object of my trust or distrust, which can only be a person in her freedom or the world as a whole. 
Its temporal meaning is indefinite openness to the future, directed toward trusting more fully. To 
it belongs a radical giving over of the self to the discretion of the other, which is betrayed 
suddenly and radically, when the one who was once disclosed to me as trustworthy is now given 
as untrustworthy, and the very evidence I previously took as corroborating her trustworthiness is 
reversed in its valence. 
On the basis of this preliminary typology, I am suggesting that trusting proper also 
contains in itself two modes (primitive and personal) that are differentiated by their objects 
(world as such – what we will soon be calling worldhood – and another person, respectively). By 
‘contains in itself’, I mean that these two modes of trust do not differ from one another in the kind 
of betrayal belonging to them. If I am right about that – and I will return to the question 
repeatedly in what follows – then primitive trust is phenomenally most similar to interpersonal 
trust, including in its vulnerability to radical betrayal. 
By approaching the matter phenomenologically, the chapter has also opened the question 
of what generative influence these various levels of self-investment exert on one another in 
concrete situations. That question will emerge in its full importance much later in the course of 
the investigation, when I inquire about the development of primitive trust in the context of 
personal trust for one’s primary caretakers (chapter 6, part II). More immediately, however, I turn 





The Freedom of Being Held in the Truth 
wherein Martin Heidegger’s Account of Originary Truth 
is found to coincide with Primitive Trust 
and yet, oddly, to anticipate its own Betrayal 
 
“[W]e all know […] that the truth can be a terrible thing, 
sometimes too terrible to live with.”154
Introduction 
 
 From the perspective of our ongoing investigation, the main burden of the previous 
chapter was twofold: 1) to establish a phenomenal distinction between background assuming – 
the way we are invested in things like structures or systems – and personal trusting; 2) on that 
basis to show that, particularly in its mode of betrayal, primitive trust shares the phenomenal 
structure of personal trusting rather than that of background assuming. With this in place, there 
are likewise two things to be accomplished in the present chapter. 
The first task is to make at least initially plausible a major claim of this entire 
investigation: that originary truth (the essence or nature of truth), is best thought in terms of the 
kind of primitive trusting laid out in the previous chapter.155 This is the case even when originary 
truth is understood as unconcealment, what Martin Heidegger has called the happening of a 
“clearing for self-concealing [die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen].”156
                                                 
154 Gitta Sereny, Into That Darkness: From Mercy Killings to Mass Murder (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1974), p. 362. The book is an investigative history based around a lengthy series of interviews with Franz 
Stangl, Kommandant of Treblinka. 
 Heidegger himself comes 
close at times to thinking this originary truth as a kind of trust, but I will begin the work of 
developing that thinking more thoroughly. 
155 In chapters 5-7, I will return to the discussion of primitive trusting to explain its genetic relation to 
personal trusting. I will also provide further evidence that originary truth should be understood on the basis 
of this primitive trusting, and I will argue that even what Heidegger calls the event of appropriation (das 
Ereignis) should be thought in this direction. 
156 Heidegger, GA 65:348. Translations from the Beiträge zur Philosophie are my own, but I have been 
greatly aided by consulting Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trs. R. Rojcewicz and D. Vallega-
Neu, op. cit. In the present case, see p. 275. 
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The second task is then to argue that Heidegger fails to carry through such thinking 
because he instead takes originary truth (unconcealment) to be something like what I am calling 
background assuming.157
So, by introducing a distinction between background assuming and trusting proper into 
the context of Heidegger’s thinking, over the course of the next three chapters I will try to show 
that a faithful interpretation of the essence of truth as our primitive relation to being requires a 
critique of Heidegger’s truth-interpretation. My larger contention is that this rethinking can and 
should be carried out by beginning from the phenomena of trust. These chapters will serve that 
argument both by helping us get our bearings with regard to truth and by posing a question about 
just what kind of break from this truth we can suffer, or to what level of betrayal we are exposed. 
 Here I bring to bear the analysis of the modes of betrayal from chapter 
1: I show that Heideggerian unconcealment is a phenomenon that already incorporates and so 
ameliorates its own betrayal, whereas we have seen that the betrayal peculiar to personal trusting 
is less comprehensible because more radical. But this brings to light a basic tension in 
Heidegger’s own thinking about what he calls “the danger [die Gefahr],” which he works out 
only uncertainly and in terms of both modes of betrayal. I will take up this immanent tension later 
(chapter 3, part III). 
 
I. The Parallel Between Primitive Trust and Originary Truth 
Since it is on the basis of my trust analysis in chapter 1 that I intend to question 
Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth, I need to begin by making plausible the relevance of 
a discussion of trust to an account of ontological or originary truth. Then, in part II, I will explain 
at some length how Heidegger’s account of truth as unconcealment involves the sort of 
                                                 
157 As we will see, Heidegger would think of background assuming as ‘the essencing (Wesung) of beyng’ or 
‘the history (Geschichte) of beyng.’ See my discussion in section I.B, below, to which I return at greater 
length in chapter 3, section II.B. 
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reorientation by appeal to a wider context that we have seen to belong to background assuming 
(chapter 1, part II). 
 
    A) Trusting Without Guarantee 
 Earlier (chapter 1, part III), I emphasized that trusting proper is only indirectly voluntary. 
I can try to bring it about, and I can make decisions in order to maintain it, but I have no direct 
control over it. I simply find myself trusting, or I find myself at some level of distrust. We could 
call this the groundlessness or the criterionlessness of trusting proper. It applies to primitive trust 
more obviously, but also to interpersonal trust. The time has come to take up more explicitly what 
this might mean. 
 My claim can be put simply: at the end of the day, there is no sufficient external criterion 
(no justifying ground) to which the experience of trusting can be referred so as to secure it – i.e., 
to ensure that I am right to trust. There may be internal criteria, since trusting proper includes the 
disclosure of what is trusted as trustworthy, but this disclosure in trust takes place prior to any 
inference from external criteria.158
In the strictly interpersonal realm, trusting is not always ethically the right response, as 
Annette Baier has emphasized,
 
159
                                                 
158 Cf. J.M. Bernstein’s account, on which trust “is subject to rational correction and modification, but not 
to rational installation”; it can only operate “as a baseline or primary attitude that does not require 
antecedent justification” (Bernstein, “Trust,” pp. 404-5). 
 so it cannot be a categorically imperative maxim; it is not the 
kind of thing that can be fully submitted to another’s judgment, since I would have to trust or 
distrust that person (and so on to infinity); it is not even the kind of thing that can be chosen on 
the basis of reason or passion (thus not exactly a virtue), for it is already a kind of affective 
159 Trust, like most good things, can be employed toward evil ends, as in the trust that allows a group of 
thieves to work together seamlessly, but the more concerning thing is that an atmosphere of trust can 
conceal exploitation. This point is from Annette Baier, “Trust and Its Vulnerabilities.” Cp. Freud’s 
concerns about loving strangers, and especially about the command to love everyone, in Civilization and Its 




In the realm of primitive trust, at least, no sufficient criterion can be discovered through 
later, thoughtful analysis, either. For here we are asking after the very bedrock itself of 
Wittgenstein’s river (chapter 1, sections II.A and III.B). ‘Why should I trust this?’ is not a 
question that can really be asked of the world as such, since outside of such trusting, there is no 
sufficiently stable and independent self to ask it. This is why René Descartes could only motivate 
his project by working backward from invented doubts, i.e., from what even his meditator 
acknowledged was a way of lying to himself.
 Hence, I am responsible or answerable for it – that is, whom I trust is ultimately not 
up to anyone else or to any externalizable system of deciding – and yet it is only indirectly up to 
me. It is, irreducibly, a manifestation of the structure of the relation between me (in all my 
complexity and history) and the person I am trusting (modified according to the level of 
complexity in her to which I am open, including her trust or distrust of me). This structure is not 
always manifested to me – some third party may see more clearly the level of trust between my 
friend and me – but when it is manifested to me, it is in the personal emotion of trusting. That is 
why there can be no sufficient external criterion for whether I should trust given either before or 
in the event. 
161
 We might take this ultimate groundlessness to be more a feature of human questioning 
than of the world. Hannah Arendt, for example, claims that it is the lack of permanence inherent 
in thinking that means it must always start again from the beginning. That impermanence also 
means, for her, that thinking can go on asking ‘why?’ ad infinitum, seeking ever anew for a 
 
                                                 
160 Cf. my chapter 6, part I, for an account of response as other than active or passive. 
161 “I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, 
by pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary.” Descartes, Meditations 
on First Philosophy, ed./tr. J. Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), p. 15 (= AT VII: 
22). In this way, the world does indeed come to be fundamentally deceitful: 1) what is knowable is what is 
re-presented to himself by a subject; 2) this subject has determined beforehand to lie to himself as a 
meditative exercise, that is, to re-present as a lie whatever is present; therefore, 3) everything that is 
present, that is ‘known,’ can be a lie! 
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beginning that would grant it permanence, in a kind of elaborate self-deception.162 Aristotle, 
likewise, takes knowing when to stop asking backward – recognizing when one has reached the 
genuine sources (arkhai) – to be a matter of intellectual virtue.163
 Yet if we attend to such a regress as a possible first-person experience, as something I 
might endure, we find that precisely the ‘I’ cannot endure it. Aristotle himself indicates this in his 
discussion of the principle of non-contradiction by pointing out that someone who really thought 
that something could be both true and not true with respect to all of the same categories would be 
unable to function.
 Since what is real is so by being 
limited, one must halt the regress at a certain point. Nonetheless, our intellect’s capacity to reach 
back to the sources remains also a capacity to try inappropriately to continue reaching beyond 
those sources. On either account, human questioning would be able in principle to artificially 
produce a certain groundlessness of our trust in the world, despite such primitive trust in fact 
being grounded. 
164
I tried earlier to indicate this relation between self and world through a discussion of 
psychosis, and I shall have to come back later to the justification of those claims.
 That is to say, the structure of our activity in the world displays the very 
sources on which it is based, so that this same structure of the self is what breaks down in the face 
of determined, inappropriately regressive questioning. 
165
                                                 
162 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1 (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace, 1978), chs. 7-10 (esp. pp. 
88-89). 
 For now, the 
crucial point is two-fold: first, that the self is constituted precisely by (or as) primitive trust, as a 
self-investment in the world that is concretely (if not always consciously) an investment in other 
people; second, that the living individual (perhaps even the person, in the Christian meaning of 
that word) can survive a very dramatic break with that primitive trust, although the self strictly 
163 Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ.6, E.1; Ethics A.3, Z.11. 
164 Aristotle, Metaphysics Γ.4. 
165 I began the discussion in chapter 1, section III.C, and I return to it briefly in chapter 4, section I, but the 
bulk of the work constitutes chapter 5. 
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speaking cannot.166 For Heidegger, this break could only be understood as the dissolution of the 
self into inauthentic dispersal among things, wherein the individual is no longer self-governed 
because she is only oriented by what everybody (das Man) does. It would be the maximal 
fragmentation of being-there.167
Such a break, which psychiatry calls “psychotic,” destroys the structured relation 
between self and world (which is, in the first instance, that between the self and others) and in 
doing so destroys both relata for the individual in question.
 
168
                                                 
166 For more on the unity of the self and the individual, in light of the possibility of the former to fall apart 
without the latter (e.g., How are we to understand the phenomenon of people who report experiencing life 
without a core sense of self?), see chapter 5, below. Also cp. Rudolf Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” tr. 
Paul Crowe, Research in Phenomenology 30 (2000): 160-179. 
 Hence what results from the break 
is very far from presenting a coherent alternative to primitive trust, as if psychosis were some 
kind of radicalized skepticism that could call into question the advisability or rationality of 
primitive trusting. Nor can psychosis serve, however, as positive evidence for the appropriateness 
of primitive trust, as if one concluded, ad absurdum, that if psychosis is the only alternative, trust 
is clearly justified. The problem in both cases is that no one is or could be in a position to make 
167 See the introduction to chapter 5, as well as chapter 7, section II.A, for my discussion. 
168 Definitions of psychosis are much-contested in the literature. The DSM-V (from the American 
Psychiatric Association) and the ICD-10 (from the World Health Organization) both rely exclusively on 
symptomatology, except to say that psychosis involves a break with reality. Peter Buckley, in his 
introduction to a volume of Essential Papers on Psychosis, expands this slightly: “Accompanying the loss 
of a capacity to maintain links to reality may be disorganizations of cognition, language, and affect” 
(Essential Papers on Psychosis, ed. P. Buckley [New York: New York University Press, 1988], p. xii). 
Later in the same volume, Edith Jacobson claims that in psychosis “the realistic representations, not only of 
the object world but also of the self as an integrated unity, are apt to break down and to be replaced by 
distorted, unrealistic, delusional concepts. In fact, the psychotic is confused about both, about the objects 
and his own self” (Jacobson, “On Psychotic Identifications,” in Essential Papers on Psychosis, p. 131). 
One group of researchers has recently tried to clarify the Gestalt of psychosis as “being afflicted 
by a radical irrationality, i.e., a serious displacement out of the social consensus” (J. Parnas et al, “The 
Concept of Psychosis,” in Clinical Neuropsychiatry 7.2 (2010): 32-37, quotation from p. 35). We can find a 
summary description of this ‘serious displacement’ in Johan Cullberg’s book Psychoses: “Acute psychoses 
imply a dislocation from the experience of the continuity of the self. The self tries to keep the anxiety-filled 
situation under control and to repair it, through creating a new state of consistency and continuity. [This 
new state is] known as a delusion.” Furthermore: “Acute psychosis implies a linguistic relationship with the 
world [in which] the sufferer [is unable] to relate in the second person: [… t]his ‘you’ relationship, built on 
being able to experience oneself in a trusting relationship with the other, is lacking or denied. Instead, the 
psychotic person lives in a third-person relationship [and is] afraid of being tempted into a trusting 
relationship[,] which is thought of as a trap” (Cullberg, Psychoses: An Integrative Perspective [New York: 
Routledge, 2006], pp. 47-48). 
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such a decision, for the question is an ontological one. We are always169 already constituted either 
as trusting or not, which is just to say that I find myself in every case as already a more or less 
integrated self – or else I do not find myself at all, and this (to varying degrees) disrupts my life as 
a living individual.170
Let me say, as a caveat, that I am not claiming that primitive trusting is a kind of belief 
by virtue of the absurd, as Søren Kierkegaard and others understand faith in God to be. The leap 
that constitutes trusting (whether primitive or interpersonal) has always already been made, and is 
not a relation to a paradox that could be laid before us. If it is an abyss, it stretches behind or 
below us, not ahead. 
 
Furthermore, the fact that there can be no sufficient external criterion does not mean that 
there can be no sufficient internal criteria. There are, of course, many good reasons for me to 
primitively trust in the world and in other people, evidences given me in all of my experiences, 
and these are not just irrelevant. They really do justify my continued trust, albeit post hoc. The 
problem is that if I come under too much pressure, they may all take on a suspicious cast – and 
once they are given as lies, there is not much structural help (though there may be the possibility 
of behavioral modification) in appealing to their legitimacy as criteria. This is because even if 
they remain relevant criteria for me, their valence is now switched. What used to be reliable 
evidence of trustworthiness is now reliable evidence of betrayal. 
                                                 
169 In the phenomenological rather than metaphysical sense of ‘always’: each time I take up the activity of 
investigation, I am already in one or the other. 
170 I do not mean to claim that no one can be in an existential or psychological crisis, so that reasons for 
trusting in the basic goodness of other people and in the coherence of the world might not be 
therapeutically or pastorally useful. This happens frequently, and if such reasons are not sufficiently 
provided, may lead even to the kind of break with reality that I am talking about – a psychotic episode in 
which I fail to find my self in the world. But those reasons can only serve to strengthen an already existing 
(if somewhat shaky at present) trust by calling me to rely in particular instances and then proving faithful. 
They cannot create such trust directly – for what could induce me to trust them (either the reasons or the 
people offering them) if I had no minimal preexisting trust in the world, in other people, and in myself? 
How would I feel their pull as a pull on me? 
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As a third and last caveat, let me insist that the absence of sufficient criteria for primitive 
trust does not imply the absence of normative value in trusting. I am trying to characterize a kind 
of trust that is ontological, but this does not mean either that the failure of such trust (psychosis) 
is somehow equally as valuable as health, or that interpersonal trusting is not of high moral 
worth.171
To put it another way: in what could we be more invested than that there is value in the 
world? Is this not what makes possible any other self-investment?
 Rather, primitive trusting (including its essential bond with trusting at least some 
persons) is the basis for normative value, that which allows for anything else to be coherently 
valuable. 
172 And could there have been a 
point at which we laid out the possibilities side by side – there is value, there is no value – and 
chose one?173
                                                 
171 Though it is not as unambiguously good as some might at first think. 
 It seems to me, contra Nietzsche, that there could not have been. Instead, in any 
given encounter with particular entities, they are given in terms of their (un-)trustworthiness, and 
this can only show up against the background of primitive trust or distrust. The closest I might 
come to such a decision would be the question whether to transfer my trust in a particular person 
to trust in the world as such, as I will revisit in more detail later (chapter 5, part I, and chapter 6, 
part II). Even if that situation places at the core of psychosis some choice to affirm or reject 
trusting, it still presupposes an existing (unchosen) trust, since if I do not trust any person, I 
cannot trust the world. 
172 For Friedrich Nietzsche, perhaps, it would be an error that our kind of life needs. Or else it is due to a 
faith in grammar, in the world as ordered like Western European languages, that holds out the illusory 
promise of genuinely normative values (i.e., a real world-order). Cf. On the Genealogy of Morality, 1st 
essay, §13, and “‘Reason’ in Philosophy,” §5, in Twilight of the Idols. See also my further discussion in 
chapter 5, below. 
173 Cp. Nietzsche’s claim in On the Genealogy of Morality that we would rather will nothingness than not 
will (3rd essay). Since all willing is for him evaluation, positing of values, this is as much as to say that we 
are structurally invested above all else in the project of valuing, i.e., of self-investing in things (or, at the 
limit, in nothingness). Although I do not agree with him that our being is basically willing, nonetheless he 
seems to me to be on to something crucial. 
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 But then we can say that primitive trusting is trusting that entities will somehow show up 
as they are, i.e., in their being. I do not mean that primitive trust forgets about deception or falsity 
– indeed, it is only on the basis of such trust that truth and falsity show up as importantly 
intertwined174 – but merely that primitive trust, like trusting a person, survives through an 
indeterminate number of disappointments and failures without feeling itself betrayed in the strong 
sense. If there can be no sufficient external criterion for primitively trusting what is, and if 
trusting proper discloses both my relation to the one trusted and discloses that one as trustworthy, 
then primitive trusting involves disclosing what is (either as a whole or particular states of affairs) 
as basically trustworthy, as unable to completely dissimulate, even though there is no way 
externally to guarantee this.175
In other words, primitive trusting means finding oneself already invested in the self-
showing of what is, not only relying on but genuinely trusting being to show up in what is (at 
minimum, as a certain kind of order and independence of those entities). It is an unthematized 
recognition of being as not wholly self-concealing, and it is necessary for any coherent activity in 
the shared world.
 We could specify this by saying that such trust opens me to what-
is in a way that lets entities be both minimally coherent (ordered into a world) and yet somehow 
independent of me (not requiring my control). Hence, one can know what is real, but this requires 
allowing things to show themselves, in their ordered relations, rather than measuring them against 
an external standard. 
176
                                                 
174 The paranoiac speaks the truth and regards all opposition as intrinsically false or irrelevant, since there is 
too much at stake if he could be wrong; for the schizophrenic, there is not enough distance from the world 
for truth and falsity (which assume mediation) to matter. Cf. Alphonse De Waelhens, Phenomenology and 
Lacan, pp. 236-243. 
 It impels us into experiencing things (since we cannot determine them in 
175 I think something like this is what the ancient Greeks and the medieval Latins meant in tying together 
being and goodness. 
176 Here I think Heidegger is just right that our everyday activities contain a preliminary understanding of 
being. I think this is also true of the psychotic’s everyday activities, to the extent that they are integrated, 
but that for her the relation to being is the same as the relation to language – both are taken up as a kind of 
game, in which she is not fully invested. Hence, as will become crucial below (chapter 5, part I), she loves, 
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advance), and that experience is primarily given as non-subjective (whatever our subsequent 
doubts may be). 
But the ordered relations between things that primitive trust discloses allow us to 
understand things by referring them to one another or to a whole context in which they belong. In 
other words, such trust opens up meaning. And to be involved with things in a way that allows 
them to serve as normative standards for our interactions with them – such that we can get those 
meaningful referrals wrong but cannot get them wholly wrong – is to be open to those 
interactions as faithful or unfaithful to the standards, as true or false to the things. 
So, one way to put all of this would be to say that primitive trust is what lets one stand 
“in the truth,”177
So far, then, it looks plausible to think that primitive trust names a phenomenon that 
could be called ‘the essence of truth.’ But is this the same phenomenon that Heidegger is after? 
 what lets one be a part of the shared world that grants common, meaningful 
access to particular entities. Primitive trust would then turn out to be a question of the essence (or 
nature) of truth, that which puts us in the truth game, allowing the real to matter to us in terms of 
truth and falsity. It is a question, in other words, of what opens up for us a sufficiently coherent 
world in which we can experience entities (including assertions) as true and false. 
 
    B) Truth Without Guarantee 
I think that it is. Heidegger understands originary truth along lines very similar to those I 
laid out above for primitive trust. Already at the end of §44 of Being and Time, he engages the 
question of an external criterion for truth when he confronts the problem of skepticism. He has 
just been giving a phenomenological account of the experience of propositional truth and asking 
                                                                                                                                                 
hates, and acts, but finds these investments inadequately structured to constitute a trustworthy, shared 
world. 
177 Heidegger, Being and Time (BT) 221-2/263-5. 
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after its ontological ground, when he pauses to ask whether such an investigation does not 
illegitimately presuppose that there is such a thing as truth.178
Although Heidegger himself does not in this text, we might distinguish here two different 
levels of skeptical question. One would be: ‘Why should we think that anything at all is true?’ 
Another would be: ‘Why should we think that we could ever tell if this (statement, say) is true?’ 
 
The latter is a theoretical question about the existence of a criterion for particular 
situations or judgments, though not yet the relatively practical question of what that criterion 
might be. It is epistemological, like asking whether we could ever know a sufficient criterion for 
trusting particular persons. Like Descartes’s meditator, it thus assumes that there is something 
that could justly be called ‘truth’ but worries that we may not have access to it. Falsity might 
carry the day from the outset. 
The former question, by contrast, is much more sweeping. It asks for evidence or 
argument to show that we can and should use ‘true’ itself as a measure for sentences, beliefs, or 
objects. This version of skepticism is ontological,179 like asking whether there is any sufficient 
justification (i.e., criterion) for trusting primitively. It resembles Nietzsche’s movement from 
concern that truth might be founded on lies (metaphors) to concern with the value of truth in the 
first place (i.e., with the will to truth).180
Heidegger’s answer (it is primarily the broader question with which he is concerned) 
turns out to be very similar to the one I gave above for trust: we can only pose such a question 
from the hither side of a fateful (rather than subjective) decision. This involves understanding 
‘decision’ not as something made or taken by a conscious subject, but rather as a crucial parting 
 
                                                 
178 BT 226-7/269-70. 
179 There is also a semantic version that makes (as far as I can tell) no ontological commitment. This is the 
deflationary (or at least disquotational) claim that the predicate ‘is true’ is only a semantic trick of one kind 
or another, since ‘“Snow is white” is true’ has the same fulfillment conditions as ‘Snow is white.’ I have 
addressed similar positions briefly in the Introduction. 
180 Cp. Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” with the third essay (especially §§24ff.) in 
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality. 
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of the ways (a scission) that, in our experience, we only encounter as either already having 
happened or not (hence, as ‘fateful’). “It is not we who presuppose ‘truth’; but it is ‘truth’ that 
makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we [stably] ‘presuppose’ 
anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible [ermöglicht] anything like presupposing.”181
Heidegger must mean that presupposing (voraussetzen), the setting out of principles 
beforehand, only makes sense if there is already a “subject” (who can do the supposing) within a 
world (a meaningful place into which it can be set). But the “subject” within a world, according 
to Heidegger, is not most fundamentally a subject; it is, rather, being-there (Dasein), the entity 
that belongs to being as the place at which the latter shows up or displays itself. And this 
showing-up of being, the opening of a world (i.e., of all-that-is as an intelligible, if not yet fully 
understood, whole), is what Heidegger means by ‘truth’ when it is understood ontologically. 
 
That is why he claims in the Contributions to Philosophy that this ontological version of 
truth, ‘the truth of beyng’ (which is no longer truth in the sense of true propositions about beyng, 
but rather truth in the sense of beyng’s self-showing), admits of no external determination (or 
external criterion). “But from where is the essence of this truth [of beyng] and with it the essence 
of truth as such supposed to be able to be determined other than from out of beyng itself?”182
                                                 
181 BT 227-8/270-1, original italics. 
 This 
claim requires quite a bit of explanation, some of which cannot be fully developed until we have 
established more context (chapter 3, section II.B). Let me begin with the term ‘beyng,’ in its 
archaic spelling. 
182 Heidegger, GA 65:92, my emphasis. Cf. Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), p. 73, trans. mod. 
Along with some sections of Meditation (Besinnung, 1938-39), the Contributions (1936-38) are 
the most controversial and interesting of Heidegger’s many engagements with the nature of truth between 
Being and Time (1927) and the publication in 1943 of a much-reworked essay, “On the Essence of Truth.” I 
deal with the latter essay at some length later in the present chapter (section II.C, below) and more briefly 
with the relevant discussions in the Nietzsche lectures in the next chapter. I also make occasional reference 
to Heidegger’s other major discussions of the problem in the intervening years: “The Origin of the Work of 
Art” and “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” as well as lecture courses on The Essence of Truth (delivered twice), 
Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic”, Parmenides, and The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic. 
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I follow Richard Polt, among others, by interpreting being (spelled in the usual way) as 
the patterned givenness of the whole of what is. He calls it “the difference it makes that there is 
something rather than nothing,”183 or the import of things – where ‘import’ sums up both the 
meaning (i.e., in-principle intelligibility) of those things and their importance (i.e., they matter; 
they are not nothing).184 If, in an everyday way, we encounter the whole of what is as a kind of 
element in which we move, a space of familiarity,185 then that space is articulated according to 
more and less crucial differences. Being is the pattern according to which we always already find 
some differences marked as (obviously) mattering more and others less; it is the particular, a 
priori way in which what is can show up compellingly. It thus makes things accessible as things 
that are (in the double sense just given to ‘import’), i.e, as entities.186
As the double sense of ‘import’ shows, being for Heidegger is not reducible to meaning, 
since something can matter to me precisely as exceeding my understanding, and indeed every real 
thing is given as resistant to my understanding it, even if also as, in principle, partially 
intelligible. By the same token, however, being is not simply independent of meaning, since the 




Furthermore, this a priori pattern, which is the source of things’ meaningfulness, can 
itself be given to us in a thoughtful experience, as happens when philosophy considers the 
 Even things that are given as mattering but beyond my understanding show up 
in a negative relation to that pattern, as exceeding it. 
                                                 
183 Richard Polt, The Emergency of Being, p. 28. 
184 Ibid., p. 60. Polt also coins the term ‘ways-of-sense’ and refers us to the ancient Greek word ‘dynamis’ 
to try to say what Heidegger is getting at with ‘being.’  
185 Ibid., p. 25. 
186 ‘What is’ (das Seiende, ‘entities,’ or ‘things’ in a broad sense), according to Heidegger, includes “not 
only the actual of any sort, but at the same time the possible, the necessary, and the accidental, everything 
that stands in beyng in any way whatsoever, even including negativity and nothingness” (GA 
65:74/Contributions 59). I mostly write ‘what is’ (and sometimes hyphenate it to avoid syntactic confusion) 
to preserve its singular, collective sense. 
187 See chapter 4, section III, below, for more on this as a contentious reading of Heidegger. Richard 
Capobianco and Thomas Sheehan have been the major players in a debate about the meaning of ‘being’ for 
at least a decade. 
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metaphysical categories within which it moves. We can then – although mostly we do not – ask 
about the source of this givenness, what could be called being’s own givenness. That source, the 
giving of being, is what Heidegger names ‘beyng’ (Seyn), making use of the older German 
spelling of ‘being’ (Sein) in order to indicate that asking about beyng requires asking “further 
back,” as it were, but does not thereby require asking about something else.188 (Heidegger also 
refers to this giving as ‘being itself.’) As Polt puts it, beyng names “the contingent happening of 
[…] import […] – the making of the difference between something and nothing – the giving of 
the being of beings.”189
We might say, then, that being, the patterned givenness of what is, designates in part 
what the discipline of metaphysics primarily investigates. It is, for example, what marks out 
essential traits from incidental, focuses on things as primary over relations, and attends to 
modality, realness, and so on. Translating Aristotle’s ousia quite literally (the abstract version of 
the participle for ‘to be,’ ousa), Heidegger refers to all of this as the beingness of what is (die 
Seiendheit des Seiendes). 
 
In contrast to the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger asks about the source of this 
givenness, which is also necessarily a question about the source of our receptivity to it. How is it 
that we can be struck by this patterning itself as strange or – most especially – as changing 
through different times or cultures? Why is it not simply always obvious? What unifies the 
various categories, modalities, and so forth in which being shows up? In what light (or, rather, in 
what cleared space that first lets in light) can being show up as such, and not only as the a priori 
structure within which what is can matter to us? He refers to this source variously as the meaning, 
the essence, the truth, or even the place of being, as well as naming it ‘beyng.’ 
                                                 
188 Ibid., p. 58. We can imitate Heidegger by using an archaic spelling of being in English: namely, beyng. 
189 Ibid., p. 61. 
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We shall have to come back to all of this in more detail (chapter 3, section II.B), but for 
now let us simply assert that Heidegger finds a hidden unity in the various a priori patterns that 
have unfolded in Western European history. (These would include understanding the being of 
what-is as logos or idea, understanding it as being-created by God, or understanding it as merely 
the value of a variable in a logical expression.) He then tries to interpret this historical unity as 
being’s own “essencing,” by which he means its essence (Wesen) inflected verbally: understood 
as a sort of essential unfolding (Wesung) or a unifying that cuts across chronological history. It is 
simply the concealed, structural unity of these different ways in which things can be understood 
as essential, but that unity is itself interpreted as happening in history, indeed as forming a kind of 
alternate history. We could say that it comprises what most importantly or most really happens 
(Geschehen) in chronological history (Historie), and therefore name it, following Heidegger, 
simply ‘history’ (Geschichte).190
For Heidegger to say, then, that both the essence (or, verbally, the essencing) of the truth 
of beyng and the essence of truth itself must be determined (bestimmen) from out of beyng, this 
cannot mean ‘derived from,’ as if we had a conceptual grasp of beyng which then yielded a 
coordinate concept of truth. Instead, it means something more like a structured link or relation 
between beyng (as the historical transformations of the basic meanings of being) and the 
correlative transformations of the essence of truth as a manner of disclosure.
 
191
                                                 
190 Geschichte also means ‘story,’ so there is a sense here of locating the “plot” in history. For more on this 
alternate history, see chapter 3, section III.D.3. 
 This, too, I will 
develop later (chapter 3, section II.B). For now, let me say something about how Heidegger 
understands essences, since we have begun speaking of ‘the essence of beyng’ (which seems at 
191 Being-there (in my usage, at least) is thus the place at which beyng shows itself in some one 
constellation or pattern for what is – i.e., shows itself as being. Beyng is not just the same as the belonging-
together of being and thinking (that would be too easy), but it is what is granted to thinking in the event 
(das Ereignis) that allows being and thinking to belong together (by appropriating them to one another). 
See chapter 3, part II, for further elaboration. 
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first nonsensical), and since such an investigation will make clearer why he thinks there can be no 
external criterion for the essence of truth. 
According to Heidegger, phenomenological inquiry (and especially the inquiry into the 
essence of truth) shows us that essence is only derivatively what something is, as answering 
Socrates’ question, what is it? (ti esti). Primarily, the ‘essentiality’ of essence refers to how a 
phenomenon shows up. So, instead of looking for some permanently enduring thing (a universal 
kind, a form, a common property holding of various instances, or even the Neo-Kantian 
transcendental condition of possibility192) to which we should refer this particular as its essence, 
phenomenology would have us look for the modes of unfolding that emerge as central to this 
particular phenomenon (one might say: how it essentially unfolds). “If we speak of the ‘essence 
[Wesen] of a house’ and the ‘essence of a state,’ we do not mean a generic type [das Allgemeine 
einer Gattung]; rather we mean the ways in which house and state prevail [walten], maintain 
themselves, unfold and pass away – it is how they essence [wesen].”193 From this verbal sense of 
essence, we can in many cases derive a general kind, but that is not the primary meaning of 
‘essence.’ Instead of looking to something permanent that governs the thing’s movement, then, 
Heidegger locates the essence of the phenomenon in the unity internal to the movement itself.194
For this reason, Heidegger can claim that the history of beyng (Seynsgeschichte) is not 
something other than beyng itself in its essencing (Wesung), its essential unfolding or happening. 
 
                                                 
192 Cp. Heidegger’s marginal note from 1954, situated at the beginning of “On the Essence of Truth”: 
“Essence: (1) quidditas [quiddity] – the ‘what’ – koinon [what is common]; (2) enabling [Ermöglichung] – 
condition of possibility; (3) ground of enabling.” Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” in 
Pathmarks, ed. W. McNeill (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,  1998), p. 136/GA 9:177. 
193 Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, tr. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 30, trans. mod. Hereafter: QCT. Cf. GA 
7:31. Heidegger adds here that the verbal sense of wesen includes lasting or enduring (währen), which 
ancient Greek philosophy interpreted as permanence rather than as verweilen, tarrying for a while, and so 
looked for essences that could not be subject to becoming. 
194 Cf. Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), pp. 114-
15: “Heidegger […] equates the operation of essence with movement as such” and “shift[s] the questioning 
from the what of metaphysics to the how of pre-metaphysical thought. For this is how verbs are qualified: 
not nominally, but adverbially.” 
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Beyng is not an entity to which history could happen; it is not a substance persisting through 
change. Beyng becomes available only as history, as the immanent phenomenological unity of 
being’s own transformations. Thus, “the truth of beyng is nothing at all distinct from beyng, but 
rather its ownmost essence [Wesen].”195
But how a phenomenon shows up (or is enabled to show up) is not only dependent on 
that phenomenon itself; it depends also on us, and indeed on our own modes of openness. Thus 
the being or essencing of a thing may change chronologically, albeit within certain bounds set by 
the thing itself (the moon appears quite different to us now than to the ancients who thought it a 
goddess, but it is not as if they lacked experience of the moon itself); thus also our access to the 
thing’s being is irreducibly conditioned by our disposition, our (historically and culturally 
conditioned) familiarity with or way of encountering phenomena. This is why Heidegger can 
refer to essence as “a way of disclosing that destines [eine geschickhafte Weise des 
Entbergens]”
 There is no external essence, no criterion, that could be 
given independently of that history, or against which moments of that history could be measured. 
196 us to identify certain features of phenomena as essential. As Mark Wrathall 
articulates it, “the essence of a thing is given by that in the light of which it is brought into 
unconcealment.”197
It seems to me that this is what licenses Heidegger’s frequent ‘negative mode’ analysis – 
wherein a phenomenon can belong essentially to that of which it is a privation – and even opens 
the door to what he calls “the proper non-essence [das eigentliche Unwesen]”
 
198
                                                 
195 GA 65:93/Contributions 74. For more explanation, see section II.C of the present chapter and chapter 3, 
section II.B, below. 
 of a 
phenomenon. Our preliminary investigation of trust by way of betrayal (chapter 1) provides a 
good example here. If there is a mode of disclosure within which a phenomenon belongs – its 
196 GA 7:30/QCT 29, trans. mod. 
197 Mark A. Wrathall, Heidegger and Unconcealment (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2011), p. 31. 
198 GA 9:194, 197/Pathmarks 148, 150. 
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essence – there will also be a peculiar mode of concealment for that same phenomenon. This 
concealment is the non-essence that belongs to it, as the various kinds of betrayal belong to the 
various phenomena of self-investment. Betrayal is precisely not trust, and yet, as nonetheless 
proper to trust, it indicates the field in which trust can appear essentially. 
What falls out of all of this is that Heidegger claims that we do not come to know 
essences primarily through definitions, or really through learning any kind of proposition at all.199 
Nor do we get there by abstracting such a definition from various examples. How would we 
decide what counted as an example if we did not already have some glimpse of the essence?200
Heidegger clarifies: “The essence is not manufactured [angefertigt], but it is also not 
randomly encountered [angetroffen] like a single thing at hand [ein vorhandenes einzelnes 
Ding].”
 
Instead, he describes grasping an essence as a kind of bringing-forth (Hervor-bringung) or 
productive seeing (Er-sehen), without thereby understanding it as arbitrary (or as a product of 
social agreement). It must somehow be limited by the matter (die Sache) being grasped, but it 
cannot be compared to any external criterion. The bringing-forth of the essence is precisely what 
first sets up a standard or criterion, against which purported examples can then be measured. It is 
the recognition of a central pattern in experience. 
201 The originary grounding of the essence is, rather, a seeing that leads what is essential 
to the phenomenon out of its concealment, i.e., it uncovers the phenomenon as such. Crucially, 
this means that “knowledge of essence, if it is to be communicated [zur Mit-teilung kommen], 
must itself be accomplished anew by the one who is to take it up [aufnehmen].”202
                                                 
199 What Heidegger does with tautologies is rather different, but I cannot go into it here. 
 In order to 
grasp the essence, I must have an insight, get it for myself, and this is an unconcealing of what 
was previously hidden from me. We may do this in a way that soon subsides into the background 
200 Heidegger works out this argument in Basic Questions of Philosophy/GA 45, §20-24. 
201 GA 45:85-6/Basic Questions 77. 
202 GA 45:87/Basic Questions 78. 
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of our activities, in which case it is the gaining of a certain familiarity (Kenntnis) – thus we all are 
familiar with the essences of any number of entities that we learned as children and/or deal with 
frequently. But we may also do it more explicitly, thoughtfully, and then we gain knowledge 
(Erkenntnis or Wissen) of the essence. 
Here, especially, is where phenomenology finds its work. And because the essence must 
be posited anew for each thinker, seen in a way that brings forth what was unseen, the productive 
seeing of an as-yet-unseen essence may also be called ‘thinking the unthought.’ From this 
perspective, we may understand why Heidegger spends so much of his work asking about the 
essence of this or that phenomenon: that is precisely the task of the philosopher, who “is a thinker 
only if he is this kind of seer.”203
But if all thoughtful grasping of essences happens in this way, does not the 
criterionlessness I have claimed for primitive trust simply place it among the ranks of any number 
of other phenomena? It does not. Primitive trust, which discloses a minimal, mind-independent 
order among phenomena, is what enables us to bring forth the essence as stable. It opens the 
space in which such essences can be productively seen (Er-sehen). By attending to its betrayal, 
we can address this trust as if from the outside, encounter it as a phenomenon with its own 
essence, but we always do so already from within it, since it is that by which phenomenality can 
occur. 
 
Finally, since bringing forth a previously unseen essence is a way of belonging to 
being,204 and since it involves precisely drawing something out of concealment (i.e., un-
concealment), we may also understand, at least preliminarily, why Heidegger claims in the 
Contributions that “the truth of beyng is the beyng of truth.”205
                                                 
203 GA 45:94/Basic Questions 84. 
 In other words, beyng’s essence, 
204 “Knowledge of essence [Wesenswissen] creates precisely belonging to being…” GA 45:87/Basic 
Questions 78. 
205 GA 65:95/Contributions 75. 
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that in the light of which beyng may be experienced, is nothing other than the essencing of truth 
as unconcealment, i.e., as the concealing/revealing interplay according to which unconcealment 
happens. 
 
    C) Truth and Trust for Heidegger 
But if I am right in proposing that what I describe as primitive trust is the same 
phenomenon that Heidegger names ‘truth’ (or: ‘the essence of truth’), i.e., that which opens a 
minimally coherent world without appeal to an external criterion,206 my proposal should be borne 
out by his explicit discussion of truth in terms of something like trust. The bulk of this discussion 
also takes place in the Contributions, at the end of a long portion devoted to thinking the essence 
of truth.207
 In the previous paragraph (§236), Heidegger has already indicated the level at which he 
wishes to inquire: how is it that we come to stand in the essence of truth? Is there such a thing as 
truth? If so, why and how?
 In §237, he looks for the appropriate way to speak about our essential standing in the 
truth: is that stance a kind of faith or belief (Glaube)? Or a kind of knowledge (Wissen)? Is the 
tradition (e.g., Plato, Thomas Aquinas, Hegel, Kierkegaard) correct to assume that faith and 
knowledge are both ways of possessing what is true, so as then to argue about which way is better 
or more basic? Or are belief and knowledge at this fundamental level less like possessions and 
more like ways of belonging? 
208
                                                 
206 Note that the question of a coherent world is ontological, not primarily about the ontic coherence of 
one’s beliefs, which is why Heidegger’s account cannot be straightforwardly a coherence theory of truth. 
 The paragraph, as I read it, attends carefully to the reflexive 
question that bedevils any account of truth – is this account of truth (as, say, the clearing for self-
207 There are a few other scattered mentions of trusting with which I will deal at various points in the course 
of the larger investigation. See chapter 3, below, for discussion of “The Question Concerning Technology,” 
the lecture course Basic Concepts, and “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” See chapter 7 
for discussion of the Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and “A Dialogue 
on Language.” Finally, see both chapters 3 and 7 for discussion of the lecture courses Nietzsche and What 
Calls for Thinking? 




As we saw in Being and Time, Heidegger again locates the difficulty in discovering what 
such a question presupposes, on what basis it rests. It seems, as Heidegger points out, that any 
why-question (including: ‘Why think that truth exists?’) rests already on the assumption that there 
is some truth – whatever its character may be – something to be found out by the questioning. It is 
also motivated by some investment in this thing to be found out. We could ask, in other words, 
“whether it is not the case that in the question ‘Why truth?’ truth lets itself unfold as the ground 
of the ‘why’ and thus lets itself be determined in its essence.”
 We saw an example of this just above: if I claim that knowing the 
truth means getting it right, how can I ever know that I have gotten this claim itself right? What 
could provide a criterion? 
210
Heidegger does not wish to break out of this circle since, as I argued earlier (section I.A), 
it is not the kind of circle that could be escaped. Rather, he wants to figure out how to understand 
that knowledge (Wissen) of truth that must be already assumed in any question about it. Is it 
really knowledge? Although whatever is happening here remains obscure, nevertheless it is clear 
that there is something going on: as he puts it, there seems to be something like a “between” 
(Zwischen) unfolding between us and beyng, some realm in which we stand that is external 
neither to beyng nor to us, but essentially belongs to the very occurring or happening of beyng.
 In asking ‘why,’ we already 
assume certain criteria for what could count as an answer. But that means that we already know 
what truth is, even if only imprecisely, since we have already determined what kind of thing can 
count as a true answer. 
211
                                                 
209 Cp. the various paradoxes, especially (but not only) the Liar, around which so much theorization of the 
truth-predicate turns in the contemporary analytic philosophical discussion. I have addressed these briefly 
in the Introduction, part II, above. See Kevin Scharp, Replacing Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), for reflections on such paradoxes and their consequences for theories of truth. 
 
This is a way of saying that in our activities amidst things, our dwelling in language, our 
210 GA 65:367/Contributions 290. 
211 GA 65:368/Contributions 290. See also the discussion of possibility in chapter 3, section III.C, below. 
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perceptual sensitivity to both the visible and the invisible (where the latter is the context for, or 
what is implied in, the visible), and our affective attunement, we seem to have access not only to 
things but to their being. Our very involvements in the world already provide questions with a 
space within which they can move; this space is both the friction that lets them grip things at all 
and their necessary orientation toward the specific phenomena in question. We find ourselves 
receptive to being, which means that we and being’s source (beyng) somehow belong together, as 
if we dwelt within the same element. It is only from out of this “between” that may or may not be 
“knowledge” that we (quite innocently) can ask our questions about truth, no matter how 
skeptical those questions may be.212
I take this to mean that Heidegger himself is looking for an appropriate way to name our 
most fundamental receptivity to what-is in its being. We should not fail to appreciate that in this 
context he directly considers something akin to trust. 
 
To find an answer to his question, he begins with a fairly typical characterization of 
believing as holding something to be true or deeming it true (Für-wahr-halten). To “believe” in 
this sense, then, is to adopt (aneignen) for oneself whatever is true so as to concur (zustimmen) 
with it.213 It deals with things that are true (propositions, sentences, particular beings, etc.) rather 
than truth itself as such.214
This first sense of ‘belief’ is often governed by a particular conception of knowledge as a 
kind of possession, the constant or consistent having of a (correct) mental representation 
 
                                                 
212 Plato’s Socrates occasionally (cf. Meno) characterizes this “between” as, on one side, the participation 
(metexis) in the Ideas of everything that in any way is, and, on the other side, our having been exposed to 
the Ideas in their purity before this life – although the trauma of birth was such as to make us forget that 
pure exposure. (We might ask, with Freud, whether this would be a simple forgetting or an anguished 
refusal to remember, but that is for chapter 6.) 
213 Notice that Heidegger does not speak here only of beliefs about things, or, in other words, only of 
beliefs as propositions or mental representations. The possibilities of intentional comportment that would 
count as believing are left open in this regard, so that although Heidegger’s goal does seem to include 
persuading us to stop philosophically thinking of knowing as a form of correct representation, he need not 
also claim that we should stop taking everyday beliefs as ways of holding things to be true. 
214 GA 65:368/Contributions 291. 
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(Vorstellung) of a state of affairs. I say ‘governed by’ because belief here turns out to be one form 
of knowledge, even if (as on Plato’s divided line) it is a deficient form. On this account, we 
merely believe that for which we do not or cannot have proof; or, in more contemporary 
language, each of us possesses a whole range of beliefs (or views), some of which are true, and 
some subset of these latter count as knowledge because they are properly warranted or justified. 
‘Knowing,’ in this initial sense of having the right representations for the right reasons, 
likewise deals only with things that are true (die Wahren: in this case, representations). It must 
assume some prior familiarity – though this need not be explicit – with the criterion for truth so as 
to be able to deal with truths. From this perspective, Heidegger acknowledges, the phenomenon 
of our primitive relation to the truth “is obviously not a ‘knowing’ but rather a ‘believing’.”215 We 
merely believe (also in the initial sense) that there must be truth and that it has a certain character, 
beliefs that certainly cannot be proven.216
Nonetheless, Heidegger claims, this familiarity with the nature of truth can also be 
considered a deeper, more authentic (eigentlich: in the sense of ‘more appropriate for our way of 
being’ or ‘more our own’) knowing (Wissen), the kind of knowing that the whole of the 
Contributions is trying to work out.
 
217 Such knowledge “knows the essence of truth and 
consequently, in the turning [Kehre], is first determined from out of this essence itself.”218
                                                 
215 GA 65:369/Contributions 291. 
 
216 In Aristotelian terms: there can be no demonstrative knowledge (epistēmē) of the first principles 
(arkhai), but there must be some other way of knowing them (gnorizein) [Aristotle, Metaph. E.1, Post. An. 
A.10, B.19]. That is, we have to get our initial premises from somewhere, and it cannot be from the 
conclusion of some other argument. 
 It is not yet clear to me whether Aristotle would agree with my attempt to characterize this 
originary openness or receptiveness as a particular kind of trust, pistis (on this, see Claudia Baracchi, 
Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy, in which she claims that for Aristotle we must trust both sensation 
and the apparent teleological structure of the world), but Aristotle is certainly after the same phenomenon 
in his account of nous, the capacity to receive what is evident. 
217 Cf. §2, among other places: “the truth of beyng – for the thinker [denkerisch] it is indwelling/enabling 
knowledge [inständliche Wissen] of how beyng essences [west]” (GA 65:6-7/Contributions 8, trans. mod.). 
218 GA 65:368/Contributions 291. 
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Knowledge in this second, more originary sense does not deal with what is true (das Wahre) but 
with the essence or nature of truth itself (die Wahrheit).219
I shall return to how Heidegger thinks this essence in my discussion of unconcealment 
(part II, below), but for now the crucial thing is that truth for Heidegger is not primarily a 
criterion that could be applied (like correspondence, coherence, or even correctness more 
generally). It is, rather, a receptivity that must be lived: a familiarity with the criterion for truth 
and with the phenomena that can be compared with that standard. This trusting receptivity can 
then be taken up authentically – we might say, thoughtfully – in which case it becomes 
knowledge in the second sense, or it may be simply lived through thoughtlessly, as we mostly do 
(inauthentically). But then any explicit knowing of this essence of truth first requires being tacitly 
determined by it, being invested by it, so that what it is to be myself is determined (bestimmt) by 
that essence. Rather than holding some thing to be true (‘belief’ in the sense of Für-wahr-halten), 
this second kind of believing is holding oneself and being held (Sichhalten) in the essence of 
truth. More briefly put: it is abiding in the truth.
 
220
What I proposed in my first chapter to call ‘assuming’ (chapter 1, part II), Heidegger 
thinks here as a sort of persistence or endurance, a holding-out (Aushalten) against the intrinsic 
tendency to cover up or forget about the essence of truth in favor of attending to what is true. 
 This abiding, as tacit familiarity, is thus more 
originary than any particular belief, and attending to it explicitly is more originary than any other 
knowledge. For how could one hold a belief about the truth of this or that claim without tacitly 
assuming some meaning of ‘true’? And how could one hold any belief (where ‘belief’ is still 
understood as a comportment: a holding to be true), regardless of its content, without tacitly 
assuming that truth and falsity (in the sense of getting it right) matter, that they are of essential 
import? 
                                                 




Such persistence is knowledge not in the sense of a mental representation but in the sense of 
staying with a given projection despite or in the midst of realizing that the projection is 
ungrounded – that it has and can have no external criterion.221
Heidegger admits that knowing in this second sense (explicitly abiding/persisting in the 
face of the ungroundedness of the essence of truth) could also be called believing or faith (if we 
wished to humor the perspective of the first kind of knowledge),
 (A projection in this sense is a 
meaning or a pattern that I do not project as a subject but into which I find myself thrown as the 
basis of any ‘subjective’ activity.) 
222 since it cannot be 
demonstrated or secured – but this would have to be ‘belief’ in a second sense, as well: believing 
as holding oneself in the truth (Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten).223
The specific way in which we can explicitly abide, he thinks at this point – the way in 
which we hold ourselves or are held in primitive receptivity to the essence of truth – is by 
questioning any particular determination of that essence that would claim to be grounded (rather 
than without ground, i.e., abyssal). Hence, we could say that “[q]uestioners of this kind are the 
originary and authentic believers”: they are those who take truth itself seriously “von Grund 
aus,”
 Thus, we can see that his strategy 
turns out to involve working out two phenomenologically distinct senses for each term, 
‘believing’ (Glauben) and ‘knowing’ (Wissen), with an eye to their dependence on one another 
and their relation to standing in the truth. Knowing and believing, at a sufficiently fundamental 
level, are seen to be the same: a certain way of abiding in or belonging to the world as ordered. 
224
                                                 
221 Ibid. 
 which means taking the essence of truth as the (itself ungroundable) ground of particular 
truths, understanding truths from out of that essence rather than generalizing from particular 
truths to a common ‘essence’ of truth. Heidegger claims that this persistent attending to the way 
222 Compare Merleau-Ponty on perceptual faith in The Visible and the Invisible, esp. pp. 3-6, 11-14. 
223 GA 65:369/Contributions 291. 
224 GA 65:369/Contributions 292. 
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that truth unfolds, without trying to ground it or explain it away, is precisely a continual stance of 
questioning, an abiding or dwelling ‘in the truth.’225
 
  
II. Concealment as both Constitutive of and Subversive of the Truth 
“Yet the decisive question must search for the originary unity of disclosure and concealment.”226
 
 
 It should by now be at least plausible that both primitive trust and Heidegger’s ‘essence 
of truth’ name immersion in (and receptivity to) the self-showing of being. As the foundation for 
all other comportments that are organized within the world, this phenomenon cannot be 
guaranteed by any external criterion, nor can it be appropriately conceptualized as a 
generalization from particular truths.227
Let us take our cue from the beginning of this investigation, in which the peculiarities of 
primitive trust showed up through our attention to modes of betrayal (chapter 1). This suggests 
that we take the seeming inaccessibility of the truth phenomenon as an initial clue. In this, we 
follow Heidegger’s own attempt to let things show themselves: in Being and Time (1927), the 
matter provoking Heidegger’s thinking is the perpetual overlooking or forgetting (die 
Vergessenheit) of the question of being. By the time of “On the Essence of Truth” (written 1930, 
revised and published 1943), he ontologizes this very forgetting: truth contains a negation, a not-
 It is, rather, our access to the minimally coherent, shared 
world as such. But this seems to make it very hard to talk about. How do we have any access to 
what in the first place grants access of any kind – i.e., to the truth as a phenomenon? Is the 
supposed perspicuity of being in fact inaccessible from the start? 
                                                 
225 See below, chapter 7, for my discussion of Heidegger’s realization that originary receptivity must be 
listening rather than questioning. Both questioning and listening are ways of taking as granted rather than 
only for granted. 
226 Heidegger, Basic Principles of Thinking, in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, tr. A.J. Mitchell (Indiana 
University Press, 2012), p. 130/GA 79:138. This text includes two lecture cycles referred to in what 
follows: Insight Into That Which Is – for which I will simply refer to the individual lectures – and Basic 
Principles of Thinking (BPT). 
227 Cp. Tarski’s Convention T and most of the analytic philosophical literature on truth, which begins from 
instances of true (often tautological) assertions in an attempt to arrive at the relation common to all of them. 
Alfred Tarski, “The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics,” Philosophy and 




One way in which we experience this negation is in precisely the forgetting that 
Heidegger had investigated earlier (which he now calls ‘errancy,’ die Irre).
 which he elsewhere calls ‘abandonment by being’ (Seinsverlassenheit). 
Let me concentrate on what can be drawn from these two sources. 
229
How can Heidegger say that both hiding and opening up are essential to truth? By 
demanding that we think from and continually along with a first-person experience of the matter 
at hand, Heidegger seeks the phenomenological essence of truth (cf. section I.B): not a common 
and peculiar property of all truths – not even their common Idea as revealed by imaginative 
variation – but rather the unity from which or in light of which the phenomenon of truth becomes 
available for experience. 
 This forgetting 
turns out to be more than a merely accidental error on our part; rather, just avoiding erring 
altogether is impossible, as we shall see, since errancy marks the finitude of being. Forgetting is 
thus a necessary part of the unitary phenomenon that he names ‘unconcealment.’ That 
phenomenon, in its most originary unfolding, includes both light and dark, both truth and untruth; 
that is, it essentially includes both un-concealment (a-lētheia) and the concealment to which it 
refers (lēthē), from which it is drawn. 
Here a reminder is in order. One of the basic tenets of (and motivations for) 
phenomenology is that phenomena are wholes irreducible to their constituent parts. Another is 
that the parts may or may not bear a causal relation to the whole. Thus, for example, the layered 
phenomenon of hearing a bear growl is not reducible to raw sense data plus a causal process of 
                                                 
228 “The concealment of what is as a whole, un-truth proper, is older than every openedness of this or that 
entity. It is older even than letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds-concealed and comports itself 
to concealing.” GA 9:193-4/Pathmarks 148, trans. mod. See also: “Truth, in its essence, is un-truth” (“The 
Origin of the Work of Art,” in Basic Writings, rev./exp. edition, ed. D.F. Krell [San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1993], p. 179; GA 5:41); the claim is repeated in the (roughly contemporaneous) 
Contributions, “The essence of truth is un-truth,” with the clarification that “negativity belongs to [gehört 
zu] truth” (GA 65:356/Contributions 281). 




compilation or organization into the meaning of a bear’s growl. Nor is it reducible to 
apprehension of a background situation (campsite in the woods… food not yet hung from a tree… 
night falling…) plus a foreground noise, which I would again put together into understanding the 
whole as a bear’s growl. Rather, what is given in the experience – what I nervously hear – is 
already as it were synthetic: I hear a bear’s growl (or, perhaps, something that I can’t quite 
identify but that sounds uncomfortably like a growling bear). That remains the basic 
phenomenon, even though I can also analyze it into parts: for example, what makes it possible 
(the background of the situation, including my expectations), with what moods and emotions it is 
shot through (fear, excitement), the particular tonalities of the sensory input (pitch, length, 
nearness to my tent), and so on. Above all, it is not the case that there is first a fully independent 
object upon which I would then layer a set of background conditions, a mood, and an 
interpretation, as if these latter could be removed and something intact left over for me.230
When I speak of a phenomenological structure, then, I mean this given unity of multiple 
moments that can be encountered by attending to what unfolds in one’s experience. Heidegger, 
for example, characterizes his account of being-there (from Being and Time) as the articulation of 
just such a structure. In the Zollikon Seminars, he claims that Kant’s ‘analytic’ in The Critique of 
Pure Reason “is not a reduction into elements, but the articulation of the unity of a composite 
structure [Strukturgefüge]. This is also the essential factor in my concept of the ‘analytic of 
 
                                                 
230 This is in no way to say that I create the bear or its growling. Indeed, the ways in which the bear is 
independently of my presence in its terrain show up all too clearly, precisely in the phenomenon of its 
growl – the noise is given as the noise of a powerful, potentially dangerous thing with its own desires and 
tendencies of movement, both of which are mostly unknown to me. I even experience, with trepidation, the 
difference between my imaginative projections (about what the bear must be wanting or is likely to do) and 
whatever it really is wanting and likely to do. In short, what is real is given to me through this fear, through 
the typical ways of making camp, through my relative inexperience with bears, through my sense of 
hearing that has been sharpened by a few days out in the woods, etc. These are not optional addenda to the 




This must be kept in mind in the following analysis of unconcealment. The basic 
phenomenon, according to Heidegger, is a complex but irreducible happening, in which an entity 
(a situation that matters and is perhaps accessible to interpretation) is made available, opened up 
for my comportment toward it, precisely through the withdrawal (or self-concealment) of what 
makes it available. This relation of withdrawal is not a causal relation, since it must be already in 
place if we are to discover any causal relations. (The entity toward which I am able to comport 
myself could, for example, be itself a causal relation.) It is, rather, a phenomenal relation, one that 
need not be posited or presupposed because it can be allowed to show itself. 
 Phenomenological analysis, in this sense, maintains a reference to the whole in every 
articulation of the separate moments. 
Heidegger’s strategy of attending to what withdraws will be clearer if I crystallize it 
around a couple of everyday phenomena that are central to his work. Jean-Paul Sartre has left us a 
beautiful example in his description of entering a café: 
I have an appointment with Pierre at four o’clock. I arrive at the café a quarter of an hour late. 
Pierre is always punctual. Will he have waited for me? I look at the room, the patrons, and I say, 
“He is not here.” […] When I enter this café to search for Pierre, there is formed a synthetic 
organization of all the objects in the café, on the ground of which Pierre is given as about to 
appear. […] I am witness to the successive disappearance of all the objects which I look at – in 
particular of the faces, which detain me for an instant (Could this be Pierre?) and which as quickly 
decompose precisely because they “are not” the face of Pierre. […] But now Pierre is not here. 
This does not mean that I discover his absence in some precise spot in the establishment. In fact 
Pierre is absent from the whole café […, which] makes itself ground for a determined figure; it 
carries the figure everywhere in front of it, presents the figure everywhere to me. […] It is an 
objective fact at present that I have discovered this absence, and it presents itself as a synthetic 
relation between Pierre and the setting in which I am looking for him. Pierre absent haunts this 
café and is the condition of its self-nihilating organization as ground.232
 
 
Sartre captures rather well the sense in which an absent person or thing is not simply 
statically gone, but rather absences in a verbal sense, withdraws from my searching glance. Yet 
this very absencing of the thing or person is itself in some way present for me, indeed, more 
                                                 
231 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 150/115. 
232 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, tr. Hazel E. Barnes 
(New York: Washington Square Press, 1956), pp. 40-42. 
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present than the other people around me, who in a different sense might be presumed to be 
‘really’ present.233
Our ability to make sense of this phenomenon arises from thinking negation as privation, 
rather than as utter non-being. It is, in other words, the recognition that presence and absence 
(position and negation) are not simply binaries; things presence (in a verbal sense) in a way that 
is co-constituted by absence, and they absence in a manner co-constituted by presence.
 
234 For the 
moment, let us call this phenomenon the interweaving of presence and absence.235
It is in this sense of important or significant presence and absence that Heidegger often 
speaks of ‘nearness’ and ‘distance.’ Pierre can genuinely distance himself (absence) only through 
being already near (present) in my concern.
 
236 His merely physical remoteness from or proximity 
to me is not determinative, since I can be intentionally brought near him on the other side of the 
world in a thought, mood, or name, just as I can be distant from him when he is physically right 
next to me. Thus, no thing or person can be fully present (‘just there’) because full presence 
would have no sense, no import: things are by belonging to contexts, and this belonging can be 
articulated as an interweaving of presence and absence. Heidegger at a certain point calls this 
interweaving ‘the juncture’ (die Fuge),237
                                                 
233 ‘Really’ here means: if the structure of my attention is radically altered so that I experience the café in 
terms of a set of bodies – for example, if I wish to count them to ascertain compliance with fire code. 
Alternatively, if I have reason to suspect that the other patrons of the café (or some of them) are responsible 
for Pierre’s absence (What have they done with him?!), they may present themselves (i.e., they may 
presence), but precisely on the ground of his absence. 
 and I shall borrow his name for it. 
234 Recall the structure of disorientation as the betrayal proper to assuming in chapter 1, part II. 
235 Notice that, pace Sartre himself, this interweaving is not a dialectical oscillation. 
236 Cf. Heidegger, “Positionality,” in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, p. 24, trans. mod./GA 79:25: 
“Everything that presences or absences bears the character of concern. Distance lies in concern. Concern 
lies in nearness.” Cf. “What absences is also present, and, as absencing from it, presences in 
unconcealment” (Heidegger, “Anaximander’s Saying,” in Off the Beaten Track, trs. J. Young and K. 
Haynes [Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002], p. 261/GA 5:347; hereafter, OBT). 
237 “What presences [Das Anwesende] is what stays awhile [das je Weilige]. The while [Die Weile] 
essences, as the transitional arrival, into departure [Weggang]. The while essences between coming hither 
and going away. The presencing [das Anwesen] of everything that stays awhile essences between this two-
fold absencing [Ab-wesen: to essence away from]. […] This between is the juncture [or joint, joining: die 
Fuge] [. …] Presencing is, in both directions, enjoined into [verfugt in: disposed toward] absencing. 
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But the juncture is founded on a deeper phenomenon, one generalized from the 
phenomenal relation between figure and ground in perception. We might call it constitutive 
concealment. In order to be as a juncture of presence and absence, an entity must both find some 
place against a background structure of intelligibility (including non-reflective practices) and 
assert its sheer thatness, its singularity, by resisting this background in its own peculiar way. (If it 
resists entirely, it shows up as important but unintelligible.) 
Sartre’s example is helpful here, too, since it emphasizes the relation between Pierre and 
the context in which I expect him. Thus the other people and things in the café are given as 
obstructions or reminders, as possible Pierres or uninteresting non-Pierres, or as smaller groups of 
people among whom he might be found. They must (and do) recede in the face of Pierre’s all-too-
present absencing, concealing themselves in all their other possible significations in order to show 
up first as not-Pierre and then as the ‘synthesized ground’ of which Sartre speaks.238
There are thus two sorts of concealment that constitute the thing as what it is: 1) the 
background structure of intelligibility that determines how things can show up for us (which 
 Nonetheless, 
there remains peculiarity even in their withdrawal from my attention – some people are more 
obstinately intrusive than others, some signify contexts more or less related to Pierre. This 
resistance (self-concealment) indicates both that it really is their other possible ways of showing 
up that are concealed here, not only my own inventions, and that those possibilities are not simply 
secret. Instead, in the very style of their concealment, these other significations show their 
distinctiveness as possibilities belonging to particular persons. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Presencing essences in such a juncture. […] The while essences in the juncture” (GA 5:354-5/OBT 267, my 
italics to convey German grammatical emphasis). Notice that the juncture is explicitly temporal here. For a 
beautiful reading of this joint or juncture as central to Heidegger’s work, see David Nowell-Smith, “The 
Art of Fugue: Heidegger on Rhythm,” Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 2 (2012): 41-64, esp. pp. 
44, 47, and 50. 
238 Lest the example be thought limited to sight, we could carry out very similar analyses for the other 




Heidegger names ‘world’) must recede toward the horizon, appearing in the being of the thing as 
only the background upon which that thing emerges; 2) the entity’s peculiar way of resisting this 
structure (which Heidegger names ‘earth’) must conceal the multiple other ways it could belong 
or fail to belong – the multiple other contexts in which it could be encountered. The struggle (der 
Streit) between world and earth is what allows something to be and makes it necessary that its 
being is marked by both presence and absence. 
I find these two ontic phenomena helpful in understanding the ontological phenomena as 
Heidegger interprets them. Let me just indicate this with a last observation about Sartre’s 
example: This present absencing of the expected friend – which may even be quite painful; let us 
say that he is leaving the country tomorrow, and this was my final opportunity to talk with him in 
person – is neither something in my head nor something only abstractly related to him, but a state 
of affairs that I genuinely discover (in the sense of un-cover, entdecken), one that emerges with 
some gradualness (perhaps more and more quickly as I grow frantic) from being covered over by 
the café’s crowdedness. The matter of his absence is, in other words, disclosed (erschlossen) to 
me; it becomes unconcealed (unverborgen). Furthermore, the matter that is disclosed includes 
both the fact that Pierre is absent and the meaning (or unintelligibility) of that fact, since these 
two are not separable in the experience.239
Let us now begin the analysis of unconcealment, guided by the question of what it would 
be like for one’s originary holding oneself/being-held in the truth to be betrayed, and trying to 
understand it by transposing the two ontic phenomena just outlined into an ontological register. 
 Thus the search for the friend displays ontically (i.e., at 
the level of entities) something like the juncture and the constitutive concealment that are at work 
in phenomenality itself, if we consider phenomenality itself as a phenomenon – as originary truth. 
  
                                                 
239 Even if I do not at first recognize what it means (indeed, I cannot recognize all that it means), his 




A) Truth and Falsity of Assertion 
Truth has most often been philosophically understood in terms of the truth or falsity of 
assertions, so let us begin there.240
 I say to my friend, ‘There's a bear outside the tent!’ What am I doing?
 We know in an everyday way what it is to be betrayed by an 
assertion: a claim turns out to be false. But what happens experientially, phenomenally, in this 
turning out to be false? 
241 According to 
Heidegger,242 I am pointing out a particular, now-salient feature of the situation in which my 
friend and I find ourselves. I do so by relying on our shared language and shared orientation to 
the circumstances (although one or both of us may have been asleep, we are now awake and not 
dreaming, inside a tent in an area natively inhabited by other animals, with some knowledge that 
bears are often wild and in various ways dangerous animals, etc.).243
                                                 
240 Or statements, or propositions, or sentences… this aspect of the question about truth-bearers is not 
crucial to our investigation, since the truth-bearer in which we are ultimately interested is being-there itself. 
 We could say that I am 
cognitively interpreting the otherwise pragmatic situation, restricting our view of it in order to 
241 The usual analysis would go something like this: the statement has some propositional content (in 
addition to its illocutionary force) to the effect that there exists a bear with a certain extrinsic relational 
property, namely that of being currently located outside of our tent. We may ask whether this assertion is 
true. We would normally say that it is true iff there really is a bear within a reasonable range outside of the 
tent, assuming that the sentence is contextually appropriate and well-formed. (If I am dreaming and 
muttering in my sleep, the situation is a bit unclear. If neither I nor my friend understands English, the 
analysis will likewise meet some difficulties.) 
According to many accounts of propositional truth, then, we may go on to ask in virtue of what 
this assertion is true, and the answer will be in terms of a certain relation (called ‘correspondence’) between 
my statement and the facts of the matter, or the state of affairs that includes bears and my tent. The 
difficulties of specifying this relation beforehand, so as to yield all and only the sentences we would 
normally wish to recognize as true, are well-rehearsed. But the intuition involved seems a fairly 
straightforward one: my sentence purports to represent a state of affairs in the world, and truth (or being-
true) is a property of those sentences that accomplish this representing accurately. Such sentences, just in 
consequence of their possessing such a property, (mostly) do not mislead those who hear them. 
Mark Wrathall has persuasively argued that Heidegger’s disagreement begins, not with denying 
propositional truth, but by arguing against representational theories of propositional truth. For Heidegger, it 
is just wrong to think that there are three present-at-hand objects (speaker, sentence, and state of affairs) 
among which a relation would need to be defined. See Wrathall, Unconcealment, pp. 21-26, 47, and 
Wrathall, “Heidegger and Truth as Correspondence,” in Heidegger Reexamined, Vol. 2, eds. H. Dreyfus 
and M. Wrathall (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-20. See also Heidegger’s own explicit (albeit not 
entirely clear) treatment of the question in GA 45/Basic Questions, especially §§12-13, 15, and 19-26. 
242 BT 196-199/154-157. 
243 Heidegger summarizes as follows: “asserting is 'pointing-out that communicates by giving something a 
determinate character' [mitteilend bestimmende Aufzeigung]” (BT 156/199, trans. mod.). 
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make it explicit according to a certain definite pattern, namely, as shaped by ursine nearness, 
which is either threatening or wondrous or both, depending on my tone.244
In making the assertion, then, I foreground one part of the whole situational context and 
make it central, bringing it up for predicative attention. This may aid our joint comportment 
toward the (pre-predicative but already meaningful) situation, or it may distract us; but it also 
means that my friend and I can now comport ourselves toward my claim itself. For example, we 
can ask whether my assertion is true, maybe by straining our ears and peering out carefully 
through the tent-flap (empiricism), or maybe by debating whether or not bears can live this high 
up in the mountains (rationalism). Regardless, in successfully asserting, I uncover as particularly 
salient (or disclose for conceptual thought) part of the structure of pre-predicative involvements 
(i.e., the situation) in which we live. I orient myself and my friend toward the the situation as 
something determinate. 
 
Thus, the criterion of truth for my assertion will be to what extent my conceptualization 
of the pre-predicative situation is genuinely oriented by the situation it aims to highlight – i.e., 
whether or not my comportment has uncovered a bear outside the tent. We could call this ‘the 
correspondence of my assertion to what really is,’ or, following Mark Wrathall, “being 
successfully directed toward the world in a propositional attitude.”245
                                                 
244 My example uses an assertion of existence in order to emphasize that what is pointed out (aufgezogen) 
in asserting is a state of affairs (Sachverhalt), a predication or something determinately taken-as (bestimmt), 
rather than just an object (a variable). It would be simpler but less wide-reaching to take a more classical 
example of predication, e.g., ‘Snow is white.’ 
 Heidegger designates it 
‘correctness’ (Richtigkeit), since it is a question of orientation (Richtung) toward a matter (a 
situation or state of affairs): allowing the matter to accurately or correctly orient my speech. The 
truth of assertions is not originary truth, which is why it admits of a criterion at all, but at this 
level it is appropriate to say, for Heidegger, that the essence or measure of truth is correctness. 
245 Wrathall, Unconcealment, p. 12. 
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 If that is what happens in asserting, then when my assertion fails to be true, there are two 
different kinds of thing that could be going on. It could be that I have just failed to make an 
assertion. My utterance does not have the ontological character of assertion, either because it does 
not point out (it fails to be about anything in the right way: e.g., ‘One time I caught a fish this 
big,’ when uttered evidently only to impress), or because it does not make the situation definite as 
something (commands, among other utterances, do not predicate, although they may point out: 
e.g., ‘Look!’), or because it does not communicate (if the other person does not get what I intend, 
is not directed toward it in the way that I am, then communication fails: e.g., misunderstood 
sarcasm or insufficient language competence). 
Alternatively, I may have made an assertion (conceptually disclosed a situation) but not 
done so in accordance with the situation as it really is. Then the claim is false. It really does 
uncover the situation in some way (otherwise it could not be either true or false), but it misdirects 
the hearer, whether purposely or by mistake. The pre-predicative situation does involve 
something that can sound like a bear’s growl, but it is not a bear. 
 It is especially clear in the case of purposeful misdirection (lying) that I must have some 
access to the situation other than what is given through my assertion. This need not amount to 
conceptual knowledge; I need not be able to assert correctly in order to willfully assert what is 
incorrect. But it does require that what I am talking about be somehow available to me. Similarly, 
the experience of being lied to and recognizing it makes evident that I am involved with the 
situation in some way other than only through the liar’s assertion.246
                                                 
246 There is a complication here that comes to light in trying to explain Heidegger’s constellation of terms. 
Many assertions (perhaps most) are uttered in the mode of idle conversation (Gerede), conversation that 
does not do much work. (Cf. Wrathall, “Social Constraints on Conversational Content,” ch. 5 in 
Unconcealment, for the translation and the explanation.) Such assertions can still be correct or incorrect 
(i.e., propositionally true or false), but only for someone who is sufficiently competent to meaningfully 
disclose the situation. Thus, I may claim that Fermat’s last theorem remains unproved. I have been told this, 
and I do not really know what it means because I am not sufficiently conversant with mathematics. My 




 Thus, in the “Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger says: 
Yet why should we not be satisfied with the essence of truth that has by now been familiar to us 
for centuries? Truth means today and has long meant the conformity of knowledge with the 
matter. However, the matter must show itself to be such if knowledge and the proposition that 
forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to it; otherwise the matter cannot 
become binding on the proposition. How can the matter show itself if it cannot itself stand forth 
out of concealment, if it does not itself stand in the unconcealed? A proposition is true by 




To allow the matter (die Sache) to orient my speech (or to fail to do so) requires already 
having meaningful access to that matter.248
 To sum up: an assertion is propositionally true (= correct) when it verbally discloses a 
situation as that situation is in its unconcealment – when it lets itself be fully oriented by what it 
speaks about. An assertion is propositionally false (= incorrect) when it conceptually discloses a 
situation but not as that situation is in its unconcealment – when it leaves the situation (as it is in 
 But we do not just have this independent access; we 
must both gain and maintain it. We must, in other words, cultivate a practice that allows the 
situation to open up for us. This is a kind of disclosure (Erschliessung) of the situation, a dis-
covering (Entdeckung) or un-concealing (Entbergung) of the context within which an assertion 
fits, even though no such unconcealing can be complete. It is what allows different truth-values 
for the same sentence in light of changes in time, speaker, tone, place, and so forth. 
                                                                                                                                                 
competence hears it, it will be true or false. So while idle conversation involves assertion, it does not rest 
primarily on the speaker’s prior disclosure of the situation; this means that it is only vaguely oriented 
toward that situation, except insofar as the situation is disclosed by the hearer. Cf. GA 65, §36. 
Oddly enough, speaking in the mode of idle conversation does not prevent me from attempting 
either to lie or to tell the truth. If I am clever, I can purposely speak only to those without the relevant 
competence, thus attempting to mislead (lying) without saying anything either true or false. The name for 
this is ‘sophistry.’ 
247 GA 5:38/Basic Writings 176-7. 
248 Cp. Donald Davidson, “True to the Facts,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 
UK: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 37: “The chief difficulty [for correspondence theories of truth] is in finding 
a notion of fact [i.e., state of affairs, matter at issue] that explains anything, that does not lapse, when 
spelled out, into the trivial or the empty.” In the balance of the essay, Davidson argues that truth is a 
relation between sentences, speakers, and dates – a three-place predicate that would allow an analysis 
entirely (and only) from the third-person perspective. 
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its unconcealment) covered up while still in some manner uncovering it.249
 But because we have spent so much effort in the history of philosophy trying to say how 
truth is correctness, we have forgotten, according to Heidegger, to think about unconcealment. 
And as mentioned at the beginning of this section, such forgetting is not incidental to the essence 
of truth. There is a danger inherent in the way truth is (i.e., in its very being): the danger “that in 
the midst of all that is correct what is true (das Wahre) will withdraw.”
 Thus, propositional 
truth depends on or is referred in its essence to unconcealment. 
250
 
 But what is this ‘what 
is true’? How could there still be correctness if what is true withdraws? What is unconcealment, 
and how do we experience it? 
B) Excursus on Terminology 
Here we open up a rather difficult problem. We are asking for the ontological ground that 
enables truth as correctness (and in the course of our analysis we will be pushed even beyond 
such a ground). We are, in other words, asking about the nature or the essence of truth, how 
something can be as true – its being-true (Wahrsein), in Heidegger’s formulation.251 Should we 
still refer to this deeper ground of correspondence truth as ‘truth’? Although Heidegger thought 
differently about this at different points,252
                                                 
249 Cp. the phenomenological dictum that being must show itself: just as perception may be deceived only 
within certain constraints (I may mistake a garden hose for a snake, but not for an elephant, because of the 
essential properties of the garden hose), so there are constraints placed on the content of a lie by the being 
of the situation. I cannot deceive by simply talking about something else (that is distraction, not deception). 
I must disclose the matter in what I say, but I can disclose it precisely in a way that mis-directs you toward 
it. Thus the lie of the serpent in Genesis 3 (“You will surely not die! For God knows that in the day you eat 
from [the tree] your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil”) relies on the 
tree’s real relation to the knowledge of good and evil but conceals the character and consequences of this 
knowledge. It also trades on God’s really being wise (again, concealing the nature of this knowledge), so 
that Eve can be directed toward the tree as “desirable to make one wise” (quotations from the New 
American Standard Bible). 
 I think there are three good reasons to speak of 
250 GA 7:27/QCT 26. 
251 BT 218/261. 
252 Cf. Heidegger’s famous retraction in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” (GA 
14:76/Basic Writings 446-7). 
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unconcealment (alētheia) as truth, so long as we keep in mind that it does not mean propositional 
correctness.253
According to Heidegger, truth happens as history,
 
254
1) Alētheia (unconcealment) named the broader, more fundamental phenomenon for the 
ancient Greeks, not simply correctness. This is especially important with regard to 
Aristotle, with whose work Heidegger’s account is purposely contrasted. In the final 
chapter of Metaphysics θ, Aristotle differentiates the truth of speech from a (more 
originary) truth of being, which is a kind of intuitive contact or touch (thigein) by which 
we know essence (ti esti; to ti ēn einai). This latter kind of truth, the “most governing”
 and we only have conceptual access 
to it by retrieving this history. This gives rise to my first two reasons. 
255 
meaning of being (to on), does not admit of falsity – one either makes contact or not.256 
Heidegger, by contrast, precisely wants to admit the non-essence of truth (i.e., 
concealment, which is something more than either simple failure to make contact, since 
that would be my fault, or propositional falsity) into the essence of truth itself.257
If, as explained earlier (section I.B), essence is taken verbally, as that which 
prevails in a phenomenon, in the light of which the phenomenon is primarily 
experienced, then discussion of the essence of truth must transcend propositional 
correctness toward the ground of our experience of it, while remaining a discussion of 
truth’s essencing, not of something else that would be a common property of particular 
truths (e.g., reference). 
 
 
2) Again, in conversation with the Western European philosophical tradition, it makes a lot 
of sense to call being’s self-showing ‘truth,’ and being’s concealment or disguisedness 
                                                 
253 For further discussion of the problem, along with an argument for taking unconcealment to mean ‘truth’ 
that is mostly unrelated to my reasons, cf. Wrathall’s responses to Ernst Tugendhat (in “Heidegger and 
Truth as Correspondence,” op. cit.) and to Cristina Lafont and William Smith (who both defend Tugendhat) 
in the appendix to chapter 1 of Unconcealment. For a more thorough argument in favor of originary truth as 
genuinely truth, also in response to Tugendhat, see Daniel Dahlstrom, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 
chapter 5. 
254 “ ‘History,’ grasped essentially, and that means thought from out of the essential ground [Wesensgrund] 
of being itself, is the transformation [Wandel] of the essence of truth.” “History ‘is’ the transformation of 
the essence of truth.” Heidegger, Parmenides, trs. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), pp. 54-55/GA 54:80. We should hear in this transformation (Wandel) a kind of 
wandering (Wandern) of what counts as truth, what standard enables propositional truth. See section I.B, 
above, and chapter 3, section II.B, for further discussion. 
255 Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ.10, 1051b1, reading to de kuriōtata on (most governing [sense of] being) with 
Jaeger, against Ross’s rather arbitrary bracketing of kuriōtata. 
256 Ibid., 1051b21-27. Cf. Heidegger’s commentary on the passage, GA 45:97/Basic Questions 86, in which 
he calls this more basic meaning of truth an “unconcealing” (Entbergen) of what is. But Heidegger takes 
the concealment from out of which unconcealing draws what is, i.e., the ground of the unconcealedness of 
what is, to remain unthought for Aristotle (cf. §27). 
257 For an account that stresses the centrality of this move, see John Sallis, “Deformatives: Essentially Other 
Than Truth,” in Double Truth (Albany: SUNY Press, 1995). The only way to make Aristotle’s account 
approach this would be to read the failure of contact as some kind of being led astray. See chapter 3 of 




‘untruth’ or ‘falsity.’ Heidegger’s efforts from early on lie in the direction of finding the 
unified source from which both propositional truth and meaningfulness or significance 
arise. He later speaks of this attempt to overcome the fact/value divide in terms of 
belonging (‘property’, or, more literally, ‘own-dom’: Eigentum, like kingdom): In what 
way do things belong to us and we to them? Why can we own or disown the importance 
of something? In other words, how are we to understand what makes things matter to us, 
what makes us care so deeply about speaking correctly? From whence arises our will to 
truth? Karsten Harries has shown that this latter question arises at the heart of 
Heidegger’s search for the meaning of being.258
But meaningfulness or significance is part of what I have been calling ‘import,’ 




 so holding together truth and meaning is 
part of what allows him to follow the tradition in holding together truth and being 
(although it is not just the same). For Heidegger, truth as unconcealment names a relation 
to the happening of import – i.e., to beyng (section I.B, above). Unconcealment is the 
‘there’ of beyng, the place and moment (Augenblickstätte) at which it shows up. 
Moreover, we have Heidegger’s own pronouncement on the matter from 1958, published in 
“Hegel and the Greeks.” 
3) “If the essence of truth that straightaway comes to reign as correctness [Richtigkeit] and 
certainty [Sicherheit] can subsist only within the realm of unconcealment, then truth 
indeed has to do with alētheia, but not alētheia with truth.”260 I find this to be a helpful 
formulation. Heidegger wants to think an unconcealment that is not dependent upon 
propositional truth and metaphysical interpretations of being,261 one that is more 
originary, as the element within which both (propositional) truth and (metaphysical) 
being take place. It seems to me that this way of understanding the matter easily survives 
his claim in 1964 that it is untenable to translate alētheia as ‘truth.’262
 
 
For these reasons, I shall continue, following general practice, to refer to the phenomenological 
essence of truth as ‘truth,’ distinguishing it primarily from ‘what is true,’ and using ‘correctness’ 
or ‘propositional truth’ to refer to the truth of assertions. 
                                                 
258 “In asking for criteria of a meaningful life, we raise a question of value; in asking for criteria of 
meaningful sentences [i.e., sentences that can be true or false], we raise a question of logic. Is this 
ambiguity simply a sign of an unfortunate lack of precision, or does it perhaps point out the way towards a 
more fundamental analysis which will enable us to escape from the bifurcation of fact and value, of logic 
and ethics,  by exhibiting the common root of both in meaning?” Karsten Harries, “Martin Heidegger: The 
Search for Meaning,” in Existential Philosophers: Kierkegaard to Merleau-Ponty, ed. G.A. Schrader (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 164. 
259 We could even, with Harries, understand import simply as ‘meaning,’ so long as we maintain its twofold 
character “of being a claim [i.e., mattering] and an essential structure.” Ibid., p. 182. 
260 GA 9:442/Pathmarks 334. 
261 Here he terms it “released from its reference to truth and being” (Ibid.), but of course this cannot mean 
that it is unrelated to them, only that it is not to be thought as dependent on them. 
262 For a clear account of the circumstances surrounding this famous retraction, see Christopher Nwodo, 
“Friedländer versus Heidegger: A-letheia Controversy,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 




C) Truth as Unconcealment 
But if we are now asking about truth as what makes correctness possible, we shall have to 
follow Heidegger’s directive that being-true (ontologically) is unconcealing (entbergen, 
alētheuein, ‘truth-ing’), i.e., being-uncovering (Entdeckendsein) in the sense of ‘to be as 
uncovering.’263 Dasein, ‘being-there,’ is as the one who un-covers: this way of being is what 
Heidegger names freedom (or ‘being-available’: Freiheit). His account of freedom forms a kind 
of hinge between two principle layers of unconcealment (at the level of entities and at the level of 
being). Since this is not easy to keep in order – what constitutes concealment at one level is 
precisely unconcealment at another level – I shall first think through it in terms of a concrete 
example, then propose a more schematic account that attends to Heidegger’s own terminology.264
If we are to unpack Heidegger’s analysis through the concrete example of the bear 
outside the tent, we must attend to the concealment that is revealed at each level by failure (i.e., 
by a certain mode of betrayal). In this way it will become clear that these ‘betrayals’ are 
constitutive, included in the very structure of the truth phenomenon – in other words, that untruth 
belongs essentially to truth. 
 
                                                 
263 BT 218/261. 
264 As a shorthand anticipation of the schematic version, we can draw on Wrathall’s model of four “planks” 
in what he unhappily names Heidegger’s “truth-platform” (Unconcealment, pp. 12-14). My account is 
heavily indebted to, though not simply a rehearsal of, Wrathall’s admirably clear summary. 
Plank 1: propositional truth (correctness, die Richtigkeit) 
Plank 2: truth (uncoveredness, das Entdeckendsein) of what is 
Plank 3: truth (unconcealment, die Unverborgenheit) of the being of what is (des Seins des 
Seienden) 
Subdivided into a) disclosure (die Erschlossenheit) of being-there and world, of what is 
as such or as a whole, and 
b) truth of essence (die Wahrheit des Seins /der Sinn des Seins, in which what is gets 
carved up according to patterns of import that mark certain features as essential, others as 
impossible, etc.) 
Plank 4: truth as clearing (die Lichtung) 




First: the truth of what is. 
Entities (= what is [das Seiende]) are unconcealed when they fit within my world, 
becoming meaningfully available for my comportment (Verhalten) toward them. This takes place 
on the basis of a two-fold concealment: the covering-up of both their independence and my a 
priori patterns of involvement with them (i.e., the covering up of their being). This means that 
they conceal themselves by resisting my practical comportment (i.e., resisting my understanding), 
but they do so yieldingly, extending the promise of further intelligibility as they become more 
familiar to me within that comportment. 
 The noise outside my tent shows up for me as a bear growl (rather than merely as an 
unknown disturbing entity) on the basis of my previous practical experience with sleeping in the 
woods at night, camping in areas where bears live, occasionally chasing them off with rocks and 
noise, etc. My pre-thematic, learned competence, my sense of knowing my way around in this 
kind of situation, is the comportment that uncovers this entity (the bear’s growl) as something 
definite, something that has a place in a more or less familiar set of references. It is also what 
allows me verbally to uncover this state of affairs as a meaningful one, i.e., to say, ‘There’s a bear 
outside the tent!’ As we have noted, this assertion can then be true or false (= correct or 
incorrect), depending upon its agreement with the state of affairs made available through my 
comportment.265
 Still, of course I can get it wrong – not only the statement, but also the prior uncovering 
(Entdeckung). My comportment can uncover the entity (the matter at hand) as something other 
than what it is. I cannot be completely wrong – there cannot fail to be any trace of the way of 
 
                                                 
265 Cf. Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth” (GA 9:186/Pathmarks 142): “The openness of comportment 




being of the real entity in that as which I disclose it, or else my sanity comes into question266
 Now, we have to ask what allows me to get it wrong. In other words, keeping in mind the 
distinctions drawn in my previous chapter, we might cautiously ask: by what am I “betrayed”? I 
am not completely incompetent in the situation; I did not mistake the singing of crickets or the lap 
of water against the nearby shoreline for bear noises. But I also have much to learn, both about 
uncovering situations that involve bears and about uncovering proper responses to such entities. 
In other words, the state of affairs remains disguised (partially covered-over) for me because I do 
not yet have the appropriate skills. I am only partially initiated into the practice of camping in 
bear-country, so I can make a certain level of mistake – be deceived in certain ways – in 
uncovering the entities involved in that practice. 
 – 
but I can of course mistake the groaning of a tree in the wind for the growling of a bear, even at a 
pre-thematic level. Here it is clear that something normative is at stake in our pre-predicative 
involvements, as well as in speech: if I run screaming from the tent when I hear what is really the 
groaning of a tree, I have not made any assertions, and yet the disconnect between my meaningful 
comportment and the situation will be clear to someone more experienced, for whom the sound is 
evidently only a tree in the wind (and for whom it is also obvious that running away is among the 
worst possible responses to the approach of a bear). The entity uncovered by the more-competent 
comportment of such a person will be more fully discovered, i.e., not disguised (verstellt) as 
something that it is not, even if never completely uncovered. The situation itself will make more 
sense to my companion, who will experience the inappropriateness of my comportment (both my 
situation-specific inexperience and the awkwardness of my current action) as untrue to the 
situation – as failing to be oriented by the proper discovery. 
                                                 
266 Cp. Wittgenstein on making mistakes. If I genuinely think that my hamburger is the square root of 3 
(and am making neither a philosophical nor a mystical claim), then I do not even succeed at being mistaken 
– something much more serious is going on. 
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 That I must learn implies that the ways of being, the varied import, of entities are not 
simply dependent on me. Heidegger’s account is far from solipsism. Indeed, the independence of 
bears and their habits from my understanding of them was already painfully clear in my fright (if 
the bear were purely my positing, as in Idealism, it would not frighten me in the same way). But 
that independence becomes clear again in a different manner when I sheepishly return to the tent, 
out of breath from sprinting away. The situation is now evident to me as well: it is not one that 
includes a real bear. 
 We should notice something strange here. For an entity to show up meaningfully in my 
world, it must precisely resist that world, holding itself (on the one hand) somehow independent 
from my system of familiar references, without (on the other hand) being so foreign that I do not 
even notice it. This is what we spoke about earlier as the juncture between presence and 
absence.267 What is it that allows entities to do both? How can I discover them as both 
independent (i.e., themselves) and meaningfully located within the field opened up by my 
comportment? In other words, what constitutes my exposure to them, the relation (Verhältnis) 




Freedom is how Heidegger rethinks intentionality. What is can be free (importantly 
available) for me because I am free for (open to) it. But my freedom here is to be understood in 
an ontological sense; it does not consist in willing. It means that I am not free (in a more everyday 
sense) to close myself off. I do not choose to be open to the bear; in one way, I would much 
 
                                                 
267 See the example from Sartre in the introduction to part II of the present chapter. 
268 “All comportment [Verhalten] is grounded in this bearing [or relationship, Verhältnis] and receives from 
it directedness toward beings and disclosure of them” (GA 9:194/Pathmarks 149). In such a relationship of 
openness, I have “already attuned all comportment” to a meaningful, more or less ordered world, i.e., “to 
what is as a whole” (GA 9:192/Pathmarks 147). 
269 “The essence of truth, [if truth is understood] as the correctness of a statement, is freedom” (GA 
9:186/Pathmarks 142, italicization of the whole sentence removed). 
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rather not be open to it at all. Then there would be no possibility of my suffering from it. But 
since I am already ontologically open to it by being somehow attuned to it – perhaps in part by 
regretting that I do not have the expertise needed to be more open to it, more confident about 
what to do – I must then choose freely (in a more common or ethical sense of ‘freedom’) how to 
order my comportments, which claims on my attention and skills I will honor. For example, will I 
attend primarily to the bear, or instead to my verbal assertion about its presence? The bear is 
certainly given as much more urgently important, but I can comport myself toward it by trying to 
ignore it. 
Again, ontological freedom does not consist in indifference, according to Heidegger.270 It 
is not as if I become free for the bear (i.e., open to it) by ceasing to care about it or to care what it 
does. Nor do I become any more free by attempting to dictate its reality arbitrarily. Rather, I find 
myself engaged with, let into (sicheinlassen auf), the open region of the whole context. This 
being-invested is freedom, whose essence is what Heidegger calls ek-sistence, “exposure 
[Aussetzung] to the disclosedness [Entborgenheit] of what is as such.”271 It is in accord with this 
ontological exposure, with my being right out amongst things, that I am a sensitive body, an 
entity that can feel pain, rather than a subject irrecoverably distant from an objective world.272
I may, on the basis of this ontological freedom that I am (i.e., the freedom of being-there, 
intentionality), try to let my ontic comportment be as open as it can be. I may (both 
metaphorically and literally) step back in the face of the bear in order to see what it will do, to let 
 As 
that body, I can be ontically torn open precisely because I am (ontologically) already one who is 
open to other things. I am my body, I do not merely have a body, because I can bleed. 
                                                 
270 See his explanation of freedom as letting-be of what is (Seinlassen vom Seienden) (GA 9:188/Pathmarks 
144). 
271 GA 9:188/Pathmarks 145. Cp. “[F]reedom is engagement in the disclosure of what is as such” (Ibid.). 
272 Cp. Andrew J. Mitchell, “Entering the World of Pain: Heidegger,” Telos 150 (Spring 2010): 83-96. Cf. 
Heidegger, The Event, tr. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 
166/GA 71:194, where he understands “pain as the essence of the experience of being.” 
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it show itself so that my responses (both pragmatic and assertoric) may be oriented by the way it 
is uncovered, and so that this uncovering itself may be appropriate to the situation (as given by 
my broader understanding of being).273 This would be to attend to the things themselves, to let 
what is presencing (das Anwesende) go ahead and present itself, without “importing anything else 
in addition into it.”274
But my particular comportment is only open to what is by concealing my background 
understanding of being. (This concealing of the role of such understanding is what Heidegger 
calls errancy.) Freedom can seem like nothingness, a lack or an emptiness (e.g., arbitrariness as 
non-determinism), precisely because it does in a way negate: it conceals the general patterning of 
import in favor of some thing that is thereby disclosed as important.
 
275 I am open to something 
(there is something that reaches me within an open region) only in that I temporarily forget the 
particular structure of that openness itself. Freedom is what allows me either to seek an open 
involvement with the things uncovered, or to forget that both their independence and my 
involvement are at work in unconcealment.276
It is by such a “forgetting” that I can become the measure or criterion of what is.
 
277
                                                 
273 “[E]ngagement [with the disclosedness of what is] withdraws [entfaltet sich zu einem Zurücktreten] in 
the face of what is in order that [the latter] might reveal itself with respect to what and how it is, and in 
order that [propositional] correspondence might take its standard from what is” (GA 9:188/Pathmarks, 
144). 
 
Instead of needing to learn about how to comport myself appropriately toward bears so as to be 
the site for their unconcealment as bears (in all their glory), I understand the bear in terms of the 
security of my life. Rather than abiding in exposure to what is, I try to persist through securing 
myself, ascertaining the optimal management of resources so as to convert the bear into yet 
274 See Heidegger’s marginal note to the 1943 edition (GA 9:188/Pathmarks 144), “nichts anderes dazu 
und dazwischen bringen.” 
275 GA 9:193ff/Pathmarks 148ff. 
276 We will shortly come across one more level of constitutive concealment: that I am thrown into this 
particular background understanding, that it does not originate with me, must remain in concealment if any 
entity at all is to be disclosed as a distinct thing, having genuinely essential properties. 
277 GA 9:195-6/Pathmarks 149-50. 
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another resource. Here it is the truth of essence that is concealed: I think the bear needs 
converting into a resource (‘Why don’t the park rangers do something about this?’), without 
realizing that my background understanding of being has already allowed the bear to appear 
primarily in that light, as ‘not yet a resource’ or as ‘hazardous to my resources.’ 
 
Second: the truth of essence. 
Heidegger maintains that I am always disposed (gestimmt) in some way or other. This is 
in part the pre-cognitive mode (literally: mood, Stimmung) in which things are given to me as 
mattering, even if they are as-yet unintelligible; it is also in part the basic cognitive structure by 
which I understand certain ways of being as obviously definitive or essential (i.e., as mattering 
most). Thus, my possibilities of comportment – the structures within which what is can be 
uncovered for me – are themselves unconcealed through my fundamental disposition 
(Grundstimmung). These ways of being are taken to be most important and thereby set the 
parameters within which I can experience the import of what is (i.e., that it matters and what it 
could mean). This takes place on the basis of a second two-fold concealment: the tendency to 
attend primarily to what is unconcealed covers up the process of and constraints upon 
unconcealing itself, and the disposition to take certain ways of being as essential covers up other 
possibilities of comportment, other patterns of essentiality. 
 So as to remain in line with Heidegger’s portrayal of the contemporary understanding of 
being (as positionality, das Ge-Stell),278
                                                 
278 See chapter 3, section III.A, below, for an account of das Ge-Stell. 
 let me caricature the example a bit. I encounter the bear, 
or perhaps what I mistake for a bear, as a kind of unwanted and maybe unwarranted (but 
nonetheless in some way planned-for) interruption in the construction of my wilderness vacation. 
My camping trip is carefully organized to yield maximum relaxation and experience of natural 
beauty within the confines of a long weekend. I encounter it as a rejuvenating break, allowing me 
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to return to work re-energized. In addition to taking out a permit for hiking, picking out an 
already cleared campsite in an approved area, and finding out whether the use of fire is permitted 
in pre-constructed fire rings or only in portable camp stoves, I have planned for bears as a certain 
kind of calculated risk, against which I am carrying along barrels specially designed and mass-
produced for the stashing of food in bear-country. The bear does not show up for me as potential 
food, as I carry no weapon and have brought with me pre-made, freeze-dried meals. Nor do I 
experience myself primarily as potential food for the bear – although what fear I do have of being 
eaten is not due to having some great work in life that would be cut short or to letting down 
something much greater than I, but only to a kind of offense at my life being cut off. If anything, 
the bear shows up as something I must restrain myself from feeding (according to various posted 
placards), either voluntarily or involuntarily, from out of my own stock of supplies.279
 Let us say that there really is a bear in this scenario, and that it in fact succeeds at making 
off with some of my food. I am outraged, but this, too, is according to certain patterns. Given my 
background understanding of being, the situation does not show up as a personal struggle 
between the bear and me;
 
280
                                                 
279 As will become clear below, these ways of encountering the bear are neither simply false nor simply 
projections. In context, the bear really is something I should not feed. Heidegger’s point is a) that there is a 
lot of context going into letting this count as one of the most important real features of the bear, and b) that 
it is a constitutively limited view – so we can adopt new perspectives and compare them, but we can never 
have a whole story in which all the real features of the situation are equally compelling, since some things 
must always appear as more important. 
 nor is it just one more movement of fate, to be accepted like all 
others. Rather, it is more centrally an inexcusable interruption of order – nature ought not 
interfere with my enjoyment of it! Once I am over the fright, the bear shows up in my reflective 
thought not as a potential oracle or source of clothing (‘I let it get away!’), but as a kind of 
troublesome intrusion driven by instinct (‘It got away with my stuff!’). His raiding of innocent 
campers appears as the effect of a set of determinable causes (too many people in the wilderness, 
some of whom intentionally feed the wildlife and some of whom spoil bears’ natural food sources 
280 Cp. William Faulkner’s “The Bear” in Go Down, Moses. 
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by sport fishing, etc.). All of this is shaped, if Heidegger is right about our current understanding 
of being, by the horizon of orderability. 
The resulting situation, too, is a question of exchangeability, and shows up as a problem 
to be solved (rather than, say, an opportunity for a religious experience). How do I obtain supplies 
basically like the ones I just had? Do I have enough food to carry on with my planned excursion? 
Or will I need to return early? Other means of procuring food, either hunting or gathering, 
probably do not occur to me. Why not? Not only because I am not good at or equipped for either 
activity (unless I have brought along a fishing pole), although this is true, but in the first place 
because food comes from grocery stores. My life (along with that of most others in my world) is 
structured so that hunting and gathering are leisure activities for the privilege of which we pay 
money earned through jobholding. They are not themselves primarily functional activities for me, 
which leaves me more or less unprepared to survive through them. Experiencing them as the 
primary work of daily life is something I could read about or hear stories about from other parts 
of the globe (or other strata of society), but I cannot live it as my reality. Survival through hunting 
and gathering is somehow closed off as an existential possibility for me. 
 
Third: the clearing for self-concealing. 
To see the positive character of this concealment of certain ways of life as existential 
possibilities, we have to recognize that what Heidegger calls the clearing is not a “gallery of 
possibilities,” in the sense of an art gallery that would keep “different determinate ways of being 
in the world locked in the back room, while exhibiting one at a time.”281
                                                 
281 Wrathall, Unconcealment, p. 34. 
 This is because there 
could be no possibility-space that encompassed many different clearings as clearings, i.e., as 
what opens the import of the world (i.e., being, which is itself the very horizon of possibility). 
The only way I can encounter different clearings is historically, and that means in their 
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withdrawal from my own clearing – as not making compelling sense but feeling like maybe they 
should.282
This limitation also arises in the phenomenon’s mode of availability for thinking. 
Although I can in some ways experience a shifting of, or a difference between, various 
dispositions to what-is as a whole, if I try to attend to what governs this shift, I am quickly in very 
deep water without a stable place (such as my comportment to the bear’s growl) from which to 
examine. Let me try to say why. 
 To put it another way, existential possibilities, unlike logical possibilities, cannot be 
laid one beside the other, since they are potential ways of being exposed to things; living through 
any one of them changes the structure within which all the others show up. 
First of all, even though whatever entities I uncover (bear growls, toothbrushes, a 
mother’s love, or the revolt of the proletariat) show up for me in terms of the prevailing 
understanding of being – the ways of being that I, situated in a certain community belonging to a 
certain period of history, am disposed to regard as essential – nevertheless this ‘in terms of’ does 
not wholly determine the valence of that uncovering. It may be that what is shows up in a 
negative mode, like a jammed nail gun in the midst of a building project. When things show up 
this way, it provokes questioning: ‘What is wrong with this thing?’ Or, in various contexts of 
failure: ‘Why does love so stubbornly refuse to be a good resource?’ ‘Why does evil seem like it 
both is and yet cannot be a creation of God?’ ‘Why are we not yet thinking?’283
Second, in reflecting on my experience of the bear in conversation with others who are 
either culturally or historiologically remote from me,
 
284
                                                 
282 I do not have time to address it here, but art can do a lot of work toward granting us a kind of 
problematic receptivity to the claims of other clearings, precisely because the artwork opens up and holds 
open a world to which I may not belong. 
 I may catch some glimpse of the 
283 These three questions are some of those that arise repeatedly at the limits of various clearings. They 
mark central weak points for, respectively, the contemporary Western clearing, the medieval theistic 
clearing, and Heidegger’s futural or event-oriented clearing. 
284 Hence the impulse to refer to other, chronologically contemporary peoples in historiological terms, i.e., 
as ‘primitives’ or ‘pre-modern,’ ‘pre-industrial,’ etc. Even here, we cannot grasp a broader possibility-
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constitutive concealment at work in the clearing, but this will only show up as a kind of curiously 
obtrusive absence (an absencing). The bear is not a god for me, nor is it the judgment of the gods 
or of the fates upon me karmically, nor do I feel myself secure in my immortal soul against 
whatever it may do to my body. Here it becomes evident that groups to which I do not belong 
inhabit very different fundamental attunements to what is and hence experience different features 
of the (partially shared) world as mattering most (i.e., as essential). Indeed, this is an experience 
of my not belonging to these groups, an encounter with the difference between us. While I can 
recognize these other positions abstractly and try to feel their pull, they will not shape my primary 
attunement, the most compelling way in which I encounter the bear, unless I undergo a 
complicated conversion of my way of life.285
Third, if what counts as the being of what is changes over the course of history,
 I can choose to see from different perspectives, but 
that does not mean I can inhabit them at will. Instead, my very access to other perspectives is 
opened by my own fundamental attunement to the independent entities that we share. 
286
That experience, which is also available within the phenomenological step back, 
according to Heidegger, would be akin to how one discovers the different basic tones 
 then 
not only may I realize, in a genuine conversation with writers from the past, that there have been 
other basic ways of understanding being (though I may be unable to inhabit them), it might also 
happen that I live amidst the shift between epochs. This would mean not that I would have a kind 
of pluralized basic disposition (Grundstimmung), but that I would experience the distress of the 
difference between two such dispositions, find myself adrift more often in deep water. I would 
feel somehow untimely, out of joint – disoriented. 
                                                                                                                                                 
space, except negatively – the concession that ‘there are many right ways’ to do something, varying across 
cultures, does not remove their strangeness and lack of pull on me; it only signifies abstractly that ‘my way 
is not exclusively right.’ 
285 Not even all of these are open to me. I as Western European cannot simply convert to an ancient First 
Nations way of experiencing the world. 
286 If, indeed, this is the unfolding course of history (die Geschichte) as the differences between destined 
basic dispositions (die Geschicke)… 
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(Grundtöne) governing the stanzas of one of Friedrich Hölderlin’s poems. These tones shape their 
respective stanzas, but are experienced as such only in the movement from one stanza to another 
(hence, in the shift of tones), which is also the only way to identify them rightly, since they 
follow certain patterns of change but are only inadequately determined within any given stanza. 
Put in terms of unconcealment, the discovery of this shift would be an experience of the clearing 
as such, of the opening up of one understanding of being rather than another – i.e., of the clearing 
for concealment. 
This may sound as if a magician is opening a door to one room by closing a door into 
another, or stashing a rabbit in one hat so as to leave another hat empty, but that would be right 
only if the clearing itself, the particular configurations of being, and the self-concealing were 
precisely entities, like hidden rabbits and empty hats. On Heidegger’s account, this would be to 
think metaphysically, to assume that there is one realm of beings (bears growling and proletarian 
revolts) grounded by or referred to another realm of super-beings (clearings, senders of being, and 
something hidden that we never quite get to see).287
If, instead, we try to think away from rabbits and hats, and even to think unconcealment 
away from what is unconcealed in its unconcealedness (by analogy with what is in its beingness), 
we encounter the two-fold or internally conflictual (innig-strittige) essence of the unitary 
phenomenon of unconcealment. That is, every unconcealing necessarily involves (and indeed 
stems from) a concealing. 
 
                                                 
287 The justification for this metaphysical way of thinking, which Heidegger thinks is a mistake but far from 
a stupid one (or even one that we can simply leave behind), is the assumption that everything either is or is 
not. If it is, it’s a being (i.e., a thing that is); if it isn’t, it’s a nonbeing. Heidegger thinks this fails to express 
our experience, so he tries to organize some other options: some entities exist (ek-sist: in the sense of being 
intentionally directed toward or exposed to other beings), while most entities do not, strictly speaking, 
exist. Some ‘things’ essence (wesen) and can be said neither to be a being nor to be (or not be) a nonbeing. 
Even the term ‘nothing’ is ambiguous: not being a thing (i.e., a no-thing) differs essentially from empty 
nothingness. This is not a word-game but an attempt to think in a way faithful to experience. See 
Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” tr. D.F. Krell, in Pathmarks, pp. 82-96. 
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We should try to make sense of this in terms of the clearing. If we ask who or what 
decides which basic disposition will prevail, who or what governs the history of being, we are left 
with no answer other than ‘it takes place’ so (es ereignet sich). But properly considered, 
according to Heidegger, this answer is neither a problem of limited knowledge nor even a merely 
negative phenomenon (as it inevitably seems when we try to move toward it starting from truth as 
correctness). 
It is not a problem of limited knowledge because there is not some hidden thing that we 
are lacking.288 We might think that we are only failing, constitutively or accidentally, to know the 
real author or maker of the history of being – the magician who directs the changes of basic 
disposition. But Heidegger thinks that this history shows itself as the kind of thing that is neither 
written nor made at all. In other words, the internal strife of unconcealment is not an 
incompleteness of human knowledge, although this is evidently incomplete. Truth would not lose 
its two-fold character even if in principle knowledge could be arranged like a set of objects, all of 
which we could someday possess.289
But Heidegger claims more than that. Lēthē, the concealment inherent in and constitutive 
for all unconcealment, is not even the negative side of the phenomenon. (Recall Heidegger’s 
consistent emphasis that a-lētheia is a privation of more originary lēthē.) It is the non-essence 
(das Unwesen) of truth, the un-truth, but it is not falsity. Rather, it is a kind of rethinking of 
Aristotelian potency (dunamis), something other than current actuality (energeia) that is also not 
simply lack (sterēsis), a positive condition that enables (ermöglicht) freedom (in the sense of 
 
                                                 
288 “The concealment of beings as a whole does not first show up subsequently as a consequence of the fact 
that knowledge of beings is always fragmentary” (GA 9:193/Pathmarks 148). “[N]egativity belongs 
intrinsically to truth, by no means as a sheer lack but as resistance[…]” (GA 65:356/Contributions 281, 
trans. mod.). 
289 This is what some pragmatist, Idealist, and coherence theories of truth seem to imply. 
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openness to what is).290 As that which first makes possible any comportment to what is, it could 
be called an ontologization of Nietzsche’s sense of forgetting as necessary for health.291 For it is 
the clearing away of other possible understandings of being so as to grant a space for one such 
understanding to prevail; thus, that clearing away (the non-essence) is essential to any 
unconcealing (the truth). As Heidegger dramatically puts it, “truth, in its essence, is un-truth.”292
By now, it should be clearer how Heidegger’s account of truth relies on the two 
phenomena with which I began this part of the chapter. The juncture, or the interweaving of 
presence and absence into presencing and absencing, governs the way that Heidegger thinks of 
freedom as openness (exposure). Similarly, his attention to betrayal as one part of a unified 
phenomenon relies on constitutive concealment, in which “the unconcealment of what is, the 




 But in order to see this a bit more directly, let 
me turn from my description in terms of an example to a more terminologically careful (and 
hence more schematic) version of the same account. 
First of all and most of the time, we are caught up in the particular things that are. These 
entities (i.e., situations, the facts of the matter, states of affairs, beings, what is = das Seiende) 
show up as meaningful items, things with a certain importance, within our comportment, whether 
that comportment be theoretical or practical. It is a certain kind of involvement with (i.e., 
openness to) the matter at hand that accomplishes this unconcealment of particular entities: hard-
won experience with this type of situation and conversance with the contexts in which it belongs. 
                                                 
290 Heidegger speaks of concealment or untruth as what is most proper (das Eigenste) to truth (GA 
9:193/Pathmarks 148). Die Eignung (‘appropriateness’) and its cognates serve as Heidegger’s translation 
for dunamis, explicitly preferred over das Vermögen (‘capacity’); cp. “On the Essence and Concept of 
Phusis in Aristotle’s Physics β.1,” Pathmarks, 211, 214, 218ff/GA 9:277, 280-1, 285ff. 
291 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 2nd essay, §1. 
292 GA 5:41/Basic Writings 179. 
293 GA 5:337/OBT 253. 
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Even so, it is never a complete nor an infallible unconcealment; we often fail to uncover what is 
in a manner that is appropriate to it or to our projects. 
Such failure shows a concealing (absencing) at work in the unconcealment (the truth or 
presencing) of what is. And this concealing turns out to be constitutive of the unconcealment. 
Although what is cannot show up as such (i.e., in its being) without being-there (Dasein), it must 
nevertheless be independent of being-there.294 That independence – what I called earlier (at the 
beginning of part II) ‘self-concealing’ or ‘earth’ – shows itself whenever what is fails to be 
meaningfully available for me in the right way. Initially, I encounter it as a certain manner of 
resistance to my context of meaningful involvements (my comportment), as well as a certain 
weight or wear on my lived body, and this resistance never goes away. Thinking ontologically, 
we can say that the thing captivates (berückt) and transports (entrückt) me (i.e., alters originary 
spatiality and temporality for me), precisely inasmuch as it is, properly speaking, a thing (Ding) 
to which I am exposed: a place that conditions (be-dingt) me by gathering temporality and 
spatiality.295
Thus, I can only understand things or situations by becoming familiar with them 
(learning), locating them within my world of referential meanings and coming to know my way 
around them, but that process is constitutively incomplete. Things in their independence are only 
uncovered through the strife (der Streit), the competition, of earth and world: my world of given 
meanings encounters the sheer thatness, the resistance to intelligibility, of what is. Were this not 
 Thinking ontically, we may point out that the thing requires a certain amount of 
energy and attention to engage with it, making certain demands on my body and my thinking. 
                                                 
294 Heidegger says at various points that what is (das Seiende) would still somehow hang around without 
being-there (Dasein), although being (Sein) would not, so what-is would not, strictly speaking, be. See, for 
example, BT §43, esp. 212/255; BT 183/228, 230/272-3; “Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” (GA 
9:306/Pathmarks 233). See also Heidegger’s discussions of the being-less (das Sein-lose) and the nothing-
less (das Nichts-lose), what-is as it would ‘be’ independent of being, in GA 70. 
295 See Heidegger, “TheThing,” in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures/GA 79, on things as places that condition 
and gather, as well as Andrew J. Mitchell, Heidegger Among the Sculptors (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. 
Press, 2010), pp. 74-77, and Jeff Malpas, Heidegger’s Topology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), esp. 
chs. 4-5, for commentary. On originary time and space (i.e., transport/ecstasy and captivation, 
respectively), see Contributions to Philosophy, as well as Polt, The Emergency of Being, pp. 180-192. 
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the case, there would be no friction; meaning could get no traction on the things. For example: we 
familiarize ourselves with individual entities by referring them to types, locating them within 
common patterns, but the excess of what is means that it does not fit neatly within them. This is 
the condition for entities that have been freed through particular comportments still to show up as 
what they are not, to remain covered over.296
That constitutive concealing, the resistance of what is to the opening that we are, lets 
what could be called the hinge of Heidegger’s analysis, especially in “On the Essence of Truth,” 
come into view: freedom. This has two senses – both of which differ from the usual concept of 
freedom as a property of a subject – and the ambiguity is what allows it to be a hinge upon which 
the analysis (and being-there itself) turns.
 
297
In the first and ontological sense, freedom is a structured and engaged openness, a certain 
receptivity that requires a coherence and stability of world, which allows me to involve myself in 
comportment. Heidegger calls freedom in this sense the essence of propositional truth. This 
engaged openness is an openness to what is there, but also necessarily one that is engaged with 
the open region as such. John Sallis expands this formulation by reading the first (1930) version 
of “On the Essence of Truth” along with the later one (1943). The comportment involved in 
making a true assertion, Sallis explains (following Heidegger), is twofold: it must reveal things as 
they are, make them manifest (Offenbaren), and it must be bound by those things, let them be 
binding on its assertion (Verbindlich-sein-lassen). The first fold involves presenting things by 
setting them within the open region (das Offene) of my comportment; the second involves 
 
                                                 
296 Polt emphasizes the excess of what-is in “Meaning, Excess, and Event” (Gatherings 1 (2011): 26-53); 
Wrathall emphasizes its independence in Heidegger and Unconcealment, pp. 24-25. (Cp. Wrathall, 
“Unconcealment,” in A Companion to Heidegger [Blackwell, 2005], p. 350: “The question of the 
disclosure of being or essences is the question of how there can come to be modes of being or essences 
which are independent of us in the right sort of way.” This is cut from the version of the essay reprinted in 
Heidegger and Unconcealment.) 
297 “Yet turning toward [what is most readily available] and away from [the mystery of unconcealing] is 




maintaining a pre-given directedness toward the things that lets them be presented as they really 
are. “Thus, the openness of comportment requires a certain engagement in the open region and a 
certain openness to what is opened up there, namely, to the beings to which speech would submit. 
Such engaged openness is to be called: freedom.”298
This first sense of freedom is thus oriented by and toward what-is as a whole (das 
Seiende im Ganzen, which is the open region), but since what is can only be unconcealed 
particularly, by particular comportments, unconcealing entities requires forgetting, turning away 
from, the structuring coherence of that whole. We could hardly feel the urgent pull of some 
particular situation if we were always attentive to the structure that allows us to experience 
situations as urgent. ‘Errancy’ (die Irre, or Irrtum), a sort of wandering or adventuring among 
what is, is the name Heidegger gives to this tendency to take what is as just obviously available, 
open on its own, rather than as having been opened up through our disposed involvement. In this 
necessary erring, being is disguised (verstellt) as reducible to what is – things wear their being on 
their sleeves, as it were – so it is just this errant way of assuming that finds itself betrayed when 
what is resists uncovering. The resistance per se is not the problem; rather, that resistance makes 
possible the realization that it is our freedom that first opens up what is. And errancy, finding 
itself referred back to its own cleared freedom, discovers that being must be something 
irreducible to what is.
 
299
                                                 
298 Sallis, Double Truth, pp. 93-4, original italics. 
 This presents being-there with a call, a demand for response. 
299 “The inordinate forgetfulness of humanity persists [… and ] this persistence has its unwitting support in 
that relationship [Verhältnis] by which being-there not only ek-sists [i.e., opens up what is meaningfully] 
but also at the same time in-sists, i.e., holds fast to what is offered by what is as if it were open of and in 
itself. […] Errancy is the free space for that turning in which in-sistent ek-sistence adroitly forgets and 
mistakes itself constantly anew” (GA 9:196-7/Pathmarks 150, trans. mod., original italics). 
 “This erring itself is the clearing (openness – truth) of beyng. Errancy does not set itself against 
the truth; errancy is not sublated [aufgehoben] and made to vanish by the truth. Rather, errancy is the 
appearing [or the manifestation, das Erscheinen] of the truth itself in its own essence. Errancy: in which the 
prevailing [jeweilige] interpretation of beyng must wander [sich verirren], but which wandering alone 
thoroughly measures [durchmißt: stretches through as a diameter] the clearing of refusal in a truthful 




In the second sense, then, freedom is a name for authenticity, which would be less like 
the essence of truth than like truthfulness, responding appropriately to the freedom that is the 
essence of truth. It means explicitly belonging to the open realm, dwelling thoughtfully in the 
truth by being attentive to the structure that mysteriously lets us be involved in opening up what 
is. This sense of freedom is closer to the traditional concept, but Heidegger wants to mark it 
specifically as an active response to finding myself already thrown into a clearing. He puts it this 
way in “The Question Concerning Technology”: 
The unconcealment of what is always goes upon a [peculiar] way of revealing. The destining 
[Geschick: i.e., the given structure in which one just finds oneself] of revealing always pervades 
humanity. But that destining is never a fate [Verhängnis] that compels. For the human being 
becomes truly free [frei: open or available] insofar as he belongs [gehört] to the realm of destining 
[i.e., to beyng] and so becomes one who listens [ein Hörender], not only one constrained to obey 
[ein Höriger]. […] Freedom is what conceals in a way that clears [das lichtend Verbergende], in 
whose clearing [Lichtung] shimmers that veil which veils the essencing [Wesen] of all truth and 
lets the veil appear as what veils.300
 
 
Freedom in its second and fullest sense, then, involves abiding within a certain tension or 
in relation to a certain mystery: namely, that precisely a concealing is what opens up, even though 
it is not a concealing of some definite things to which we could in principle have access. Such 
freedom requires letting the “veil” that covers over other possible essences of things appear as a 
veil, which means recognizing that removal of the veil makes no sense here. By contrast, any 
attempt to avoid concealment, to reach absolute transparency by removing the veil, necessarily 
ends up in a blind reductionism, since it must take all clearings as fundamentally reducible to its 
own.301
                                                 
300 GA 7:25-6/QCT 25; emphasis added and trans. mod. 
 In this sense, freedom lies in recognizing the peculiarity of one’s own structured openness 
– the fact that the clearing belongs to me, historically, and not only I to it – without demanding 
some further criterion that would guarantee this structure of openness as the only objectively right 
one. But this same freedom also calls for me to own up to my responsibility for the blindspots in 
my own openness. 
301 Cf. the discussion of danger, and especially of the leveling-down of all modes of disclosure, in chapter 
3, section III.A. 
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Since freedom in the first sense is oriented by and toward (sich richtet auf) what-is as a 
whole, and this (precisely as forgotten or concealed) is required for the unconcealing of particular 
entities, there is always the possibility of turning (kehren) back toward the structuring that first 
opens up what-is as a whole. This structuring, the patterns of import that allow what is to matter 
in certain ways and not others, is the being(ness) of what is. In the distress of what I have been 
calling disorientation, when the structures we had assumed come into question (when the world 
performs a transcendental reduction on itself, as it were), we can step back from our fascination 
with particular entities and recognize that what is only shows up (in its intelligibility and in its 
independent resistance to intelligibility) on the basis of a grounding disposition 
(Grundstimmung). That structuring disposition is a coherent way of being moved by what is, 
allowing things to matter relative to one another. It is a particular attunement (Stimmung) to 
essences: we always already encounter certain ways of being as definitive, as mattering the most. 
Our understanding of being, in other words, requires a determinate patterning (Bestimmung).302
We might think that we had reached firm ground here. But precisely the determinacy of a 
given understanding of being, precisely the structuring that allows for unconcealment, means that 
it, too, can be betrayed. The specificity is historical; what shows up as essential for the ancient 
Greeks or the early Christians was not the same as for the medieval Europeans, nor as for the 
modern Europeans, nor as for us in the 21st century. The unified meaning (or truth) of being (der 
Sinn des Seins) is multiple and unfolds historically.
 
303
                                                 
302 Cf. Wrathall, Unconcealment, pp. 31-34, and my further discussion in chapter 3, section II.A, below. 
 This does not mean, for Heidegger, that 
there is some entity, being, which shows itself in different ways; being is neither an object that 
presents various features at various times, some of which are more essential than others, nor an 
303 Meaning and truth are not usually the same, even for Heidegger, since truth includes a sense of 
belonging, and since the unconcealing of something may not be the same as the Dasein-projected horizon 
that gives its sense. But the answer to Heidegger’s initial question about the meaning specifically of being – 
by which he meant the unity of the various ways in which being is said – turns out to be the same as the 
answer to his later question about the truth of being. See the “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” GA 
9:377/Pathmarks 286.  
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essence that lies always beyond a series of illusory appearances. Being, Heidegger says, is not, 
but rather essences (west), unfolds essentially in the way a phenomenon does. The phenomenality 
of being (which, as we have seen, he calls beyng), being’s appearing or givenness, which itself 
structures the unconcealment of what is, essences as an interiorly structured happening 
irreducible to any of its moments (i.e., it is unified), but not as some thing over and above those 
moments. Beyng ‘is’ its appearing-as-concealed (being), and every appearance is constituted by 
reference to (against the background of) the whole series, but no single appearance is or could be 
sufficient to present the whole all at once. Being itself (= beyng) cannot be fully unconcealed; full 
presence is denied (versagt) when it comes to beyng’s truth. 
We could say, then, that our sense of the stability and inherent rightness of our basic 
disposition toward essences – i.e., our confidence in the unconcealment (the truth) of essence – is 
constitutively betrayed. It is not the sort of thing that admits of ground (i.e., an external criterion) 
because it is itself the ground, and yet it happens historically. It changes, yet without an ‘it’ 
(something underlying) there to change. 
This negative or dark moment of the phenomenon is what Heidegger calls the mystery 
(das Geheimnis), the finitude of being (die Endlichkeit des Seins), and being’s abandonment (die 
Seinsverlassenheit). It is the clearing (die Lichtung) as a clearing-away (lichten) of all other 
possible understandings of being, in order to let what is show up according to a determinate 
pattern. Since what is cannot show up except according to some determinate pattern or other, it is 
also the event (das Ereignis) that appropriates being to being-there and vice versa. As the full 
thinking of thrownness (Geworfenheit), it is unconcealment (Alētheia) thought originarily 
(ursprünglich), the clearing that gets its peculiar shape – its proper openness – precisely from 
concealing (das lichtende Sichverbergen). It cannot itself be unconcealed in terms of some other 
movement – it has no essence but itself – yet it can be experienced in the way that Pierre’s 
absence can be experienced: as a withdrawal. 
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Tom Sheehan puts it this way: “We do have a relation to the intrinsic non-disclosure of 
mind [his term for the unity of being and thinking], but that relation is between our ever-possible 
impossibility of minding things (Sein zum Tode [being toward death]) and mind’s impossibility of 
being disclosed, i.e., its intrinsic Verbergung [concealment].”304
  
 That is to say, our finitude is not 
only the fact that we will die but the finitude of being (i.e., import) itself, which not only will 
“die” with the human race but changes across human history, without appeal to any external 
anchor. There is something about ourselves that we ineluctably cannot get behind or determine 
(our thrownness as mortality), but this is not simply a failing on our part – it is, rather, the cost of 
the world’s being-opened for us, our being-invested in it, which takes place according to some 
determinate structure that we likewise cannot get behind or determine (our thrownness as the site 
for being). 
Such, then, is the schematic version of the account. We can track it quite precisely 
through the text. Heidegger mentions at a certain point in “On the Essence of Truth” that he is no 
longer speaking of essence “in the sense of what is general (koinon, genos), its possibilitas and 
the ground of its possibility.”305
                                                 
304 Thomas Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” in Interpreting Heidegger, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 42-68. Quotation from p. 58, original italics. 
 We can line up these three levels with Heidegger’s own 
progressively deepening analysis in the essay: the general account of truth is adequation or 
correctness (section 1); the possibility of or what enables (ermöglicht) adequation is open 
comportment that gives a standard for correctness (section 2); the ground of this enabling, the 
transcendental condition of possibility, is freedom (section 3). But freedom is ek-sistence, being 
exposed to what is, and this means exposure also to untruth, which must bear some essential 
relation to the truth (section 4). This untruth (concealment) turns out to be the other side of a 
unified phenomenon (section 5). But now if we attend to freedom as exposure from the side of 
305 GA 9:194/Pathmarks 148. 
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concealment (which requires a leap), we realize that unconcealment is the privative side of the 
phenomenon (sections 6-8). Asking after the essence of truth has thus run us up against the truth 
of essence, of being (in Heidegger’s ‘Note’), and we realize that “sheltering that clears” (das 
lichtende Bergen, ‘the truth of essence’) “lets unfold essentially” (läßt wesen, ‘is’ in a transitive 
sense) “the correspondence between knowledge and what is” (die Übereinstimmung, ‘the essence 
of truth’).306
Most simply: the freedom into which we are thrown opens up the truth of what-is on 
condition that being-there’s own dispositional relation to the truth of being (i.e., of essences) 
remain concealed. Indeed, being disposed in some particular way just is such a concealment. That 
truth of being, in turn, is not quite originary, but rather rests in the clearing that specifies (and 
thus unconceals) it precisely by closing off other options, i.e., by concealing the historical 
character and particularity of its own essencing (i.e., by concealing itself). Originary truth, for 
Heidegger, is the clearing of or for self-concealment. 
 
 
III. Conclusion: On Investment 
 Let us return to Heidegger’s discussion (in the Contributions; see section I.C above) of 
unconcealment as holding oneself in the truth (Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten) and, more 
specifically, as the event (das Ereignis) of clearing or the happening (das Geschehen) of truth that 
is the most important part of chronological history. We can now see that abiding or being-held in 
the truth is a kind of freedom (as two-fold openness) and that in Heidegger’s thinking it inclines 
toward what we have designated as a second, more ethical sense of freedom – one which 
Heidegger elsewhere says “fulfills [erfüllt] and consummates [vollzieht] the essence of truth in 
the sense of the unconcealing [Entbergung] of what is.”307
                                                 
306 GA 9:201/Pathmarks 154. Cp. the end of section I.B, above, especially the closing quotation from 
Contributions. 
 Although we always in fact belong to 
307 GA 9:190/Pathmarks 146, trans. mod. 
139 
 
being, for Heidegger, the second sense of freedom is to be found in belonging explicitly: in 
owning up to this belonging, experiencing the event as an event on the basis of an experience 
with the historicity of being. In other words, freedom in the second sense is an explicit investment 
or involvement both in the open region (recognized as finite) and in what is, instead of our usual 
investment primarily in what is, which covers up our always-underlying investment in the open 
region. At the same time, our affective responses show that this freedom is a being-invested by 
the clearing that gives meaningful access to what is. 
We could say, therefore, that for Heidegger ontological belonging is a kind of investment. 
When this belonging is explicit (or owned, eigen), it is authentic (eigentlich): a freedom (or, as 
we saw in section I.C, a knowledge) constituted by working to preserve our attention to the 
concealing that is constitutive for unconcealment, by letting the mystery remain as mystery, 
rather than trying to force beyng into full presence. 
But to preserve or endure in this sense requires a certain kind of experience; it is 
something one must journey through (er-fahren). It means encountering withdrawal (Entzug) or 
refusal (Versagung), i.e., the presencing of beyng’s absence, as a positive phenomenon. To 
undergo such an experience, Heidegger emphasizes,308
                                                 
308 See “The Nature of Language,” in On the Way to Language, tr. Peter Hertz (San Francisco, CA: 
HarperCollins, 1971), p. 57/GA 12:149 (hereafter: OWL), and What Calls for Thinking?/GA 8, lectures 1-4. 
Cf. Zollikon Seminars 143/110, trans. mod.: “it seems necessary to characterize our […] method under the 
name ‘express engagement [Eigens Sich-einlassen] in our relationship to what we encounter,’ in which we 
always already sojourn. In a certain sense, what is characteristic of phenomenology is the act of will not to 
resist this engaging-oneself.” 
 requires a risk. So long as we remain 
within the third-person perspective, our very distance (as avoidance of investment, the search for 
a prior external guarantee) keeps us from interpreting absencing as constitutive concealment. But 
when we go along a way – leap into a particular, first-person horizon within which what is can 
show itself – we are exposed to the danger of being upended (disoriented) by that which draws us 
onward through its withdrawal. We might, for example, assume both that truth was primarily a 
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matter of assertions and that it was crucially important. In our very attempt to explain the nature 
of truth, however, we might discover that if it is only about assertions, then we cannot retain its 
importance, except as a semantic device. We would feel ourselves drawn on by the promise of 
truth’s importance, only to be upended along the way of understanding by its seeming 
unimportance. 
If, instead of fleeing from this experience, we remain with the disorientation, Heidegger 
claims that we can discover, in the encounter with concealment as what cannot be overcome (and 
thus cannot itself be fully unconcealed), an unexpected proximity to real things. For they are 
independent of us precisely as what resist or withdraw from us in their own peculiar ways. Herein 
arises the possibility of becoming at-home in the uncanny (i.e., in the disruptive, in what 
withdraws as refusing to be integrated), if we exercise our freedom in the second sense and let 
things be as withdrawing, preserving their independence rather than demanding full presence or 
control. And this is an existential possibility – one that cannot be embraced in advance or without 
the risk of going wrong. 
Such reorientation by remaining with the disorienting encounter is very close to what I 
have previously characterized (chapter I, part II) as one way to deal with the “betrayal” of 
assumption-trust. There, we saw that I can reorient myself by reinterpreting both my previous 
assumptions and their betrayal within a larger context. This reorientation would remain at the 
level of assumption-trust, since the broader context remains a unified structure whose coherence 
and resilience I assume. Through a reading of Heidegger’s various interpretations of originary 
truth as a phenomenon, I have tried to make it plain in this chapter that his account of truth as 
unconcealment that includes concealment is a way of reorienting us by taking up new 
assumptions about the broader context. What seemed like betrayal (untruth) is reinterpreted as the 
very essence of truth (in the Contributions), or at least incorporated into truth’s own structure as 
its proper non-essence (in “On the Essence of Truth”). 
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This kind of reorienting move – which Heidegger usually calls a leap – orients itself 
toward what I would like to name a complex phenomenon. This would be a phenomenon with 
multiple essential aspects that remain distinct from one another, united but not dialectically 
synthesized. Heidegger refers to such phenomena as Janus-faced, looking both directions, to 
indicate the distinctness of the essential aspects.309 One ontic example he uses is that of a 
staircase, which at once goes both up and down. The staircase holds together vertical ascent with 
horizontal landing in what Heidegger calls a “dynamic configuration [bewegtes Gefüge].”310 The 
landing, as Bret Davis points out, is both the place where one stands and the place from which 
one reverses direction;311
For phenomena given as perceptually real, their unseen aspects (the “back side”) are 
partially given as implied in my perception of the aspect facing me. Taking our cue from the 
staircase example, we could say by contrast that a complex phenomenon is one whose other side 
is discovered only in privileged moments of insight that also constitute a turn from one essential 
side to the other.
 it is thus also the place from which one can experience positively the 
unity of the two directions. 
312
                                                 
309 Heidegger, “Summary of a Seminar,” in On Time and Being, tr. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1972), p. 53/GA 14:63. 
 Although I can grasp truth and lack of truth together, I cannot authentically 
encounter the privation as itself a positive phenomenon, as an essential aspect of the structural 
unity of unconcealment as a whole, unless I invest myself in walking the meditative path that 
Heidegger walks. This path involves becoming disoriented in my assumptions about truth, then 
reorienting through a kind of leap that allows me to hold together concealment as ineliminable 
and unconcealment as clearing a place where things can show up.  
310 Heidegger, Country Path Conversations, tr. B.W. Davis (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2010), pp. 108-9/GA 77:167-9. Hereafter, CPC. 
311 See the translator’s footnote on CPC 168. 




Quite generally, for Heidegger, the freedom of being-invested lies in experiencing truth 
in terms of a finite venture like this. Truth is a contest between earth and world, an intrinsically 
unfulfilled intention, or the undecidability and impossibility of a guarantee that this is the correct 
basic disposition by which to encounter things. Holding oneself in the truth (or being-held in…) 
is therefore, according to Heidegger, not at all a “self-serving snatching up of a self-made 
certitude [or security, Sicherheit].”313 Instead, as David Krell puts it rather dramatically: “truth, 
the unhiddenness of beings, […] is not normative but disclosive; not eternal but radically 
historical; not transcendent but immanent in the things wrought; not sheer light but 
chiaroscuro.”314
Nevertheless, as I will argue next, standing “in the truth” is in fact still more precarious 
than Heidegger allows. In the end, on his account, such standing is still self-assuring; for although 
there are indications that he would like to take a different path, he ends up characterizing it still in 
terms of assumption-trust. Thus, any betrayal (concealment) of the truth is always incorporated 
into the structure in advance, even if this can only be recognized from the other side of a 
disorientation. 
 
                                                 
313 GA 65:370: “eigensüchtiges Erraffen einer selbstgemachten Sicherheit.” 
314 D.F. Krell, “Analysis” of Heidegger’s Nietzsche I, in Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 1, p. 256. I would add 
that it is not primarily normative, since I think propositional truth and the truth of entities do remain 
normative, even though originary truth does not because it is what enables normativity at all. See BT 217-





Self-Certainty Yields Only to Reassurance 
wherein Thoughtful Exposure to Self-Concealment 
is seen to be the Hope of Humankind 
 
Introduction 
 I argued in my previous chapter that it is at least plausible, both on independent grounds 
and on the basis of evidence within Heidegger’s own corpus, to understand primitive trust and 
originary truth as interpretations of the same phenomenon: namely, the phenomenon always 
privileged by Heidegger and always difficult to glimpse, that of phenomenality itself.315
 But now I must ask: to what extent is Heidegger right? What if the kind of betrayal to 
which we are exposed by our primitive trust in the world cannot be incorporated into the 
phenomenologically encountered structure of concealment and unconcealment? What if the threat 
involved in beyng’s default is less like disorientation about an essencing that “is” always already 
at work, and more like the betrayal of a personal trust? In such disorientation, beyng’s structural 
withdrawal would repeatedly overturn our metaphysical assumptions about it, but would also 
 From 
there, I examined Heidegger’s account of that originary truth as unconcealment and showed it to 
be, for us, a phenomenon of self-investment that incorporates its own complex betrayal – ‘the 
clearing for self-concealment’ (die Lichtung für das Sichverbergung) or ‘self-concealing that 
clears’ (lichtendes Sichverbergen), as he variously names it. In other words, I showed that he 
interprets the phenomenon of holding oneself in the truth (Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten) in terms 
of what I earlier called background assuming (chapter 1). The structure thus assumed is the unity 
of truth and untruth, unconcealing and concealing, as which being is always given, even if only in 
its withdrawal. 
                                                 
315 Were it not for Heidegger’s explicit privileging, we could put ‘phenomenon’ here in quotation marks, to 
indicate that for the most part it does not appear. See BT §7 and the seminar in Zähringen (Four Seminars, 
trs. A. Mitchell and F. Raffoul [Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 2003], p. 80/GA 15:399) for 
Heidegger’s discussions of a phenomenology that would attend to the non-apparent. See also my chapter 7, 
section II.B.1, below. 
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enable Heidegger’s step back into a broader, reorienting set of assumptions. In a more personal 
betrayal, my self-investment in the world would be susceptible to such fragmentation that both 
myself and my being-in-the-world could lose their coherence. In the latter case, recovery would 
be “possible” in a way similar to the possibility of restoring trust in a person: sometimes it 
happens, but its happening is quite unpredictable, despite our best efforts. 
 Eventually, I want to suggest that such a personal betrayal, undergone with regard to the 
world as a whole, is a kind of disintegration that should be associated with what psychiatry calls 
‘psychosis.’ But before doing so, let me make clear what is at stake by showing that the very 
possibility of a betrayal that cannot be integrated – and thus the possibility of radical 
disintegration – can open up for us a far-reaching difficulty within Heidegger’s own work. 
This path toward clarifying the stakes of my overall project will help us in three other 
ways. First, the work carried out here will serve to support my preliminary phenomenological 
typology of trust (chapter 1) by showing its fruitfulness for thinking both with and against 
Heidegger. Second, along this path we will open up the question of trust for Heidegger in a 
broader sense. We have looked at that question rather intensively so far by examining the unity of 
faith and knowledge at their root (chapter 2, section I.C), but Heidegger’s interpretation of our 
self-investment in the world, though only obliquely addressed as trust, ranges more widely than 
that one section from the Contributions can indicate. Finally, my approach to the immanent 
critique of Heidegger’s thinking – which involves attending to the differences in kinds of betrayal 
that I laid out in my first chapter – will illuminate a problem that has been noticed by several 
commentators in different ways but not yet worked out thoroughly. 
Those are the tasks before us; now let me trace the path a bit more concretely. In order to 
present an immanent critique of Heidegger’s thinking, I will begin by showing (part I of the 
present chapter) that Heidegger wants to give us a way out of the subject-centered trust in reason 
that has marked the metaphysical tradition. This trust, he claims, is really a kind of self-assurance 
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– a way of making-oneself-certain, a “self-serving snatching up of a self-made security”316
Heidegger’s proposed way out (part II) involves interpreting the essence of the human 
being as being-there (rather than as a subject possessing properties): something that exists as 
already entrusted to the historical, structured unfolding of access to being, released into it rather 
than fundamentally estranged from it.
 – that 
has come to the fore more and more strongly in the history of Western philosophy. 
317
But in being mastered by it, we nonetheless belong to this relation inextricably (part III). 
It is thus not something we could ever completely lose or forfeit; we never simply cease to be in 
the truth, any more than we ever completely escape being in the untruth. I will argue that since his 
attempt to twist free of metaphysics is carried out by interpreting ontological danger and salvation 
as unified in a complex phenomenon, he nonetheless continues to reserve a certain self-assurance 
for thinking. Thinking, even as response to what we cannot master, remains at the level of 
 To put it differently, then: Heidegger re-thinks reason – 
understood as the primary faculty of the rational animal, thus as a system projected by and 
centered on the human being – as only a particular, historical (geschichtlich, i.e., involving 
phenomenological rather than chronological history) interpretation of a broader relation that is not 
human-centered. That broader relation he interprets as logos, the self-articulating of the whole. 
Not simply reason but the structured, historical granting of various particular patterns of what is 
governs the relation between being and thinking. That relation, which he names beyng, is thus not 
something we can master; rather, we are mastered by it and can only be appropriately or 
inappropriately receptive to it. 
                                                 
316 GA 65:370/Contributions 292. 
317 For my discussions of what Heidegger means by history, see chapter 2, section I.B, and sections II.B 
and III.D.3 of the present chapter. 
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assumption-trust, finding itself given over to a stable structure. That structure is, as he puts it, one 
within which any genuine seeking of beyng simply entails already having found it.318
Here the tension will become apparent within Heidegger’s own work. Most often, he is 
concerned merely that we in fact are not seeking (“not yet thinking”), and the danger is that it 
becomes harder (but never impossible) to realize that we should or even could think (rather than 
merely calculate). This reading of the danger takes it to be constitutive; it is contained within the 
secure limits of beyng’s givenness. We can never fully think, nor can we ever fully lose the 
possibility of thought. One cannot avoid recalling Hölderlin’s dictum from the opening of the 
poem “Patmos”: “But where danger is, / Saving also grows.”
 
319
By contrast, Heidegger sometimes seems to interpret the danger more apocalyptically. He 
seems to claim that we might become unable to seek, unable to dwell within the questioning of 
being – for example, if the patterns of comportment or the language for such thinking were to be 
irrecoverably forgotten. He writes at these moments of the historically possible “annihilation” of 
the human essence, which would seem to be the removal of any possibility of an authentic 
relation to being. 
 In other words, although errancy 
is a permanent feature of our world-relatedness, that world-relatedness itself is always available, 
even (or perhaps most especially) when we are so deeply astray in forgetting that we have 
forgotten the question about the truth of being. 
                                                 
318 “[T]he unique and therefore singular goal of our history […] is seeking itself, the seeking after beyng. 
Such seeking occurs and is itself the deepest discovery [Fund] whenever the human being decisively 
becomes a preserver [Wahrer] of the truth [Wahrheit] of beyng [….] The seeking is itself the goal” (GA 
65:17-18/Contributions 16). 
Cf. “Seeking after beyng? The originary finding [Fund] in the originary seeking. […] The one who seeks 
has already found [hat schon gefunden]! And the originary seeking is that grasping [Ergreifen] of what has 
already been found [des schon Gefundenen], namely, the grasping of what is self-concealing as such” (GA 
65:80/Contributions 64, trans. mod., Heidegger’s italics). 
319 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos: Dem Landgrafen von Homburg,” in Sämtliche Gedichte: Text und 
Kommentar, hrsg. J. Schmidt (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 2005), p. 350: “Wo aber 
Gefahr ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch.” My translation. 
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I take this tension between two paths to indicate a failure to think through the apocalyptic 
version of the danger sufficiently. As evidence, I propose to marshal a series of openings onto the 
problem of trust within Heidegger’s work – openings that nonetheless fail to thematize trust as 
such, and thereby also fail to recognize the two different kinds of betrayal involved. 
To put it quite simply: I want to show that, for Heidegger, despite all his talk of danger, 
our relation to being is quite stable. The unity of being and thinking is well-guaranteed; it is not 
nearly as precarious as he sometimes makes it sound. He has, as I will show, proposed a change 
in focus for self-assuring trust (the turn from an entity, reason, to being’s peculiar givenness), and 
he no longer assures himself via correct representation, the way the metaphysical tradition does. 
Yet, for all of that, he has not sufficiently described an experience of primitive trusting – an 
account of our relation to being in its unconcealment – that is other than such self-assuring, one 
that would give our vulnerability to radical betrayal its due. Heidegger’s accounts of the self-
giving of beyng and of originary truth thereby remain paths toward self-assurance, even they are 
paths for phenomenologists rather than metaphysicians. 
 
I. Truth’s Self-Betrayal in Metaphysics 
Philosophical accounts of the nature of truth and of epistemology, especially since the 
late medieval period, have been heavily oriented toward both defeating the skeptic and dealing 
with paradoxes of self-reference. Of course, both have been concerns in some form since the very 
beginnings of Western philosophy (between Plato’s sophists and Sextus Empiricus, there was 
plenty of work to go around). But somehow the concern with ever more-thoroughgoing 
skepticism acted as a focal point for modern philosophy in a way that has left its mark on our 
contemporary intuitions and ways of posing problems. 
It is just this historical influence that interests Heidegger, especially in his ongoing 
confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche, for whom “[t]ruth is the kind of error without 
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which a certain species of life could not live.”320 On its face, this is a kind of pragmatic account 
of the truth-relation, but the characterization of truth as “error” presupposes a relation of 
adequation (whether correspondence or coherence) between us and the real world, a relation that 
admits of correctness or error. In one way, then, Heidegger takes Nietzsche to be advocating a 
thoroughly extreme position: Nietzsche’s ability to recognize truth as a mistake means that ‘truth’ 
has betrayed itself in the course of metaphysical inquiry; it has come to be disclosed as a fiction, a 
linguistic game, or a metaphysical error. But in another way, Heidegger thinks that even 
Nietzsche’s inversion of Platonism and attempted destruction of the metaphysics of the beyond 
discloses an underlying univocity about the essence of truth. This would be the univocity that has 
given rise to modernity’s fascination with skepticism, as well as to more recent deflationary 
accounts of the truth-predicate.321
In order to see that Heidegger makes sense of the modern problem by invoking a certain 
kind of trust (along with the disorientation of its betrayal), we need to be clearer on just how he 
understands the human being as affectively given over to the world. To begin, then, let me 





A) Disposition (Mood) and Affectivity 
In Being and Time §29, Heidegger attends especially to two ontic observations: first, at 
any given time, whenever I try to re-collect myself from the things with which I am involved, I 
inevitably find myself (sich befinden) in one mood (Stimmung) or another; second, I am so 
thoroughly delivered over to this mood that it structures my experience of both the things and 
myself. Furthermore, I cannot simply change my mood directly. It is as if something has me in its 
grip, and all I can do is to alter the situation or the way I am thinking about it, hoping that this 
                                                 
320 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trs. W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Random 
House, 1967), §493, p. 272. 
321 See my discussion in the introduction to these investigations. 
322 Cf. chapter 2, section II.C, beginning with the discussion of the truth of essence. 
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will indirectly alter my mood. It is thus one concrete way in which I encounter my thrownness 
(Geworfenheit), the fact that I cannot get back behind myself or fully take myself in hand.323
Heidegger names the existential structure that gathers up these ontic phenomena 
Befindlichkeit: ‘dispositionality’ or ‘affectivity.’ Along with projective understanding (Verstehen) 




Further attention to mood as a phenomenon of attunement or disposition shows that this 
structuring occurs on what might be called different levels: some affective attunements run 
deeper than others, some can be modifications of others, some are enduring and some quite 
changeable. Heidegger is primarily concerned that we not write them off as inconstant and 
fleeting things that somehow arise in the soul.
 i.e., to interpret – affectivity forms the base pair of existential structures 
that come to be united in Rede (‘talk’ or ‘telling [differences]’: logos). Thus things can show up 
for me as important and meaningfully articulated only against the backdrop of my current mood 
(Stimmung), which attunes (stimmt) or disposes me to them and so determinately structures 
(bestimmt) the possibility of our encounter. 
325 “Attunements are not something that is just at-
hand [nur vorhanden]; rather, they themselves are precisely a fundamental manner and 
fundamental way [eine Grundart und Grundweise] of being, and indeed of being-there, within 
which always immediately lies: of being with one another [Miteinandersein].”326
                                                 
323 Recall my account of the possibilities for voluntarily bringing about personal trust in chapter 1, part IV. 
 Each disposition 
is thus a way of being invested in the world as given over to or invested by it, a specific ‘how’ or 
shape of transcendence that modifies the structure of being-there-along-with (Mitdasein) another. 
324 Recall my bear example from chapter 2, part II: I never just hear ‘a noise’ (sheer sense-data) which I 
then work up into a bear or a creaking tree branch; I hear a bear (even if I am wrong about the source of the 
noise), or (if I am not sure) a movement that sounds troublingly like a bear. 
325 Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trs. W. McNeill and 
N. Walker (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 65-66/GA 29/30:99. Hereafter, FC. 
326 GA 29/30: 100-101/FC 67. 
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As Michel Henry has articulated it, in each disposition, being-there “originarily reveals itself to 
itself as handed over to the world and bound to it.”327
That is why Heidegger compares mood to an atmosphere in which being-there is 
immersed, one that thoroughly pervades and disposes (durchstimmt) our being. “[B]ecause 
attunement is the originary way [Wie] in which every being-there is as [wie] it is, attunement is 
[…] that which gives being-there subsistence and possibility [Bestand und Möglichkeit] in its 
very ground [von Grund auf].”
 
328
Disposition (or, more fundamentally, the existential called ‘affectivity’) is therefore the 
determinate way in which what is fits together for me (or fails to) as a whole. The contextual 
connections between things – their possibilities of unity and diversity – are what I project in 
understanding (interpretation), but the pull they have on me, the how of my being addressed by 
them, is given by my concrete disposition(s).
 
329 We might say that it is by my affectivity that the 
world weighs upon me, and that in the change of dispositions (Umstimmen) I can note changes in 
the pressure that make the world lighter or heavier. Of the experience of such modifications, 
Heidegger says, “everything is just as it was and yet different.”330
Heidegger is thus insisting that being-there (Dasein) is only there in a way determined 
affectively as well as interpretively. This means that whatever thinking I do about the nature of 
truth or the being of what is (i.e., whatever accounts I try to give of the articulate unity of the 
whole) must also take place from out of some mood. There can be no affectively neutral account 
 Its salience for me has been 
altered. 
                                                 
327 Michel Henry, “The Power of Revelation of Affectivity According to Heidegger,” tr. by G.J. Etzkorn, in 
Heidegger: Critical Assessments, vol. 1., ed. C. Macann (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 356-7. 
328 GA 29/30:101/FC 67. 
329 Again Henry, p. 359: “To put existence in the presence of itself, to confront it with itself in such a way 
that this ‘bringing-in-the-face-of’ does not merely mean ‘to reveal’ in some undetermined manner, but 
designates the mode according to which this revelation takes place and also its internal structure as 
constituted by transcendence, this is the fact of affectivity in general.” 
330 GA 29/30:99/FC 66. 
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– or rather, affective neutrality is also a mood (whether indifference, collected calm, or distanced 
curiosity), one that is not necessarily appropriate to the issue at hand.331
Now that we have developed the sense of affectivity (Befindlichkeit) for Heidegger, we 
need to see how he reads the history of philosophy as grounded in modifications of our basic 
dispositions (Grundstimmungen) – or, as we could also say in light of my first chapter, 
modifications of the self-investments that provide the orienting background for philosophy. 
 
Heidegger consistently interprets the Platonic-Aristotelian claim that philosophy begins 
in wonder in the light of his own work on affectivity. I will take as exemplary his 1955 
presentation on the nature of philosophy, titled What is Philosophy?.332 There, he notes that if our 
receptivity to the whole inescapably ties together both cognitive articulation and affective 
exposure, we cannot take Plato and Aristotle to mean that wonder (thaumazein; Heidegger 
translates as Erstaunen, astonishment) serves initially as a kind of propulsive cause (Anstoß, 
Antrieb) of philosophizing, but then disappears.333 This would be to understand wonder as an 
efficient cause, but not yet as a governing beginning, an arkhē. Such a beginning is rather a 
source or principle that “pervades”334
Heidegger emphasizes that wonder is understood here explicitly as a pathos, a way of 
being affected.
 the activity of philosophizing – or, we might even say, 
‘guides and undergirds.’ 
335
                                                 
331 Cf. Martin Heidegger, What is Philosophy? trs. W. Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New Haven, CT: College 
and University Press), p. 91, trans. mod./GA 11:24-5: “even the coolness of calculation, even the prosaic 
sobriety of planning are characteristics of an attunement.” See also Zollikon Seminars 252/203, where 
Heidegger designates the mood proper to research as ‘equanimity’ (Gleichmütigkeit), “in which nothing 
else is able to address me but the matter being researched.” 
 Wonder or astonishment, as one pathos among others, lets us be attuned to 
332 The presentation was made at Cerisy-la-Salle in France and thus originally titled in French (“Qu’est-ce 
que la philosophie?”); the English translation consists of alternating pages in English and German. 
333 GA 11:22-3/What is Philosophy? 80-83. 
334 Ibid. The German is durchherrscht: literally, rules throughout. 
335 This he understands in light of the Greek paskhein: to suffer (leiden), to endure (erdulden), to undergo 
(ertragen), or to carry to term and deliver, as with child-bearing (austragen). In line with the discussion of 
affectivity just above, Heidegger further interprets this enduring or undergoing as ‘being carried along 
by…’ or even ‘letting oneself be carried along by…’ (sich tragen lassen von) [GA 11:23/What is 
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things. But a certain basic kind of wonder (a Grundstimmung) is peculiar in that it gives rise to 
and governs philosophy, the love (philein) of wisdom (sophia). Heidegger understands this to 
mean that astonishment is a kind of self-restraint (Ansichhalten) or retreat (Zurücktreten), a 
phenomenological step back before what astonishes us. We should not fail to hear in this an echo 
of holding oneself in the truth (Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten); nor should we mistake this 
attunement, into which we may or may not be thrown, as something I willfully accomplish as a 
way of correctly coloring my world. Rather, we should attend to the phenomenon: in 
astonishment, what-is shows up as a whole (we are amazed by the being of what is), and we are 
drawn toward (hingerissen zu: as if by a rip-tide) and gripped by (gefesselt durch) this whole.336
Heidegger turns to Heraclitus, the first to speak of the philosophos, for an understanding 
of our relation to the whole as glimpsed in a philosophy attuned by wonder. This relation is one 
of philein, loving, which he says that Heraclitus already interprets as homologein, a way of 
belonging by saying the same as or corresponding (entsprechen) to the Logos, the structure of the 
world (and hence of entities within it). Such a correspondence is an accord (Einklang) or harmony 
(harmonia) in which things are reciprocally and originarily joined (sich fügen) with one another 




                                                                                                                                                 
Philosophy? 82-83]. We can gloss this as follows: undergoing, as experiencing in the sense of traveling 
through (German: er-fahren) or out among what is (Latin: ex-peri-ens), involves being carried unto the 
things, which themselves are never simply neutral but deeply concern us. This gloss clarifies, in terms of 
phenomenological intentionality, the final translation Heidegger offers in this series: ‘to let oneself be 
determined or attuned by…’ (sich be-stimmt lassen durch); we may thus interpolate: ‘by… the things as 
they show themselves.’ 
 
  Another principal meaning of austragen is ‘to stage,’ as of a competition or a battle. The 
connection between such ‘staging’ and intentionality will become important for my discussion of desire 
and the event (das Ereignis) in chapter 7, section III. 
336 GA 11:23/What is Philosophy? 85. 
337 GA 11:14/What is Philosophy? 47. Here we have a recapitulation of the truth-analysis from the previous 
chapter: correspondence of speech and thing presupposes a more originary openness, figured here as love: 
being joined in logos (something prior to speech, legein). I pass over questions about the faithfulness of 
Heidegger’s Heraclitus interpretation. 
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What is loved in such philosophy – that to which we are originarily joined – is the 
sophon. Heidegger tries to stay with Heraclitus in articulating this as hen panta, “one is all,” 
which is to say that being unifies or gathers the whole of what is.338 But this is what Heraclitus 
thinks as Logos, that which gathers the whole meaningfully, rendering the openness of things to 
one another by articulating their boundaries and relations. So, in the attunement of wonder, we 
are reciprocally joined to the Logos, which gathers what is into a unified whole. “What-is in its 
being: this became the most astonishing thing for the Greeks.”339
Heidegger outlines, by way of contrast, the modification of this astonishment that he 
finds already in Plato and Aristotle. He thinks that they attempted to rescue (retten) that most 
astonishing thing, what-is in its being, from the glibness of the sophists, but at the cost of 
becoming people who only strive after the sophon. Henceforth, loving (philein) was marked less 
by belonging or correspondence (entsprechen) to the gathering of the whole, what Heraclitus had 
experienced as harmonia, and more by striving or desire (orexis, eros) for that sophon. With the 
affective modification came a cognitive modification of the interpretation: ‘what-is in its being’ 
became the question, ‘What is that-which-is, insofar as it is?’ (for Plato, as reported by Aristotle,: 




Finally, Heidegger examines the very different disposition (and the accompanying 
alteration of the interpretive question) that inaugurates modern philosophy. Descartes, he claims, 
asks instead, ‘Which is the being that is truly what is?’ (where ‘truly what is’ is understood as ens 
 
                                                 
338 “Das Sein ist das Seiende,” where Heidegger specifies that the italicized ‘is’ should be taken 
transitively, to mean something like gathers (versammelt) (GA 11:14/What is Philosophy? 49). 
339 “Seiendes im Sein…” (GA 11:14/What is Philosophy? 49), trans. mod. 
340 GA 11:15-16/What is Philosophy? 50-55. In German: Seiendes im Sein  Was ist das Seiende?  Was 
ist die Seiendheit des Seienden? 
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certum, a certain or ascertained being).341 The addition of ‘truly’ here indicates to Heidegger the 
shift in mood: it is only from within the disposition of doubt that ‘what truly is’ means ‘what is in 
certainty [Gewissheit]’. He spells out Descartes’s situation a bit more explicitly elsewhere, 
writing that “Descartes’s position arises from the necessity for a person who has abandoned faith 
[…,] who has been placed entirely on his own self, therefore to seek to hold on to something else 
that is reliable and trustworthy [zuverlässig und zuversichtlich].”342
That Descartes does indeed begin with at least methodological doubt is hardly 
contestable, even though how thoroughgoing or genuine that doubt is remains in question. 
Heidegger’s reading understands doubting as the grounding disposition (Grundstimmung) that 
orients all of Descartes’s thinking (and the modern tradition thereafter). This says two things: 
first, that doubting is not simply in Descartes’s control, and second, that it attunes or disposes him 
to a particular essence of truth, from within which attunement only those things that meet the 
standard will show up as true (i.e., as in accordance [Stimmen] with reality). We might add here 
that even this doubt, as methodological and oriented toward certainty, is taken up by Descartes in 
the way that is only possible in foreground assuming, the kind of self-investment that pertains to 
hypotheses or explicit methodological assumptions. Heidegger then interprets this foreground 
assumption as grounded in a set of background assumptions that attune Descartes, without his 
noticing, to understand certainty as essential to truth. 
 
In defense of Heidegger’s reading, his interpretation is grounded in the way Descartes 
characterizes not only the main question (which could be merely methodological doubt) but also 
the answers or conclusions. Thus, Descartes takes himself to be the most certain thing, and God is 
encountered precisely as the ground of that certainty – which is, for example, rather far from the 
                                                 
341 GA 11:23/What is Philosophy? 84-87, trans. mod. In German: Welches ist dasjenige Seiende, das im 
Sinne des ens certum das wahrhaft Seiende ist? 
342 Zollikon Seminars 142/109, trans. mod. 
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unnameable mystery encountered in medieval negative theology.343
But the relations between dispositions are complex, and it turns out for Heidegger that we 
can recognize a sort of counter-disposition that properly belongs with doubt. In the disposition of 
doubting, one is inclined to put all one’s eggs in a single basket, as if one said: ‘If we could just 
find a single starting-point that would be undoubtable…’ (proposed starting-points: the I think, 
the more geometrico, the monad, nature, the unity of experience, the self-positing of the I, 
immediate knowledge in sense-certainty). Thus Heidegger concludes that 
 The mark of a true being, 
something that is real, is clarity and distinctness of perception (holding also for invisible things), 
and this mode of perception is characterized precisely as what permits of certainty. Hence the 
epistemic emphasis falls on the subject (rather than on the thing), as that self-certain thing for 
which other things are certain or doubtful: that which is oriented to the world by its own 
doubting. 
the disposition or mood [Stimmung] of doubt is the positive attunement to or affirmation of 
[Zustimmung] certainty. Henceforth certainty becomes the standard or measure-giving form of truth. 
The mood of confidence [Zuversicht] in the always available absolute certainty of knowledge 




Even if Heidegger is right, we are going to want a bit more specificity. If certainty is the 
measure of truth as seen from the disposition or affective attitude of doubt, how on this set of 
assumptions do we attain that certainty? 
If I have assumption-trust in a particular structure and now find myself potentially 
betrayed by that structure – disappointed in my specific expectations and trying to discern 
whether I am fully disoriented – I am still inclined by habit (and by concern to preserve the 
structure) to orient myself by remaining invested in the same structure I have been trusting, but to 
                                                 
343 See, e.g., The Cloud of Unknowing, anonymous, from the 14th century. Ed. J. Walsh (Paulist Press, 
1981). 
344 GA 11:24/What is Philosophy? 85-88. ‘Confidence’ here translates Zuversicht, in which we should hear 
zu versichern (to assure or ensure, to make certain about), especially in such close proximity to the use of 
Zustimmung as attunement to or direction toward (stimmung zu). 
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be more wary about my decisions to rely. For one attuned by doubting, then, what is most loudly 
and explicitly trumpeted as trustworthy – as crucial to the structure – will no longer be the place 
to look for the guarantee of certainty, although one still assumes that this guarantee must be 
maintained. Thus, the Church, the State, and God may still be appealed to, but now necessarily in 
a secondary fashion, in the mode of a chosen reliance rather than an obvious, structuring 
assumption. Instead, one falls back on what has been implicitly assumed (i.e., in a background 
way), something familiar and ostensibly safe, and assumes it more explicitly (i.e., foregrounds it). 
According to Heidegger, it turns out that this familiar, long- and implicitly trusted thing is 
reason (ratio), interpreted as the properly human faculty. In Descartes’s writings, for example, 
this appears as good sense (bon sens) – which he takes to be equally distributed among rational 
animals345
But if our confidence about being-in-the-truth lies in reason, then it makes all the 
difference whether we are reasoning correctly or not. So what we need is a reliable method to 
guarantee the correct use of this faculty. That is why Heidegger points out that reason, which for 
Descartes and much of the modern tradition is supposed to keep itself independent of the 
passions, is itself ruled by a certain disposition, which in turn orients all those who are, on this 
view, properly attuned human beings. Reason “is disposed to confidence [ist auf Zuversicht 
gestimmt] in the logical-mathematical intelligibility [Einsichtigkeit] of its principles and rules.”
 – or as ‘thinking’ (cogitare), the mode of all experience. 
346
This realization opens the way for our next concern: namely, how Heidegger interprets 
what happens when we finally discover ourselves thoroughly disoriented – when our assumption-
 
                                                 
345 René Descartes, “Discourse on the Method for Guiding One’s Reason and Searching for the Truth in the 
Sciences,” in Discourse on Method and Related Writings, tr. D.M. Clarke (Penguin Classics, 2003), pp. 5-
6, 10, 14. 
346 GA 11:25/What is Philosophy? 89-90. Cf. Heidegger’s numerous other readings of Descartes, including 
the most famous one in Being and Time (§§19-21). For example, see his interpretation of Descartes as the 
link between Protagoras and Nietzsche: GA 6.2 124-171/Nietzsche IV 96-138. 
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trust in the accessibility of being is betrayed. As we shall see, it turns out that this is centrally 
related to our understanding of the essence of truth. 
 
B) Trusting in Reason is the Current Grounding Disposition (Grundstimmung) 
In the third of the Nietzsche lectures (from 1939), in a section entitled “The Essence of 
Truth (Correctness) as ‘Value-Estimation,’” Heidegger takes up Nietzsche’s account of the nature 
of truth for the second time.347 In this return, he deals with modernity’s approach to the essence of 
truth by examining the following claim of Nietzsche’s: “Trust in reason and its categories, in 
dialectic, thus the value-estimation [Wertschätzung] of logic, proves only their usefulness for life, 
proved by experience – not their ‘truth.’”348
 Heidegger interprets this passage (i.e., he thinks through the phenomenon of trust in 
reason) in the following way: he claims that both everyday and metaphysical thinking are 
grounded in trusting (vertrauen) that the relation between being and thinking is secured, or made 
certain, precisely by reason (Vernunft). He clarifies this ‘trust’ as consisting in two synonymous 
claims: a) “that what-is as such [das Seiende als solches] shows itself in the thinking of reason 
and its categories,” and, in other words, b) “that truths [die Wahre] and truth [die Wahrheit] are 
apprehended and secured [gesichert] in reason.”
 
349 We have, he says, delivered over or entrusted 
(anheimgegeben) to reason our whole capacity both to be brought before what is and to place it 
before ourselves, to represent it (vorstellen).350
                                                 
347 He had left it behind after the first such lecture course two years prior, in favor of a focus on the eternal 
recurrence of the same in the second course. 
 
348 Quoted at GA 6.1:458/Nietzsche III 33. The quotation is from Will to Power, §507, p. 276, original 
italics. For Nietzsche, we trust in and value reason, not because we have any proof that it allows us to reach 
what we idealize as the truth, but only because it turns out to be pragmatically successful. ‘Falsehood’ can 
be just as useful, if not more so, than ‘truth’ – and Nietzsche thinks it has been for quite some time now. 
(Cf. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §110.) 
349 GA 6.1:477/Nietzsche III 50. 
350 See GA 6.1:478/Nietzsche III 51. ‘Capacity’ translates Vermögen, which in the broader context of 
Heidegger’s thought could either mean an anthropocentric ‘faculty of the mind’ (Seelenvermögen), as 
Vernunft is traditionally taken to be, or it could mean an ‘enabling’, as beyng enables us to think it. Here it 
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One evidence of our collective philosophical trust in this model of reason may be found, 
according to Nietzsche (and Heidegger follows him in this) in our growing response to reason’s 
accumulated failures. Our contemporary fights over “values” – concerning both their relation to 
facts and questions about who can impose such values on whom – are signs that our metaphysical 
trust in reason has been betrayed. Nietzsche claims: “The feeling of valuelessness was attained 
with the realization that the overall character of existence may not be interpreted by means of the 
concept of ‘purpose,’ the concept of ‘unity,’ or the concept of ‘truth.’”351
The history of our disorienting discovery of their incongruity is laid out in three stages in 
The Will to Power: 
 In other words, the 
relation we assumed between being and thinking does not seem to have worked out. 
1) “we have sought a ‘meaning’ in all events that is not in them: so that the seeker eventually 
becomes discouraged [… ;] now one grasps the fact that becoming aims at nothing and 
achieves nothing” – so nature is not teleological but accidental; 
2) “one has posited a totality, a systematization, indeed any organization in all occurrences, and 
beneath all occurrences [… ,] but behold, there is no such universal! [… M]an has lost his 
faith in his own value when no infinitely valuable totality works through him” – the gods have 
fled, so human dignity cannot be genuinely grounded but only asserted; 
3) “one escape remains: to condemn the whole world of becoming as a deception and to invent a 
world that would lie beyond it as the true world. But, as soon as [one] finds out how that 
world is fabricated, solely out of psychological needs[, …] one concedes the reality of 
becoming as the only reality[, …] but one cannot endure this world, which, however, one does 
not want to deny.”352
 
 
In the first step, according to Nietzsche, we realize that purpose is not inherent in the 
world. It is not merely the case, as Descartes already maintained, that we cannot know whatever 
purposes God has put in the world. In fact, there are no final causes. The second step marks the 
failure of both Aristotelianism and German Idealism: the underlying unity that was sought 
without or after the medievals’ one God turns out to be merely our construction, rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
seems to mean both, since in metaphysics the work of enabling – bringing human beings before what is – is 
delivered over from beyng to the human faculty of representing. 
351 Quoted at GA 6.2:47-8/Nietzsche IV 25; Heidegger’s italics. Quotation from Nietzsche, Will to Power, 
§12, p. 13. 
352 Quoted at GA 6.2:46-7/Nietzsche IV 24-5, Heidegger’s italics. Quotation from Nietzsche, Will to Power, 
§12, pp. 12-13. 
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something like a necessary condition for the possibility of experience. The third step, the failure 
of truth, takes us back all the way to Plato, who, on Nietzsche’s reading, first sought the true 
world (of ideas) in order to make up for the chaos of the world of becoming. But the genealogical 
account of the history of this ‘true world’ shows that world, too, to be all too human.353 None of 
these anchors for value remains any longer believable, Nietzsche thinks, and thus he concludes: 
“Trust in the categories of reason is the cause of nihilism.”354
We could summarize as follows: life turns out to be unbearable in the clear light of the 
will to truth. That light has shown us too much, leaving us no recourse to any adequate unity or 
any stable being that would not be completely given over to becoming. Values turn out to be only 
our projections, investments that are not true to any underlying reality. This is why, although it is 
an error, we in some sense need the concept of truth. 
 
To confront this analysis, Heidegger wants to rethink the relation between being and 
thinking – namely, their unity and difference – but he must do so from out of thinking’s very 
failure, in the midst of our disorientation and disillusionment. It cannot, therefore, be a matter of 
reassuring ourselves that we are valuing correctly, no matter how complicated such a 
philosophical assurance might be. Rather, it must be an investigation of the very context within 
which the world comes to matter to us, which we have subsequently represented as a matter of 
human valuing of otherwise inert facts. He begins this account of our most fundamental 
integration into a world that makes claims upon us by attending more closely to what is 
presupposed by Nietzsche’s diagnosis. 
According to Heidegger, we should hear Nietzsche’s rehearsal of our collective 
disorientation as pertaining to “an investment of values in and a withdrawal of values from the 
universe of what is, which as it were exists in itself and permits such an investing and 
                                                 
353 Cf. Nietzsche, “How the ‘True World’ Finally Became a Fable,” in Twilight of the Idols. 
354 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §12, p. 13. 
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withdrawing of values. […] We are actively engaged in valuation and devaluation.”355
Trust in reason as the unifying mediator between being and thinking may at first seem 
unobjectionable, but since it presupposes a certain interpretation of reason, it also takes for 
granted a certain version of what it means to be something. Reason is understood here as the 
representing faculty of the soul and, eventually, of the subject.
 But in 
telling the story that way, Heidegger will point out, we assume ourselves as sovereign subjects 
over against a world that is simply there, as an object, in which we can freely invest and from 
which we can freely withdraw. We do not attend sufficiently to what permits this investment, for 
we Nietzscheans have once again presupposed the relation between thinking and what is, rather 
than having thought through it from out of itself. 
356
As we saw (section I.A), according to Heidegger, early in the history of metaphysical 
thinking the logos was understood as what structures all that is, including the human being, such 
that we primarily belong to it and, derivatively, articulate it (cf. Heraclitus). When that logos was 
later interpreted, problematically, as merely a power of the subject – a power which we did not 
give ourselves, to be sure, but over the use of which we nevertheless have or in principle can have 
full control – then the modern concern that we might not be able to know things in themselves 
eventually had to arise in all its force.
 
357
When seeking the truth is taken to involve assimilating one’s representational faculty to 
what is by itself just there, not intrinsically related to me, then the standard of truth (i.e., truth’s 
essence or nature) lies in whatever obtains the security of this assimilation (adaequatio). As we 
 We gradually shifted to taking this power for granted, 
rather than receiving it as granted. 
                                                 
355 GA 6.2:68/Nietzsche IV 43. Cf. Nietzsche, Will to Power, §12, pp. 13-14: “Final conclusion: all the 
values by means of which we have tried so far to render the world estimable for ourselves and which then 
proved inapplicable and therefore devaluated the world – all these values […] have been falsely projected 
into the essence of things.” 
356 Cp. the first sense of ‘knowing’ in chapter 2, section I.C, above. 
357 “Ratio is a facultas animi, a power of the human mind [as rational animal], the actus of which inhabits 
the inner man. The res, the thing, lies apart from ratio” (Heidegger, GA 54:74/Parmenides, p. 50). 
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saw, the proper exercise of reason, in that case, must consist in following the proper cognitive 
method, one that allows the subject to secure beings as objects of its knowledge. But the most 
secure method turns out to proceed by only addressing itself to such beings as admit of, for 
example, mathematical representation.358 This is because the principle of sufficient reason – the 
most straightforward expression of metaphysical trust in reason – grasps the being of whatever is 
as representability in terms of reason’s categories, over which the transcendental ego exerts its 
structuring control. Knowing things turns out to be assuring oneself of one’s correct 
representation, i.e., making those representations secure through the proper use of the subject’s 
power-to-represent (rationality or judgment).359
Just as when Physics necessarily assumes certain categories from the outset of its 
investigations (e.g., matter, energy, potential, cause), so that only what fits within those categories 
can show up for it as real, so, according to Heidegger, metaphysics assumes a set of categories 
(quantity, quality, etc.) and a process (reasoning) according to which what is must show up.
 Knowledge is (self-)justified true belief. 
360
                                                 
358 For a reading of Descartes’s Rules for the Direction of the Mind, cf. Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 129-
44/99-110. 
 
This assuming does not take being into account except as the a priori: in other words, once again 
as what is, only this time attended to in its manner of being, what it is and that it is. It does not 
adequately ask about the being of this very a priori. The Aristotelian study of being qua being is, 
he claims, the study of what is just insofar as it is, not yet the study of how it is or of what lets it 
be. Metaphysics thereby tends to place the human in control of being’s givenness (beyng) and 
359 Heidegger locates the forerunners of the modern era in Luther’s search for assurance (Sicherung) of 
salvation (in the super-sensible realm) and Galileo’s physics as seeking mathematical assurance 
(Sicherung) of nature (in the sensible realm). See GA 15:292-3/Four Seminars 13-14. The progression 
culminates in the absolute subject (Hegel) and its will to power (Nietzsche). For the whole story, see GA 
54:57-77/Parmenides 39-52. In brief: falsity and truth have been understood as lethē/alētheia  
falsum/veritas  incertum/certitudo  abstract part/absolute subject  will to power as the subject’s 
negating/affirming. 
360 GA 6.1:479/Nietzsche III 51. 
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forgets, crucially, that beyng is disclosed in accord with its own structure of revealing and 
concealing, to which we integrally belong but over which we have no control.361
Hence, in such metaphysical thinking, according to Heidegger, reason is “the most 
extreme pre-decision [Vor-entscheidung] as to what being means” since only what reason 
“represents and secures [vor- und sicherstellt]” has a rightful claim to be in being.
 
362 For this 
reason, Heidegger takes ‘trusting in reason’ to be a founding manner of being-human, a basic way 
in which our whole comportment can be constituted (Grundverfassung), for it decides what will 
be allowed to count for us as real.363
Because it decides rigidly about the unity of being and thinking beforehand, rather than 
assuming that experience grants meaningful truth and so seeking an experience of this unity, 
reason blocks genuine thinking, which should question back toward the sources without 
assuming their character. ‘Reason’ should be understood here as Heidegger’s name for a 
fundamental (or background) variety of assumption-trust in being, according to which access to 
being is granted or denied by relying on reason as a faculty.
 Using the distinctions we have already worked out (chapter 
1), we can make this a bit more precise: what Heidegger calls ‘metaphysics’ involves assuming 
one’s relation to being – hence, assuming a particular configuration or meaning of being, 
presupposing what can count as beings – on the basis of which one either relies on reason, 
expecting it to give one contact with being (rationalism), or refuses to do so (skepticism, 
irrationalism). 
364
                                                 
361 Such forgetting is precisely the visible manifestation of nihilism: we project categories (values) into the 
world, and we can take them out again (kill God, as it were), so they fail to be really independent 
conditions for us. Here Heidegger reads nihilism as just the hiddenness of beyng – the negation in beyng, 
its refusal to become fully present – as it shows up in anthropocentric accounts of being that take being to 
be nothing more than the a priori of knowing. Cf. “Nihilism and the History of Being,” GA 6.2:301-
361/Nietzsche IV 199-250. 
 That is why Heidegger 
provocatively claims that “[t]hinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, 
362 GA 6.1:478/Nietzsche III 51. 
363 GA 6.1:478/Nietzsche III 51. Metaphysics trusts reason as a power of the subject, rather than beyng as 
that which makes use of beyng-there. 
364 In Aristotelian terms, this is to understand all noēsis as dianoēsis. 
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glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought.”365
 
 As we shall soon see, 
however, this very thinking, even if it does not assume the character of the sources, still assumes 
their givenness within a certain structure: that of revelation and concealment. 
II. The Unity of Being and Thinking 
“[I]f the absolute is supposed merely to be brought nearer to us through this instrument [of cognition], 
without anything in it being altered, as with a bird caught by a lime-twig, it would surely laugh our little 




How can we find our way out of the metaphysical predicament? What possibilities do we 
have? If trusting in reason actually prevents genuine thinking, according to Heidegger, then in 
what should we trust? Or should our grounding disposition even be some variety of trust? As 
what sort of grounding disposition should we understand being-held-in-the-truth (Sich-in-der-
Wahrheit-halten)? 
Heidegger does not directly answer these questions, but I think his response can be 
inferred from the course of his thinking. And I think that response turns out to be homologous to 
the metaphysical trust he has just criticized, hence vulnerable to similar criticism. We can find 
our way toward this thought via a brief amplification of our earlier discussion of freedom.367
 
 
A) On Freedom as Exposure 
I claimed toward the end of that discussion that trusting as an investment means both 
being invested in the world and being invested by the world. But I also claimed that to hold 
                                                 
365 Heidegger, “The Word of Nietzsche, ‘God is Dead,’” GA 5:267/Question Concerning Technology 112. 
This does not mean, please note, doing away with reason. Heidegger claims that it is not a counter-
glorification of irrationalism (which, as a reaction, still stands upon the trust in reason – cp. GA 
6.1:478/Nietzsche III 51). It is, as for Kant, a recognition of the limits of reason. Thinking commences not 
by abandoning reason, nor even by seeking the destruction of its adversary, but by coming to know reason 
as this adversary – as that which it must confront and whose depths it must plumb. 
366 G.W.F. Hegel, “Introduction” to Phenomenology of Spirit, §73. Quite appropriately, ‘the absolute,’ 
rather than ‘the instrument,’ is the referent for all the third-person pronouns in this sentence. Cf. Hegel, 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg. von H.F. Wessels und H. Clairmont, Philosophische Bibliothek Bd. 414 
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988), p. 58, lines 7-12; and Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Bd. 9, p. 53. 
367 See chapter 2: section II.C (beginning with ‘The hinge’) and part III. 
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oneself/be held in the truth (Sich-in-der-Wahrheit-halten) and thereby also in untruth, to invest in 
or engage in (sich eingelassen auf) what-is to such an extent that things inherently matter to us 
according to some determinate way of being disposed (some Bestimmung) and not others, is a 
kind of exposure (Aussetzung). We feel this in our finitude: the cost of disclosure, of letting 
anything matter to us as potentially intelligible, is vulnerability to what is disclosed. Thus, what 
Heidegger has sought to develop under the names ‘exposure,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘openness,’ I have 
called ‘investment’ and have tried to specify as certain kinds of trusting. 
But specifically what kind of openness or freedom is involved here, according to 
Heidegger? Earlier, following John Sallis, I called it an ‘engaged openness,’ meaning: an 
openness to what is there, but an openness that is necessarily also engaged with the open region 
as such. Following Heidegger’s account in Basic Questions of Philosophy, we could expand this 
to say: “In the correctness of the representational assertion there prevails [waltet] consequently a 
four-fold openness: (1) of the thing, (2) of the region between thing and man, (3) of man himself 
with regard to the thing, and (4) of man to fellow man.”368
                                                 
368 GA 45:19/Basic Questions of Philosophy 18-19. Heidegger here summarizes a longer statement: “[I]f 
our representing [Vorstellen] and asserting […] are supposed to conform or correspond [sich richten] to the 
object, then this entity [whatever it is] must be accessible [zugänglich] in advance, in order to be able to 
present itself openly as a standard and measure for the conformity with it. In short, the entity […] must lie 
open. Even more: not only must the [entity] itself […] lie open but so must the domain that the conformity 
with the thing has to traverse, so that we may read off from it, in the mode of representing, what 
characterizes the entity in its being so-and-so. Moreover, the representing human, who conforms or adjusts 
himself [sich richtende] to the thing by representing, must also stand open. He must be open for what 
encounters him, so that it might encounter him. Finally, the person must be open for human beings, so that, 
co-representing [mitvorstellend] what is communicated to him in their assertions, he can, together with the 
others and on the basis of being-with them, conform to the same thing and be in agreement [verständigt und 
einig] with them about the correctness of the representing” (GA 45:18-19/Basic Questions 19, trans. mod. 
and original italics restored). 
 The first fold is a matter of 
comportment toward the specific thing about which I speak – is it something I am experientially 
familiar with in the right ways to be able to talk about it? The second fold is my engagement in 
the open region as such, my exposure to what is as a whole and the patterns of import that 
structure that whole. The third fold is my openness to the thing as presented within that open 
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region, letting it bind my speaking. And the fourth fold is a matter of my relation to others, my 
being-with them in such a way as to direct their attention through speech. 
Thus, the structured and invested openness to things that allows them to be unconcealed 
for us in their being – i.e., our receptivity to them – is what Heidegger means by ontological 
‘freedom’ (Freiheit). But we should recall that with this word he understands ‘being-available’, in 
the sense of the ordinary German use of frei to mean a place that is unoccupied and in that sense 
open or free for use. Heidegger describes the essencing of that kind of freedom as liberation 
(Befreiung), but not empty liberation. Specifically, it is “liberation into belonging to being,” or a 
“displacement [Versetzung] into being” or “into the free region [das Freie].”369 That liberation 
makes us free “toward [zu] what is, from [von] what is, for [für] what is, before [vor] what is and 
in the midst of [inmitten] what is.”370
We might be tempted to interpret even this kind of freedom as a property of human 
beings, something that would belong to us and be deployed by us. But Heidegger thinks this is to 
miss the point. We cannot in fact choose whether or not to disclose what is, nor can we choose 
whether to be in a clearing (i.e., to disclose what is according to some given sense of what is 
essential). We could put it this way: as irrecoverably intentional, exposed to and lost among 
things,
 In other words, belonging to being as the essence of 
freedom here means being the place where what is can show up in its being, but also where being 
can be encountered as such. Oddly enough, this kind of freedom is always already occupied, 
claimed, or invested, since it means being-a-there (Da-sein) as the performative site of the 
ontological difference between being and what is, over which site we cannot have control. 
371
                                                 
369 Heidegger, Basic Concepts, tr. G.E. Aylesworth (Bloomington, IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), p. 
57/GA 51:68. 
 being-there cannot ever simply take itself in hand, any more than it can fully grasp or 
control the things among which it finds itself. Freedom is no property (Eigenschaft) of ours, 
370 GA 51:68/Basic Concepts 57, trans. mod. 




Heidegger claims, but as displaced into it, human beings are the property (Eigentum) of freedom: 
we belong to being as its site of disclosure, and as such we are ineluctably related to, vulnerable 
to, things and their import (i.e., their being).372
 If our exposure to unconcealed things includes openness to the open region as such, to 
their unconcealing, then we are also exposed to the concealing in which unconcealment has its 
‘ground.’ “In the proper [eigentlich] sense, the clearing of self-concealing [Lichtung des Sich-
Verbergens] means that the inaccessible shows and manifests itself as such – as the 
inaccessible.”
 We cannot escape our ontological relationality. 
373
From this perspective, according to Heidegger, if the being of what is addresses us, 
makes some claim to importance, and yet has not even been adequately asked about in the long 
history of philosophy, then this is no simple failure of otherwise very intelligent thinkers. Rather, 
those thinkers saw the problem in one way (asking after universal traits of things that could be 
ascribed to them as their beingness, ousia) but could not see it more deeply (to ask what non-
thing allows things to be at all). If this blindness does not depend on us, then it must be a 
constitutive moment of the phenomenon of being’s own givenness (i.e., its essencing). Thinking 
has not simply failed to reach being; it has encountered beyng’s own essential withdrawing, albeit 
without having made the latter explicit. We are indeed disoriented, but reorientation is possible by 
 Thus, as we have seen (chapter 2, section III), Heidegger’s phenomenological 
approach to thinking requires going along (or investing in) a particular descriptive way (Weg), 
encountering something strange – a disorientation of assumptions, the self-bracketing of the 
world – and then attempting to see that betrayal itself as also an integral part of the phenomenon. 
This is because phenomenology involves a focus on how something is given, seeking the essence 
as a unity that emerges in interpretation as we go along the way. 
                                                 
372 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” GA 9:188-91/Pathmarks 144-6. 
373 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 229/183. 
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locating the whole system (consisting of our inherited set of assumptions and their more recent 
betrayal) within a larger context of assumptions.374
 
 
B) Trusting in Unconcealment is Heidegger’s New Grounding Disposition 
“When a withholding and denial press on, only someone whose thinking is too short-sighted, i.e., not 
genuine, remains caught up in them and finds there an occasion for despair. This is always evidence that 




This implies, it seems to me, that Heidegger thinks we must trust (in the sense of 
assumption-trust) the intrinsically concealed source of the unity of being and thinking. This 
source is also called ‘the event’ (das Ereignis) that joins beyng and being-there in some definite 
manner, as well as ‘originary truth’ insofar as it is unified in its various clearings. In other words, 
for Heidegger we must trust unconcealment as a complex phenomenon in which we are 
necessarily embedded.376
 
 Support for this interpretation comes in two forms. The first requires 
thinking through the matter along with Heidegger; the second is a reading of a significant opening 
in one of his late-period essays. 
1. One way of thinking along Heidegger’s path, attending to the matter of his thinking 
along with him, is to ask what it means for being and thinking to belong together. The question 
about this relationship (Verhältnis) between the human essence – what I am for now calling 
‘thinking’ – and the being of what is, namely, the question of what element this relationship rests 
in (worin… beruht), is, according to Heidegger, “the unique question that all traditional thinking 
above all must be made to face.”377
                                                 
374 Cp. the two modes of reorientation articulated in chapter 1, part II, and the course of thinking laid out in 
“On the Essence of Truth,” as we have traced it in chapter 2, section II.C. 
 It is Husserl’s phenomenological question of the correlation 
between noēsis and noēma, now modified beyond the constraints of a sphere of immanence. It is 
375 GA 65:412/Contributions 326-7. 
376 Recall my earlier account of a complex phenomenon (chapter 2, part III). 
377 Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, tr. J.G. Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 79, trans. 
mod./GA 8:85. Hereafter, WCT? 
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no longer a matter of switching attitudes so as to effect a reduction; rather, the givenness of being 
(i.e., beyng) is intrinsically “reduced,” intrinsically hidden, and thus it enables a certain 
experience of originary truth as incorporating its own betrayal. As we have seen (chapter 2, part 
II), concealment belongs to the core of the phenomenon of unconcealment. 
We get a hint of how Heidegger thinks about this relationship between being and thinking 
from his claim in What is Called Thinking?: 
as soon as I thoughtfully say ‘human essence,’ I have already said relatedness [Bezug] to being. 
Likewise, as soon as I say thoughtfully: ‘being of what is,’ the relatedness [Bezug] to the human 
essence has already been named. […] Said from out of the matter [Sache]: there are here neither 
members of the relation [Beziehung] nor this relation as such.378
 
 
Evidently, Heidegger is here trying to avoid, on one hand, dialecticization of the relation 
(‘there are not members of the relation’), and on the other, abstraction (‘nor is there this relation 
as such’).379 But one remarkable upshot of this is that one cannot start with one “side” (being or 
thinking) and get to the other; one has to begin with their unity. Thus Heidegger claims that 
“every way of thinking always already goes along within [geht… innerhalb] the whole 
relationship [Verhältnis] of being and the human essence, or else it is not thinking at all.”380
Let us try to see what these two claims would mean. Looking up at the sky, I notice that 
the clouds are white and puffy today. I thus see that something is (the clouds are not nothing) and 
what it is (they are clouds). In an everyday way, then, I encounter the clouds in their being; I 
encounter a state of affairs (Sachverhalt). But I do not see this state of affairs; what I see are 
 First, 
we could not be thoughtful in the relevant way unless we were already joined to being. Therefore, 
secondly, something said about one “pole” must be seen as always already a description also of 
the other “pole.” 
                                                 
378 GA 8:85/WCT? 79, trans. mod. 
379 Cf. GA 65:286-7/Contributions 225: “essencing [Wesung] is not supposed to name something that lies 
beyond beyng; instead, it utters what is innermost to beyng, namely, the event [das Er-eignis], that 
oscillation [Gegenschwung] between beyng and being-there in which the two are not objectively present 
[vorhandene] poles but are the pure coming to be of the oscillation [die reine Erschwingung] itself.” 
380 GA 8:85/WCT? 80, trans. mod., original italics. 
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white, puffy clouds. Where in sensory intuition is the categorial designation that they are? It is a 
kind of excess, one that is included in any encounter with entities, yet not located in perception. 
Maybe being in this case is something empty, a mere semantic form, but then why does it matter 
to me so much that they are? Why has this ‘to be’ exercised the philosophical tradition to such an 
extent? Imaginary clouds would not reach me in the same way; black clouds would lay claim to 
me in a much different way. I am struck by the being of things, not only by the things. 
As Hegel also recognized (see the epigraph to this section), we would have no access to 
the being of what is if we had to consciously acquire it somehow, for example through correct 
reasoning. Even if it also involves this, the subject’s relation to what is cannot only or even first of 
all be a kind of trial and error, reaching out from within itself to seize (more or less well) on what 
is just lying around independently of it. Rather, according to Hegel, the history of our attempts to 
think what is as it is (to reach being) must also themselves already display being, and do so in a 
way somehow proper to it, as its own history; thus is history introduced into ontology.381
To put the problem this way is not to take being as a separate entity with properties. 
Rather, it takes seriously the attempt to think the belonging-together of being and thinking, rather 
than simply (or complexly) reducing being to thinking. For if we really do belong to being, then 
according to Heidegger two things follow: 1) our most interesting failures (at least) are parts of 
being’s history (Geschichte), its happening (Geschehen) – i.e., aspects of beyng – and not only 
measures of the distance thinking has yet to cover; 2) our successes remain limited, not because 
they are somehow also failures on our part, but because being itself is finite. Privation at an 
 
                                                 
381 The question of the differences between Heidegger and Hegel is one to which Heidegger himself 
returned many times, and one that I cannot deal with here. See, e.g., Identity and Difference/GA 11; 
“Hegel’s Concept of Experience,” in Off the Beaten Track/GA 5; “Hegel and the Greeks,” in 
Pathmarks/GA 9; Hegel (GA 68, as yet untranslated). 
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ontological level (Mangel, Entbehrung, Not) is to be understood as self-refusal, self-withdrawal 
(Sichversagen, Sichentziehen).382
As we have seen (chapter 2, section II.C), this is what allowed Heidegger, in trying to 
understand the truth phenomenon, to interpret failure ontologically, incorporating the very 
experience of betrayal into his thinking by allowing it to point back to a deeper unity. For he 
interprets the unified historical (geschichtlich) experience of ‘trusting in reason, then becoming 
disoriented’ as indicating a more complicated phenomenal unity of being and thinking. In other 
words, assuming the guarantee of right reason, or too quickly pre-determining being, as 
metaphysics has and does, is still a way of belonging to being, even if one that does not own up to 
it explicitly. Thus, it is not only our contingent failure that leads us to seek in the right use of 
reason an external guarantee of propositional truth. It is, rather, our desire to completely 
unconceal or render fully present what cannot be so rendered (beyng) – and this desire is 
structural to the relation between beyng and thinking itself. 
 
Let us see what all of this amounts to in Heidegger’s terminology. First, we would not 
seek to understand beyng if it did not escape us and frustrate us by refusing full intelligibility (die 
Versagung). Nor, second, would we encounter what-is as compelling our interest, as definitively 
mattering in some particular way, if the necessity of that refusal, beyng’s constitutively limited 
intelligibility, its mystery (Geheimnis), were not itself disguised as a merely temporary or 
contingent receding into the background (die Verstellung). 
Put differently: we can happily ignore the source of import for the sake of what it lets be 
important only if it seems that this ignoring is up to us, that we could just as easily attend 
primarily to the source. But we pay a price for ignoring the source – our standards come to be 
drawn more and more from what claims us, and when we try to return, to attend to the source of 
import, we bring these standards with us. That price, Heidegger thinks, is nonnegotiable… unless 
                                                 
382 Cf. GA 29/30:243/FC 162. 
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we learn to live with the source as not fully intelligible, responding appropriately to its claim 
without thereby losing the import of what is. 
 But by the same token, there is no claim without those who are claimed. It is not simply a 
farce to speak of freedom here. According to Heidegger, being is “entrusted [anvertraut] 
preeminently and only to thinking.”383
What, then, is the relation between beyng and thinking? The least we can say is that it is 
never one-sided, as far as Heidegger is concerned. There is no beyng without thinking, but 
genuine thought is always a response to the claim of being – something is disclosed as important, 
and our attentive receptivity to that disclosure is thinking. Taken together, these claims mean that 
thinking is always on the basis of our investment in some particular coherently important world 
(i.e., on the basis of some kind of trusting). They also mean that genuine thinking, which turns 
back to being by recognizing essences, i.e., by taking over the unthought (being) in what has 
already been thought, “is only capable of this when it is trusted by [or is familiar to] what is to be 
thought.”
 As self-showing, it needs being-there, which is the place at 
which it shows up, the one to whom it lays claim. Thus beyng – as the happening of import – 
needs (braucht) and uses (gebraucht) us. That means: there is no being, no coherent organization 
of what-is according to essential patterns of importance, without being-there, and likewise of 
course no giving of these patterns (no beyng), although what is would hang around – presumably 
even hang together – in its own way without us. 
384
The unthought here is entrusted to us in what has been thought previously, what has 
shaped us and so remains alive in us for re-thinking. “What is to be thought remains entrusted 
[anvertraut] to thinking – in an unusual way, of course. Namely, until now, thinking did not at all 
think that, or to what extent, what is to be thought at the same time withdraws itself thereby [sich 
 
                                                 
383 Heidegger, “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being,” GA 6.2:360/Nietzsche IV 250. 
384 Heidegger, Introduction to Philosophy—Thinking and Poetizing, tr. Phillip Braunstein (Bloomington, 




In fact, if being and thinking really belong together, and thinking is ineluctably temporal 
(as ek-static transcendence), how can we avoid asking about the correlative temporality or 
historicity (die Geschichtlichkeit) of being? But Heidegger claims in the Parmenides lecture 
course that when we think history (die Geschichte) in terms of essence (see chapter 2, section 
I.B), we think it “from out of the ground of the essence of being itself,” which is to say from the 
perspective of beyng. Thought from this perspective, history turns out to be “the transformation 
[der Wandel] of the essence of truth. It is ‘only’ this. […] What is as historical [Das geschichtlich 
Seiende] has its being from out of such transformation.”
 that is, withdraws itself in its very being-entrusted to thinking. 
Thus, what is to be thought is not produced by thinking but given to it, latent in what has already 
been thought as formative of our sense of being. Yet, even as given in this way, the unthought is 
not simply there like an object; rather, it is still partially withdrawn, drawing us onward. It 
remained unthought for even the highest of previous thinkers not because they fell short of what 
they could have been, but because our clearing (the way beyng claims us) discloses as essential 
different aspects of what is than theirs did. Although we share with them both what is and the 
matter for thought (beyng as source of import), nevertheless what is shared is not simply identical 
(das Gleiche), since beyng unfolds according to its own history. 
386
To make sense of such a claim, we must recognize that Heidegger’s project is to inquire 
into the unity of the manifold meanings of being, without simply giving up and declaring that 
being is an empty generality. His phenomenological attempt is thus to stay with the matter – 
being and its phenomenality – until he can undergo an articulated experience of its essence (i.e., 
the unity of its givenness). So, he says, basic words [Grundworte] like ‘being’ and ‘truth’ are 
 
                                                 
385 “Was heisst Denken?” GA 7:132. This is not from the lecture course but from a separate lecture 
presented to the Bremen Club in 1952 and included in Lectures and Essays. There is to my knowledge no 
published translation. 
386 GA 54:80-81/Parmenides 54-55, trans. mod., original italics restored. 
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themselves historical, important happenings (Geschehen) in chronological history. By this he 
means that their manifold meanings are not accidental – not mere polysemy, nor due only to 
random chronological development – but necessary, unified in a way that is open to being 
experienced phenomenologically.387 Hence “multiplicity of meanings [die Mehrdeutigkeit] is the 
element within which all thought must move in order to be rigorous thought.”388
But if we cannot decide beforehand about the fixed identity of the essence, then 
Heidegger’s claim about transformations in the essence of truth need not dissolve into either 
relativism or historicism, as he insists that it does not. There is what he calls an “essentiality” 
(Wesentlichkeit), a stable core, to the essence, but since the essence is not a thing so much as a 
unified unfolding, that stable core just is the unified pattern of the unfolding. The essence of truth 
is given each time as arising from a depth of field, as having a history. Plants or animals, too, are 
given as self-unifying across a chronological history. But in the case of something like 
phenomenological history (Geschichte), which cannot simply be out there over against us (as, 
say, the growth of a plant can), there is no difference here between the thing (unfolding 
transformations that are interiorly related somehow) and its essence (this interior relation of the 
transformations). Instead, that history is sedimented into our dispositions, our language, and our 
patterns of understanding. 
 This, in turn, 
entails that thinking must always be an interpretation from out of a definite investment in the 
matter to be thought. In that way, it is intimately tied to the claim dealt with earlier (chapter 2, 
section I.B) that recognition of essences must be made anew each time. 
Heidegger therefore distinguishes between two senses of essence as one-over-many: 1) 
truth (Wahrheit) as the essence of truths – hence what would unite many particular truths that 
belong together – must indeed be valid for all of those particular truths; but it does not follow that 
                                                 
387 GA 6.1:144-145/Nietzsche I 143-144, trans. mod. This rein on the slippage of signifiers is one source of 
Derrida’s lengthy argument with Heidegger. 
388 GA 8:75/WCT? 71, trans. mod. 
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2) the essence must be unchanging (i.e., universally valid in itself). So long as the transformation 
is a transformation and not simply a random change, it has sufficient unity to be always the same 
(the essence of truth) without always being identical.389
This is a phenomenological insight: we encounter essences as unities that emerge from 
the self-showing of the phenomena. Hence, if the phenomenon shows itself to involve change, the 
essence will be recognizable as what prevails in that change. “But what is preserved [or maintains 
itself throughout, sich… durchhält] in the metamorphosis [Verwandlung] is what is unchangeable 




Instead, and minimally, Heidegger claims that “[h]istorical meditation [geschichtliche 
Besinnung] […] allows the recognition that in matters of essence there is no progress but only the 
transformation of the same [die Verwandlung des Selben].”
 Such an essence could be the form or look (eidos) toward which the change 
moves, as Aristotle would have it, but is it so firmly decided that this form is pre-given (and 
indeed permanent)? Or even that what governs this sort of transformation is such a form? (Recall 
Heidegger’s reading of the history of philosophy as governed by fundamental attunements, 
section I.A.) 
391 As Heidegger never tires of 
repeating, the same, das Selbe, is not the abstractly identical, das Gleiche.392 The same is, I would 
say, that which can be encountered as belonging to a unified essence in a genuinely thoughtful 
response to the complex presencing of the phenomenon.393
                                                 
389 For this argument, see GA 6.1:149-150/Nietzsche I 147-148. 
 
390 GA 6.1:150/Nietzsche I 148. 
391 GA 45:54/Basic Questions 49. 
392 Heidegger links this sharing to Socrates’ claim that philosophy always tries to say the same about the 
same. Cf. Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 30/24, presumably referring to Plato, Gorgias 482a, 490e-491a, 
and 509a. 
393 This distinction is frequently put to use by Aristotle to differentiate things that are somehow the same 
(one) in being but not identical. His example is not a stairway but the uphill road from Athens to Thebes, 
and one famous deployment of it is to explain how motion or change caused by something else is still only 
one activity taking place in the thing moved. Hence teaching is the activity of the teacher in the learner, 
175 
 
Finally, if it seems odd that a question about the history of being in its givenness – and 
thus about the unity of being and thinking – should be so directly referred to the transformations 
of the essence of truth, we have but to remember the consistency with which questions about the 
essence of truth have already led us to questions about the truth of essence (chapter 2, end of 
sections I.B and II.C). It is interesting but hardly surprising, then, that the problem of the 
essencing of being would turn us toward the essencing of truth, and thus (as an essence that 




Let me sum up what has been gained along this first path. Because of the concealed 
source of unity between being and thinking, even our most remarkable failure – our forgetting of 
the question of the meaning of being – is not simply due to our necessary wandering (errancy) 
from the essence of truth; we could say also that truth itself constitutively wanders, as it were,395
                                                                                                                                                 
even though what it is to teach is distinct from what it is to learn. See Aristotle, Physics 3.3, for the 
example, and Metaphysics 7.4-6 and 7.11 for his discussion of the relation. 
 
disclosing the world differently in different historical clearings. This is what Heidegger calls ‘the 
mystery,’ that intrinsic concealment behind which we cannot venture. Nevertheless, in 
Heidegger’s phenomenological thinking, we do gain access to an experience of the unity of these 
different clearings – an experience of the internally unified transformation of the essence of truth 
– and this complex phenomenon replaces reason as that to which we are given over in 
Heideggerian thinking. 
394 Cf. Heidegger’s explanation: “If the essence of the human is founded in the fact that he is that entity to 
whom being itself is unveiled [sich enthüllt], then the essential destining [Zu-schickung] and the essence of 
‘sending’ [das Geschicht] is the unveiling of being. But if unveiling is the essence of truth, and if in 
accordance with the transformation [Wandel] of this essence of truth the assignment [Zuweisung] of being 
is also transformed, then the essence of ‘history’ is the transformation of the essence of truth.” GA 
54:81/Parmenides 55, trans. mod., original italics restored. 
395 This turn of phrase is from L.M. Vail, Heidegger and Ontological Difference (University Park, PA: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972), p. 82, who refers to “the wandering course of the open realm 
itself” as “the kernel of one of [Heidegger’s] most difficult ideas.” 
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It turns out, then, that the grounding disposition of Heidegger’s thoughtful 
correspondence to beyng is indeed a form of trusting, specifically that of assumption-trust. This 
kind of trust would then be a translation of what Heidegger names “shocked and diffident 
restraint [erschreckend-scheue Verhaltenheit],”396
Being shocked [or terrified, Erschrecken] is being taken aback, i.e., back out of the customariness 
of familiar comportment, back into the openness of the pressure of what conceals itself. In this 
openness, what was hitherto customary shows itself as what alienates and at the same time 
fetters.
 the disposition honored as central in the 
Contributions that presumably orients thoughtful holding-oneself-in-the-truth (Sich-in-der-
Wahrheit-halten). We may be able to glimpse how this restraint could be awakened from out of 
the very disorientation highlighted by Nietzsche if we attend to the shock and terror (das 
Erschrecken) involved in discovering oneself to be “betrayed” by a set of assumptions or a 
structure. Here is Heidegger’s description of what I have understood (chapter 1, part II) as 




The ‘hitherto customary’ is what one had assumed, the rug that one discovers in shock to have 
been pulled out from beneath one. If we remain disposed by that shock, in which the self-
concealing of beyng is disclosed, according to Heidegger, we may find ourselves (befinden uns) 
also in the grounding disposition of reserve or restraint (die Verhaltenheit), the affective step-
back that turns toward (kehrt zu) the self-refusal and corresponds (entspricht) to it as the 
essencing of beyng.398
Accordingly, I would claim that this restraint (Verhaltenheit) belongs within the field of 
the phenomenon of assumption-trust (chapter 1). The clearest way to see this is that restraining 
 
                                                 
396 GA 65:16/Contributions 15. 
397 GA 65:15/Contributions 14, trans. mod. 
398 “In restraint, even though one is still taken aback, there prevails [waltet] a turn toward [Zukehr] the 
hesitant self-refusing as the essencing [Wesung] of beyng” (GA 65:15/Contributions 14). Heidegger goes 
on to describe restraint or reserve as the “Grundzug” of the grounding disposition (his emphasis on ‘zug’), 
which should be heard both as the basic characteristic of that disposition and as the basic pull (Zug) on us, 
the way things fundamentally reach us in that disposition (GA 65:17/Contributions 16). The grounding 
disposition “is hardly to be named in one word, unless that word is ‘restraint’ [Verhaltenheit]” (GA 
65:395/Contributions 313, original italics). 
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the desire to check up on the situation – to take soundings, as it were – corresponds to the 
temporal delay inherent in assuming. In the self-investment we have named ‘relying,’ such 
restraint could only be a willed decision, since the temporal structure of reliance-trust involves 
some audit already having taken place, though in principle supplemented by future checking. In 
assuming, by contrast, we have seen that such audits are necessarily delayed due to the 
complexity involved in discovering oneself to be “betrayed.” Thus, restraint could no longer be a 
willful decision; it would have to be a disposition involved in orienting me within this kind of 
self-investment. 
In fact, it seems that restraint would be precisely the name for the attunement involved in 
the kind of reorientation that takes a step back and interprets its own previous assumption and 
betrayal as belonging together within a larger context (what Heidegger calls ‘turning toward the 
self-refusal’). It is, in other words, the disposition that enables a certain response to disorientation 
(i.e., to “betrayal” in the realm of assuming). Not by chance, that kind of response is precisely the 
one we have seen Heidegger to employ (in chapter 2, section II.C, as well as in the present 
section). 
 
2. The second way to bring into view what Heidegger thinks we should trust lies in 
reading his late essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking.” Here, as we shall see, 
he implies that we ought to turn from trusting what-is to trusting the very structure of 
unconcealment. 
Toward the end of this 1964 text, Heidegger appeals to Parmenides as one who, from the 
viewpoint of the end of metaphysics, can be seen to have spoken already at the beginning of 
philosophy about the clearing as a constitutive concealment. Heidegger translates the following 
portion of Parmenides’ poem: 
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but you should learn [erfahren] all: / both the untrembling heart of unconcealment [translating 
alētheia], well-rounded, / and also the opinions [Dafürhalten] of mortals who lack the ability to 
trust [Vertrauenkönnen] what is unconcealed.399
 
 
Though he translates the whole passage, Heidegger here abandons his most typical 
strategy – carefully interpreting each word – in favor of a focus on the phrase ‘the untrembling 
heart of unconcealment, well-rounded.’ He takes the ‘heart of unconcealment’ to be the 
phenomenon of the clearing, alētheia proper: “unconcealment itself in what is most proper to it, 
the place of stillness that gathers in itself that which first grants [gewährt] unconcealment.”400 
That ‘place of stillness’ is lēthē, the concealing side of the truth-phenomenon. Hence, as we saw 
above, concealment first grants unconcealment, and Heidegger names that granting ‘clearing’ 
(lichten).401
It is this clearing for self-concealing that Heidegger understands in this essay to be “the 
possible presencing of presence [das mögliche Anwesen der Anwesenheit] itself,”
 
402 which is to 
say, the possibility of experiencing (erfahren) what first gives presence, what allows things to 
show up as fundamentally mattering to us, hence as making various claims on us.403
That which first grants unconcealment, Heidegger says, is the way (der Weg), the path of 
experiential (erfahrendes) thinking, by which we may seek out and receive (Vernehmen) just this 
appearance of the process of presencing itself. The clearing, then, is what grants the possibility 
both of this way (i.e., a particular kind of thinking) and of the experience to be had along the way 
(i.e., the experience of beyng as self-refusing, sichversagend). In such an experience, that which 
allows anything to show up meaningfully for us (including the being of what is) itself shows up 
(albeit only as withdrawing). The clearing makes both the way and the experience possible 
 
                                                 
399 Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens, GA 14:83/Basic Writings 444, trans. mod. 
400 GA 14:83-4/Basic Writings 445. 
401 Cf. note 20, GA 14:84: “d.h. die Lichtung”. 
402 GA 14:84/Basic Writings 445. 
403 Wrathall distinguishes between intelligibility – being meaningful as organized, instrumental 
referentiality – and existential mattering (when I am and must be engaged in something). Beingness gives 
us only sheer intelligibility. Cf. Wrathall, Unconcealment, pp. 200, 210. 
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because it itself is the source or element of the belonging-together of being and thinking, of 
presence (Anwesenheit) and receiving (Vernehmen), which is presupposed by any showing up of 
particular beings.404
Heidegger then briefly contrasts the ‘way to the heart of unconcealment’ with ‘the street 
of mortal opinion’. But there is in this text no reference to Parmenides’s explanation for the 
failing of mortal opinion to reach alētheia – namely, that mortals lack the ability to trust/rely on 
(Vertrauenkönnen) what is unconcealed. Instead, Heidegger interpolates the famous discussion in 
which he gives up his earlier claim that alētheia was at one time experienced by the Greeks as 
unconcealment rather than as truth determined by correctness.
 
405 Such a context prompts one to 
ask, precisely, why mortals always take aletheia to be (halten … für) correctness. And Heidegger 
himself does ask this, in a certain way. “How is it that alētheia, unconcealment, appears to man’s 
natural experience [natürliche Erfahren] and speech only as correctness and reliability 
[Verläßlichkeit]?”406
The surprising addition of ‘reliability’ here to Heidegger’s usual characterization of 
propositional truth as ‘correctness’ must be a nod in the direction of pistis, the ‘ability to trust 
[Vertrauenkönnen] what is unconcealed’ that appears in the passage from Parmenides.
 
407 In other 
words, we mortals are too caught up in determining whether we can rely upon beings, the things 
unconcealed, even to consider the clearing that first lets beings appear as reliable or unreliable.408
                                                 
404 GA 14:84/Basic Writings 445. 
 
405 GA 14:85-87/Basic Writings 445-447. 
406 GA 14:87/Basic Writings 447-448, tr. mod. 
407 Cp. Heidegger’s somewhat different translation of the same Parmenides fragment, in the 1942/43 lecture 
course Parmenides. Pistis is translated there as ‘relying on’ (Verlaß). If we look further forward, in the 
Zähringen Seminar (Four Seminars) Heidegger simply drops the latter portion of the passage (the part 
involving trust) from his citation and translation. He no longer takes even Parmenides to have thought 
unconcealment separately from correctness. 
408 Heidegger’s explicit discussion of reliability (Verläßlichkeit) in “The Origin of the Work of Art” is in 
line with my characterization of it in chapter 1, above. There he describes reliability as the ground (the 
essential being, das wesentliches Sein) of ‘usefulness’ or ‘serviceability’ (Dienlichkeit). We should hear in 
the latter, which he calls an essential consequence (die Wesensfolge) of reliability, the means/end 
distinction familiar from Aristotelianism. What a thing is, especially an artificial thing, is determined by its 
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So much so that, in epistemology, we even rely upon these beings – truths – for constructing a 
theory of truth, when we generalize from what truths (unconcealed things) share in common. 
Thus, Heidegger does not spend much time on Parmenides’s own diagnosis of the 
problem because this diagnosis itself wanders in errancy – that is, gets caught up in what is and 
forgets being. It is not our ability or inability to rely on unconcealed things that keeps us from 
experiencing alētheia as such, but rather our focus on what is given (those very unconcealed 
things) instead of on the how of givenness, i.e., the essential structure of beyng. 
Heidegger’s thinking, by contrast, does not rely on what is, on beings, but on the 
phenomenological structure of the clearing that allows them to show up. Thus, he goes on to 
answer his own question – about why alētheia appears throughout the history of Western thought 
only as correctness – by claiming that alētheia is the clearing for self-concealing, not only for 
presence (or revealing).409 In other words, as we have already seen (chapter 2, section II.C), he 
claims that untruth – understood as hiddenness rather than incorrectness – is not simply a 
privation of truth but is included in the phenomenal structure of truth, so that unconcealment 
necessarily makes possible (ermöglicht) for us a twofold possibility: we may experience it as the 
clearing, or we may fail to experience it that way.410
                                                                                                                                                 
end (which determines the form). But in reliability we have a more originary thinking of the thing’s 
openness to us, its solicitation of our trust in it as reliance. “The tool in its genuine tool-being comes from a 
more distant source. Matter and form and their distinction are of a deeper origin” (GA 5:20/Basic Writings 
161, trans. mod.) than that of the end or the use. 
 
 For the tool’s reliability “first gives to the simple world its shelteredness [Geborgenheit, in which 
lies its certainty (gewiss) for the user] and secures for the earth the freedom of its steady pressure” (GA 
5:20/Basic Writings 160, trans. mod.). This reliability is both 1) a belonging of the tool to the earth that 
gives and refuses without explanation (unerklärt) and 2) the protection of that tool in the confidence of a 
familiar world – hence, as Heidegger names it, a “protected belonging [behütetes Zugehören]” (GA 5:20). 
That is to say, as I claimed earlier: relying is structured by familiarity and oriented toward definite (even if 
implicit) expectations, clearly exposed to disappointment if the thing fails. 
409 GA 14:87/Basic Writings 448. 
410 Cf. GA 45/Basic Questions, §30, where Heidegger interprets what failed to happen historically as what 
approaches us as ever more necessary (notwendiger) and more compelling (nötigender). Precisely by being 
held back or withdrawn into mere possibility, it draws attention to its own necessity (Notwendigkeit). 
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Although this is clearly no longer to put one’s trust in what-is, it seems to me to be no 
less a matter of self-assurance than the assumptions of metaphysics. If we assume that the 
mystery is ineluctable and that beyng’s unconcealment is unrelenting, then we can make a certain 
kind of progress by coming to have an experience of the unity of being and thinking as granted, 
but there is no ontological change on offer here: we remain caught up in the dynamic of revealing 
and concealing, the same dynamic in which we would be caught up if we had never bothered to 
think. 
The specific self that would be reassured here is the thinker, the one who can recognize 
being’s givenness even in its very abandonment of beings. Such a thinker gains 
phenomenological insight into a certain essential structure – that of originary truth, or that of the 
history of beyng – and this insight allows the thinker to assume that being will always disclose 
what-is, that our exposure is never-ending. This is a matter of assurance or security, not of one’s 
own making, but nonetheless brought about through one’s own assuming of a certain context. 
  
C) The Turn (die Kehre) as an Alteration of Self-Investment 
This discussion of truth in Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides takes us to the core of 
Heidegger’s well-known turn. For although he does not in this text explicitly address himself to 
the mortals’ trust (or lack thereof) that is mentioned by Parmenides, he nevertheless proposes a 
turn from relying on particular entities (while assuming that being is a super-entity) to 
assumption-trust in the unified structure of beyng’s essencing, which includes the complex 
phenomenon of concealment and unconcealment. As he puts it, this would be the turn from what-
is in its being to the meaning or truth of being, i.e., to the essencing of beyng. From our 
investigation, however, we can see that it is in fact a matter of switching between kinds of trust. 
Let me try to characterize that turn more clearly, since there are various distinguishable 
levels. First, at an ontic level of distress, we might become concerned about the reliability of 
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various things that are and turn to being, not yet by thinking it explicitly as the being of what is 
(i.e., the philosopher’s refuge), but simply within our everyday understanding of being. In this 
sense, Heidegger contrasts the everyday reliability (der Verlaß) of being to the flux of what is. 
Not only do we encounter being (as import) along with every experience of what is; being is even 
presupposed by any doubt about particular things. “For how could we doubt what-is, in whatever 
respect, if what is called ‘being’ did not remain in the first place reliable [verläßlich]? Being is 
the most reliable [das Verläßlichste], and this so unconditionally that, in all spheres of our 
comportment toward what is, we do not ever become clear as to the reliance [Verlaß] we 
everywhere place upon it.”411
If at some point we become enamored of this reliability of being (we metaphysicians), 
then we might try to ground our lives directly upon being’s stable foundation, perhaps by living 
in light of the eternal forms of what is, or by appealing to the a priori as a defense against 
skepticism. Yet, as some metaphysicians in fact did discover (see section I.B above), being then 
slips away, turns out to be general and empty; we are denied (versagt) its reliability to directly 
ground our projects. From that vantage point, being shows up as the refusal (die Absage), the 
great disappointment, of our expectations for its constancy and meaningfulness.
 Although we fail to notice that our comportment is opened up by 
the (historically variable) patterns of import that highlight what-is as essential or inessential, that-
things-are can always be counted on to remain. 
412
At that point, Heidegger thinks that the way out is to make the turn to thinking about how 
being is given, how it can turn out to be both most reliable and also ‘nothing,’ the refusal of 
ground. This is, as we just saw, a phenomenological move, except that instead of concentrating 
on the structures of givenness for what is, he asks about the givenness of those structures 
 Being, as both 
Hegel and Nietzsche claim in very different ways, is nothing. 
                                                 
411 GA 51:62/Basic Concepts 52. 
412 GA 51:62-3/Basic Concepts 53. 
183 
 
themselves – how is being itself given? Like we saw with the essence of truth in the previous 
chapter, being is given to us precisely as concealed, as withdrawing from us, bracketing itself. 
This means: every time we try to reify it as a particular a priori pattern, we eventually discover 
ourselves again betrayed. 
But if, again as with the phenomenon of originary truth, we are granted the space in 
which to step back from this repeated experience of positing and betrayal – what Heidegger calls 
the ‘history of metaphysics’ or (as the repeated discovery that ‘being’ is nothing) the ‘history of 
nihilism’413 – we may be able to encounter that history as itself a unified phenomenon, one with 
its own essential structure. Then we could attend, as Heidegger does, to the way in which the 
withdrawal (Entzug) or refusal (Versagen/Absagen) or even the abandonment (Verlassenheit), the 
staying-away (Ausbleiben), of being – all of which are names for the source of our experience of 
disorientation – are in fact the way in which being is given to us. Then we could interpret our 




Let us now render all of this in terms of the analysis of trusting undertaken at the outset 
of this investigation. We would say, then, that Heidegger wants to turn us from assuming being as 
the unity of eternal forms – and relying on reason as what in principle ensures our access to those 
forms – to assuming our basic belonging to what gives being. That is, he responds to our 
historical disorientation by reorienting us to a broader structure within which our previous 
assumptions can find their place. This is why he ends “The Question Concerning Technology” 
with the hope that art might help us out of the predicament that metaphysical thinking has gotten 
                                                 
413 “[D]oes not nihilism also, or perhaps first of all, put itself properly into play where not only is there 
nothing to what is but also nothing to being? Indeed. Where there is simply nothing to what is, one might 
find nihilism, but one will not encounter its essence, which first appears where the nihil concerns being 
itself. The essence of nihilism is the history in which there is nothing to being itself” (GA 6.2:304/Nietzsche 
IV 201). 
414 Cf., among other places, GA 65:494/Contributions 388: “Beyng as appropriating event is history.” 
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us into by “newly awakening” for us a “glance into what grants [das Gewährende]” being, and by 
“instituting anew” our confidence or trust (Zutrauen) in that same granting.415
But discovering oneself, in an insight, as given over to something that is simultaneously 
disclosed as trustworthy is just the general phenomenon of trust-like self-investment that we have 
already outlined (chapter 1). We can now see what we should find ourselves trusting, according 
to Heidegger: the complex self-showing of beyng’s essence.  
 
It seems to me that the way Heidegger speaks of our belonging to this essence conflates 
two kinds of trustful security that I have tried to distinguish (chapter 1, parts II and III). On one 
hand, there is the security of an assumed context, in which (for example) I have grasped the 
relevant ontological relations and thus understand where I belong within them. This kind of 
security has glimpsed but not mastered whatever betrayal might eventuate, and is prepared even 
for repeated disappointments along the way. It has, we could say, incorporated a certain level of 
betrayal into its understanding of the context: although I cannot simply avoid speaking 
metaphysically, I recognize in advance that being withdraws from such speech, and so prepare 
each time to make a fresh start, albeit always within the space opened up by the essential insight 
into the unity of being and thinking. 
On the other hand, there is the security found in personal trusting, in which I am given 
over to the freedom of the other, confident in her trustworthiness (as disclosed in an insight) but 
nonetheless vulnerable to her radical betrayal of my trust. The latter would not be able to be 
anticipated, nor would the relation be in principle recoverable after such a betrayal, even if 
sometimes the relationship does (contingently) recover. 
We can still see the difference between Heidegger’s proposal and metaphysics quite 
clearly when he describes being as “the simple, the insignificant, ungraspable by the fangs of the 
                                                 
415 GA 7:36/QCT 35. 
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will, withdrawing itself from all artifices of calculation, because it surpasses all planning.”416 It is 
not, in this sense, subject to a ‘self-serving snatching up of a self-made security.’ Yet, in the same 
passage (from his lectures on Parmenides), Heidegger characterizes being as phenomenality 
itself, what must be with us already in any coherent experience. It is “what essences always 
already and in advance [… ,] the uncanny [Un-geheure] that shines into everything ordinary, i.e., 
into what is.”417
When we become distressed or skeptical about the nature of that encounter, as Nietzsche 
makes clear that we have, Heidegger provides the thinker, specifically, with a way to reassure 
herself. In an experience of a certain essential unity that binds history (as Geschichte), we can 
recognize that being is not a vapor. If it is nothing, it is nothing in a very robust sense, as the non-
thing that allows all things to be. Since our essence lies in being-there, we belong to being always 
already, so that even if it can only be encountered in its withdrawal, nonetheless we are drawn 
along within that very withdrawal, held in relation to it, and thus held open for disclosure. 
 Being is thus immanent to what is, as Heraclitus says of the gods while standing 
at his stove, but it is immanent precisely as first opening up whatever is for our encounter with it. 
 
III. The Place of Danger and Salvation 




“What grace gives us is endangerment. Endless toil is grace. Unceasing danger is grace. […] Grace lets us 
be reached by [endless toil and unceasing danger].”419
 
 
 To claim that originary truth is – and thus that our relation to being is – a kind of self-
assurance for Heidegger is already to take up an interpretive position concerning his frequent 
                                                 
416 GA 54:150/Parmenides 101. 
417 GA 54:150/Parmenides 101. 
418 GA 79:75/“Turn” 71. “Even in positionality, as an essential destiny [Wesensgeschick] of being, there 
essences a light from the flash of beyng.” 




references, starting in 1936-38 (in the Contributions),420
If all of this sounds rather apocalyptic, that is no accident: a straightforward reading of 
Heidegger’s discussions gives rise to a certain amount of distress (die Not) concerning our 
collective future. Nevertheless, there is another reading that is both possible and in various ways 
demanded by the texts. Tracing this latter reading will confirm my claims about Heidegger’s 
thinking as elaborate self-assurance, even in the moments at which he is most concerned to 
disorient our metaphysical background assumptions. 
 to our status as essentially threatened. In 
these discussions he characterizes a danger that would not be only one among many in the midst 
of World War II, but rather the danger (die Gefahr), one that threatens our essence as human 
beings and therefore also the range of possibilities for our future. His work on this danger, and on 
the promise contained in it, forms a further meditation on what we just saw to be the nihilism of 
the Western philosophical tradition: the gradual recognition that there is nothing to being. 
I began the discussion of unconcealment (chapter 2, section II) with a pair of phenomena 
explained at the ontic level: 1) the interweaving of presence and absence (which Heidegger calls 
‘juncture,’ die Fuge) and 2) constitutive concealment. Let me now present another to help make 
sense of Heidegger’s discussion of the danger. 
The third phenomenon I want to indicate is simply the working out of a 
phenomenological assumption that underlies everything we have seen from Heidegger so far: 
being must be given, even if only as intrinsically concealed, or as withdrawing from appearance. 
In other words, as we discovered in his account of the essence of truth (chapter 2, part II), we are 
also exposed to (or open to) concealment, not only to what is unconcealed, hence we can 
phenomenologically experience the process or happening of unconcealing as such. I would like to 
call this phenomenon (according to a familiar move) a crisis, in the technical, ancient Greek sense 
                                                 
420 According to Iain Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), pp. 200-1. 
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of a decisive (krinein) moment that displays the unity of a complex phenomenon by turning from 
one essential aspect of the phenomenon to another.421
One of Heidegger’s clearest examples of this is the relation between night and day. Dawn 
and dusk here mark crises between what might initially be taken for simple opposites, or even for 
two merely (chronologically) alternating durations, each of which would be just there for a 
certain amount of time, then replaced by the other for a time. In other words, day, like night, 
would be simply present and then absent, rather than presencing or absencing. But in saying that 
one replaces the other, we already indicate a relation that is not adequately understood in the 
indifference of sheer alternation. Day would not be day (in all its complexity) without the 
anticipation of and the emergence from night. The experience of night would be completely 
different – i.e., night would be a different thing – if night were not understood as arising out of 
and being followed by day.
 
422
Thus, to put it in terms of the two phenomena introduced earlier, night presents itself 
within day precisely by its absencing, its withdrawal or self-concealment therein, while day 
constitutively appears upon a background of concealment: that of its relation to night, and that of 
day’s own peculiar resistance to complete intelligibility.
 All our experience of either one is oriented by the other. The two 
phenomenally belong together; as a structured unity (or whole) of experience, they can be said to 
form a single phenomenon. 
423
                                                 
421 Thomson follows Hubert Dreyfus in calling this a Gestalt switch, in which one abruptly experiences y in 
the very place where one previously experienced x (his example is the duck-rabbit that Wittgenstein made 
famous). For the comparison, see Heidegger, Art, pp. 192-3. 
 Hence neither is complete without the 
422 Astronomy attempts precisely to gain distance from day and night as humanly meaningful phenomena, 
in order to allow them to subside into indifferent moments of Earth’s rotation (the 24-hour day). Even here, 
however, one does not make sense without the other: the rotation must continue, and a large part of what it 
is to be the planet is exposure to the sun. 
423 For important uses of the day/night phenomenon in Heidegger’s work, see among others Elucidations of 
Hölderlin’s Poetry (tr. Keith Hoeller [Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000], pp. 133, 158/GA 4:109-10, 




other, which is another way of saying that each opens onto the other, although they are not 
synthesized into a higher unity. They are, we could say, co-constitutive.424
The unity of this complex phenomenon becomes most apparent when we try to give an 
account of either daybreak or nightfall. Just here, at the joint or turning between the moments of 
the whole phenomenon, we find we cannot account for the moments except in terms of one 
another. Dawn just is a movement from night into a day that night has already gathered to itself, 
but to which it has not yet submitted. Something crucial happens, dawn is an ontic “crisis,” in this 
sense of the word, and yet it was already implicit in the very experience of night. We await the 
dawn in hope and perhaps anxiety, but nonetheless with little ultimate fear that it might not come 
at all. (It is not by accident that David Hume addresses precisely the rising of the sun in his 
argument against inferring the future from previous experience.) 
 
By thinking in terms of crisis as the moment of visible unity of a complex phenomenon, 
already in Being and Time Heidegger interprets the moment (Augenblick) of understanding my 
own death, my ultimate exposure and contingency, as a disclosive and potentially redemptive 
event. Then, as we have already begun to see, Heidegger uses that same analysis at different 
points in his career for the essence of truth, the essence of technology, and the essence of nihilism 
(i.e., the history of metaphysical thinking). Each is understood ontologically in terms of a crisis – 
a decisive point marking the turn between two sides of the same coin – in which the most extreme 
danger constitutes the very possibility of salvation. Each is thus a phenomenal unity that allows 
what seems like betrayal to be maintained as assurance: what seemed, in the midst of 
disorientation, like endless night is now, in a thoughtful reorientation, seen to take its place in a 
constitutive relation to bright daylight. 
Our task in what follows is to recognize this understanding of crisis as it is at work in 
Heidegger’s interpretations of our place in the history of beyng. To do so, we need to attend to 
                                                 
424 For another example, see Socrates’s discussion of pain and pleasure in Plato’s Philebus. 
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three different pieces: 1) Heidegger’s narrative about the danger and about our possible salvation 
(the latter supported by an account of the human essence and of possibility), 2) an apocalyptic 
interpretation of the narrative, and 3) a phenomenological interpretation of the narrative. Since 
the apocalyptic interpretation seems to follow most clearly from the way Heidegger talks about 
the danger, I will give that version (section III.B) as a supplement to the basic narrative (section 
III.A). Then, since the phenomenological interpretation seems to follow most clearly from the 
way Heidegger talks about salvation, I will give that version (section III.D) after consideration of 
the salvation part of the narrative (section III.C). So: first apocalypse, then phenomenology. This 
way of proceeding will allow us to do justice to both readings at some length, which is necessary 
for developing an immanent critique of Heidegger’s work. 
My claim, ultimately, is that Heidegger’s repeated interpretations of the danger genuinely 
pull in two different directions. I will try to show that seeing this as a tension between his dual 
commitments to phenomenology and to hermeneutics can aid our understanding of it, but I will 
also defend a version of the phenomenological reading as most faithful to the bulk of his work. If 
I am right, then the very persistence of this tension constitutes further evidence for my reading of 
Heidegger’s trust in beyng as a form of background assuming. It supports my reading negatively, 
since the most obvious objection to my claim – namely, that he thinks we are essentially 
endangered, not at all secure – turns out to depend on what is neither the only nor even the best 
interpretation of the texts. But a demonstration of the tension also supports my reading positively, 
since it allows us to see that even Heidegger’s own attempts to characterize the unity of being and 
thinking in some way other than as a guaranteed structure consistently succumb to an account that 
ultimately reassures us of our essential relation to being. 
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A) Beyng Is Endangered By Its Own Essential Structure 
In 1945, as World War II drew to a close, with his two sons still held in Russian prisoner-
of-war camps, Heidegger composed a dialogue between two German prisoners in such a camp. 
This was not the first time he had written about the danger (die Gefahr), but he makes use of the 
dialogue’s setting to emphasize the layered relation between ontic and ontological danger. 
It is clear, first, that the prisoners find themselves threatened by the rigors of camp life, 
including despair. But, on the same level, the war is now ending; things will get better. There will 
be progress and improvement of living conditions. The ontic danger is, perhaps, soon passing. 
Yet it matters that this conversation takes place in the evening (it is entitled “Evening 
Conversation in a Prison Camp in Russia Between a Younger Man and an Older Man”), that is, 
on the way toward daybreak, to be sure, but only through a deepening darkness.425 They both 
speak of being wounded, but they do not seem to mean physical injuries. And although the topic 
of the conversation is a glimpse into what is healing, the older man makes clear that “in order to 
comprehend [begreifen] what has become healing for you, I would have to know [kennen] what is 
wounded in you. And what is not wounded and torn apart in us?”426
The younger one explains that “the devastation [Verwüstung] we are thinking of has not, 
after all, existed just since yesterday. And it is not exhausted by what is visible and tangible. It 
can also never be accounted for by an enumeration of instances of destruction [Zerstörungen] and 
the obliteration [Auslöschung] of human lives, as if it were only the result of these.”
 This brings them to discuss 
the ontological danger that remains and perhaps even grows stronger as the ontic danger clears up 
with the end of the war. 
427
                                                 
425 Cp. Heidegger’s rhetorical questions in “Anaximander’s Saying”: “Do we stand in the very twilight of 
the most monstrous transformation of the whole earth and of the time of the historical space in which it is 
suspended? Do we stand before the evening of the night of another dawn? […] Is the Land of the Evening 
only now emerging?” (GA 5:325-6/OBT 245). 
 Instead, 
426 GA 77:206/CPC 133, my italics. 
427 GA 77:207/CPC 133. 
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what is at stake operates on the level of essence, in terms of the invisible that enables visibility. 
As Hubert Dreyfus has nicely put it: “The threat is not a problem for which there can be a 
solution but an ontological condition from which we can be saved.”428
The difference between these two levels in terms of the danger (die Gefahr), or what 
threatens (die Bedrohung), appears relatively clearly in Heidegger’s Bremen lecture entitled “The 
Danger,” presented just a few years after the war (1949). It is also correlative to the various layers 
of truth I worked through in my previous chapter, and to the various turnings mentioned just 
above (section II.C). 
 Solutions make problems 
dissolve, whereas ontological salvation, for Heidegger at least, transforms us by altering our 
range of possibilities. 
Heidegger says, first of all, that death, pain, and poverty, as ontic distresses, “are all 
indications by which the danger lets it be noted that the [ontological] distress remains outstanding 
[bleibt … aus] in the midst of the tremendous [ontic] distresses, that [in these distresses] the 
danger is not as the danger.”429
                                                 
428 Hubert Dreyfus, “Heidegger on Gaining a Free Relation to Technology,” in Technology and the Politics 
of Knowledge, eds. A. Feenberg and A. Hannay (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 99, 
original italics. 
 Simply because we are concerned about genuinely terrible things 
regarding beings does not mean that we are at all distressed with regard to our relation to being. 
In fact, according to Heidegger, ontological danger only is insofar as it concerns us or presences 
to us, so that when we are concerned about ontic dangers, that is an encounter with our 
ontological danger, but as unrecognized, rather than as most dangerous. He has just spent several 
pages working out the ontological meanings of these particular indications: as the limit to world-
disclosure, death is beyng’s refuge or gathered sheltering, which indicates that beyng does not 
show up without being-there; pain is beyng’s basic sketch, indicating our exposure to its 
structured independence (we cannot fully control how things matter to us); poverty is liberation 
429 GA 79:57/“Danger” 54, trans. mod., original italics.  
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into the propriety of things, indicating our ineluctable belonging to them. When we fail to 
interpret these ontic phenomena ontologically, we are simply milling about in what is, failing to 
attend to beyng. 
Then, secondly, Heidegger sets out the interrelation of the two levels, first in terms of the 
way ontology shapes our experience of what is, then in terms of how we might come to recognize 
this shaping in a thoughtful experience of disorientation and discovery. First, in the order of the 
phenomenon itself, the ontological danger “is concealed in that it is disguised [verstellt] by 
positionality [das Ge-Stell].”430 (By positionality, to which I will return in detail shortly, 
Heidegger means the way being shows up to contemporary human beings: it orders or positions 
whatever is as information for use.) Here we can recognize the mystery (self-concealment) that is 
not encountered as mystery (or the danger as danger) because it is disguised, meaning that it 
disposes (ver-stellt) us into errancy.431 That is one level. Again, however, positionality “is itself 
veiled once again in what it lets essence, in technology [Technik].”432
Second, if we follow the chain the other direction, according to the order of our 
knowledge of the phenomenon, we receive some guidance about what the ontic phenomena mean 
ontologically.
 Here we have a second 
level, that of what is: we encounter things in a technological way – we deal with them as 
resources for maximization – but do not notice that this is a particular way of being disposed 
toward them rather than simply what they are in themselves, independently of us. 
433
                                                 
430 GA 79:57/“Danger” 54. See below for the meaning of ‘positionality.’ 
 In other words, we get an explanation of why our relation to the essence of 
technology is a strange one. 
431 “The zone of this dangerousness [Gefährlichkeit] of the danger [i.e., how we encounter the danger as 
dangerous], which thinking must traverse in order to experience the essence of beyng, is that which earlier 
in another place was named errancy [die Irre], [which] would belong to the essence of truth in the sense of 
the unconcealment of being” (GA 79:54/“Danger” 51-2). 
432 GA 79:57/“Danger” 54. 
433 Going this direction, starting from what is most familiar to us, is parallel to the movements in chapter 2, 
section II.C, and in section II.B of this chapter. 
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To what extent is it strange? Because the essence of technology does not come to light as 
positionality, nor the essence of that as the danger, nor this danger as beyng itself, therefore 
precisely now, where everything indeed is more and more permeated by technological 
manifestations and the effects of technology, we everywhere still misinterpret technology.434
 
 
Let me follow for a bit Heidegger’s account of the essence of technology, so as to clarify 
what he means by ‘positionality’ (das Ge-Stell). Normally, das Gestell means a rack, a frame or 
framework, a stand, or a stage, such that die Gestellung means a presentation or an appearance 
(presumably on the rack or the stage), a muster or a marshaling (of forces in some pre-arranged 
area). But Heidegger hyphenates the word because, in thinking ontologically, he recognizes that 
the Ge-Stell is not one single thing, but rather the unity or essence of a multiplicity of 
phenomena.435 These phenomena include (at least semantically) a whole set of words involving 
stellen (which itself has a relevant range of meanings including to place, to posit or position, to 
establish, stand, or impose, and to supply).436 The unifying name that Heidegger gives for what 
governs all of this ordering and positioning, hence what first disposes us to see everything that is 
in terms of its orderability or disposability, is ‘positionality’ (das Ge-Stell).437
But let us ask about the matter itself, not only the name. Earlier (chapter 2, section II.C), I 
characterized the truth of essence as a set of dispositions, a fundamental attunement, to take 
certain things as essential, i.e., as the characteristics of what-is that matter the most. As we have 
  
                                                 
434 GA 79:57/“Danger” 54, trans. mod. 
435 Heidegger hears it as a word explicitly modeled on das Gebirge (a gathering of mountains, Berge, into a 
mountain range) or das Gemüt (one’s temper or disposition, as a gathering of the ways one is inclined 
toward something, nach etwas zumute ist), or even das Gebäck (pastries or cookies, a gathering of what has 
been baked, gebacken ist). The first two examples are from Heidegger, GA 79:32/“Positionality” 30-1. In 
the third lecture of Basic Principles of Thinking (included as “The Principle of Identity” in Identity and 
Difference), Heidegger adds das Gesetz, law, which gathers by positing (setzen) the unity of (or by setting 
together, zusammensetzen) many propositions (Sätze). See GA 79:124/BPT 116. 
436 Thus: to requisition or to order (Bestellen); to pursue, to entrap, or to provoke (Nachstellen); to imagine, 
to represent or to think representationally (Vorstellen); to produce (Herstellen); to arrange or to situate 
(Hinstellen). 
437 Other English translations have been offered for the term, including ‘Enframing’ (Lovitt and 
Stambaugh) or ‘the Frame,’ ‘the Construct’ (Sheehan), ‘the System’ (de Beistegui), and probably others of 
which I am not aware. For reasons given in the text, I will use ‘positionality,’ which is Andrew Mitchell’s 
translation. The ‘-ality’ suffix preserves the generalizing effect of the ‘Ge-’ prefix, and the term reminds us 
explicitly that what are gathered or structured are activities of positing and positioning for the sake of 
disposing most efficiently. 
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since seen (section I.B of this chapter), Heidegger claims that trust in reason is just such a pre-
determining disposition. Positionality is the current form of that trust in reason, which trust has 
been reaffirmed with a vengeance precisely in reaction to the disorientation that Nietzsche 
highlighted. As what Heidegger calls an epoch or a dispensation (Geschick) of being,438 it is a 
pre-decision about what can count as real (i.e., a set of assumptions integrated and in that sense 
learned, but not consciously adopted). In this case, what is allowed to count as real, the 
structuring filter through which we see everything that is in the epoch of positionality, is what 
Heidegger calls standing-reserve (Bestand) or (more colloquially) resources.439
What does all of this mean? We contemporary Westerners encounter natural resources, 
renewable resources, and even human resources, all of which obviously must be managed so as to 
be dealt with efficiently and appropriately. And in order for these things to be managed as 
resources, they must be on hand as organized, at our disposal, available for requisitioning, so as to 
aid production or consumption. When our understanding of being is in terms of information 
(which is posited beforehand as uniform and endlessly orderable, transferable, and replaceable), 
everything turns out to be reducible to information. Even data, as data-stream, is not primarily a 
gift (Latin: datum, what is given) but what is to be – one might almost say, is destined (geschickt) 
to be – processed and communicated. That is just what one does with data. 
 
I am tempted to say that this is simply right. Not necessarily that Heidegger is right in his 
diagnosis, but that this characterization of things as resources that ought to be governed by 
efficiency, of data as inherently for processing and communicating, is an accurate representation 
of the way things really are. Does Heidegger think we should pursue inefficiency? Does he think 
we should forget that some of our natural resources are non-renewable and just go ahead and 
                                                 
438 Cf. “Anaximander’s Saying,” GA 5:337-8/OBT 254-5. 
439 Conveniently, Bestand is the noun form of bestehen, which can mean ‘to be’ in the sense of ‘to persist’ 
(so of course Bestand is a shape of being!) but can also mean more specifically ‘to be in place’ or ‘to be 




squander them? He has characterized being-there as fundamentally oriented in the world by its 
projects – how are we supposed to carry out projects without seeing things as resources for them? 
That temptation, the sheer difficulty of imagining some genuinely other way of looking at 
things that would have the same intuitive pull or level of obviousness as the one I have, is 
precisely what Heidegger thinks is dangerous about positionality. It is why Dreyfus referred to it 
as an ontological condition from which we need saving. As an epoch in the history of the 
transformations of truth and being described earlier, it is not unique in shaping what is obvious. 
That is what every different clearing does. Heidegger’s worry is that this particular epoch is, we 
could say, uniquely good at closing off other options. In his lecture on positionality, he explains 
that “standing reserve [inherently] persists [Bestand besteht]. It persists insofar as it is imposed 
upon to make a requisition [auf ein Bestellen gestellt].” In its turn, “[r]equisitioning is only 
directed to one thing […]: to position the one whole of what presences as standing reserve. 
Requisitioning is in itself universal.”440
There is an intentional circularity here, what Heidegger calls “the circuit of ordering 
[that] takes place in positionality and as positionality.”
 
441
Heidegger’s claim, then, could be summarized this way: what is can only be seen as a 
constantly present stock of resources if everything is such a resource, if the whole into which 
things fit is an ordered system that exists for the sake of perpetuating that system. “Positionality 
names the universal ordering [universale Bestellen] that is gathered from itself, the gathering 
requisition [versammelnde Bestellen] for the complete [vollständigen] orderability of what 
 The goal is to get everything to be 
maximally available for use. But why is that the goal? Because that produces the greatest 
efficiency. And why be efficient? Because resources need to be maximally available for use. Such 
a circle tends toward encompassing everything that is and all ways of unconcealing what is. 
                                                 
440 GA 79:26, 32/“Positionality” 25, 30, trans. mod. 
441 GA 79:32/“Positionality” 31. 
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presences as a whole.”442 Because of this uniquely universalizing capacity, positionality assumes 
a role that other constellations of beyng have not – that of the highest danger.443
The essence of positionality is the collective positioning that pursues its own essential truth with 
forgetfulness, a pursuit that is disguised in that it unfolds in the requisitioning of everything that 
presences as standing reserve, establishing itself in this and ruling as this.
 Let us try to see 




As a first move toward clarity, let me simply paraphrase: The danger, the essence of Ge-
Stell, is Stellen gathered in itself, which ensnares (nachstellt) the unconcealment of its own 
essence in forgetting.445
So we have, at one level, a concealment of the fact that being (the various structures of 
givenness for things) is itself given or unconcealed. This concealment unfolds as a remarkably 
long run of forgetting. But, at another level, it is not as if we ever notice that everyone has 
forgotten this crucial happening, since it seems to us like we know what things are: resources to 
be managed and ordered in an optimal way. The question concerning technology is then merely 
how best to deal with those resources. Heidegger highlights this second level, the level of self-
disguising – we could say: the fact that it is structurally disguised – as what is dangerous about 
the danger, or, in other words, as the way that we encounter the danger every day. 
 This pursuit (Nachstellen) with oblivion (i.e., the withdrawal behind what 
is and its import that allows beyng, the granting of this import, to be forgotten) is therefore the 
ontological danger, but it disguises itself (sich … verstellt) by showing up as ordering (Bestellen), 
thereby establishing itself (sich … einrichtet) in – and ruling or determining everything that is as 
nothing other than – standing reserve (Bestand). 
                                                 
442 GA 79:32/“Positionality” 31, trans. mod. My rather free translation incorporates Heidegger’s marginal 
note indicating that ‘universal’ is to be understood as “versammelnde,” gathering. 
443 “The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger. […] 
Yet when destining reigns in the mode of positionality, it is the supreme danger” (GA 7:27/QCT 26, trans. 
mod.). 
444 GA 79:68/“Turn” 64. 
445 Recall the progression from Being and Time: the question of the meaning of being (the question about 
its givenness, how it is unconcealed) has been completely overlooked or, whenever it emerged briefly, 
immediately forgotten through the whole history of very smart people thinking very hard. That seems odd. 
There must be something about being that lends itself to this forgetting or even produces it. 
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As a second mode of clarification, let me translate more expansively. Heidegger claims 
that “technology itself prevents any experience of its essence”446 (recall that its essence is 
positionality) by developing in the departmental sciences a kind of knowing that cannot reach the 
realm of essence – i.e., one that cannot think being as such but only what is, in its patterns and 
probabilities. If we assume that everything is explicable by recourse to forces (or, more broadly, 
through the use of mathematics; or, still more broadly, that everything is explicable at all, that an 
explanation is the only mode of knowing), then it turns out that what we admit to encountering 
are all and only things that are explicable by forces (or, respectively, things that are fully 
explicable). Thus, once the variety of modes and concrete practices of thinking are leveled down 
to only calculative reckoning,447 the manipulation of information, then every time we try to 
evaluate technology, we do so technologically (i.e., from a technological Framework, the Ge-
Stell), and so we take technology as an entity rather than as being itself.448
If we do manage to gain an experience of technology’s essence, however, and so see it as 
an instance of beyng’s own essencing – i.e., as the understanding of being that prevails in 
Western humanity currently – then we realize that the essence of technology “is to seek more and 
more flexibility and efficiency simply for its own sake,”
 
449
                                                 
446 “What Are Poets For?” in Poetry, Language, Thought, tr. A. Hofstadter (New York: HarperCollins 
Perennial Classics, 2001), p. 115, trans. mod./GA 5:295. 
 as Dreyfus helpfully summarizes. 
Then we might be able to realize that all the many threats to and from various entities (including 
mass death, poverty, pain, and global warming) are posed as problems that encourage us to seek 
447 Cf. “Gelassenheit,” translated as “Memorial Address” in Discourse on Thinking, trs. J.M. Anderson and 
E.H. Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 56 (trans. mod.)/GA 16:528: “the approaching tide of 
technological revolution in the atomic age could captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man in such a way 
that calculative thinking may someday remain as the only way of thinking that is valid and practiced.” 
448 Cf. the common claim that ‘technology is just like anything else, dependent for its value on the use to 
which it is put.’ This claim has two major problems, according to Heidegger, which are separated in my 
statement of it by the comma. First, ‘technology is just like anything else’: this takes technology as a sort of 
vague collection of machines, or perhaps as a certain capacity (like information conversion and transfer), 
but at any rate, as a means to an end, hence as an entity among others. Secondly, ‘dependent for its value on 
the use to which it is put’: this takes all things as intrinsically value-neutral facts, entirely subject to human 
use and valuation. (See the discussion of Nietzsche in section I.B, above, and GA 79:60/“Danger” 56-7.) 
449 Dreyfus, “Gaining a Free Relation,” p. 100, original italics. 
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technological solutions, and that solving them in this way may turn out to be a Pyrrhic victory, 
since it will further entrench us in our positional understanding of being. 
But if we thus bracket the level of ontic danger, there remain still two different ways to 
interpret Heidegger’s discussion of beyng as itself the ontological danger. As Richard Polt puts it, 
“Heidegger’s writings seem to swing back and forth between two poles: unique happening and 
universal structures.”450
 
 We could also say: between a hermeneutics of history and a certain 
phenomenology. I will begin with the way of reading ontological danger that seems to me more 
obvious, the one that construes the threat as more serious. Then, after considering how Heidegger 
thinks the human essence as possibility, I will present the second way of reading the danger and 
ask whether the threat thus construed is sufficiently troubling to warrant Heidegger’s apocalyptic 
descriptions of it. 
B) Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted (Apologies to Kant and Derrida) 
If we return to the “Evening Conversation,” we find the danger characterized as the unity 
of the earth’s devastation (again, not merely destruction) and the correlative annihilation (mit ihr 
zusammengehende Vernichtung) of the human essence.451
                                                 
450 Richard Polt, “Ereignis,” in A Companion to Heidegger, eds. R. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall (Oxford, UK: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), p. 389. 
 Considered as this unity, Heidegger 
451 We should not miss the reference to Nietzsche contained in ‘devastation’ (Verwüstung), a bringing about 
of the desert or wasteland (die Wüste). In a set of lectures delivered ten years after the “Evening 
Conversation” was written (namely, What Is Called Thinking? in 1951-52), Heidegger quotes Nietzsche’s 
seemingly self-contradictory aphorism: “‘The wasteland grows; woe to him who shelters wastelands 
within!’” GA 8:69/WCT? 64, trans. mod. 
Heidegger at this point in his thinking distinguishes between devastation on one hand and 
destruction or annihilation on the other, but he holds the former to be worse, not better. “[The aphorism] 
means, the devastation is growing wider [breitet sich aus]. Devastation is more than destruction 
[Zerstörung]. Devastation is more uncanny than annihilation [Vernichtung]. Destruction only sweeps aside 
all that has grown up or been built up so far, but devastation blocks all future growth [i.e., binds it under the 
ground: unterbindet] and prohibits all building. Devastation is more uncanny than mere annihilation. The 
latter, too, sweeps away everything – indeed, even the nothing – but devastation establishes and spreads 
what blocks and prohibits” (GA 8:31/WCT? 29-30, trans. mod.). It is as if devastation implied not only 
razing a village and killing all its inhabitants, but salting the earth and poisoning the water table, as well. 
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calls the danger “evil itself [das Böse selbst],”452
If the danger is, in whole or in part, that our essence will be annihilated, as Heidegger 
maintains in the 1930s and ’40s, then it is hard to see how what saves could always remain 
entwined with that danger. When Heidegger explains in 1957 that “[a]s presencing, being is 
dedicated to [or ‘delivered over to the ownership of’: zugeeignet] the human essence,”
 although he is careful to distinguish this as prior 
to any sense of moral evil. I take him to mean that such annihilation would prevent us from being 
able to authentically distinguish between moral good and evil in the first place, such that we 
would not be able to name it as a moral evil; just as I pointed out earlier (chapter 2, section I.A) 
that there is no place for us to stand from which primitive trust can be evaluated as justified, since 
any such stance is already within that trust. 
453 having 
already warned us in 1946 that the human is threatened “with the death [Tod] of his own 
essence,” a threat which “assaults [or concerns: angeht] the essence of the human in its relation to 
being itself,”454
It seems, in fact, that between 1936 and 1946 Heidegger traces out just this worry. For 
example, he claims in “Nihilism as Determined by the History of Being” (written 1944-1946) that 
“the human is threatened with the annihilation [Vernichtung] of his essence, and being itself is 
endangered in the usage of its abode.”
 is this not painting an apocalyptic scenario in which being, which we normally 
take to be what is most reliable, would no longer enable what is to show up for us? That what is 
would cease to be disclosed to us as mattering at all? 
455 In other words, since being-there is the place (or abode) 
at which beyng manifests itself by “using” being-there to let what is presence (An-wesen),456
                                                 
452 GA 77:207/CPC 133. 
 and 
453 GA 79:126/BPT 118. 
454 GA 5:294-5/“What Are Poets For?” 114-15. 
455 GA 6.2:355/Nietzsche IV 245. 




the human is threatened with being unable to essence as being-there, then what is could no longer 
presence – and from this there would be no recovery.  
Even worse, there may already be no recovery. As we will see, Heidegger’s concern is 
that our epoch in history may have reached a point of no return, from which any possibility of 
salvation through thoughtful awakening to the crisis has been removed by our vision of the world 
as willed and calculable (i.e., as will and representation). Heidegger claims in the Contributions 
that a second inception of thinking, in which we would experience beyng as event, would have to 
inaugurate a new relation to what is. In this new relation, all of our dealings with what is would 
be oriented from out of an attentiveness to beyng, “such that beyng, its truth, explicitly bears 
every relation to what is.”457
Furthermore, Heidegger asserts that the “success or failure” of such a salvation “cannot 
be calculated,” even though we can think through its contours, what it would have to involve, in 
advance. This means that the attempt by positionality to posit everything as calculable runs 
aground here, since what would ground this radically different way of being is “given or withheld 
by the event of appropriation itself.” Thus, despite its requiring our cooperation (“a coming-to-
meet-it [Entgegenkunft] from the side of the human”), we can neither calculate nor control it, nor 
even sovereignly bring about our own cooperation, since this is “perhaps already something 
impossible for humans today.” It would take place from the side of beyng, as a “cutting loose” of 
what is from the pervasive strictures of positionality, a “squandering” of things by freeing them 
from total control.
 That would require a fairly radical transformation – Heidegger calls 
it an overthrowing (Umwerfung), a sea-change in how we are as human beings – by which we 
would be extricated from our current orientation, an orientation that involves “the disavowal 
[Verleugnung] of all history [Geschichte]” in favor chronological history (Historie). 
458
                                                 
457 This paragraph and most of the next paragraph are from GA 65:248/Contributions 195-6. 
 
458 GA 65:406/Contributions 322. 
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Returning to 1946, Heidegger says that we are threatened with “a single endless 
winter”459 in which it would be dark all the time. He has earlier characterized this as “the 
conclusive abandonment by being [schließlichen Seinsverlassenheit],”460 the “desolation 
[Verödung] of the human,”461 and (he adds some 20 years later) we would be the slaves of this 
complete concealment of being (vollkommene Verborgenheit des Seins), its complete oblivion 
(vollkommene Seinsvergessenheit).462 This is “the danger of all dangers to being-human 
[Menschsein], namely, the danger of the grounding and destroying of its essence [seiner 
Wesensgründung und Wesenszerstörung].”463 In such a situation, “the human being would no 
longer be there [nicht mehr da sei] in order to correspond [entsprechen] to what appears, but 
rather only in order to master” what previously was an appearance.464
 All of that, I submit, would seem to justify Heidegger’s use in the Contributions of 
dramatic words like erschrecken, to shrink back in terror (the basic disposition that governs one’s 
initial response to an experience of beyng), Verrückung, deranging the human essence into being-
there (what is required for becoming authentic understood as a kind of going crazy, questioning 
the obvious basic patterns of experience), and entsetzen, to unsettle by horrifying or appalling 
(one way to characterize beyng’s self-refusing relation to us). And it would make good sense of 
Richard Polt’s translation of die Not, the plight or distress or urgency of our situation, as 
‘emergency’ in his commentary on the Contributions.
 
465
                                                 
459 GA 5:295/“What Are Poets For?” 115. 
 
460 GA 65:423/Contributions 335, my italics. 
461 GA 65:406/Contributions 322. 
462 GA 15:370/Four Seminars 63. 
463 GA 65:424/Contributions 335. 
464 GA 15:284/Four Seminars 9. 
465 Titled, appropriately, The Emergency of Being. See pp. 5-6 for his justification of the translation, 
although it is hardly strange to everyday German, in which a normal term for emergency is Notfall (lit.: a 
case of distress), the emergency room can be referred to as the Notaufnahme (the place that accepts 
emergencies), raising the alarm in an emergency is a Notruf (a call of distress), and one of Heidegger’s 
early lectures took place during and was interrupted by the War Emergency Semester (Kriegsnotsemester). 
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 We might call this the apocalyptic strain in Heidegger’s thinking, in which he attempts 
hermeneutically to interpret our historical situation and even to attend to a parallel hidden history 
(Geschichte) that shapes the chronological one. Indeed, as Polt explains in an essay on the 
manifold meanings of ‘the event’ (das Ereignis) in Heidegger’s work, at least around the time of 
the Contributions (the late 1930s), Heidegger attempts to “explicitly embrace historicity and 
integrate it into our thought.” 466
First, as I will discuss in more detail below, being-there “must be recognized as a 
historical possibility rather than as a given phenomenon.” The analyses of Being and Time and of 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, in which being-there is the neutral essence inhering in each 
human being, are seen to be inadequate to understand our complex belonging to being-there. 
 Rather than thought’s being able to grasp the essences of 
givenness phenomenologically, givenness is, in a way, itself up for grabs. This has several 
consequences that Polt lays out. 
Secondly, the event (as the grounding of the there) is “highly exceptional,” “inaugurating 
a place and age in which the givenness of beings can be questioned and cultivated by a 
people.”467
                                                 
466 Polt, “Ereignis,” p. 381. This essay was published before the appearance in 2009 of GA 71, entitled Das 
Ereignis, dated 1941-42, and relevantly containing, among other things, a 20-page set of extended 
dictionary entries concerning words essentially linked to Ereignis (titled “The Event: The Vocabulary of its 
Essence”), not unlike Aristotle’s Metaphysics Δ, and an 8-page summary entitled “The Treasury of the 
Word.” These two sections on vocabulary are followed by roughly 20 pages of more loosely organized 
thoughts, under the titles “The Event” and “The Event and the Human Essence.” 
 Heidegger’s differentiation between two inceptions (the first – ancient Greek – and 
the other that he seeks) do not “refer to moments in which human beings recognize or fail to 
recognize an already given state of affairs”; rather, “[t]o seek the other inception is […] to 
prepare for the essential happening of Ereignis itself.” This essential happening, “should it ever 
happen, will be a crisis,” so “in a time that is indifferent to crisis, the greatest danger is that be-ing 
will fail to happen, because we will fail to enter the condition of urgency that Ereignis requires.” 
467 This quotation and the rest of this paragraph from Polt, “Ereignis,” p. 382. 
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The possibility of beyng’s failing to happen suggests, then, that the event may be one, unique 
event that has never yet happened, or has not yet happened fully, and may never happen. 
Nevertheless, thirdly, Heidegger claims that “only the greatest happening, the innermost 
event, can still save [retten] us from lostness in the bustle of mere incidents and machinations.”468 
But such saving may not be available, since the event may not take place. That risk may also 
suggested be by Heidegger’s later echo in the Spiegel interview, when he claims that “only a god 
can still save us” – or, perhaps, “only another god can save us.”469 As Polt neatly summarizes, 
then, this historical thinking is “in the future tense and subjunctive mood.”470
 Polt goes on to characterize Heidegger as quickly turning away from this revolutionary 
tone, which flashed up for a brief moment in the Contributions. Nevertheless, as I will try to 
make sense of in what follows, every one of Heidegger’s works cited just above in offering what 
might be called the apocalyptic reading – including the Contributions – also carries an 
ameliorating qualification. With this crucial and yet, Heidegger in each case carves out room for 
the possibility of salvation. Such consistency should lead us to understand that very possibility as 
belonging essentially to the danger, as one of the aspects of danger’s self-unified structure. 
 
Recognizing this structure would then open up a more phenomenological interpretation 
of the ontological danger. We can catch glimpses of this already, when Heidegger says that “the 
danger of all dangers” is “the danger of the grounding and the destroying” of the human essence, 
and that in such destruction the human being would no longer be there to correspond to what 
appears but only to master it.471
                                                 
468 GA 65:57/Contributions 46, partially quoted in Polt’s article, p. 385. 
 In the danger, then, we encounter not only the destroying but also 
the grounding of the human essence. Likewise, should that danger come to pass, the human 
469 As Dreyfus points out (“Free Relation,” p. 105), the latter is also a possible translation of Heidegger’s 
“nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten.” See Heidegger, “‘Only a God Can Save Us’: The Spiegel Interview 
(1966),” tr. W.J. Richardson, in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. T. Sheehan (Precedent, 1981). 
The interview was published May 31, 1976, five days after Heidegger’s death. 
470 Polt, “Ereignis,” p. 384. 
471 See GA 65:424/Contributions 335 and GA 15:284/Four Seminars 9, respectively. 
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would no longer be there in some ways (those modes of disclosure would be closed off), but we 
would still be there to do something, in which case perhaps we could turn and own up to our 
being-there. Maybe even in the very taking-place of what the danger threatens us with, the human 
essence (being-there, Dasein) would not really be annihilated after all.472
It begins to seem as if we might have two competing accounts of the danger in 
Heidegger’s work. There is his frequent talk of essential annihilation and desolation, but there are 
also hints that such language is overblown, or at least requires heavy interpretation. To sort out 
what Heidegger means by the danger, and to see whether annihilation is an appropriate word, or 
whether something else is at stake here, we will have to consider more closely the terms of his 
discussion. If it is the human essence that is threatened, how does he think that essence? If danger 
and salvation are understood as possibilities, what does he mean by ‘possibility’? These 
considerations will open up a second way of reading the danger, one that would attend especially 
to the status of what saves as a constant possibility. 
 
  
C) Of Essence, Possibility, and Essential Possibility 
If nothing else, Heidegger’s apocalyptic language brings into sharp relief the 
circumstances under which something like the question of the truth of being might emerge from 
within experience. Already in Being and Time, being-there understands being precisely insofar as 
its own being is at issue. And as Polt reminds us, what is as such (Seiendes als solchen) makes a 
difference to us only because we are confronted with questions like ‘who am I?’ and ‘who are 
we?’ The givenness of being thus shows up in a crisis over my identity, a crisis of belonging.473
                                                 
472 Heidegger consistently distinguishes between annihilation (vernichten) and nihilation (nichten), 
reserving the former for complete removal or destruction, and the latter for modification, transcending, etc. 
See, e.g., “What is Metaphysics?” GA 9:113-14/Pathmarks 90. 
 
For when my identity becomes problematic, then the problem of identity as such can emerge – 








1. Human Essence 
 Heidegger consistently claims that “the history of the human being” in which he is 
interested is “the history of the essence of this being,”475
We find confirmation that this initial characterization is faithful to Heidegger’s account in 
the same set of Bremen lectures from which our discussion of the danger has proceeded. In the 
lecture called “The Turn,” Heidegger says that the human essence is “to be the one waiting, the 
one who waits upon the essence of beyng, in that he protects [hütet] it by thinking.”
 so if we are to think about who we are 
for Heidegger, we must get straight how he sees the human essence. First of all, I should note that 
already, in a somewhat hasty way, I have characterized the human essence as thinking and as 
complexly belonging to being (in the earlier discussion of the unity of being and thinking, section 
II.B). 
476 And in a 
lecture from the same cycle called “The Thing,” he claims that mortals “are the essencing 
relationship [das wesende Verhältnis] to being as being”477
                                                 
474 Briefly: the law of identity (A is A) is a law of thinking, but in the ‘is’ and in the claim of universal 
validity it appeals to the being of whatever is identified, and so a question about how being and thinking are 
related must arise. See Basic Principles of Thinking (GA 79) and The Principle of Reason, tr. Reginald 
Lilly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991)/GA 10. 
 – that is, a relationship not simply to 
the being of what is, but to being taken on its own terms, in terms of its givenness. Thus both 
thinking and belonging to being – indeed, thinking as belonging to being – are understood by 
Heidegger to characterize the human essence. But in pointing out this confirmation we have run 
across two other designations: the human as essentially the one who waits (der Wartende), and 
humans as mortals. 
475 GA 65:491/Contributions 386. 
476 GA 79:71/“Turn” 67, trans. mod. 
477 GA 79:18/“Thing” 17. 
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We can find some help in locating the unity of all of these designations by turning once 
more to the “Evening Conversation,” in which the Younger Man is so designated because he 
proposes an account of the human essence that initially seems more recent, while the Older Man 
proposes one that seems older (although these turn out to fit together).478
Heidegger weaves together their designations by orienting both thinking and being-
mortal toward waiting (warten). This is why the Younger Man claims that “the older definition 
can only be elucidated if the younger one is thought through.”
 The younger one 
follows the ancient Greek philosophers in seeing humans as preeminently thinkers, the thoughtful 
animal, zōon logon ekhon. The older prisoner goes a bit further back, to ancient Greek epic and 
drama, in which humans are essentially mortals: those who are related to the divine but are 
emphatically not immortal. 
479 Here Heidegger draws on 
(without explaining) his extensive work on Greek thinking and proclaims that “logos originarily 
means gathering [Sammlung],” such that the human essence as thinking means “to be [actively] in 
the gathering […] toward the originary all-unifying One.”480 Being-gathered in that way is a 
mode of receptive relation (to the One or the divine) that opens us up, since it involves a certain 
attentiveness (Achtsamkeit), one that seems connected with waiting for the pure coming (das 
reine Kommen). Similarly, to be mortal means to be stretched out toward death, to be exposed to 
it and hence able to know about it as such, which “is possible only for one who can, according to 
his essence [Wesen], wait on that which, like death, waits upon our entire being [Wesen].”481
We may say, then, as a kind of summary, that by being opened up through our relation to 
the being of other things and to our own death, we are there as disclosive of being. Hence we 
 
                                                 
478 GA 77:221-25/CPC 143-146. 
479 GA 77:223/CPC 145. 
480 Ibid. 
481 GA 77:225/CPC 146. 
207 
 
guard (wahren) the truth (Wahrheit) of being,482 watching over it attentively as stewards 
(Wächter)483 or shepherds, all of which can be characterized as a certain kind of waiting (warten) 
or dwelling (wohnen). This waiting is not so much waiting for beyng as waiting on it, serving it, 
acquiescing to its use of us as the place where it shows up.484
Waiting is difficult in part because it requires accepting finitude (ours and that of beyng), 
meaning, among other things, that we cannot simply determine the traits of being sub specie 
aeternitatis. Although we cannot avoid such attempts, each one is another version of what 
Heidegger calls metaphysics, another way of forgetting that beyng exceeds our categories.
 We should hear an allusion to 
primitive trust in this account of the human as one who essentially waits on pure coming (i.e., as 
one who projects the future). That which allows us to be open for what comes, to wait on it, and 
thus structures our openness along determinate lines (in a particular clearing), is a kind of trust 
that relates us to beyng. In this trust we can dwell in the shared world as our home. 
485
In this characterization of being-there as the one who attentively waits, we can also hear 
the account from Being and Time: being-there is care (Sorge), the ontological meaning of which 
is temporality (Zeitlichkeit). That temporality means that our own being comes to us from the 
future, what is to come (and, like death, cannot ever be present), that on which we wait. As 
 We 
must name it anew in each experience of thinking, which involves waiting on it so it can show up 
in our speech. Such waiting is also difficult in part because we experience this very excess of 
beyng as our own inescapable being-exposed to things: they matter to us, hence we are vulnerable 
to them, and this is never simply on our terms. 
                                                 
482 Cf. the “Letter on Humanism,” GA 9:342/Pathmarks 260-1: the human essence is “to be called by being 
itself into the preservation [die Wahrnis] of being’s truth.” 
483 Cf. GA 65:491/Contributions 387: “The human being [is] the steward [Wächter] of the truth of beyng.” 
484 Cf. Bret Davis’s footnote 4 in his translation of Country Path Conversations, p. 140. 
485 Being is logos, or the idea, or ousia, or… . Heidegger at one point characterizes beyng as “never sayable 
definitively and therefore never sayable in a merely ‘provisional’ way” (GA 65:460/Contributions 362). Cf. 
the discussion of the region that is the source of our horizons by being turned in part toward us in “A 
Triadic Conversation,” GA 77:111-148/CPC 72-96. 
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shepherds or guards of the disclosure of beyng, we care about it and for it: not only things, but 
that and how they are matter to us, and we disclose those things in terms of our determinate ways 
of being among them (sein bei). But something has changed in the account. There is now a 
certain distance understood between the human and being-there, which is precisely the distance 
between a thing and its essence for Heidegger. 
 Thus, returning to the Bremen lectures, we find Heidegger emphasizing that humans must 
become mortal, become what we already are, just as in Being and Time being-there needed to 
become authentic (eigentlich) being-there by owning up (eignen) to its own destined role in the 
manifestation of what is. “From out of rational living beings (animale rationale), the mortals 
must first come to be.”486 “The human is not yet the mortal” because “the essence of death is 
disguised [verstellt] to the human.”487
I will have to come back later in more detail to the interpretation of death (chapter 4), but 
for now the important thing is the distance between the human and the human essence – between 
the human and the mortal. This is the same distance we find in the Contributions, where 
Heidegger discusses the separation under two heads: what it means for us not to own up to our 
essence, not to be authentic, and what would be involved in becoming who we (essentially) 
already are. 
 
First, if the essence of the human is to be understood as disclosing beyng by waiting on it, 
by watching over it through thinking, and ‘essence’ is that in the light of which something is 
unconcealed, then to whatever extent we forget beyng and fail to understand its withdrawal as a 
withdrawal (as absencing rather than sheer absence or emptiness), to that extent we can be 
revealed to the thinker as those who do not wait – those who are astray (irrend) among what is – 
in other words, those who do not think. Since Heidegger’s name for the human essence is ‘being-
                                                 
486 GA 79:18/“Thing” 17. 
487 GA 79:56/“Danger” 54, trans. mod. 
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there,’ in the light of our essence we currently are being-there, but only in a negative mode, as it 
were: in the mode of being-away, inauthentically straying (erring) among what is, precisely in our 
metaphysical efforts to determine the being of what is. Heidegger characterizes being-away as 
“pressing on with [betreiben: pursuing as if plying one’s trade] the closedness of the mystery and 
of being, forgottenness of being.” And he adds: “Herein is expressed in converse [gegenwendig] 
the essential relation [Bezug] of being-there to beyng.”488
If maintaining being as closed-off (taking what is as inherently open, without need of 
being) is the converse, the negative mode or counter-essence that can make us aware of being-
there as proper to us, then we have a foothold from which to ask about what authentic being-there 
might look like. Indeed, we must already have caught a glimpse of the essence in order to 
recognize the non-essence as belonging to it. How then does Heidegger understand authenticity in 
the late 1930s? It must involve sustaining some sort of openness to the mystery and to being. 
 
For one thing, we can say that with respect to beyng, “[b]eing-there is grounded abyssally 
[abgründig: without further ground] in the event, and thereby the human being [is, too], if he 
succeeds at leaping [Einsprung: entering through a leap] in creative grounding.”489
                                                 
488 GA 65:301/Contributions 238, original emphasis. 
 The leap 
indicates that one cannot infer one’s way to the event as the historical giving of being; one must 
grasp it, encounter it, in an insight or a leap (Sprung). The perspective from which one is thinking 
has to change suddenly (rather than discursively), so as to think from the event toward what is, 
rather than from what is back to the event. When and if such inventive thinking (Er-denken) 
happens, then the human owns up to being-the-there for finite beyng to show itself. The human 
would thus take on the “character of the being-there in which the there is endured [bestanden: 
also ‘confirmed,’ as when one passes a test] by sheltering the truth in some fashion or other (such 
489 GA 65:301/Contributions 238. 
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as thoughtfully or poetically, or by building, leading, sacrificing, suffering, rejoicing).”490 In such 
a sheltering, beyng is not forgotten but preserved as what gives itself only in epochs (from Greek: 
epekhein, ‘to hold back from’); it is preserved precisely as concealed, but concealed now in an 
activity that engages with what is in a new way, rather than getting lost in it and forgetting beyng. 
Hence in such a sheltering, what is endured (or withstood) is possibility, “not an arbitrary one, 
and not ‘the’ possibility in general, but possibility’s essence.”491
We are not yet thinking in this way, as Heidegger tells us over and over in What is Called 
Thinking?
 
492 Nevertheless, this is not simply our fault, since it is beyng itself that sets upon and 
entraps itself in positionality. Nor is our being-away an accidental privation or recoverable failure 
of full presence. “Being-away comes to be the name of an essential (and indeed necessary) 
manner in which the human being relates – and indeed must relate – to being-there. With this, 
being-there itself undergoes [erfährt] a necessary determination [or destiny: Bestimmung].”493
  
 In 
this curious passage, we encounter the ‘necessity’ – the irreducibility – of errancy, which cannot 
permanently be avoided. This would perhaps also suggest even the ‘necessity’ of metaphysics, 
and a ‘necessary’ determination of being-there, to complement (perhaps) the ‘essence of 
possibility’ just mentioned. Were we to try to speak in terms of form and privation, we would 
have to say that the privation here, as something not simply accidental, alters or modifies the 
form. I will come back to this shortly (section III.D), when I develop the second reading of the 
danger, but first we need to understand more of what possibility and necessity could still mean for 
Heidegger. 
                                                 
490 GA 65:301/Contributions 238. 
491 GA 65:487/Contributions 383. See below for my interpretation. 
492 Was heisst Denken? in Heidegger’s title is polyvalent. What does ‘thinking’ mean? What calls for 
thought? What summons forth thinking? Or: what does thinking call for? (The last is from Manfred Frings, 
“Parmenides: Heidegger’s 1942-1943 Lecture Held at Freiburg University,” in Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology 19.1 (1988): 15-33, p. 21. 




It is well-known that for Heidegger, in explicit contradistinction to Aristotle, possibility 
ranks higher than actuality.494
 Let me begin with the negative side. On Heidegger’s account,
 But it is less than obvious how to understand this. I think we can 
make sufficient sense of it by looking at two passages, one from Heidegger’s “Letter on 
Humanism” and one from the Contributions. 
495 metaphysics has gotten 
itself stuck from the very beginning by privileging actuality (energeia, actus, Wirklichkeit), 
understanding this as a conjunction of constancy and presence. Thus, what is most real is what is 
most fully actual, and this is what is most constantly present (preferably existing in an eternal 
now). Possibility, then, as an abstract form of potency (dunamis) or ability-to-be-something, is 
taken as a lower level of actuality, since it is not yet or no longer fully present, while the highest 
level of actuality is designated as necessity (being always fully present), and the latter is taken as 
the aim or telos of all things (such that it can be understood as entelecheia, having its aim within 
itself). Thus the great chain of being is a chain of being-as-actuality.496
Furthermore, although the being of what is (ousia, the abstract noun form of ousa, 
participle for ‘to be’, according translated by Heidegger as ‘beingness’) turns out to be same as 
actuality (energeia) in Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
 
497
                                                 
494 Cf. BT 38/63 and “My Way To Phenomenology,” in On Time and Being, p. 82/GA 14:102.  
 in a confusing development of later 
metaphysical thought, essence (what a thing is, essentia, the literal Latin translation of ousia), 
gets subordinated to existence (that a thing is, existentia), which becomes correlated with 
495 Heidegger’s account, please note. I seek here only to elucidate, not necessarily to endorse. 
496 See GA 65:281/Contributions 221 and GA 66:187, as well as the lecture course Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force/GA 33. In Contributions §158, Heidegger refers to 
possibility and necessity as “so to speak, two horns [Hörner: like horns of a dilemma, but also like 
antennae]” of energeia as actuality. 
497 Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ.8, 1050b2-3: “So that it is evident [phaneron] that the being [ousia] and the 
form [to eidos] are actuality [energeia].” 
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actuality.498 As a result, being (as ousia) ends up designating the abstract essence (what Aristotle 
called the ti esti, the what-being, or the articulation of a thing’s being in speech), which is a kind 
of possibility. Hence one can articulate the being (the essence, what it is, in one sense of ‘is’) of a 
unicorn without claiming that there are any (that it is, in another sense of ‘is’). Whence also 
various forms of the ontological argument for the existence of God take as granted the possibility 
of such a being (God’s essence) and try to show that this is the singular being for which existence 
is included in that essence. This makes God the sole necessary being, in contrast to all other 
beings whose existences are ultimately merely possible (i.e., contingent upon God’s willing 
them). In what sense the essences of all non-divine beings are also contingent in the same way is 
then a matter of debate.499
 But Heidegger wants to think being (i.e., possibility) as the highest, without thereby 
making it abstract (i.e., non-actual). So, just as with essence, he has to give a positive account of 
possibility that does not take it to be abstracted from what is. If metaphysical thinking takes 
necessity and possibility as a kind of split in being, as modal modifications of presence, then the 
thinking of beyng must try to understand “plurality within the happening [or essencing] of be-ing 
itself, which is irreducible to presence [… i.e.,] plurality within the giving of the being of 
beings,”
 
500 as Polt explains. The key is to realize that beyng “cannot be understood in terms of a 
telos that is to be made actual; it happens only when it retains its problematic, questionable 
character and is not subservient to a further goal.”501
                                                 
498 This is, to be sure, made slightly less confusing if we take into account Aristotle’s categorial distinction 
between first and second ousia (which becomes the difference between existence and essence), but that still 
does not solve the problem that arises from within a synoptic perspective. 
 Thus beyng has to be thought as refusing 
itself, as self-withdrawal – in other words, according to the how of its givenness. 
499 Heidegger makes oblique reference to this problem in GA 65:281/Contributions 221; the fuller account 
comes from “Metaphysics as History of Being,” in The End of Philosophy/GA 6.2 (Metaphysik als 
Seinsgeschichte). 




Heidegger reluctantly acknowledges that we could start by thinking of this self-
withdrawal along the lines of Aristotle’s definition of motion (kinesis): “refusal [die 
Verweigerung] (the essencing of beyng) is the highest actuality of the highest possible as possible 
and is therefore the first necessity.”502
First, as Polt says, beyng “preserves possibility without subordinating it to actuality 
(presence).”
 Two things about this are particularly noteworthy: 
503
Second, and crucially, in the passage about refusal Heidegger writes of ‘the possible’ 
(das Mögliche), not of ‘possibility’ (die Möglichkeit). This I take to be an attempt to move away 
from abstraction. In discussing the essence of being-there, I quoted Heidegger to the effect that 
authentic being-there would withstand or endure the essence of possibility, not possibility in 
general. He goes on to explain that this essence “is the event [das Ereignis] itself as the enabling 
[das Vermögen] of what is most unique about the appropriation [der Er-eignung] – an enabling 
that withdraws into what is most extreme. Such withdrawal […] bestows the fissure [das 
Geklüfte] of beyng.”
 It reveals the possible precisely as possible by making it active, setting it to work. 
Thus the challenge for Heidegger is always to think beyng as beyng, rather than give in to the 
temptation to understand it as a being (or on the basis of beings). 
504
                                                 
502 GA 65:192/Contributions 244. Cp. Aristotle, Physics 3.1, where he defines motion as the activity 
[entelekheia] of a potency as a potency. 
 The essence of possibility is thought as the event itself, what gives being 
or makes the difference between what is and what is not. We could also say that it is what enables 
(vermöglicht) what is to show up as important (i.e., in its being), since it is what allows our 
engagement in a particularly patterned world. The event carries out this enabling precisely 
through withdrawing in a particular way, thus bringing about the multiplicity in the happening of 
beyng that we were looking for: what Heidegger calls ‘the fissure.’ Thus Heidegger claims that 
“[t]he possible [das Mögliche] essences in beyng alone and as its deepest fissure [Klüftung], so 
503 Polt, Emergency, p. 151. 
504 GA 65:487/Contributions 383. 
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that in the thinking of the other beginning beyng must first be thought in the form of the 
possible.”505
We are now prepared for a look at the passage from Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism,” 
in which he tries to think possibility concretely, in its essencing. Once again, he is giving an 
account of the unity of being and thinking, in the course of which possibility comes to light as 
essentially a making-possible (Ermöglichen) or even an enabling (Vermögen). 
 
It is in virtue of [or by the power of: ‘kraft’ dessen] the enabling [das Vermögen] of favoring [or of 
loving: des Mögens] that something is enabled to be. This enabling is the authentic ‘possible’ [das 
Mögliche], the essence of which rests in favoring. From out of this favoring, being enables 
thinking. The former makes-possible [ermöglicht] the latter. Being as what enables and favors 
[das Vermögend-Mögende] is the may-be [das Mög-liche]. As the element, being is the ‘quiet 




We should observe, to begin with, that we have once more the familiar three layers. 
There is first of all possibility (das Mögliche) at the level of everyday, metaphysically influenced 
language, an abstraction that is theoretically understood in relation to actuality.507 Its essence 
(designated generally by reference to ‘the possible’ but in this passage by ‘the authentic possible’ 
so as to avoid unwanted ambiguity) is enabling (Vermögen), or authentic making-possible 
(ermöglichen, Kant’s ‘condition of the possibility’). The essence of that, then, the happening in 
light of which it is unconcealed, is what Heidegger here calls favoring (das Mögen) and 
elsewhere names inclining-towards (Zuneigung).508
                                                 
505 GA 65:475/Contributions 374. For Heidegger’s experimental working-out of beyng as the possible in 
terms of its fissure, see GA 65/Contributions §159 on mastery [Herrschaft]; for the corresponding 
development of necessity as a fissure of beyng, see GA 65/Contributions §§160-163 on being-toward-death 
[Sein zum Tode]. 
 
506 GA 9:316-17/Pathmarks 241-242, trans. mod. 
507 “Our words ‘possible’ and ‘possibility,’ under the dominance of ‘logic and ‘metaphysics,’ are thought 
solely in contrast to actuality; that is, they are thought on the basis of a definite […] interpretation of being 
as actus and potentia, a distinction identified with that between existentia and essentia. […] I do not mean 
the possibile of a merely represented possibilitas, nor potentia as the essentia of an actus of existentia” (GA 
9:316-17/Pathmarks 242). 




Richard Kearney has made the second layer perspicuous by showing that an ambiguity 
arises in Being and Time between making-possible as inauthentically understood (a projective 
activity of being-there) and as authentically understood (making-possible as being-there’s 
thrownness by being into what is). Kearney then claims that “vermögen [enabling] is to be 
correctly understood as the exclusively authentic essence of ermöglichen [making-possible].”509 
On Kearney’s reading, then, enabling is making-possible “from the point of view of Being in 
general […] rather than [that] of the being of man in particular.”510
With regard to the third layer, we may say that Heidegger characterizes what enables 
(i.e., the element in which thinking moves, the truth of being) as intimately related to that which 
it enables. It is not a property of something at-hand (like Vermögen understood as a capacity of a 
body) so much as a phenomenologically accessible ‘back side’ of a phenomenon, the invisible 
implied in the visible. The intimacy is an active allowing to belong: what he calls favoring or 
loving (Mögen) and understands as “the bestowal of [the loved thing’s] essence as a gift.”
 
511
What Heidegger speaks of as ‘intimacy’ here is what we have already seen as the unity of 
being and thinking, their belonging-together (section II.B of the present chapter). It is this that 
was said to be unrelenting, ineluctable, and this that I want to put in question by thinking through 
the phenomenon of primitive trust. What is the character of this belonging? How do we really 
experience our relation to being? 
 
Since it is being that enables, what is enabled is allowed to belong to being; in other words, it is 
allowed to be. Hence Heidegger eventually speaks of being itself (= beyng) as letting-presence 
(anwesen lassen), what first grants the being of what is (= import) as presencing (Anwesen). 
                                                 
509 Richard Kearney, “Heidegger and the Possible,” in Philosophical Studies 27 (1980): 176-95, p. 187. 
510 Ibid. 
511 GA 9:316/Pathmarks 241: das Wesen schenken. 
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3. Essential Possibility 
With those questions in mind, let us now try to see what significance this intimacy has for 
being-there as the human essence. The human is not merely something at-hand that would 
possess properties or attributes (although it can derivatively be described and studied this way). 
Instead, in each case we are as projected possibilities – ways of being that are projected in 
response to a call to be in some determinate way or other (as setting certain goals, actively 
fulfilling certain roles, and so on). So, we cannot lose our possibilities in the sense of misplacing 
items at-hand. We can only cover them up more or less by projecting other possibilities 
instead.512
Our essence, then, is also not something at-hand but rather what stands out as of central 
importance when we think ourselves as in relation to beyng (which claims us). This means that 
the human essence is radically at stake in each attempt to think it (or to think being), for although 
dispositions to take certain things as essential have been handed down or destined to us, it does 
not seem to be thoroughly determined in what light the human will show up each time. 
 
This is probably what Heidegger is after in saying that humans have our essence as 
something peculiar (Eigentümliches) to us or even as our property (Eigen-tum), the space of what 
is our own (Eigentum understood as own-dom, like kingdom). For this ‘having’ is a kind of 
project: we must “carry out the acquisition [or adoption: Aneignung] and loss [Verlust]”513
                                                 
512 Aristotle would have said: by enacting other forms of life, from which activity other possible activities 
would then arise. Heidegger’s emphasis lies always on the side of the possible, so he instead takes 
projection of my possibilities to be what enables me to enact any of them (i.e., to be actual), and my own 
thrownness to be what enables me to project possibilities. 
 of our 
own being-appropriated, of our belonging to beyng in our very temporo-spatial structure without 
being able to ground or adequately grasp that beyng. What is up for grabs, as it were, is both that 
and how we are appropriated; our task, that to which we are called, is thus “authentically 
[eigentlich] to be the explicit proprietor [eigens Eigentümer] of our essence, and to endure 
513 GA 65: 489/Contributions 384. 
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[bestehen] this authenticity […] by standing within it [inständlich].”514 In short, it is because we 
may also fail to endure the strain of authenticity, in which we are face to face with the 
groundlessness or finitude of beyng, that having our essence as our property places our essence 
“in constant danger [steten Gefahr] of loss.”515
 
 
D) Of Essence as Gift: Phenomenology 
And yet… there is another way to read all of this, one that I think makes better sense 
overall of Heidegger’s thinking. For if our essence is not something at-hand, then Heidegger’s 
worries about the ‘annihilation’ or ‘desolation’ or ‘loss’ of the human essence cannot refer to the 
disappearance or destruction of something at-hand. Indeed, it seems that, however they might 
sound, if they are to be consistent, those worries cannot at all be about the complete removal of 
the human essence from us or from our possibilities, for at least two reasons. 
First, it is not as if we already had our essence firmly in hand as something actual. As we 
saw above, Heidegger thinks being in terms of (a revised understanding of) possibility, not 
actuality. Indeed, Heidegger claims in the Contributions that being-there is “the being [Sein] that 
distinguishes humans in their possibility [i.e., in] the highest human possibility.”516 Hence our 
being, our essence, is what enables our activities; it is not controllable by our activities. One could 
even say that what above all we do not have from ourselves, what can only be given to us, is 
precisely our essence. Heidegger claims in this vein that “the highest and authentically 
persevering gift [eigentlich währende Gabe] to us remains our essence, with which we are gifted 
such that we first are who we are from out of this gift.”517
And since it is only as given, we may ask what gives our essence, from whence this 
enabling. Here Heidegger approaches his theme from both sides, as it were: from both noēsis and 
 
                                                 
514 GA 65:489/Contributions 384-5. 
515 GA 65:489/Contributions 385. 
516 GA 65:301/Contributions 237. 
517 GA 8:146/WCT? 142. Cf. the quotation from QCT in the last line of section II, above. 
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noēma. He asks what is given to us, how to characterize our essence, and, as we saw earlier, he 
discovers it to be waiting, dwelling, or (to stay with the passage just cited) thinking (noēsis): 
“what is given in the sense of this dowry [Mitgift] is thinking. As thinking, it is entrusted to [or 
pledged to: zugetraut] what there is to think.”518
From the other side, then, he also asks how thinking is given to us as our essence. We are 
enabled (vermögen) to think only insofar as we are given what is most questionable or thought-
provoking (das Bedenklichste), what would like to be thought – insofar as it is bestowed upon us 
as a gift, or, we could say, is entrusted to us.
 The ‘dowry’ of which Heidegger speaks we 
could understand as the gift that accompanies (Mitgift) our being-joined to being. 
519 What would like to be thought, being itself, “first 
allocates thinking to us, entrusts [zutraut] thinking to us as our essential destiny 
[Wesensbestimmung], and thus above all assimilates [vereignet] us to thinking.”520 In determining 
our essence as thinking by being given for thought, even (or especially) as withdrawing from that 
thought, beyng places us back into our essence. Said more directly: being itself, the event, is what 
“entrusts [zutraut] to us our own essence as such.”521
If we put these two claims together, then, it turns out that we are entrusted with our own 
essence (thinking) by what is to be thought (beyng), and our essence is reciprocally entrusted or 
 
                                                 
518 GA 8:146/WCT? 142. 
519 Cf. GA 8:131/WCT? 126, original italics: “When we ask, ‘What calls us to think?’, then we look toward 
that which allocates [vergibt] to us the gift of this dowry [die Gabe dieser Mitgift], as well as to ourselves, 
whose essence rests in being gifted [begabt] with this dowry. Only insofar as we are gifted with what is 
most thought-provoking [das Bedenklichste], bestowed [beschenkt] with that which long since and for a 
long time to come would like to be considered, are we enabled [vermögen] to think.” In the ‘would like to 
be considered’ (möchte bedacht sein), we should hear the echo of the Mögen, the favoring that enables 
thinking – or calls for it. In the lecture just prior, Heidegger has already meditated on this call, heissen, as 
used by Martin Luther to translate the Latin iubere, “wishing that something might [möge] happen” (GA 
8:121). From there, Heidegger has understood it as befehlen, to order or to command, but heard here as to 
commend (anbefehlen) or to entrust (anvertrauen) (GA 8:122, 162). 
520 GA 8:125/WCT? 121. Cf. the summary and transition for that lecture, GA 8:130/WCT? 125: das 
Bedenklichste “entrusts [zutraut] thinking in general to us as our essential destiny.” “uns das Denken 
zutraut” could also mean ‘gives us credit for thinking,’ but Heidegger adds a marginal note indicating that 
it means “to maintain [thinking] by enabling the capacity [fähig-vermögend halten] and to entrust 
[anvertrauen] the accomplishment of this enabling [Vermögens].” Note that Vermögen can also mean 
‘capacity’, and fähig as an adjective can mean ‘accomplished.’ 
521 GA 8:129/WCT? 124. 
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pledged to what is to be thought (beyng). Since all of this takes place through the withdrawal of 
beyng, we should recognize it as a more benign version of Heidegger’s characterization of 
positionality. “The name for the gathering of the challenges [Herausfordern: challenging-forth 
understood as the current form of the claim (Anspruch) that beyng always makes on us] that being 
and the human deliver to [zustellt] one another such that they reciprocally position one another is: 
positionality.”522 We can see, then, why Heidegger would say that even (and perhaps first) in 
positionality, “we catch sight [erblicken] of a belonging-together of the human and being wherein 
the letting-belong first determines the type of togetherness and its unity.”523 In other words, in 
recognizing positionality as the depths of the danger, we also recognize that the unity of being 
and thinking is a strictly given unity, one over which we do not have control. That insight or 
glimpse, which he thinks can only be provided by a leap (not, e.g., by a deduction),524
 
 is how 
Heidegger understands what saves [das Rettende]. 
1. Hölderlin’s Dictum 
For Heidegger, ontological saving (retten) does not primarily mean “to seize hold of a 
thing threatened by ruin [Untergang] in order to secure it in its former continuance,” “to snatch 
something from a danger.”525 That would be salvation at the ontic level. Instead, saving means “to 
set something free [freilassen] into its own essence,” or “to fetch something home [einholen] into 
its essence, in order to bring the essence for the first time into its authentic shining [eigentlichen 
Scheinen].”526
                                                 
522 GA 79:124/BPT 116. 
 
523 GA 79:127/BPT  119. Belonging is understood here as interrelated spheres of ownership: “By its 
essence, because it is needed, the human is brought into the ownership [vereignet] of what is at first still 
called ‘being.’ As presencing [on the other hand], being is delivered into the ownership [zugeeignet] of the 
human essence.” The space in which the essencing of beyng meets the essencing of the human is, quite 
simply, the event (das Ereignis) that appropriates one to the other and vice versa. 
524 GA 79:122/BPT 114. 
525 GA 7:29/QCT 28; “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in Poetry, Language, Thought 148/GA 7:152. 
526 GA 7:152/“Building Dwelling Thinking” 148; GA 7:29/QCT 28, trans. mod. Heidegger had earlier (in 
the Bremen lectures of 1949) elaborated it as follows: “to dissolve [lösen (but not to redeem, erlösen)], to 
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Since essences are grasped in a productive seeing (Er-sehen) – as the event is thought by 
an inventive thinking (Er-denken) – it is not surprising that Heidegger thinks we are saved 
precisely through a certain kind of insight, what he refers to as an “event of insight [Ereignis des 
Einblickes],” in which the human essence is “what is caught sight of by this insight.”527
If we wanted, at this point, to try to hold onto the apocalyptic reading laid out earlier, we 
would have to put all that was just said about the gift of our essence into the subjunctive. Thus, 
somehow, we belong to an essence (thinking) that may be given, along with an explicit belonging 
to being, if we are at some point enabled to accomplish the thinking toward which we are 
currently (along with Heidegger) only underway. It might also not be given; our essence might 
instead be destroyed or completely refused, in either case ceasing to be a possibility for us. 
 It is then, 
from out of an attunement of restraint, that we glimpse our belonging to beyng even in beyng’s 
withdrawal, refusal, and abandonment, then that we recognize positionality (as a particular way of 
belonging to beyng) as the essence of technology and as a manifestation of being itself. In other 
words, says Heidegger, what saves lies in recognizing the danger as danger, beyng as beyng, 
possibility as possibility, mystery as mystery, without making it ontic or actual. It is, in my terms, 
grasping these as complex phenomena that give themselves in their very withdrawal from 
actuality. 
Such a reading, however, would also have to come to grips with a second reason why we 
probably need not worry about the possible impossibility of our own essence. According to 
Heidegger, although we are destined to project the possibilities that cover up the danger, 
                                                                                                                                                 
liberate or make available [freimachen], to free [freyen], to spare [schonen], to shelter [bergen], to take 
under protection [in die Hut nehmen], to guard […] to put something back into what is right, what is 
essential [in das Rechte, Wesenhafte zurückstellen] and guard it therein” (GA 79:87/“Turn” 68). “Building 
Dwelling Thinking” (from 1951) then makes explicit the connections between these words in a meditation 
on building as dwelling that moves from zufrieden sein (to be at peace) to zur Freie gebracht, in ihr bleiben 
(brought into the the open, to remain in it), from frei/fry to geschont (spared) and from freien to schonen (to 
spare), from schonen to in sein Wesen zurückbergen (to shelter back into its essence, the realm of its own). 
Cf. GA 7:150-1/“Building Dwelling Thinking” 147. 
527 GA 79:76/“Turn” 71. 
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nevertheless in this very distortive projecting, we are implicitly always projecting the possibility 
of what saves. That is why he can say that being itself is preserved (verwahrt) in positionality,528 
which means, as we saw with truth (chapter 2, section II.C), that it is given as concealed, rather 
than as simply present. This follows the saying of Hölderlin that Heidegger quotes frequently: 
“But where danger is, there grows / also what saves [das Rettende],”529 albeit modified by 
Heidegger’s recognition that growing involves taking root and thriving, both of which “happen 
concealedly and quietly and in their own time”530
Here it will be helpful to recall the phenomenon of the crisis as I characterized it at the 
outset of this part of the investigation (the beginning of section III). There, I called it the moment 
of visible unity of a complex phenomenon, which means of a phenomenon whose “reverse side,” 
as it were, is not so much given apperceptively in every presentation as it is granted in privileged 
moments of insight that also constitute turnings from one essential side to the other. In the 
example of the dawn, we find a turn from night to day in which it becomes clear how the essences 
of day and night are bound together. Also important to the ontic example are two features that, it 
seems to me, return in the ontological phenomenon of danger and saving: first, the turn from 
night to day (and vice versa) is phenomenally always implied, always coming (Zu-kunft); second, 
the darkness hides things in a way daylight does not. 
 – i.e., underground. 
The former feature is true of the phenomenon, even though from a purely theoretical 
perspective we can propose that something cosmically could go horribly wrong such that dawn 
                                                 
528 Cf. GA 79:51-2/“Danger” 49. I conclude this from the following claims in the text: Heidegger says a) 
that “world is being itself,” b) “World and positionality are the same [das Selbe],” c) “The same [Das 
Selbe] is […] the relation of differentiation [das Verhältnis des Unterschiedes],” d) “That which necessarily 
is held [gehalten] – i.e. protected, i.e., preserved, and so in a rigorous sense remains reserved [verhalten] – 
in this relation [Verhältnis] that takes place [sich ereignend] is the same [selbig].” Note that the meaning of 
the word ‘world’ has changed from Being and Time. 
529 See GA 7:29, 35/QCT 28, 34; GA 5:296/“What Are Poets For?” 115; GA 79:72/“Turn” 68; GA 
4:21/Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry 40. 
530 GA 7:30/QCT 28. He continues: “But according to the words of the poet, we may precisely not expect 
that there where the danger is we should be able to lay hold of [aufgreifen] what saves immediately and 
without preparation” (trans. mod.). 
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will never come tomorrow, and even though from the perspective of lived experience (Erlebnis) it 
can at times seem as if the dawn will never come. (Note that the latter perspective only makes 
sense if we already assume that dawn is coming.) It is furthermore true that day and night have 
distinct meanings and open distinguishable worlds; their reciprocity and essential transformation 
into one another do not make them interchangeable. 
The latter feature, that day exposes and night hides, is at the ontological level not a 
simple binary but a kind of imbalance. So, although Heidegger speaks of the “limpidity of the 
dark” that “keeps [behält] the light to itself” and needs to be guarded as “the mystery of light,”531
If I am right about that, then even when Heidegger refers (“What Are Poets For?”) to “the 
light of day” as “the world’s night, rearranged into merely technological day,” this ‘night’ of the 
world must conceal a possible, more authentic light. He immediately goes on to claim, as 
mentioned in the apocalyptic reading given earlier (section III.B), that this technological day “is 
the shortest day. It threatens a single endless winter.”
 
in his reference to ‘keeping’ he still uses the night as a figure of hiddenness or concealment 
(lēthē), of absencing (Abwesen) rather than abstract or sheer absence (Abwesenheit). 
532
I take it that he is not speaking ontically here of the way that technological things 
(electric lights) replace the sun and artificially extend the day. He means rather that the mode of 
unconcealing granted to us in positionality only lets things show up as resources, and precludes 
(darkens or hides) all other modes of unconcealing. As the essence of technology, positionality is 
thus a ‘technological day’ that would also be the ‘night’ (the concealment) ‘of the world,’ i.e., of 
the granting of context that allows what is to be meaningfully. But positionality, even in 
 
                                                 
531 GA 79:93/BPT 88. “Thus the dark [das Dunkle] holds itself distinct from the pitch-black [das 
Finsternis] as the mere and utter absence [Abwesenheit] of light.” 
532 GA 5:295/“What Are Poets For?” 115. Cp. the Contributions to Philosophy, where, in the midst of 
thinking beyng as a hearth-fire that burns out the space for its own embers to glow, Heidegger asks 
rhetorically, “How to find beyng? Must we light a fire in order to find the fire, or must we not rather 
reconcile ourselves to watching over the night first?” (GA 65:487/Contributions 383). 
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threatening a ‘single endless winter’ (in which the world would be permanently dark, i.e., 
hidden), nonetheless must also ‘keep’ a more authentic light, a genuine ‘day’ of other modes of 
unconcealing that would remain possible even in the midst of ‘endless winter.’ 
That is why, then, in the same text where the human is characterized as essentially 
“risked” or “wagered”533
Again, if we ask about the Country Path Conversations, in which the specter of “the 
annihilation of the human essence” arose and from which we disclosed the human essence as pure 
waiting, we find waiting further specified as releasement (Gelassenheit). But in this discovery, we 
also discover that releasement, as letting oneself engage in that upon which one waits, is only 
possible if we are already admitted to that in which we may or may not engage. The Older Man 
explains to his interlocutor that the latter was “already one who waits whenever the event of the 
devastation distressed you. If we were not already in essence those who wait, then how could we 
 and is claimed to be in danger of “the death of his essence” (still in 
“What Are Poets For?”), that risking or exposing is understood as both tossing (loswerfen) into 
danger and retaining (einbehalten), as one does with a betting chip. “As wagered, those who are 
not protected [human beings] are nevertheless not abandoned [preisgegeben]. If they were […] 
surrendered [ausgeliefert] only to annihilation [die Vernichtung], they would no longer hang in 
the balance.” This could mean that we are delivered over (ausgeliefert) to whatever may come, 
not only annihilation but also, perhaps, authentic grounding. But instead, Heidegger interprets it 
to mean that precisely as endangered, put in the balance, the human essence is sheltered 
(geborgen) in the wager itself, hence always already secure (sicher) in its ground (i.e., in being). 
The annihilative threat seems then to be drawn back into the juncture of presencing and absencing 
that marks a complex phenomenon. 
                                                 
533 gewagt, i.e., as thrown (or cast like dice, or played like a card, or laid like a bet) by being, which is 
understood from out of Rilke’s poem as itself the venture (das Wagnis) or the authentic venturing (das 
eigentliche Wagen). Heidegger reads Rilke’s interpretation of being as grounded in metaphysical willing 
(venturing as willing), but he nonetheless stays with the words in an attempt to twist free of that will or at 
least to point out of it. 
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ever become so? […] [W]e [can only] wait on that in which we [already] belong.”534 As Andrew 
Mitchell points out, “For the human, who belongs to [beyng] by essence, to not be released into 
[beyng] is nevertheless still to bear a relation to [beyng].”535 This is what the Older Man means in 
saying that “we release ourselves to the coming because our essence is already released to it”536 
through no doing of our own. We are thus in one sense always already appropriated to beyng,537 
while in another sense we have only the essential possibility of fulfilling that appropriation, 
responding to it explicitly. Again, Mitchell: “This ambiguous position between yes and no is not 
something to flee from but rather is itself the human essence that allows admittance into the open. 
Suspended between yes and no, our ‘residence in this between is waiting.’”538
In a similar way, it is in precisely the same text where Heidegger projects the danger as 
both the possible annihilation of our essence and our possible refusal to let being use us as its 
abode – indeed, it is only a page before – where he also names being itself “the unrelenting [das 
Unablässige],” “what never lets up [lässt … ab] from unconcealing what is.”
 We are essentially 
suspended in the balance, wagered, but already in such a way as to remain secured. 
539
                                                 
534 GA 77:231/CPC 150. 
 This never 
relenting from unconcealing, Heidegger suggests, might seem straightforwardly good (it 
“essences as promise”) but in fact cuts both ways: it also means that the mode of unconcealment 
that covers up all other such modes by proclaiming that being is empty and general (positionality, 
nihilism) does not relent in such concealing, just as it does not relent in its revealing. This is how 
we are (unrelentingly) tempted into metaphysics: being itself appears permanent, given, so its 
givenness need not come into question. The danger to which being is given over (as self-
535 Andrew J. Mitchell, “Praxis and Gelassenheit: The ‘Practice’ of the Limit,” in Heidegger and Practical 
Philosophy, eds. F. Raffoul and D. Pettigrew (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), p. 327. I have replaced “that-
which-regions” (die Gegnet) with ‘beyng’ for the sake of simplicity. 
536 GA 77:231/CPC 150. 
537 “He belongs to it, insofar as he is inceptually appropriated [ge-eignet] to the open region, and indeed by 
the open region itself” (GA 77:122/CPC 79). 
538 Mitchell, “Praxis,” p. 327; he quotes from “A Triadic Conversation,” GA 77:123/CPC 123. 
539 These quotations and the next two paragraphs are from “Nihilism as Determined by the History of 
Being,” GA 6.2:354-5/Nietzsche IV 244-5. 
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pursuing) can therefore also be described as the threat “that the emergency, as which [being] 
essences compellingly, never becomes for historical human beings the emergency that it is.” 
But Heidegger also mentions the other side of the coin here: that, as unrelenting, and as 
needing being-there in order to appear at all (permanent or otherwise), being compels (or 
necessitates: nötigt) being-there into serving as its place of appearance.  
If we then attend to the coin itself – the unity of the phenomenon – it displays the crux of 
the human essence, the balance or the hinge on which that essence turns either toward what is or 
toward being itself. This hinge is the fact that being itself addresses (beansprucht) the human 
essence as its abode, whether by withdrawing or by approaching.540
                                                 
540 Inter alia, GA 6.2:330/Nietzsche IV 223. That is to say: whether approaching by absencing or 
approaching by presencing, where approaching is understood as mattering to us and allowing everything 
else to matter to us in a coherent way. Both this text and the just-previous one from “What Are Poets For?” 
turn on an interpretation of our relation (Bezug) to being as a kind of draw or pull (Zug) that can be 
manifest even in withdrawal (or pulling away: Entzug). In a marginal note to GA 6.2:330, Heidegger marks 
this as the event (Ereignis). 
 The fact that being emerges 
as needing us in the very conditions of its utmost leveling down – in which it seems like it is 
simply absent, rather than withdrawing – means that there is a task for thinking that will not go 
away. It can be removed neither through our own achievement of thinking (in which case “the 
emergency [die Not] would be enabled [vermag] to be compelling [nötigen] in the realm of the 
human essence”) nor through our own failure to think. The latter is the case because being 
“remains what is to be thought by thinking,” even and especially when it is forgotten, since “the 
lack of distress is the emergency [or need: die Not] of being as such,” while being as such “is 
entrusted [anvertraut] preeminently and only to thinking.” It can only become explicit through 
thinking, but it only becomes explicit as emergency, as needing us ever again to think it; it can 
only become explicit through thinking, but the possibility of such thinking remains always 
implicit in being’s usage of us to let what is show up. 
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If (following Polt) we take the 1936-38 Contributions as the height of Heidegger’s 
apocalyptic interpretation of history, it is remarkable that we find even there evidence of what I 
have called the more phenomenological reading. Keeping in mind our recent consideration of 
possibility (section III.C), we realize that enabling, as the essence of possibility, only happens as 
a withdrawing “movement,” the history or essencing of beyng, which cannot be pinned down to 
one permanent manifestation. Heidegger says it this way: “That beyng […] does not become a 
being, is expressed most pointedly by saying: beyng is possibility, which is never at-hand 
[Vorhandene] and yet always granting and denying [immer Gewährende und Versagende] in 
refusal through the appropriating.”541
The significance of this passage becomes clearer in the light of two other, later accounts. 
In “Anaximander’s Saying” (from 1946), Heidegger characterizes being itself, the event, as what 
“clears itself in what is and lays claim to [in Anspruch nimmt] a human essence” – in other words, 
that it addresses the human essence as its abode in the midst of what is – “a human essence that, 
as destined [geschickliches], receives its historical path [Geschichtsgang], a path sometimes 
guarded [gewahrt] in, sometimes released from [entlassen], but never separated from [getrennt] 
being.”
 Here the refusal of beyng to fully show itself, to show up as 
something other than concealed, is understood not only as hesitating (i.e., perhaps to be given in a 
new way, perhaps not) but as always both granting and denying itself. We should note carefully, 
then, that even in the Contributions, there is a move toward understanding beyng’s abandonment 
as inescapably structural. 
542
                                                 
541 GA 65:475/Contributions 374, my italics. 
 That inability to be separated from being, the latter’s unrelenting quality, is what 
542 GA 5:336/OBT 253. Cf. the two marginal notes indicating that being itself is to be understood as the 
event (Ereignis) and that its laying claim to the human essence is “Brauch” (custom or usage) and 
“Vereignung” (bringing into ownership, joining and appropriating). 
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Heidegger in 1953 called “the innermost, indestructible [unzerstörbare] belonging of the human 
being within what grants,”543
What Heidegger claims in all three passages (as in the various passages from 1944-46) is 
that the whole complex phenomenon of endangerment and saving takes place (sich ereignet) 
within the vicissitudes of belonging to and being used by beyng. As we saw earlier (section II.C), 
he calls these vicissitudes ‘turnings’ (Kehren), the turning to and fro of being-there between 
authentic being-there and being-away. It seems, then, that neither we nor beyng could ever 
annihilate, destroy, desolate, or otherwise do away with our possibility of turning back to beyng. 
 i.e., within the event, or within being itself. 
 
2. Heidegger in Question 
I turn now to the one remaining text cited earlier in support of the apocalyptic reading, 
the seminars in Le Thor. This is also where Heidegger explains the danger most concretely, so I 
will take the opportunity to characterize it once again. I would like to take up Heidegger’s 
response to some questions that were raised by Roger Munier in the course of the 1968 seminar, 
but whose answers were then postponed until the first day he could attend the following year: 
September 6, 1969. Munier’s fifth and sixth questions, as reported in the protocol, ask about what 
we might call the “dangerousness” of the danger. I would summarize them as follows: ‘In the 
epoch of positionality, as in every other epoch, we only encounter the truth of being as hidden. 
This may be disappointing, but if it is the very structure of being and truth, then what is the big 
deal?’ 
In his own words, Munier asks: could one not say that the danger will “finally bring 
about an essential poverty [of disclosure], from which a turning around [Umkehr] of the human to 
the truth of its essence becomes possible, even if by a detour of errancy?”544
                                                 
543 GA 7:33/QCT 32, trans. mod. 
 In my words: does 
544 GA 15:341/Four Seminars 44-5. 
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this historical danger not also share the phenomenological structure of truth, as a complex 
phenomenon that includes its own betrayal (i.e., errancy)? 
Munier then names the danger explicitly: “The scientific interpretation of the world and 
of natural phenomena brings about a situation where every day the human loses more and more of 
an already immemorial naturalness.”545 Meaning is leveled down into calculability or 
predictability – fundamentally: orderability. As Heidegger puts it earlier in the same seminar, 
“when the astronauts set foot on the moon, the moon as moon disappeared. It no longer rose or 
set. It is now only a calculable parameter for the technological enterprises of humans.”546
Munier then adds, however, “But what harm does that do [was schadet das jedoch] when 
it makes us attentive to what is indicated by these appearances [Erscheinungen] of the world, 
appearances mastered now and in future – when other more originary ways of expressing the 
mystery should be thereby unfolded, something to which the appearances no less attest in their 
own way?”
 We can 
no longer encounter it as having any other real, true meanings, even if we can project poetic 
significance onto it. 
547
Heidegger responds in the seminar itself, as I read it, by characterizing the danger under 
four different headings. 
 This is my question for Heidegger, as well. If appearance always, structurally, 
shows being, and always shows it to be self-concealing, and always will, what harm does it do 
when it conceals and reveals according to the particular constellation that makes it most ‘urgent’ 
for us to rethink it? Whence the urgency? The possibility of the saving insight into the danger as 
danger cannot be abolished, since it resides in the very danger itself. 
First, as I hope to have made clear by now, Heidegger emphasizes that forgetting of being 
does not signify per se a lack or privation in us. Rather, nothing is more dear (i.e., more essential) 
                                                 
545 GA 15:341/Four Seminars 45. 
546 GA 15:331/Four Seminars 38. 
547 GA 15:341/Four Seminars 45, trans. mod. 
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to emergence than concealment, as he translates Heraclitus’s physis kruptesthai philei. In other 
words, “being is not ‘subject to falling out of attention,’ but rather conceals itself to the extent 
that it is manifest.”548
Second, one version of this self-concealment is that being intrinsically resists articulation 
as being; we always want to make it some extant thing, forgetting the ontological difference. This 
is why, for Heidegger, the discussion of being repeatedly arises in the context of the nothing (das 
Nichts) as what is no-thing, that which nihilates (nichtet) entities without annihilating 
(vernichten) them.
 Beyng is itself finite. 
549 This is what Heidegger had already characterized in the seminar the 
previous year as “the most dangerous matter [gefährlichste Sache]” for thinking,550 and in the 
Contributions 30 years earlier as the greatest danger to beyng, one which constantly arises out of 
itself: that greatest danger is “for beyng to make itself ‘a being’ and to tolerate confirmation on 
the basis of what is.”551
Third, understanding positionality means recognizing that the danger lies in part in “the 
fixing of language outside of its natural possibilities for growth,”
 
552 which is what happens when 
we reduce it to an instrument for the communication of information. Heidegger thinks that our 
authentic form of receptivity is to listen to what is unsaid in the metaphysical language of the 
tradition (see chapter 7, section II.B), so as to learn to speak otherwise, pushing language to twist 
free of metaphysics. If, on the other hand, “the possibilities of computer calculation set the 
standard for language,”553
                                                 
548 GA 15:344/Four Seminars 46. 
 then we think of art, etymology, and thoughtful saying as fanciful or 
metaphorical rather than as disclosive of things. Thus Heidegger says that such reduction of 
language may bring about the end (das Ende) of both language and tradition, since the handing-
549 See, e.g., “What is Metaphysics?” GA 9:113-14/Pathmarks 90. 
550 GA 15:307/Four Seminars 22. 
551 GA 65:476/Contributions 375. 
552 GA 15:351/Four Seminars 51. 
553 GA 15:351/Four Seminars 51. 
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down of tradition primarily happens in language. If everything is assumed to be replaceable, then 
nothing needs to be handed down, and persistence comes to refer to consistently having 
something new.554 As Paul Ricoeur has put it in another context: “The same epoch [technology] 
holds in reserve both the possibility of emptying language by radically formalizing it and the 
possibility of filling it anew by reminding itself of the fullest meanings, the most pregnant ones, 
the ones which are most bound by the presence of the sacred to man.”555
Fourth, Heidegger claims that the most extreme danger, the extremity of the danger, is 
“that man, insofar as he produces himself, no longer feels any other necessities than those 
demands [i.e., hypothetical imperatives] that his self-production calls forth.” Nothing constrains 
us; we take ourselves to be conditioned only by ourselves. In so doing, we take up a 
fundamentally new relation to being, but completely without noticing: to be is no longer even to 
be an object, which had its own problems, but is now to be replaceable, meaning that the 




Previously, metaphysics always felt the need to explain its conditionedness – its 
contingency – by appeal to a first cause, a single anchor for meaning. But now, for what 
Heidegger takes to be the first time, we just think we are unconditioned, not in need of 
metaphysics. Even our concerns about interpreting humans as resources are couched in terms of 
human resources and the exchangeability of values. Although we are in danger of becoming a 
mere byproduct of production – simple waste for disposal – we comport ourselves as lords of the 
earth, as if technology were something we created and could control. 
 
                                                 
554 GA 15:359, 369/Four Seminars 56, 62. 
555 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, tr. E. Buchanan (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1986), p. 349. 
556 GA 15:368-9/Four Seminars 61-2. Cf. “Science and Reflection,” GA 7:55/QCT 173. Cp. W.V.O. 
Quine’s famous claim that “to be is to be the value of a variable,” in “On What There Is,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 2 (1948/49): pp. 21-38. 
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Iain Thomson explains it this way: since we see all entities, including ourselves, as 
“intrinsically meaningless resources on standby to be optimized for maximally flexible use,” we 
end up optimizing for its own sake. The danger, then, is that “we could become so satiated by the 
endless possibilities for flexible self-optimization […] that we lose the very sense that anything is 
lost with such a self-understanding.”557
Heidegger’s way of putting this is to say that while every constellation of beyng destines 
us to a particular way of unconcealing and not others, positionality is “the highest danger” 
because “it drives out every other possibility of unconcealing.” This is because it “conceals 
unconcealing as such and with it that in which unconcealment, i.e., truth, takes place [sich … 
ereignet].”
 
558 In the grip of ordering for its own sake, we forget the uniqueness of the human 
being as belonging to and needed by beyng, indeed as the site for projecting a meaningful world. 
If the being of what is can be understood as exchangeability (Ersetzbarkeit), which is the 
character of information, then it seems that nothing need be hidden. “For what is of equal value, it 
is no longer a matter of whether and how it itself still presences as unconcealed against [the 
background of] something else, something concealed.”559
Even here, however, the very extremity of the danger implies a turn into what saves. Thus 
Heidegger points out in “The Question Concerning Technology” that since positionality is itself 
is not something we can invent or make, not something that is itself subject to ordering, it shows 
us that we are conditioned; we belong to what grants unconcealment, i.e., to the event. But that 
means that being itself (as positionality) grants us an experience of our essence (as needed and 
used by being itself) for the first time, and so inclines us to re-think our metaphysical 
 Just when it seems that everything 
could in principle be unconcealed, lying there before us as information, what is covered over is 
precisely the fact that we, as fully human and thus finite, are needed by being for unconcealing. 
                                                 
557 Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity, pp. 199-200. 
558 GA 7:27-8/QCT 26-7. 
559 GA 79:52/“Danger” 49. 
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understanding of essence.560 In this way, we are pressed to think the essence of truth by the truth 
itself (essencing in positionality as its current constellation). This is why the Le Thor seminar 
turns right at the end to an attempt to make sense of the event.561
Since the danger is that we will forget completely – in the sense of losing any modes of 
disclosive activity that might remind us – that we are needed for (or that to us is entrusted) the 
multiple ways of being of things, their multiple modes of disclosure, what saves is realizing this 
danger as a danger. That means remembering (Andenken) that the multiple modes of import of 
things are entrusted to us – granted to us – for disclosure. We, at least, are not disposable or 
replaceable. 
 
According to Heidegger, then, the “essential insight is that man is not a being that makes 
himself”562 but one who must wait upon something else, one whose essence is given from some 
other source. What is our own, the realm of our proprietorship (Eigentum), must be given to us. 
Thus, in the “Evening Conversation” the Older Man explains that what heals does so “by letting 
us [expressly] become those who wait.” He then adds: “And so for those who wait, the near and 
the far is the selfsame, although precisely for them the difference of the near and the far holds 
itself open most purely.”563 I take this addition to be a description both of authenticity (explicitly 
taking oneself up as one who waits) and of what I have named grasping the unity of a complex 
phenomenon: experiencing what saves as the back side of the danger, recognizing that beyng 
withdraws (into the far) and deeply concerns us thereby (is near), that concealment (the far) and 
unconcealment (the near) belong essentially together.564
                                                 
560 GA 7:32-3/QCT 31-2. 
 Such authentic waiting does not take 
561 GA 15:366-7/Four Seminars 60-1, including the claim that “positionality is, as it were, the photographic 
negative of the event” (trans. mod.). 
562 GA 15:359/Four Seminars 56. 
563 GA 77:226/CPC 146. 
564 This experience is described in the Contributions as follows (GA 65:381/Contributions 301, 
Heidegger’s emphasis): “The abyss as staying-away of ground is still supposed to be the essencing of truth 
(i.e., of the concealing that clears). Staying-away of ground: is that not the absence [Abwesenheit] of 
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everything to be of equal value (gleich-giltig), nor does it erase the difference between the 
unconcealed and the concealed aspects of a thing, but it does recognize them as aspects of the 
same (dasselbe) phenomenon. As Heidegger himself puts the matter at a certain point, waiting 
sees positionality as Janus-faced: “It can be understood as […] a most extreme shape 




3. Phenomenology as Apocalypse 
If we are to interpret Heidegger’s account of endangerment and salvation as 
phenomenological in this way, we will have to make some sense of his apocalyptic language. 
Here I shall just mention – without endorsement or critique – three attempts to do so by other 
important interpreters as further evidence of a deep phenomenological streak running through 
Heidegger’s work on the danger. We could perhaps take these three interventions as elucidations 
of Heidegger’s claim in the Le Thor seminar that “‘human life’ as such would be impossible 
without the prior [vorgängige] and unacknowledged [ungewußte] clearing of being,”566 as well as 
the claim from the Contributions cited earlier that being-away (erring) is a necessary 
determination or destiny of being-there.567
In a recent book on sculpture, Andrew Mitchell understands abandonment by being 
(Seinsverlassenheit) in light of Heidegger’s frequent claims that things begin their presencing at 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
unconcealment? But the hesitant self-refusal [of beyng] is nonetheless precisely clearing for concealing, 
hence is presencing [Anwesung] of truth. Certainly, [this counts as] ‘presencing,’ yet not in the manner in 
which something just there [Vorhandenes] presences, but rather [as the] essencing of that which first 
grounds [any] presence and absence [An- und Abwesenheit] of what is, and not only this.” 
 This point appears in the Le Thor seminar as “the [phenomenological] ‘step back’ (the step that 
retreats from metaphysics) has the sole meaning of making-possible [ermöglichen], in the gathering of 
thinking upon itself, a glance ahead to what comes. It means that thinking begins anew, so that in the 
essence of technology it catches sight of the heralding portent [Vorzeichen], the covering pre-appearance 
[Vor-Schein], the concealing pre-appearing [Vor-Erscheinung] of the event itself” (GA 15:367/Four 
Seminars 61). 
565 Heidegger, “Summary of a Seminar,” in On Time and Being, p. 53, trans. mod./GA 14:63. 
566 GA 15:362/Four Seminars 58. 
567 GA 65:302/Contributions 238. 
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their limits, “for it is here that they enter into relationships with the rest of the world,”568 into 
contexts in virtue of which they have their being. Thus, “[a]bandonment is a way to think being 
as neither wholly present (it has abandoned beings) nor wholly absent (abandonment is noted, it 
leaves its mark on beings).”569
If we think the self-withdrawal, self-refusal, or abandonment of beyng as what opens 
things up to one another, it becomes clear why this would both be always already the case and 
why it would still claim our express recognition. Precisely because beings are exposed to one 
another, we can jumble them all together and take them as present in standing-reserve; precisely 
because their being is vulnerable to context, we can to a certain extent manipulate the context to 
make them serve our ends. Their essential relationality, however, will always cut against our 
metaphysical attempts to take them as simply present or absent, hence we will always have the 
possibility of realizing that their resistance to unconcealment implies the happening of such 
unconcealment, the presencing involved in presence. 
 “This idea of an abandonment of being keeps us from imagining 
being as inhering in the thing,” since for Heidegger beings “are no longer construed as self-
contained and discrete objects but as already opened and spilled into the world.” Abandonment, 
then, is a way of recognizing the “constitutive insufficiency” of beings by which they are 
abandoned to the world, to their context, to the states of affairs within which they can be 
understood: “Being lies beyond the being, calling out to it that it come forth.” This does not mean 
that being is a thing existing somewhere beyond all beings, but rather that, since things are 
“essentially relational,” for Heidegger “[b]eing takes place between presence and absence […] at 
the limit of the thing.” 
Thomas Sheehan has long been advocating a phenomenological reading of Heidegger, 
but for my purposes at the moment, I want to focus on his account of nihilism. In a pair of essays 
                                                 
568 Mitchell, Heidegger Among the Sculptors, p. 1 and passim. 
569 This quotation and the rest of the paragraph from Mitchell, Sculptors, pp. 22-23. 
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called “Nihilism: Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle” and “Nihilism and Its Discontents,” Sheehan reads 
Heidegger as parallel to Socrates in the latter’s encounter with Meno. Socrates tries to get Meno 
to attend to the essence of virtue, rather than endless examples, just as Heidegger tries to get Ernst 
Jünger (and the rest of us) to attend to the essence of nihilism. Sheehan sets this up quite 
precisely: “Without first answering [the question of essence] (Heidegger seems to say), one might 
end up like Meno […], thinking that nihilism could be overcome by nature, effort, or learning, or 
perhaps by some other way.”570 Thus Sheehan lines up the possibility of “a future ‘turning’ of 
being” with overcoming nihilism “by nature,” the discipline of willing not to will with “by 
effort,” reading Heidegger’s texts with “by learning,” and some kind of gift from the last god with 
“by some other way.”571
Parallel to this realization, Sheehan claims, is Heidegger’s recognition that overcoming 
(überwinden) nihilism is an illusion. Indeed, Sheehan goes all the way the other direction and 
advocates what he calls techno-nihilism, the availability of everything to our understanding, as a 
triumph of history.
 The point, Sheehan claims, is that “once one recollects the essence [of 
something], one realizes that it is always already present, always already known” – it does not 
need to be bestowed at all. 
572
                                                 
570 This quotation and the rest of the paragraph from Thomas Sheehan, “Nihilism: 
Heidegger/Jünger/Aristotle,” in Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives, ed. B.C. Hopkins 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishing, 1999), pp. 278-9. 
 To support this, Sheehan presents a tendentious reading of Heidegger’s 
open letter to Ernst Jünger (“On the Question of Being”), claiming that Heidegger there shows 
that “we should await no such future moment [i.e., a future overcoming of nihilism] when being 
571 Sheehan takes Heidegger’s “only a God can save us now” as ironic (like Socrates’ reply to Meno toward 
the end of the dialogue) in this context. 
572 Cf. the following claims from Thomas Sheehan, “Nihilism and Its Discontents,” in Heidegger and 
Practical Philosophy: “Hence, planetary technology is not only inevitable but also unsurpassable” (p. 287); 
“The technological domination of the globe is the gift of the finite open” (p. 295); “One can promote and 
affirm a world that is, in principle, completely knowable and controllable by human beings and still remain 
resolutely true to the open” (p. 295); “the mystery of Ereignis inhabits and empowers planetary technology. 
Therefore, we live into the mystery of Ereignis not by being less nihilistic but more [i.e., by carrying out] 
the task of the endless humanization of the world. This was clearly not Heidegger’s move, but it should be 
our own” (p. 296). 
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would ‘turn toward’ human beings – because, [Heidegger] says, being is always already” a 
turning-toward the human essence.573 The event (Ereignis), Sheehan claims, thus “names the Ur-
fact that human beings are thrown out of immediacy and into discursiveness, so that worlds of 
possible significance are engendered and sustained.”574 In other words, entities are “intrinsically 
open to what the Greeks called nous/noein [thought] and therefore are noēta (intelligible), always 
already correlative to a possible human noēsis [thinking].”575 This is what Sheehan calls “the 
entity’s intrinsic intelligibility, the a priori status of its availability for human engagement.”576
Miguel de Beistegui, too, reads Heidegger as a phenomenologist. Specifically, he reads 
the event not as “an event that took place once, and from which everything else unfolds,” but as 
“the event that does not cease to take place, and in the taking place of which a world is opened 
up, and beings find their own place. It is the advent of presence, or the opening up of being.”
 
The emphasis here is clearly on the ‘always already’ character of our relation to being. 
577 
As I have tried to show at some length already, between this event that constantly takes place and 
our forgetting of it in positionality, “there is a structural unity. Not an accidental, random 
relation, linked to some historical contingency, but an essential or intimate relation, precisely, 
which amounts to nothing other than the necessity of history.”578 Hence our technological way of 
unconcealing, which is “in a sense contingent,” is nevertheless “one that is inscribed structurally 
within the essence of truth.”579
The most interesting contribution de Beistegui provides for my problematic here, 
however, is his attempt to understand history (die Geschichte) as Heidegger thinks it, including 
 
                                                 
573 Sheehan, “Nihilism and Its Discontents,” p. 277. Note that Heidegger does not literally say ‘always 
already’ in the letter, though he does say that being turns toward us (“On the Question of Being,” in 
Pathmarks/GA 9). 
574 Ibid., p. 280. 
575 Ibid., p. 285. 
576 Ibid., p. 289, original italics. 
577 Miguel de Beistegui, The New Heidegger (New York: Continuum, 2005), p. 83. 
578 Ibid., p. 119, original italics. 
579 Ibid., p. 117, original italics. 
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his highlighting of the problems that arise in the process. So, he claims that with the event “the 
history of being is granted a certain necessity: not a rational necessity, such as the one exposed 
by, say, Hegel, but an ontological or structural necessity, a necessity linked to the play between 
truth and untruth, or between concealment […] and unconcealment […], in the very happening of 
being.”580 This, de Beistegui says – and I am inclined to agree – turns out to be a problem for 
Heidegger, who is trying to think “a history that is entirely heterogeneous to chronology, a future 
that in a way already was, and could coincide with […] the possibly – [or even] necessarily – 
endless history of metaphysics.”581 He reads Heidegger, then, as setting up two kinds of time, that 
of beyng (the event) and that of chronology, narrative time as a series of experienced presents 
(even if we take these presents in terms of ecstatic temporality as unities of past and future). “The 
‘first’ and the ‘other’ beginning can coincide, for the simple reason that they correspond to two 
entirely different temporalities: their relation is one of chronological coincidence and historical 
[…] disjunction.”582 Thus de Beistegui claims that “[d]espite Heidegger’s talk of ‘salvation’ and 
‘rescuing,’” the future of which Heidegger speaks “conforms to neither messianic nor 
eschatological time, neither to the time of a transforming event having taken place in time, nor to 
the time of ontological hope,” and the futural man “is not the man who is announced, or 
promised, the man who will come” but rather “the ‘to come’ within the human, the possible that 
is already there,” “the man who is already coming.”583
But can we make any sense of such a parallel temporality inhering, as it were, in 
chronological history? De Beistegui thinks we can if we understand this alternate history 
according to the Contributions, as “the happening of time-space, every time absolutely singular 
 
                                                 
580 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis, p. 122. 
581 Ibid., p. 135. 
582 Ibid., p. 149. 
583 Ibid., p. 135. 
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and unique.”584 It would be, then, “the time that is otherwise than worldly, or the time of the 
earth,”585
De Beistegui thus accuses Heidegger of an “inability to distinguish entirely between 
history and chrono-logy” that plays out in his “chronologizing, as it were, something that is 
simply otherwise than chronological, and yet temporal through and through.” The primary 
example of this confusion on Heidegger’s part is his “talk of epochs, and his attempt to 
distinguish between moments ‘within’ history,”
 i.e., of concealment that shows up as self-concealing. He claims, however, that we will 
have to depart from Heidegger’s text and from the use of the word ‘history’ in order to 
consistently think such a time, “for will not ‘history’ always carry a sequential, chronological 
connotation? Does Heidegger himself not fall prey to this temptation, time and again?” 
586 even by distinguishing a first beginning and an 
other beginning. For this latter would “not so much come ‘after’ metaphysics as [interrupt] it.”587 
For this reason, de Beistegui says, “I would like to suggest that the other beginning does not 
succeed the first beginning,” since succession would again submit it to chronology. Instead, 
recognizing that Heidegger himself spoke of only one history, the history of beyng – “that of the 
fascination with, and the conquest of, beings in their presence”588
                                                 
584 Unless otherwise noted, quotations in this paragraph and the next are from Ibid., pp. 147-9. 
 – “[s]hould we not rather 
acknowledge that metaphysics would have always already begun, but that this beginning does not 
have a history that can be told? And should we not allow for the possibility that, at the same time, 
contiguous with this beginning, the interruption of it will have also always already begun?” That 
585 Cf. Ibid., p. 150: “For the earth itself has a history, which is not one of succession, but of 
superimposition, each geological stratum communicating with all the other strata.” 
586 Cf. Ibid., p. 149: “does he not succumb to the temptation of constructing a narrative regarding the 
history of the first beginning, which progresses toward an ever-greater abandonment and forgetting of the 
essence of truth in favor of an increasingly representational  and machinic worldview?” 
587 Ibid., p. 135. 
588 de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, p. 94. 
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would be to say that history – as such and all history – is “[s]tructurally […] shot through with 
metaphysics.”589
To be sure, it is not as if we have nothing to do, no responsibility to respond and thus to 
engage explicitly in what has already admitted us. The point I wish to make in this section is 
simply that for a major strand of Heidegger’s thinking (one which shows up literally everywhere 
that we might turn to support a more apocalyptic reading), we must always already be so admitted 
– it belongs to our essence in a way that cannot change. Insofar as we stand in the danger, then, 
even by forgetting it (lack of distress), we nonetheless constantly and concretely stand in the 




IV. Conclusions: A Matter of Some Tension 
With this, I would like to say, the tension I have been pointing out within Heidegger’s 
work comes to a head. Heidegger seems to say, at one and the same time: a) hermeneutically, our 
particular age especially endangers the human essence, and it may already be too late for any kind 
of overcoming; b) phenomenologically, this endangerment allows us to encounter the essential 
structure of beyng (as the giving of import) that maintains itself throughout particular destinings 
and remains always, if only ever indirectly, accessible. 
The same tension animates a particularly difficult passage from the Contributions, 
focused on the event of time-space, in which Heidegger says in immediate succession that 
waiting “puts up for decision the whether-or-not of the onset [or intrusion: Anfall] of beyng” and 
that through such waiting “everything would indeed already be decided.”590
                                                 
589 de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis, p. 150. 
 De Beistegui 
590 GA 65:384/Contributions 303-4. Here is my rendering of the whole passage: 
The recollective awaiting [erinnernde Erharren] (recollecting a veiled belonging to beyng, 
awaiting a call of beyng) puts up for decision the whether-or-not of the intrusion [Anfall] of beyng. 
More precisely, timing [die Zeitigung], as this joining of the (hesitant) self-refusal, abyssally 
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interprets it more or less straightforwardly: “Time […] springs from a certain twofold absencing, 
the twofoldness of which nevertheless points to a single event: as hesitating self-refusal [thus as 
an oscillation between granting and refusing], the truth of being is at once this event that is 
forever withdrawing, thus opening up the past, and forever approaching, turned towards Da-sein 
from the start, thus opening up the future.” Hence, the essence of truth as absencing “is what’s 
always and already awaiting Da-sein.”591
But I am not sure that it is so clear for Heidegger, at least in the Contributions. His next 
sentence seems in fact to rebut the thought that everything would already be decided, bringing us 
back to the first statement and emphasizing the decision by once again highlighting possibility. 
“But what refuses itself does so hesitantly; [this hesitation is how] it grants [only] the possibility 
of the granting and appropriating.”
 
592
What does he mean by decision? At the close of the book’s introductory movement 
(entitled “Preview”), Heidegger stops to ask about a certain either-or, about “why it comes to an 
 If we then follow Heidegger’s murky connections, he adds 
that this possibility of granting and appropriating is admitted, spaced-in, ‘as essential possibility,’ 
and the event is this essential possibility, the possibility that essences. 
                                                                                                                                                 
grounds the realm of decision. With the transport [Entrückung] into what refuses itself (which 
transport is just the essence of timing), everything would indeed already be decided. But what 
refuses itself does so hesitantly; thus it grants [schenkt] the possibility of the granting and 
appropriating. Self-refusal joins together the transport of timing; as hesitant, it is equally the most 
originary captivation [Berückung]. This captivation is the embrace [Umhalt] in which the moment 
and along with it the timing are held fast (as the originary abyss? The “emptiness”? Neither the 
latter nor fullness). This captivation admits the possibility of the granting as essential possibility, 
slots in its space [räumt sie ein]. Captivation is the arranging into space [Einräumung] of the 
event. Through captivation, abandonment is something held fast, something to be sustained [or 
withstood: auszustehende]. 
The “staying-away” of ground, its abyssal quality, is attuned from out of the hesitant refusal, 
[which is] at once timing and spacing, transporting and captivating. Arranging into space grounds 
and is the site of the moment. Time-space as the unity of originary timing and spacing is itself, 
originarily, the site of the moment; this site is the abyssally grounding essential temporality-
spatiality [Zeit-Räumlichkeit] for the openness of concealing, i.e., the temporality-spatiality for the 
there. 
591 de Beistegui, The New Heidegger, pp. 89-90. 
592 GA 65:384/Contributions 303. 
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either-or here.”593 This is not a choice that the human would simply make as an exercise of free 
will; it is, rather, the emergency within which beyng irrupts. Heidegger says it is the decision 
about who we are “[i]n our belonging and not belonging to being,”594 the decision about the 
“bestowal as a gift or the staying-away of those […] whom we name ‘the ones to come.’”595 It 
must be decided “because only out of the deepest ground of beyng itself is there still a saving of 
what is.”596 Then Heidegger adds and emphasizes: “Must that be? To what extent is there still 
only such a saving?” His answer is, as we have seen, that because the danger has become extreme 
in that it now hides itself, we do not notice any danger, and as such “the initiation of the lack of 
history is already here.”597
We may see this same tension at work in Dominique Janicaud’s interpretation of the 
theme of ‘overcoming metaphysics’ in Heidegger’s work. Janicaud explains that 
 But I think we can read the emphasized question another way, in line 
with Polt’s interpretation earlier: it is not clear for Heidegger at this point whether saving must 
remain a possibility or could be lost. 
holding Being in view as ‘Ereignis’ is not derived from the discovery of a transcendental structure 
or correlation, but announces itself as a sign heralding a new epoch. Such an irruption does not 
proceed from a decree made by thought, it emerges from what, up to the present, Being has 
reserved and now offers.598
 
 
This seems quite in keeping with the apocalyptic reading, and seems to be confirmed by one of 
the characters in the “Evening Conversation,”  who claims that the ‘to come’ “could be entrusted 
[anvertraut] to us and at the same time still held in reserve [aufbehalten].”599
                                                 
593 GA 65:101/Contributions 80. 
 “And yet,” Janicaud 
also claims, “this truth – reserved though it is – must also grant itself to humans. Everything else 
594 GA 65:100/Contributions 79. 
595 GA 65:96/Contributions 76. 
596 GA 65:100/Contributions 79. 
597 GA 65:100/Contributions 79. 
598 Janicaud and Mattéi, Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought, p. 9. Responsibility for the various 
chapters is explicitly divided up between the two authors; the passages I cite come specifically from 
Janicaud’s contributions. 
599 GA 77:218/CPC 141. 
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depends on this presumption.”600 That is what de Beistegui designates “an ontological or a 
structural necessity,”601
Were we to try to understand Heidegger’s work on the danger as consistent rather than 
internally conflicted, I think there are only two options: 
 what I have attempted to isolate as a ‘complex phenomenon.’ 
Perhaps we are intrinsically not-yet thinking, always underway toward our essence, and 
thus we correspond essentially to the structural withdrawing of beyng. This would mean that 
authenticity (being-there as grounding the event of the there) involves explicitly recognizing this 
structure to which we belong – and, I would add, finding in it a kind of security parallel to (albeit 
operating at a different level than) metaphysics’ self-securing projection of truth as certainty. 
Such recognition would take place as attuned by restraint (Verhaltenheit), in which one can 
recognize one’s place and role, drawn along by the possibility of thinking, without grasping at it 
as a goal that one must reach. As we saw (section II.B.1), this mood of restraint also involves 
being attuned by awe (Scheu) and wonder that being allows what is to show up.602
On the other hand, perhaps we are not thinking but we still might, by the grace of the 
event, should it happen. In that case, the danger is real and genuinely troubling (there is no self-
securing going on), but then it is very hard to see how we could be entitled to follow Hölderlin’s 
dictum and maintain that along with the danger there is always the possibility of what saves. 
 
Could there be a third possibility? Could it be both that the event may or may not happen 
and that we may or may not recognize it? If Heidegger is to be consistent, ex hypothesi, the 
answer is no. For on the first option just mentioned, the structural account, the event is always 
happening, and the only decision is whether or not we will ever, contingently, recognize it. Since 
                                                 
600 Janicaud, Heidegger from Metaphysics to Thought, p. 6. 
601 de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis, p. 122. 
602 Thus, in his lectures on Parmenides, Heidegger claims that we experience the Greek gods as the attuning 
ones, “since awe and favor [Gunst] and brilliance of mildness [Glanz der Milde] belong to being,” which 
are “experienced poetically in aidōs [awe] and kharis [favor], and thoughtfully in thaumaston [the 
wondrous] and daimonion [the uncanny that inhabits the everyday]” (GA 54:164/Parmenides 111). 
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the possibility of this recognition is constant (as structural), the two cases are not essentially 
different in their historical significance. It is only with the second reading that the event may or 
may not happen. But, on that reading, Heidegger always includes our recognition of it as an 
integral part of the event’s taking place. To see why, we can run through the account of saving 
again. 
What saves is the event of a certain turning, in which our experience of beyng as 
withdrawing, refusing itself, turns into an experience of being-appropriated to beyng’s 
preservation (Wahrnis) in that same withdrawing. We become thoughtfully authentic being-there 
when we recognize (not merely cognitively, but out of the attunement of restraint) that the 
withdrawal of beyng is structural and serves to maintain the mystery as mystery, rather than 
trying to force it to become fully present, to leave behind all concealment. 
As Heidegger puts it: “Only when the human essence (in the event of insight, as what is 
caught sight of by this insight) renounces [entsagt] human stubbornness [Eigensinn: self-will, lit. 
sense of one’s own] […] only then does the human correspond [ent-spricht] in his essence to the 
claim [that is encountered in] the insight.”603 To become what we already essentially are, we must 
give up making things our own (securing them for ourselves and thus securing ourselves through 
them) and yield to our being-claimed by what grants us the sphere of our own. This is to respond 
appropriately to our own finitude and to that of beyng. It involves learning to dwell with things in 
language, to belong to beyng explicitly through corresponding, which is what Heidegger names 
thinking.604
This means that even on the apocalyptic reading, the event does not happen without our 
thinking it; we are intrinsically implicated in it. In that case, I cannot see any possibility of a third 
 
                                                 
603 GA 79:76/“Turn” 71, trans. mod. 
604 GA 79:71/“Turn” 67. 
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consistent reading, one on which the event may or may not happen, but even if it does we still 
might not recognize it. 
 There remains one more tension interior to Heidegger’s account that I would merely like 
to indicate here, since it will become important a bit later (chapter 4). If we ask what role humans 
have in the decision, it seems that we can destroy our essence without any help (or, at any rate, 
what help we need has already been granted), but we cannot save ourselves without help. It will 
depend on which reading of the danger one favors whether that help has always already been 
granted, or only may be at some point in the chronological future. 
Thus, in a lecture course from 1957 (excerpted in Identity and Difference), Heidegger 
claims that we experience in positionality a kind of prelude (Vorspiel) to the event, but that it is 
not necessary that we encounter the event only through such a prelude. Rather, we might be able 
to encounter it explicitly, since in the event of appropriation, “the possibility arises that the event 
as the sheer reign of positionality is converted [or won over: verwindet] into a more inceptual 
appropriating [Ereignen]. Such a conversion […] would result in the […] retraction of the 
technological world from its position of mastery into one of servitude.”605 Heidegger emphasizes, 
however, that because we cannot master being, and because this conversion would be on the level 
of the event (ereignishaft), that possibility cannot be fulfilled purely by human effort. It must be 
brought about (or, perhaps, not brought about) by the event, which takes place in a moment of 
insight. Already in the Parmenides lecture course fifteen years prior, he describes this insight as 
“an awakening that all of a sudden sees that what-is ‘is’.” In such a moment, being “shows itself, 
if it does show itself, in each case only ‘suddenly’ – in Greek, exaiphnēs [event], i.e., exaphanēs, 
the way that something irrupts into appearance [the event], from non-appearance [literally, ex-a-
phanēs].”606
                                                 
605 GA 79:125/BPT 117-18, trans. mod. 
 
606 GA 54:222-3/Parmenides 149. 
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 We can find a similar sense of the possibility of technology for service rather than 
mastery in a public lecture entitled “Releasement” (1955), but here Heidegger seems to allow us 
more participation in both the danger and what saves. He says, on the one hand, that if we fail to 
attend to the essence of technology, we can reject the claim of things on us and so bend our 
essence out of shape (verbiegen), muddle it (verwirren), and empty it out or make it desolate 
(veröden).607 With the highest technological success, then, would come the danger of “total 
thoughtlessness,” meaning that “man would have disavowed [verleugnet] and thrown away 
[weggeworfen] what is most his own, namely, that he is a thinking or reflective being [ein 
nachdenkendes Wesen].”608
 On the other hand, more than merely recognizing the danger as danger, he calls for us to 
be attuned to things by a disposition he calls releasement (Gelassenheit). This, he claims, could 
afford us a new groundedness amidst technological things, since holding ourselves in 
“[r]eleasement toward things and openness to the mystery belong together,”
 
609 if the mystery is 
understood as what shows itself and at the same time withdraws. Such openness is holding 
oneself open for the meaning that is concealed in the technological world. It would allow us to 
use technological objects without becoming enslaved to them, without letting them get a grip on 
us as what touches us most centrally.610 And, most interesting for my purposes here, releasement 
and openness “never fall to us from themselves [von selber zu]. They are nothing accidental [Zu-
fälliges]. Both flourish only through persistent [unablässigen], courageous thinking.”611
                                                 
607 Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 54/GA 16:527. Hereafter, Discourse. 
 
608 GA 16:529/Discourse 56, trans. mod. Cf. “What threatens man in his essence is the willful opinion 
[Willensmeinung] that the human, by the peaceful release, transformation, storage, and channeling of the 
energies of physical nature could make being-human tolerable for everyone and happy [or successful: 
glücklich] as a whole” (GA 5:294/“What Are Poets For?” 114, trans. mod.). 
609 GA 16:528/Discourse 55. 
610 GA 16:526-7/Discourse 54. 
611 GA 16:529/Discourse 56. 
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 Heidegger merely locates us in the midst of this tension, articulates us once again as 
wagered or thrown into the balance, when he explains that 
we can neither discard [verwerfen] the contemporary technological world as the devil’s work, nor 
are we permitted to annihilate [vernichten] it […]. Still less are we permitted to indulge in the 
opinion that the modern technological world would be the sort that completely prohibits 
[verwehre] a departing leap [Absprung] out of it.612
 
 
 On its face, this seems quite a reasonable assessment of our situation with regard to 
technology. But once we project it upon what we have already seen in this chapter – namely, that 
‘self-securing’ is Heidegger’s basic diagnosis of metaphysical thinking about truth, and that for 
Heidegger ‘the modern technological world’ is the current shape of an unrelenting (if complex) 
unity between being and thinking – we realize that, as I have already claimed for the Heidegger’s 
truth analysis (chapter 2), subsuming betrayal within a phenomenological structure simply 
provides a more complex kind of self-securing for the phenomenologist. 
This way of grasping the situation also traces the contours of a tension internal to 
Heidegger’s thinking, in which Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology comes apart into 
hermeneutics and phenomenology, or at least has to struggle to keep these from working at cross 
purposes. I have tried to highlight the point of divergence here by asking, with Roger Munier, 
‘what harm does the most extreme danger do?’ 
Let me clarify that here I have in mind harm at an ontological level. Of course I recognize 
that there are many ways in which being stuck in a framework of will to power, calculation, and 
violence harms us ontically. Heidegger’s analyses of National Socialism in the Contributions, in 
Meditation, and in The History of Beyng, among other places, make that quite clear. Among other 
problems, an ideology of total mobilization leaves us endlessly either enlisted by or crushed by 
                                                 
612 GA 79:129/BPT 121, trans. mod. Cf. “For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of the 
technological world are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable [unentbehrlich]. It would be foolish to 
attack the technological world blindly. It would be shortsighted to want to condemn it as the work of the 
devil. We depend on technical objects; they even challenge us to ever greater advances. But suddenly and 
unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical objects that we fall into bondage to them” 
(GA 16:526/Discourse 53-4). 
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the drive to seek more power for its own sake, justifies criminal behavior internationally by 
appeal to the right of self-assertion, and generates a police state that is ostensibly for our own 
protection. 
But is Heidegger’s recognition of beyng as requiring being-there (i.e., beyng’s very 
finitude) not remarkably reassuring for the thinker? Certainly it is unsettling to realize that beyng 
is not a permanently enduring entity of whatever stripe. And yet, for one who undergoes an 
experience of the unity of beyng’s history, our belonging to this finite no-thing is not something 
we can change, even with all of our willful destruction. By locating the negation in being itself, 
then, it seems that Heidegger has absolved us of any ontological fault, at the same time 




‘Apocalypse’ Still Means ‘Unconcealment’ 
wherein the Import of Things is interpreted as Radically Contingent, 
and a New Reading of Death enters an ongoing Debate 
 
“[L]ife possesses an uncanny ability to ceaselessly throw itself ever anew 




Now that I have shown both that there are two ways to read the ontological danger and 
that the phenomenological way, although less obvious, seems more faithful to the bulk of 
Heidegger’s diverse texts on the theme, I want to turn around once more and make the case that 
in terms of the matter itself, Heidegger’s apocalyptic inclinations are in a way more appropriate 
(more sachgerecht). That case will rest on my earlier argument (chapter 2, part I) that what is at 
stake in Heidegger’s accounts of truth and beyng is the same phenomenon that is at issue in my 
account of primitive trust. We established there that as the ground of phenomenality itself, this 
phenomenon (by whichever name) cannot itself be grounded further. Because they are two names 
for the same phenomenon, we can now ask whether phenomenality itself, our very being-in-the-
world or being-held in the truth, is vulnerable to the kind of betrayal that I have claimed belongs 
to personal trusting (chapter 1, part III). 
My argument here is also a way of exploiting the tension in Heidegger’s discussion of the 
danger by using the distinctions drawn earlier between kinds of betrayal (chapter 1) to show that 
Heidegger has settled too quickly for trusting as background assuming. By showing that he 
passed over openings within his own texts that might have allowed him to think our relation to 
beyng along the lines of trusting proper, I hope to mark out a space within which to ask about that 
relation itself, both with Heidegger and against him. 
                                                 




If we were to try to sustain the apocalyptic reading of Heidegger’s own texts on the 
danger, we would have to put all of the emphasis upon the decision, the either-or, between 
authentic being-there and inauthentic being-away. Will we have the insight, or not? How will we 
respond to the silent call of responsibility to things, the quiet power of the possible? Will we 
fulfill our essence as the between of relatedness, or remain lost in metaphysical absolutes? 
In this way, we could line up a whole series of rough equivalences running through 
Heidegger’s work. In Being and Time, we may never become authentic. In the Contributions, we 
may never become being-there – we may lose our essence by not becoming explicit proprietors. 
In Time and Being, we may fail to repeatedly turn out of metaphysics and thus never be 
assimilated (vereignet) to beyng. In the Le Thor seminar, we may cease to be human, being 
reduced to the replaceable plaything of technology, without even noticing. In each case, the 
emergency of the lack of distress would somehow fail to reach us, or at least fail to turn us in 
toward our essence. Anxiety about finitude would remain covered over because we would never 
adequately confront death. 
Granting all of that, I want to ask about what I take to be a still grimmer possibility. In 
each either-or, it seems to me there is a third possibility that Heidegger has omitted. What if the 
emergency did reach us, but it was more than we could bear – if it were excessive in a way that 
destroyed the possibility of insight? What if, instead of responding to anxiety either by owning up 
to our finitude or by running away from it, we were simply overwhelmed by it? What could save 
us from that? 
To make this question a bit clearer, I want to introduce a fourth and final phenomenon 
into the series of ontic/ontological analogies that have been aiding our interpretation. (We have 
already made use of the juncture, constitutive concealment, and crisis.) This one is also 
encountered at the ontic level, but it calls more directly for an ontological interpretation than the 
others. I will refer to it as the failure of mattering. According to Robert Pippin, this is the central 
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phenomenon of Heidegger’s inquiry,614
Focusing on Heidegger’s analyses of the late 1920s, especially in Being and Time, Pippin 
contrasts Heidegger’s project with Kant’s transcendental inquiry. Kant was looking to account for 
the intelligibility of things in terms of transcendental conditions of experience, i.e., conditions 
that cannot fail to obtain (hence the “Transcendental Deduction” in the first Critique). In Pippin’s 
words, Heidegger by contrast asks: “what could meaning [especially the meaning of being] be, 
such that it could fail, utterly, and in a way absolutely fail?”
 and if we understand ‘mattering’ as the granting of import 
(i.e., the givenness of being), then I could agree. 
615 That is, through his attention to 
the phenomena of death, anxiety, and boredom, Heidegger is trying to describe the “prethematic 
ontological horizon of sense” as a finite or fragile “horizon of mattering,”616
Thus Heidegger interprets experiences of the radical failure of meaning – the way in 
which, sometimes, for no reason, the world of intelligibility collapses or threatens to collapse 
entirely – as constitutive for being-there (Dasein). Death reveals our thrownness (Geworfenheit): 
the fact that we do not make ourselves into sites of meaning. It does so because the structuring of 
ourselves as this site where things matter (what Heidegger calls ‘care,’ Sorge) happens or fails to 
happen not only beyond our control but beyond reasons.
 one that is 
constituted by its susceptibility to failure (as attested by, e.g., mortality). 
617
                                                 
614 Robert Pippin, “Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of What Isn’t: Heidegger on Failed Meaning,” 
in Transcendental Heidegger, eds. S. Crowell and J. Malpas (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2007), 
note 51. 
 That happening (the event in which I 
am appropriated to everything that is as important) is what provides the space of reasons with its 
615 Pippin, “Failed Meaning,” p. 206, original italics. Cf. “Wherever Heidegger’s Kantian talk might lead 
us, we have to keep in mind how bizarre it would sound to refer to some sort of ‘breakdown’ in the 
constitutive-conditioning function of the experience-enabling categories of causality or substance [for 
Kant],” p. 204. 
616 Ibid., p. 206. 
617 Ibid., p. 208: “what it means to be Dasein is to be able to fail to be a ‘concernful,’ circumspective ‘site’ 
of meaning, and that the succeeding and failing cannot be a part of Dasein’s project”;  “What fails is care 
[i.e., the structure of Dasein’s being], and this precisely not for any reason.” 
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pull on me. Thus, in anxiety, I experience (among other things) precisely the collapse of care – 
including care about reasons.618
Pippin locates an example of this in Herman Melville’s “Bartleby the Scrivener.” The 
title character stops working, but not because of any particular privation, not for any reason or 
grand purpose. In Pippin’s interpretation: 
 
The failure of meaning appears to be complete, not a response to the failure of humanism, of 
justice, not a response to the brutality of wage labor and so forth. […] Mattering just fails in the 
way it can […], in the way that reveals the utter contingency and fragility of it succeeding when it 
does. Its happening or not happening is the event of truth (the occasion for living ‘in truth’). [… I]t 
is the radicality of this failure of meaning that reveals what is most essential about such meaning 
(that it can so fail).619
 
 
I want to emphasize the ‘revealing’ aspect that Pippin notes here, namely, that attending to the 
finitude of meaning and hence of being, the radical and inexplicable failure or success of 
mattering, allows the failure itself to be disclosive for Heidegger. The very contingency of the 
failure of meaning displays something meaningful – the history of ‘the event,’ the non-
determinative conditions of manifestation – for us, but only so long as we are thinking about it 
from outside of the experience, as if secure from the conditions of that experience. 
 Using this fourth phenomenon, what Pippin calls ‘the failure of mattering,’ I want to put 
in question the ontological accounts that Heidegger gives on the basis of the first three 
phenomena I have described. In doing so, my intention is not to challenge the analyses of ontic 
phenomena in terms of crisis, constitutive concealment, and juncture. But I do want to ask about 
the appropriateness of these analyses when extended to the particular ontological realm in which 
Heidegger wants to use them, especially in his account of originary truth. 
It seems to me, first of all, that the radicality of Heidegger’s attention to failure in Being 
and Time gets significantly relaxed in the transition to his later work, and that this is due in large 
                                                 
618 Cf. Steven Crowell, “Conscience and Reason: Heidegger and the Grounds of Intentionality,” in 
Transcendental Heidegger, pp. 42-64. See especially pp. 54-58. 
619 Pippin, “Failed Meaning,” p. 210, original italics. 
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part to greater focus on the experiences of crisis, constitutive concealment, and juncture. For 
Heidegger in the 1920s, when my own thrownness is disclosed in anxiety – the glance into 
nothingness, in which nothing matters in a structured, meaningful way,620
Heidegger recognizes two such possible responses, neither of which is simply cognitive: I 
may own up to my finitude, the determined quality (Bestimmtheit) of my particular opening onto 
and exposure to the world, or I may disown it, fleeing back into what everybody agrees about 
with regard to death – namely, that it is an admittedly troubling occurrence that happens to 
everybody someday, a tragic necessity of life, etc. Taking up such everydayness acts like a 
sedative, soothing my existential anxiety by covering it up, thus also modulating the depth of my 
exposure to things. As is well-known, Heidegger calls these two possibilities ‘authenticity’ 
(Eigentlichkeit, owning up to my finitude) and ‘inauthenticity’ (Uneigentlichkeit, disowning the 
radicality of my exposure). 
 i.e., the demands of 
things no longer reach me in terms of a world – I can no longer maintain a posture of everyday 
indifference. Encountering what is uncanny about being-there requires of me some response. 
Heidegger’s work after this period seeks to further characterize the life of authenticity 
(which he begins to label ‘Da-sein,’ emphasizing that being-there means being-the-there at which 
being shows up). But starting already in the late 1930s and early ’40s,621 he moves toward a 
description of authenticity as dwelling in the uncanny, free from power and will, attentive to the 
danger but also to the saving power within it.622
                                                 
620 Cp. Pippin’s emphasis (Ibid., p. 207) on Heidegger’s claims that in anxiety “the world has the character 
of complete insignificance” and that “the totality of involvements […] collapses into itself” (Being and 
Time (BT) 186/231, my italics). 
 Heidegger seems in part to abandon his inquiry 
into the conditions of failed meaning, even while his language remains at times apocalyptic, 
621 See especially The History of Beyng (from 1938/40; GA 69), Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” (from 1942; 
GA 53), and Country Path Conversations (from 1944/45; GA 77). 
622 Cf. Richard Capobianco’s tracing of this transition in chapters 3-4 of Engaging Heidegger (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2010), where he focuses first on the change in meaning and relative 
primordiality of being ‘at-home’ versus alienation, then on Heidegger’s gradual switch in focus from 
anxiety to astonishment as basic moods. 
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warning of the possible “annihilation of the human essence.”623 As L.M. Vail has put it, although 
one never simply becomes authentic once for all, there seems to be a kind of tranquility that 
ensues from repeatedly making the turn back to being, allowing oneself to be drawn back to a 
recognition of its finitude and multiplicity rather than fleeing from them.624
Such tranquility, we should note, is supposed to be distinct from resignation. In resigning 
myself, I close in upon myself and only open to the world in defiant and self-protective 
explosions. By contrast, releasing myself into tranquility is supposed to open up a way of creative 
dwelling as the there for being. Richard Capobianco puts it nicely in his characterization of the 
situation of being-there: 
 One can become, in 
other words, somewhat accustomed to the shock of the nothingness in which our openness is 
uncovered. 
In calm and thoughtful reserve, we take account of our fragile, finite openness in joyful nearness 
to the astonishing unfolding of all beings (including ourselves) in Being; and we graciously accept 
and courageously take up the risk of holding ourselves open unto the Open. And by virtue of this 
gentle resolve, we think, we dwell, we create authentically.625
 
 
Vail’s and Capobianco’s summaries do seem to me consonant with Heidegger’s later 
work. But even if someone626 wants to emphasize the more discordant moments of the late 
Heidegger, I will contend nonetheless that neither early Heidegger, nor late, nor even Pippin in 
his paper on failed meaning, attends to a third possibility, one that lies beyond either authenticity 
or inauthenticity as responses to what is disclosed in anxiety:627
                                                 
623 Cf. Vernichtung in GA 6.2:355/Nietzsche IV 245 and GA 77:207/CPC 133, as well as Wesenszerstörung 
in GA 65:424/Contributions to Philosophy 335. My discussion is in chapter 3, section III, above. 
 namely, that mattering can fail in 
624 L.M. Vail, Heidegger and Ontological Difference, p. 65. 
625 Capobianco, Engaging Heidegger, p. 85. The whole selection is italicized in the original. 
626 In different ways, Reiner Schürmann (Broken Hegemonies) and Richard Polt both emphasize this side of 
Heidegger’s thinking. I will come back to Polt’s work later in the chapter. 
627 We might think that indifference (Indifferenz) just is this third possibility. But as Havi Carel points out, 
“in the mode of indifference the call [of conscience] has neither been taken up nor ignored, but has gone 
unnoticed or never took place” (Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger [Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 
2006], p. 103). Thus, indifference is indeed a third possibility, but it is not a response to the call of 
conscience as heard in the encounter with nothingness. Carel further distinguishes between genuine (echte) 
authenticity (which would be anticipatory resoluteness) and non-genuine authenticity (which would be 
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an enduring way, that the shock of being exposed to the world and to the finite structure of 
disclosure somehow, contingently, can turn out to be too much for me. The event of truth can fail 
to occur. In this case, anxiety would be neither temporary nor primarily disclosive. It would be, 
rather, disintegrative in a more lasting kind of way.628
I want first to show some ways in which his work can be seen (and has been seen) as 
opening onto the possibility of such a danger without pursuing it. The stakes can be summarized 
as follows: 
 I shall try to show that this danger – not 
Heidegger’s – is the one that calls for thinking if we are to discuss originary truth appropriately. 
I mentioned much earlier that Heidegger’s work is an attempt to describe the source from 
which fact and value, the shared world and one’s own (i.e., what really matters and what matters 
to me), have their unity: the meaning of being (see chapter 2, section II.B). In that light, it would 
seem that the most extreme ontological danger would be a collapse of this unity, the failure of this 
source to bind the self and the world, in which case neither a stable self nor a structured world 
would show up. The individual would no longer be in the truth at all. This would be the height of 
an apocalyptic danger, to which we could not say that the possibility of saving necessarily 
attaches. It is the danger not merely that we would be unable to seek, but that seeking could 
happen without finding, if questioning turned out to be not only uncanny but uninhabitable. This 
kind of betrayal, unthought by Heidegger, would be like that experienced by the psychotic, in 
which self and world are fragmented when the I is overcome by mistrust as a grounding 
disposition. I cannot authentically dwell in questioning when anxiety about there being no 
                                                                                                                                                 
sheer anxiety as paralysis). This distinction would make sense of an otherwise puzzling passage involving 
genuineness (unexplained by Heidegger) at BT 146/186: “authentic understanding, no less than that which 
is inauthentic, can be either genuine or not genuine.” And the distinction might yield non-genuine (unechte) 
authenticity as the kind of third possibility I am looking for, except that Carel, too, understands it as 
“temporary, an anxiety attack” (p. 105), in contrast to the continuousness of either inauthenticity or genuine 
authenticity. 
628 Such disintegration, like finding oneself betrayed by a person, may or may not be permanent. To say 
that again from within Heidegger’s terminology: the appropriative event that places us into the truth is 




coherent, trustworthy world to question overwhelms me – nor can I simply carry on 
inauthentically, as one does, for in this case I no longer understand or trust, no longer share the 
common world with, that ‘one’ (das Man). 
If, on the other hand, the unity is so strong that such a failure is impossible, then – as I 
have tried to show at length (chapter 3, parts II-III) – at a fundamental level our stance in the truth 
is guaranteed. Maybe we will never be as free as is essentially possible for us (in the sense of 
‘freedom’ that means authenticity, explicitly taking up our openness to beyng and to what is). 
Maybe the multiple meanings of being, the multiple modes of unconcealment, will remain 
covered up in a technological discourse. But at least the concrete possibility of fulfilling our 
essence (being-there as waiting, authentically being-free for what is and for the happening of 
being) would remain in each case available. There would be no complete technological desolation 
but only a continuous exposure to the things that require our care.629
 
 
I. Some Openings in Heidegger’s Thinking 
Let us consider first the height of the apocalyptic danger. One way to think about it 
would be, with Karsten Harries, to conceive of the event as granting meaning, unifying in a 
particular configuration being-there with being, where the latter is understood as making a claim 
on us. Thus the meaning of human existence depends on the meaning of being, but the meaning 
of being is only ever given as elusive. Harries puts it this way: we “may wait for the call of Being 
and yet hear nothing” – or even hear something that radically fragments us.630
                                                 
629 This last claim is from Andrew Mitchell in a private communication, but see also Mitchell, “Grace,” pp. 
328-9: “Protecting and taking-under-care name ways in which we can accept the relationship that these 
dimensional forces offer [i.e., earth and sky open us up to be a Between, exposed to both beyng and things]. 
It is not a matter of making these forces wholly present or of preventing their annihilation. Either option is 
still thought too absolutely in terms of a logic of presence and absence.” 
 We may let an 
encounter with the nothing turn us out of metaphysics, as Heidegger proposes in the lecture Time 
630 Harries, “Search for Meaning,” pp. 194-5. 
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and Being … and find only nothingness.631 “Meaning is given to man as a task, not as a fact. Man 
can fail in this task, he can lose meaning, either out of weakness or because the meaning of Being 
conceals itself.”632 If the event does not take place, then the thinker may turn toward being, 
seeking a meaningful source, and simply not find it. As Harries reminds us, it seems that 
something like this is what happened to several of Heidegger’s favorite thinkers: Van Gogh, 
Hölderlin, and Nietzsche, all of whom were overwhelmed in a way that turned out to be 
irreparable.633 Harries’ description of the danger seems to me to fit Heidegger’s apocalyptic 
language quite well: “If meaning were altogether absent, dread would leave man absolutely 
indifferent. Were this indifference to swallow all care, Dasein would have to cease to be”634
Phenomenologically, how can we account for such a possibility? I will return to the 
question in more depth (chapter 5), but my proposal so far is that we should understand our 
belonging to being, our self-investment in the world as such, along the lines of a trust that can be 
radically betrayed. 
 – or, 
let me add, at least cease to be as being-there. 
Another way to think of the danger would be as the genuine other of truth, something 
oppositional or resistant (Widerständiges) that, unlike concealment, would not be subsumable 
within truth itself. John Sallis has pointed out635
                                                 
631 Ibid., p. 184: “But what if the meaning of Being is nothing? If instead of hearing its mysterious call, 
dread only lets us stare at the nothingness pervading all things and forces us to turn away in nausea? At this 
point of the investigation the possibility that ‘nothing’ might possess the last word cannot be excluded.” 
 that such an other is systematically counted out 
in the Contributions, where Heidegger claims (without argument) that the essence of truth (as 
632 Ibid., p. 187. 
633 Ibid., p. 201: “Such a fascination with the fragmentary can easily lead us to disregard the [global] 
structure of our existence and thus to lose the grammar [i.e., the order] of life. It is no accident that 
Heidegger’s favorite poet, Hölderlin, and his favorite painter, Van Gogh, were schizophrenic.” Cf. 
Heidegger’s own comment in the Contributions: “Hölderlin – Kierkegaard – Nietzsche. No one today may 
be so presumptuous as to consider it a mere coincidence that these three had to come to an untimely end, 
they who, each in his own way, at last suffered most deeply the uprootedness to which Western history is 
driven and who at the same time surmised their gods most intimately” (GA 65:204/Contributions 160). 
634 Ibid., p. 185. 
635 Sallis, Double Truth, pp. 86, 105. Cf. Sallis, “Deformatives,” pp. 29-30, 44. 
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unconcealment) “prohibits every question of its relation to an other, e.g., to thinking.”636
We might take this constitutive foreclosure of a genuine other as indicating what I argued 
for earlier as the criterionlessness of originary truth. But Sallis closes his chapter by suggesting 
that we consider something “so essentially other than truth that it would be absolved from truth, 
as absolutely as madness can be.”
 In a 
chapter entitled “Deformatives: Essentially Other Than Truth,” Sallis shows that the prohibition, 
in conjunction with Heidegger’s thinking of even untruth as properly belonging to the essence of 
truth (as I explained earlier: chapter 2, section II.C), ends up licensing an experience of errancy 
itself – as if one could phenomenologically tame even what resists the process of unconcealment, 
so as to encounter concealment as the essence of anything at all. 
637
Again, in considering the matter of this most apocalyptic danger, we could also turn to an 
essay on the event by Francoise Dastur.
 This is, as I suggested above, to take very seriously 
Heidegger’s own characterization of the leap into the essence of truth as a derangement 
(Verrückung) of the human being from its (errant) position amidst what is. But it is to turn this 
characterization around and ask whether there is not a different direction in which one might be 
dislodged (verrückt): not from errancy into the essence of truth to which errancy already belongs 
(nor from technology into the danger as danger) so much as from the whole of truth and its proper 
untruth out into chaos. 
638
                                                 
636 The example suggests that Heidegger means primarily that thinking would not be something over 
against unconcealing but what can only happen within it. Sallis is right to press the question of how far the 
prohibition extends, however. 
 She describes the event as the critical moment of 
temporality (in the sense of crisis), “a critical moment which nevertheless allows the continuity of 
637 Sallis, Double Truth, p. 106. Cf. “Deformatives,” pp. 44-5. We could think in this context of Plato’s 
divine madness, the direction Sallis has indicated privately that he would have gone, had he pursued this 
opening in his own work. But my investigation seeks to show that we should think first of all of madness as 
insanity. 
638 In what follows, I cite Dastur’s English translation of her own paper, which originally appeared as “Pour 
une phenomenologie de l’evenement: l’attente et la surprise” in Etudes Phenomenologiques 25 (1997): 59-
75. The somewhat abbreviated version that I cite was given as a talk in Prague, September 1998, organized 
by the Institute of Philosophy, and was published as “Phenomenology of the Event: Waiting and Surprise” 
in Hypatia 15.4 (Fall 2000): 178-189. 
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time.”639 She identifies it with ekstasis for Heidegger, the way in which we are related to or 
stretched out toward things in their being. “Openness to the accident is therefore constitutive of 
the existence of the human being. Such an openness gives human being a destiny and makes 
one’s life an adventure and not the anticipated development of a program.”640 A 
phenomenological account of such events would thus have to be a kind of hermeneutics, 
something that could attend to contingency and the a posteriori, not only the eidetic unity of the a 
priori. Her examples of such events are religious conversion and the death of a loved one.641
Dastur’s first move is to locate, in both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s work, the basis for a 
phenomenological account of excess. In this she begins from their temporal accounts of 
expectation, thus opening the door for her to ask about a “phenomenology of surprise,” in which 
we would find that “openness to phenomena must be identified with openness to 
unpredictability,”
 
642 to “the indetermination of the future.”643
what is happening when this excess implied in the event fractures the horizon of possibilities in 
such a manner that the mere encounter with the event becomes impossible? How can we account 
for these moments of crisis, of living death, of trauma, when the whole range of possibilities of a 
human being becomes unable to integrate the discordance of the event and collapses 
completely?




As an example of such a complete collapse, she takes precisely psychosis, especially 
schizophrenia. Someone suffering from such a condition is “condemned to terror and to the 
impossibility of communicating with things and other human beings. Such a subject has lost the 
ability” to be open to the event, the capacity to integrate a new configuration of possibilities.645
                                                 
639 Dastur, “Phenomenology,” p. 183. 
 
Normally, an event is both passively undergone and actively integrated; indeed, the event itself 
cannot be adequately accounted for on the scale of activity and passivity. It is outside choice but 
640 Ibid., p. 182. 
641 Ibid., p. 185. 
642 Ibid., p. 186. 
643 Ibid., p. 185. 
644 Ibid., p. 185. 
645 Ibid., p. 186. 
259 
 
must be responded to freely; it requires a certain disposition in order to happen to us, but we are 
not sovereign over our dispositions. Indeed, this latter is the most powerful way of putting the 
point: the disposition to undergo an event “is precisely the ‘disposition’ which is missing in the 
psychotic person.”646
 What then does it mean for a person to be indisposed to the event, to temporality as the 
fundamental structure of being-there? Why does this emerge in psychosis? And what can it mean 
for our investigation, the inquiry into the grounding disposition (Grundstimmung) that integrates 
being-there into a sufficiently structured world, such that it can be exposed to things in their 
being? 
 
Dastur refers to the psychotic situation, in passing, as a ‘living death.’ This description 
certainly echoes the reports of various psychotics (beginning already with Schreber, whose case 
Freud analyzed) of something like soul-murder, an ongoing emptiness of what used to be the self. 
But it is also – as she no doubt intends – philosophically acute. It speaks to the situation of having 
passed beyond a limit that normally marks the finitude of human being (death) while yet 
surviving, carrying on until brought to an end by a limit that is in some way still more absolute (a 
second death that would be the cessation of the individual as living thing). We are usually 
inclined to identify these two limits, and for good reason, yet in psychosis we encounter them as 
somehow pried apart. 
 The Freudian analyst Jacques Lacan – who made the treatment and theorization of 
psychosis one of his primary tasks in analysis – concludes one of his seminars with a reading of 
Sophocles’ Antigone, in the title-character of which Lacan, on my reading, finds a type of the 
psychotic. Antigone, he claims, lives for a portion of the play between two kinds of death, beyond 




the limit of the human, as if she were “a still living corpse.”647 The first is a symbolic death 
(understood here as a death in language, ‘symbols’), a kind of suicide carried out when she 
proclaims that her soul died long ago and so she will bury her brother, knowing that the penalty is 
death. Lacan explains that “from Antigone’s point of view life can only be approached, can only 
be lived or thought about, from the place of that limit where her life is already lost.”648 This is 
then made visible, “consecrated,” in the play when she is punished by being sealed up alive in a 
tomb.649 The second death is then her physical suicide, carried out by hanging herself in the tomb 
where she had been placed as punishment. This, by the way, drives Hemon mad, according to 
Lacan, as it had already driven the chorus (in a certain way) mad.650
 
 Lacan implies, I think, that 
the psychotic lives in a similar in-between: not the in-between (Inzwischen) of being-there, open 
to beyng and to what is, oscillating from one to the other, but rather in between symbolic death 
(now understood as the subject’s death to language) and physical demise, the end of the person as 
biological cessation. 
II. Death and Related Phenomena 
“Thinking lives by an elective affinity [Wahlverwandschaft] with death.”651
 
 
Heidegger, of course, has given us his own set of distinctions concerning varieties of 
death, and has even understood death as marking our existential finitude: our possibility for 
exposure to and thus for disclosure of entities. Even if madness needs to be understood as the 
collapse of this disclosure, as I will argue later in the investigation (chapters 5-7), we should not 
lose sight of the ways in which the psychotic remains human. At stake in parsing the various 
                                                 
647 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960, ed. 
J.-A. Miller, tr. D. Porter (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 268. Hereafter, Seminar 7. Cf. pp. 294-5: “I 
am interested in the second death, the one that you can still set your sights on once death has occurred…” 
648 Ibid., p. 280. 
649 Ibid., p. 280. Cp. Lacan’s note that Sophocles’s Electra is a kind of double for Antigone: “‘Dead in life,’ 
she says, ‘I am already dead to everything.’” Ibid., p. 271. 
650 Ibid., pp. 268-9. 
651 Heidegger, GA 79:114/Basic Principles of Thinking 107. 
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senses of ‘death,’ then, is the possibility of understanding sufferers from psychosis as human, 
even though no-longer-being-there (nicht-mehr-Dasein) in Heidegger’s sense.652
More simply: if we are to make sense of a third possible result of anxiety, one that 
Heidegger mostly overlooks by focusing on the pair authenticity/inauthenticity, we will have to 
develop that possibility on the basis of his understanding of being-toward-death. 
 In other words, 
if we are to see what significance psychosis could have for Heidegger’s project – if we are to 
recognize that the philosophical problem is with his way of thinking about our relation to the 
truth, rather than with those outliers we call psychotic – we need to locate the kind of radical 
break that is involved within his terminology. This will then have ramifications for the 
ontological phenomena we have worked out so far, since it is precisely Heidegger’s analysis of 
death that gets displaced into his analysis of the essences of truth, nihilism, and technology. 
First, following Being and Time, we should distinguish between what he calls ‘perishing’ 
or ‘coming to an end’ (verenden), which is the death of non-human living beings – more or less 
what Aristotle saw as always recuperated by reproduction into a kind of everlasting species-being 
– and ‘demise’ or ‘decease’ (ableben), which is the passing of the human organism. In the latter, 
“the end of the entity qua being-there is the beginning of the same entity qua something present-
at-hand,”653 which echoes Aristotle’s insight that since a corpse is already something 
ontologically different from a living body, the living thing is not potentially a corpse.654
                                                 
652 Understanding being-there as Heidegger does in Being and Time: as constitutive for the human being. I 
address the modification of being-there to mean authenticity (in the Contributions, for example) in section 
IV, below, but we should keep in mind that Heidegger never simply stopped thinking of the human being 
as essentially being-there, even if we live this mostly in the negative mode of being-away. See my 
discussion in chapter 3, section III.C.1, and Heidegger’s use of Being and Time’s sense of being-there in 
the Zollikon Seminars from the decade before his death. For further discussion, see Miguel de Beistegui, 
“The Transformation in the Sense of Dasein in Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis),” 
Research in Phenomenology 33.1 (2003): 221-246. 
 
Heidegger refers to decease as a phenomenon intermediate between the mere perishing of other 
653 BT 238/281. 
654 Aristotle, Metaphysics H.5. 
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living things (whose ontological structure is not an issue for them) and the authentic dying of 
being-there. 
But Heidegger does want to think of the living human being as potentially dead – or 
rather, of death as an essential possibility for being-there – just not at the level of living body and 
corpse. Secondly, then, we should distinguish between decease as the end of biological life and 
death (Tod) as the end of meaningful life, the end of being-there.655 Heidegger calls the latter the 
“utmost possibility,” since it is a possibility projected by being-there (i.e., from within the realm 
of meaningful relation to the world) but is projected as precisely the limit of that realm. It is, then, 
the existential possibility of the impossibility of any further projection, the possibility of passing 
out of the world (Aus-der-Welt-gehen).656
Third, Heidegger further distinguishes between death as my possible impossibility and 
being-toward-death (Sein zum Tode), my essential relation to death insofar as I am the finite place 
for being to show up. This is no certainty of death as a coming event but a sense of my ownmost 
ability to be (Seinkönnen) or not be.
 We could call it the finitude (in German: Endlichkeit) 
or the end (das Ende) of the essence of a singular human being, my end. 
657 Since death, unlike decease, is not a possible happening 
but an existential possibility, there is nothing to actualize: it is only in one or another concrete 
being-toward-death. Hence, even suicide is not an actualization of death but remains decease 
(ableben).658
This third difference opens up one final distinction that is more complicated because it 
has to take into account what I signaled earlier (chapter 3, section III.C) as Heidegger’s 
rethinking of authenticity and inauthenticity, in which the former alone comes to be designated 
 
                                                 
655 “Death essences [west] not when someone is dead [… nor] when someone ‘dies,’ if dying is merely the 
extinguishing of ‘life’” (GA 71:194/The Event 165, trans. mod.). 
656 BT §47, §50. 
657 BT §52. 
658 BT §45, §53. 
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(strictly) as being-there, the latter as being-away (but still belonging to being-there as its negative 
mode). 
In Being and Time, then, being-there as the structure of all human beings just is toward-
death, whether authentically or inauthentically (or indifferently). “Let the term dying [Sterben] 
stand for that way of being in which being-there is towards its death. […] Being-there can only 
decease [ableben] so long as it is dying [stirbt].”659 Hence Heidegger’s claim that “in each case 
my own being-there is in fact always already dying [das je eigene Dasein faktisch immer schon 
stirbt],”660 i.e., actively relating to my own death. Here there is a phenomenological difference 
between sterben and ableben – the former ontologically makes the latter possible – but no 
possibility of chronological separation. To cease to be toward death (i.e., to cease dying) just is, 
considered in an ontic register, to decease, even though Heidegger already acknowledges that 
being-there “can end [enden, here equivalent to ableben] without authentically dying,”661
Ten years later, however, by the time of the Contributions, Heidegger has begun to 
distance being-there (as authenticity) from the human being and correlatively to distinguish dying 
(as authentic dying) and being-toward-death from the structural fact of human finitude. This is 
merely a terminological shift, and thus pretty easily translated, but there is a more surprising shift 
in thinking that accompanies it. In commenting on Being and Time, Heidegger explains that the 
goal was (and is) “to draw death into being-there”
 i.e., can 
be toward death inauthentically up until and including the happening of its demise. 
662
                                                 
659 BT 247/291, original italics, trans. mod. 
 – in other words, experientially to take up 
the criterionless (i.e., the ungrounded or abyssal) grounding of beyng that being-there is, to think 
being-there as inherently finite. He then claims that “not everyone needs to carry out [or 
660 BT 254/298. Cf. BT 259/303: “That in each case even everyday being-there already is toward its end – 
i.e., is constantly confronted [sich … ständig … auseinandersetzt] with its death, even if ‘by fleeing’ [or 
fleetingly: <flüchtig>] – this shows that [death] is nothing at which being-there ultimately arrives for the 
first time in its demise [Ableben]” (trans. mod.). 
661 BT 247/291, emphasis added. 
662 GA 65:285/Contributions 224. 
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accomplish: vollziehen] this beyng toward death and, in this authenticity, to take over the self of 
being-there”! It is only the thinkers of the other beginning – not even “every essential human 
being” – who need to become authentic by accomplishing being toward death, although the latter 
group, those who are authentically appropriated to beyng, “can know of it.”663
The other new and remarkable element of Heidegger’s understanding of death in the 
Contributions is the emergence of an intimate relation between human finitude and what he will 
eventually call beyng’s own finitude. Toward the end of the book, he introduces something he 
calls ‘the last god,’ which for our purposes we can take as a figure of the fact that we are thrown 
into a world we do not control. Heidegger indicates that this figure is to be thought in terms of his 
earlier thinking about death – namely, as that end or limit from which our exposed, disclosive 
existence begins.
 In distinguishing 
between authentic being-there and authentic being-there as a thinker, Heidegger here admits to 
what one has to at least suspect about his work more generally: it is written for the few and the 
rare. Even though his analyses become more and more sweeping after Being and Time as he tries 
to account for culture and history, the suspicion of the crowd remains. Our collective relation to 
beyng, the granting of an epoch, is the special responsibility of those he calls ‘thinkers’. 
664 Just as in Being and Time the authentic mode of being-toward-death involved 
resolute anticipating (Vorlaufen), so in the Contributions Heidegger says that what is last (or 
ultimate: das Letzte) “needs the longest anticipation [Vor-läuferschaft].”665
                                                 
663 GA 65:285/Contributions 224. 
 And he closes the 
section with a question: “If we have such a poor grasp even of ‘death’ in its extremity, then how 
664 GA 65/Contributions, §§ 254, 256: Heidegger says that the last god “essences in the intimation.” This 
intimation is then specified as a matter of our complicated relation to the gods, who once conditioned us but 
now find no place within the world set up by positionality. The passing-by (neither arriving nor leaving) of 
the last god would be a new beginning, in which beyng could be recognized as fully given in its 
withdrawal. The last god, as a kind of end or limit from which a new way of experiencing things begins, is 
not the event itself, but belongs (as we do) to the event of appropriation. 
665 GA 65:406/Contributions 321, trans. mod. 
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will we ever measure up to the rare intimation of the last god?”666 That intimation, however, if we 
become receptive to it, reveals the “most intrinsic finitude of beyng,” the “intimacy and 
pervasiveness of the negative in beyng.”667
In the Bremen Lectures, we find an arrangement of distinctions shifted back toward the 
need for everyone to become authentic, while splitting dying (still identified with authentic dying 
or being mortal) from being-toward-death. “The human is not yet the mortal.” In one of the more 
difficult portions of his work, he contrasts dying – as “carrying out [or staging: austragen] death 
in its essence,” hence as authentic dying – with “undying death [ungestorbene Tode].”
 We encounter this negative in the intrinsic hiddenness 
of beyng, which means that it can only be encountered historically, as the unfolding unity of the 
manifold senses of being. 
668 The 
latter he characterizes as being killed (umkommen), being put down (umgelegt werden), being 
turned into pieces of inventory for the fabrication of corpses, being liquidated in death camps, and 
even perishing of starvation (verenden) like animals. This death (Tod) in which one is not allowed 
to die (sterben) involves disguising the essence of death.669
How then can we become mortal? Heidegger’s account follows the structure of 
possibility discussed earlier (chapter 3, section III.C.2). We must be enabled to die, capable of it 
(vermögen). And we are only enabled “when the essence of death favors [or loves: mag] our 
essence.”
 
670 We are therefore only capable of dying – of becoming mortal or authentic – when 
our essence has been appropriated into the essence of beyng, when by thinking we explicitly 
correspond to our being-claimed.671
                                                 
666 GA 65:406/Contributions 321. 
 For such corresponding allows us to recognize the essence of 
death as “the highest refuge [Gebirg] of the truth of beyng itself, the shelter [Gebirg] that in itself 
667 GA 65:410/Contributions 325. 
668 GA 79:56/“Danger” 53-4. 
669 GA 79:56/“Danger” 53. 
670 GA 79:56/“Danger” 53, trans. mod. 
671 “Corresponding in this way, the human is appropriated [geeignet] such that he looks toward the 
divinities as one of the mortals in the guarded element of world” (GA 79:76/“Turn” 71, trans. mod.). 
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shelters [birgt] the concealment [Verborgenheit] of the essence of beyng and gathers together the 
sheltering [Bergung] of its essence.”672
To make sense of the ‘essence of death’ as ‘the highest refuge of beyng,’ we must think 
about it as marking the finitude of the human being. As the utmost possibility of being-there, 
death is what withdraws from all experience. I cannot have a phenomenological experience of my 
own death; it is the non-phenomenal par excellence. And, as we saw earlier, Heidegger thinks 
beyng as possibility. So death, like beyng, is the highest possibility that shows itself only in self-
concealing; it is what marks the human as the place where the withdrawal of beyng can be 
encountered. This is how death invests my very being; I am stretched out toward death, finite; I 
belong to beyng and am drawn by it even in its withdrawal. 
 
In Death: An Essay on Finitude, Dastur characterizes death as “the unwelcome guest at 
every table laid to celebrate life,”673 i.e., as a kind of ultimate horizon or background for us in 
every encounter with phenomena. Human finitude, then, is what shapes our receptivity. We 
should think this by analogy with what Heidegger says of the finitude of philosophy – such 
finitude is neither the patchiness of knowledge, nor the fact that philosophy comes to an end. It is 
not simply the fact of an outside or a boundary, hence not a contrast with infinity but a connection 
or relation to it, an exposure to that which is beyond the range of our mastery.674 “Finitude lies 
not at the end but at the beginning of philosophy, which means that finitude must in its essence be 
taken up into the concept of philosophy.”675
                                                 
672 GA 79:56/“Danger” 53. 
 For finitude to be taken up into the essence (or, here, 
into the concept) of something means that the thing’s failure or lack of wholeness is seen as a 
constitutive reverse side of the same phenomenon. Heidegger explains: “Because philosophy is 
673 Dastur, Death, p. 42. 
674 Cf. Dastur, Death, p. 78. 
675 GA 27:24. 
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essentially a human (i.e., finite) possibility, therefore a sophist hides in every philosopher.”676
When Heidegger says, then, that to be capable of dying we must be opened up by the 
essence of death, or be capable of death as death,
 
That is to say, the downfall or failure of philosophy (sophistry) is not an external threat but a 
built-in danger. Likewise, death is a built-in cost of being in the truth. 
677
This is the way in which death can be ‘the refuge of the truth of beyng,’ ‘what shelters 
the concealment of the essenc[ing] of beyng,’ since the essence of truth is self-concealing that 
clears, and the essencing of beyng is the withdrawal that gives concrete forms of import. But in 
what sense does this refuge ‘gather together the sheltering of beyng’s essence’? 
 this means we must be the entity that 
unconceals on the ground of a concealment that it can recognize. We must have caught sight of 
our essence in the event of insight that appropriates us to beyng as self-concealing. When that is 
granted to us, then our corresponding response is to die (not to decease), understood as 
recognizing and preserving this concealment as self-concealment. Heidegger elsewhere calls this 
dwelling (or waiting on beyng) because it involves seeing concealment, hiddenness, not simply as 
an external limit but instead as what spills us into a world that matters, makes us vulnerable to 
things by relating us to them, refusing to let us be self-enclosed. 
 What shelters beyng in its essence is authentic being-there, mortals who recognize and 
preserve self-concealment. But this dwelling requires recognizing both one’s own finitude (the 
constitutive incompleteness of being-there itself) and the finitude of beyng (which is entrusted to 
being-there as the place of its appearing) – and thereby recognizing their belonging-together. 
Heidegger says in 1952 that those who have become mortals die continually (fortwährend) by 
saving the earth (what resists meaning), receiving the sky (as a gift, rather than harnessing 
                                                 
676 GA 27:24. 
677 GA 79:17-18/“Thing” 17. 
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nature), awaiting the divinities (as conditions upon us that we cannot control), and ushering or 
conducting mortals into the essence of death. 
 We can unpack this ushering (geleiten) in at least two ways if we return to Heidegger’s 
account of death in Being and Time. First, he characterizes death as inevitable, something that 
cannot be overcome (unüberholbare). On this basis we can understand his later claim that “[t]he 
law of beyng’s inevitability [or inescapability: Unabwendbarkeit] is purely fulfilled in death.”678
Second, within the greater project of Being and Time – to locate the horizon of 
intelligibility (the meaning) for being in general by interrogating the entity whose being is an 
issue for itself – the analysis of death is supposed to provide a way to gather together being-there 
as a whole. That is to say that the existential (the ontological meaning) of being-toward-death is 
being-there’s ‘ability to be a whole’ (Ganzseinkönnen). It turns out, however, that because being-
there is fundamentally future-oriented in its projects, it always runs ahead of or anticipates 
(vorlaufen) whatever boundary we might draw around it. The only cut-off, as it were, is death, the 
ultimate possibility that it can and must anticipate. Thus, being-there can either be or be a whole, 
not both at the same time. The cost of wholeness is precisely the experience of itself as something 
that is – death is unavailable to experience. In this way, death can be said to ‘gather together’ 
being-there, which in turn is ‘the sheltering of beyng’s essence.’ 
 I 
take this to mean that what we earlier saw as beyng’s unrelenting quality – that it never stops 
requiring us to unconceal what is – is encounterable in the inevitability of death. Hence “death is 
the highest and ultimate attestation of beyng” in the sense that it indicates the indestructible 
belonging-together of beyng and being-there, even though  it seems that beyng (like death) is 
always absent. 
 But this finitude of the human being – i.e., its basic temporal structure as running ahead 
toward its own death – is also what “rips open [eröffnet]” beyng for us, opening us up to the 
                                                 




In his late work, then, Heidegger clarifies that his interest is not primarily in human death 
but in the finitude of beyng, its self-concealment. This already begins to appear in the 
Contributions, where he characterizes being toward death as the image of beyng’s finitude – 
specifically, its fissure, what we saw above to be the multiplicity in the very happening of beyng 
– as mirrored in the there, beyng’s abode.
 That openness of beyng, that it needs (or demands) being-there, is what 
Heidegger means by the finitude of beyng. 
680 But the strongest formulation is from the report of a 
conversation held with Medard Boss in 1963: “That the human being must die does not follow 
from the human being’s being needed [Gebrauchtwerden] in the event. It is simply the case that 
he must die.”681 This conversation took place only a year after Heidegger had told a seminar 
group that whereas for Hegel, the absolute involves overcoming human finitude, for him “it is 
precisely finitude that is made visible – not only human finitude but that of the event itself.”682 
The focus here is already more on beyng (the event) than on the human, a shift that has been 
completed by the time of the 1969 Le Thor seminar, which Heidegger closes by reiterating his 
difference from Hegel: “If being needs something of the human’s kind in order to be, then a 
finitude of being must accordingly be assumed; that consequently being would not be absolutely 
for itself, this is the most pointed contradiction to Hegel.”683
 
 
 Let me sum up this adventure through Heidegger’s various distinctions concerning death 
and dying. What Heidegger begins by calling ‘authentic dying’ and eventually just names ‘dying’ 
(or ‘being mortal by ushering mortals into the essence of death’) is something we must do 
constantly in order to remain fully within our essence (mortality, the one who waits). This is 
                                                 
679 From GA 65:283/Contributions 222-3. 
680 GA 65:282/Contributions 222. 
681 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 225/180, trans. mod. 
682 GA 14:59/On Time and Being 59. 
683 GA 15:370/Four Seminars 63. 
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because death, as an internal limit that spills us out into the world by binding us in relation to 
things, marks our finitude: we are the entity that can be a whole only at the cost of no longer 
being. Hence, as being-there, our receptivity to things and our openness to beyng are shaped 
ineluctably by this finitude. 
In that light, to ask about a third possibility beyond authenticity (dying) and 
inauthenticity (undying death, forgetting the inescapability of beyng) is to ask what it would 
mean to plunge outside of Heidegger’s thinking of mortality, to die to one’s own being-toward-
death. If anything counts as “estrangement” or as “what is most extreme,”684
One way to think about this kind of death, which we might call ‘symbolic death’ 
(meaning death to the order of language – the symbolic order – and thus to the coherent, shared 
world), is that finitude essentially involves mediation with regard to the truth. Finite knowers, as 
both thrown and projecting, are neither wholly shut out from unconcealment (i.e., capable of 
being deceived about everything) nor able to see from the perspective of full unconcealment (i.e., 
capable of a God’s-eye view). But, as we shall see in the next chapters, one aspect of psychosis is 
what we might call a non-mediated relation to the truth. Since language is what provides 
mediation, foreclosure of language destroys being in the truth. Paranoia thus involves 
identification with the truth (understood as correctness – everything must fit the story; I cannot be 
incorrect), while schizophrenia may include a sense of being shut out from the importance of 
propositional truth or a sense of absolute betrayal (everything is false). 
 it would be that. For 
if our essence is being-there as mortality, then the apocalyptic desolation or emptying out of one’s 
essence would be no longer to run ahead toward death in the same way, no longer to be finite in 
the same way. Of course, this would not mean to be infinite, but it would mean a broken (not only 
an obscured) relation to one’s finitude. 
 
                                                 
684 GA 65:284/Contributions 222-3. 
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III. A Priori Structure or Apocalypse? 
We can see more clearly why the kind of death I am proposing matters philosophically if 
we briefly return to the conflict between a strictly phenomenological and a more historically 
hermeneutic (or apocalyptic) reading of Heidegger’s project. The immanent critique worked out 
in our earlier discussion (chapter 3, part III) has already demonstrated the extent of this tension in 
his thinking of danger. The question of a different kind of danger – a death that, like betrayal in 
personal trust, one cannot be taken up authentically, yet is also not simply demise – gives us a 
further way to think the stakes of that tension: such a danger remains (needlessly) covered up for 
Heidegger because of the internal conflict between phenomenology and hermeneutics. This path 
will also show that interpreting Heidegger in terms of various levels of betrayal of trust can cast 
some light on an ongoing struggle in Heidegger scholarship. 
In a series of articles over the past 10 years, Thomas Sheehan has proposed what he calls 
a “paradigm shift” in the reading of Heidegger’s work.685 One slogan he has used for this reading 
runs: “being that can be understood is meaning,”686 in which we are to understand that Heidegger, 
as a phenomenologist, is only interested in being that can be understood and in the source of this 
meaning. Indeed, according to Sheehan, everything is intelligible except this universal 
intelligibility itself.687 Sheehan’s interpretations thus focus on Heidegger’s continuity with (and 
transformations of) Husserl’s work, guided by the intuition that we should phenomenologically 
reduce being (Sein) in Heidegger to meaning (Sinn) and even being-there (Dasein) to the there of 
meaning (Dasinn).688
                                                 
685 See, e.g., Thomas Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research,” Continental Philosophy Review 
34 (2001): 183-202. 
 I would claim that Sheehan’s strategy is not the only way to read Heidegger 
as a phenomenologist, but as one of the strongest voices in English-language Heidegger 
interpretation at present, let us take him as a representative of the ‘phenomenological’ style. 
686 Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” in Interpreting Heidegger, op. cit., p. 43. 
687 Ibid., p. 62. 
688 Ibid., pp. 47-8. 
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As we have already seen in the previous section, this strategy emphasizes the always-
already character of the things Heidegger thematizes, taking them as permanent structures of the 
human being.689 Thus, Sheehan claims that “Heidegger refuses the usual, non-technical 
translation of Ereignis as ‘event’ and interprets it instead as the appropriation of man to the 
meaning-giving process. But this appropriation […] is an a priori and therefore inescapable state 
of affairs for human being. Man is, of and by its nature, thrown into meaning.”690 Notice that this 
comes down squarely against what Sheehan calls “apocalyptic language,” “cosmic drama,” and 
“Teutonic bombast” in Heidegger’s work,691 since it takes our being-appropriated as 
inescapable.692
That implies, however, that the failure of meaning just is death, since meaning-making is 
“our very way of staying alive.”
 So long as there is human being, everything is potentially meaningful. 
693
                                                 
689 “I argue that Heidegger’s extensive corpus from beginning to end remained a hermeneutics of Dasein or 
an analytic of human existence [….] This entails that all the key terms in Heidegger’s lexicon – Ereignis, 
alētheia, Lichtung, even Seyn – are existentials precisely in the sense that the early Heidegger gave this 
term: necessities and abilities that a priori determine the human way of being.” Thomas Sheehan, 
“Astonishing! Things Make Sense!” in Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 1 (2011): 1-25, p. 3. 
 Sheehan acknowledges that our life is shaped by being toward 
690 Sheehan, “Facticity and Ereignis,” p. 53, original italics. 
691 Sheehan, “A Paradigm Shift,” pp. 200-201. 
692 Notice also that Sheehan’s way of translating – for example, Seinsgeschehen becomes ‘the meaning-
giving process’ – makes Heidegger’s most basic claims painfully obvious, just as Heidegger frustratedly 
characterized some of Husserl’s work. In “Facticity and Ereignis,” Sheehan cites a sentence from “Martin 
Heidegger in Conversation,” an interview conducted in 1969, in which Heidegger explains that “the basic 
thought of my thinking is precisely this: that being, or the openness of being, requires the human, and that 
the human is only human insofar as he stands in the openness of being” (GA 16:704). Sheehan renders 
Heidegger’s “das Sein beziehungsweise die Offenbarkeit des Seins den Menschen braucht” as “meaning – 
by which I mean the disclosure of meaning to understanding – requires human being” (53). So: instead of 
working out the contours of a fundamental relation between being and thinking that could respond to 
Nietzsche’s claim that being is a vapor, Heidegger on Sheehan’s account would have spent several decades 
trying to show that meaning (defined as what is disclosed in understanding) is only disclosed to humans, 
whose basic structure is understanding? This seems over-interpreted to the point of redundancy. I am not 
even sure that it is as interesting as the tautologies of which Heidegger is so fond, which at least sound 
strange and so may call on us to think. 
 It seems, further, that Sheehan is not yet ready to maintain his translation rule all the way, since he 
retains some references to being but modifies them to being-in-meaning. (See, e.g., In-der-Welt-sein as 
“being-already-engaged-with-meaning” [57], or Seinkönnen as “being-able-to,” understood as “being-able-
to-make-sense-of” [60].) Thus, although it is not Dasein’s being that is at issue for Sheehan but its sense-
making, it seems one would still want to ask about its being as a sense-maker. What or how is it such that it 
makes sense of things? 
693 Ibid., p. 47. 
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death – which he takes to mean “being ever at the point of death” – but understands this as 
“structural and essential to life” – to all life, “not just human being.”694 (What is unique to 
humans is that we stave off death by making sense of things and of ourselves.) There is here no 
distinction drawn between death (der Tod) and demise (Ableben); the death of the human 
organism is identified with the death of meaning-making (Tod), so “the alternative to being dead 
is to be making sense while living ever at the point of death.”695 If one removes this distinction, 
one also abandons any possibility of understanding what it could look like to be thoroughly 
overwhelmed by exposure to the world. This is why Sheehan can say that whether one responds 
to anxiety about death by owning up to it or by fleeing from it, “[i]n either case […] the outcome 
is the same”696: “in each case, the absurd [Sheehan’s word for the nothing, das Nichts, within the 
reduction to meaning] will always be, as Heidegger says, ‘slumbering’ within your experience, 
with the possibility of awaking at any moment.”697
On this reading, then, not only is there no apocalyptic ontological consequence to 
becoming-authentic or failing to do so, there seems to be no decisive significance at all to one’s 
response to anxiety. And if we were to imagine the (unmentioned) possibility of being 
overwhelmed by that dread to the point of a more permanent (i.e., not merely punctuated) 
awakening of anxiety, one that would destroy coherent sense-making, that would immediately be 
the cessation of the particular human being. 
 
As a contrast, let us look once more at Richard Polt’s reading, since he has explicitly 
written in response to Sheehan’s interpretation.698
                                                 
694 Sheehan, “Astonishing!” p. 5. He soon qualifies this as belonging properly only to human being but 
analogically to other forms of life (p. 6). 
 In an essay called “Meaning, Excess, and 
Event,” Polt tries to show that although Sheehan’s reading can take us some helpful way toward 
695 Sheehan, “Facticity,” p. 47. 
696 Ibid., p. 64. 
697 Ibid., p. 65. 
698 See also Capobianco, Engaging Heidegger, the first two chapters of which constitute a long argument 
against Sheehan’s reading. 
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understanding Heidegger’s project, that reading needs modification in light of Heidegger’s 
continued concern with two facets of being that go beyond meaning, or “ways in which meaning 
stands in relation to non-meaning.”699
The first of these ways is what Polt calls ‘excess’: it includes the resistance to 
intelligibility that things display, the fact that their reality matters to us over and above their 
meaning, and the threat of interpretive collapse. “Beings show themselves as being more than 
they show themselves.”
 
700 In other words, the very meaning of things includes a pointing outside 
of meaning, an irreducibility to the meaning they have or could ever have for me. Contra 
Sheehan, then, Polt claims that we are thrown not only into meaning (“meaningful openness”) but 
also into the refusal of meaning (“a given opacity”).701
Dastur makes roughly the same claim, characterizing finitude by pointing to a certain 
experience: “the authentic experience of that independence of what is thought with respect to the 
thinker which makes of every genuine act of thought an overwhelming event, since the parallel 




If it is true that we are struck not only by the fact that things make sense but by the being 
of things at all (and not nothingness), if things matter and not only my projects carried out by 
means of them, then part of Heidegger’s question of being must be about “the wonder that there 
is something at all, that there are beings instead of nothing, including ourselves, even if the 
 Thought reaches its object – what I encounter is meaningful in some way – and yet 
that very meaning simultaneously points beyond itself, indicating that here I am in contact with 
something excessive, something independent in the way that real things are. 
                                                 
699 Polt, “Meaning, Excess, and Event,” p. 27. 
700 Ibid., p. 34. 
701 Ibid., p. 37. 
702 Ibid., p. 77, original italics. 
275 
 
meaning of these beings is fragile or absent.”703 Sheehan, by contrast, translates Heidegger’s 
famous question as “Why are there meaningful things at all instead of the absurd?”704
The second way Polt understands meaning to relate to non-meaning is in the Ereignis as 
the giving of meaning. As we saw in the previous section, unlike Sheehan he reads this as an 
event, a happening, not a structural a priori. Furthermore, he takes such an event to be “the 
ultimate excess,” since as the giving of meaning it cannot itself have meaning. “If Ereignis were a 
structure, it would be a meaning that could be brought out through phenomenological 
interpretation.”
 If he were 
going to make this translation work, it seems to me that Sheehan would have to say that fragile or 
absent meaning is still meaning, just in a deficient mode. But then his account of meaning would 
draw quite close to the twofold description of meaning given by Harries – as both essential 
structure and claim on us – which corresponds roughly to what Polt calls ‘import’ and 
acknowledges as what Heidegger intends by ‘being.’ 
705 But at least in Heidegger’s middle period, Polt argues, the Ereignis is no 
structure. “If Dasein is the entity whose own being is an issue for it, we could speak of das 
Ereignis as the event in which our own being becomes an issue for us.”706 This would mean that 
“traumatic moments do more than reveal an already operative uncanniness: at their most radical, 
they generate uncanniness and make us a problem for ourselves.”707
If the ultimate excess that is the source of meaningfulness (i.e., of being-there as in a 
world) is an event that may or may not happen, rather than an a priori structure of the human 
being, then we can get a bit closer to thinking the desolation of an individual’s essence as a kind 
of death. If, on the level of the individual, the event fails in a decisive manner to take place (or 
 
                                                 
703 Ibid., p. 32, original italics. 
704 Sheehan, “Facticity,” p. 65n49. 
705 Polt, “Meaning,” p. 44. 
706 Ibid., p. 27. 
707 Polt, “Traumatic Ontology” (forthcoming) in Being Shaken: Ontology and the Event, eds. M. Marder 
and S. Zabala (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 12 of the MS. 
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takes place but overwhelms, disowns [enteignet] instead of appropriating [ereignet], not only 
along with it), if being-there becomes impossible, then that individual is no-longer-being-there 
(nicht-mehr-Dasein), precisely Heidegger’s characterization of death. And as with death, the 
transition is excessive: it resists being understood and cannot be experienced: it is essentially 
traumatic (although not itself the essence of trauma).708
What is at stake here is introducing a separation between death (whether qualified as 
dying or undying) as the end of being-there and decease as the end of the human person. It is a 
matter of understanding death, too, as a concrete happening, not only as the finitude toward which 
I can comport myself. Heidegger thinks that we may live without dying (i.e., live inauthentically) 
and calls us instead to live authentically by dying (continually), but what if it turns out that one 
can live after a certain kind of death – what one might call an ontological death? The latter would 
clearly be much worse than either of the first two options, but if it is the appropriate way to think 
about madness – which clearly happens for some people – then any thinking of beyng must come 
to terms with this level of finitude. Though I do not wish to ascribe such a position to Polt, 
nevertheless the apocalyptic reading of Heidegger that he defends seems to open up this third 
possibility. 
 Nevertheless, in order to think the 
finitude of being-there appropriately in its belonging to beyng, we who contingently continue to 
belong to our essence would have to face up to the radical contingency of our being-held-in-the-
truth. Thinking our relation to beyng and to the truth would thus lose the vestiges of self-
assurance that I have tried to make evident in Heidegger’s work. 
I have tried to show that such a possibility would not be simply foreign to Heidegger’s 
thinking, even if it would call for a rethinking of the essence of truth – perhaps beginning from 
the phenomenon of trust. Recall, for example, the ontic phenomenon that I characterized earlier 
                                                 
708 BT §47. This is not to say that all trauma is a failure of the event, a radical betrayal that brings about no-
longer-being-there, etc. I claim only that such failure, if it occurs (see chapter 5), essentially is traumatic. 
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as the failure of mattering. Robert Pippin interprets Heidegger’s project in Being and Time as 
attending to just such failures, learning from them, and the importance of that strategy to 
Heidegger’s work is also part of Polt’s claim about excess. Death, on Pippin’s reading, involves a 
failure of the “horizon of mattering,”709
This failure, occasioned by the ‘threat’ to meaning posed by one’s ever-impending death, is not a 
failure ‘as yet’ to make the proper sense of what seems without sense. There is no horrible fate 
that we are too fearful or too finite to make sense of. The failure Heidegger is trying to account for 
is not a failure to ‘make sense’ of death, but an occasion in which the failure to make sense of, be 
able to sustain reflectively, sense making itself ‘happens.’





In such an overwhelming happening, when anxiety does not only grip me for a moment 
but overcomes me for an extended (and indeterminable) period, I can neither flee into 
inauthenticity – the comfort of ‘how one does things’ – nor gather myself resolutely: for ‘I’ have 
in an important sense died. The world has betrayed me at the most fundamental level, yet what is 
left of me must carry on in desperation. Steven Crowell describes the disposition of anxiety as a 
breakdown of my ability to fit into the world as one (das Man) does. Facts and states of affairs 
remain for me – something shows up – but these no longer coherently suggest what should be 
done about them: 
things have properties but no affordances [that would suggest their functions], and the motives and 
reasons the latter once supplied now take on the character of something closer to simple facts 
[shorn of import], items in the world of which I can take note but which do not move me. […] 
This does not mean that significance and reasons disappear; I still register their demands, but they 
no longer grip me.”711
 
 
As Dastur indicates, one only ‘survives’ such a severe collapse as mad, psychotic, closed-off 
from the event of appropriation. But I have argued that madness here must be thought not as an 
extreme version of being-away, as being maximally scattered among what is, so much as a 
                                                 
709 Pippin, “Failed Meaning,” p. 206. 
710 Pippin, “Failed Meaning,” p. 211. 
711 Steven Galt Crowell, “Conscience,” p. 54. 
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continuing on while no longer being there, a living death that differs essentially from what 
Heidegger understands by constant dying. 
 
IV. Conclusion: To the Things Themselves 
 In one of Rilke’s short Stories of God, a gravedigger says, “Death. What do we know of 
it? Apparently everything and perhaps nothing. [Sometimes] I dig like a wild beast, so as to draw 
all my strength away from my brain and use it up in my arms. […] And it is a kind of anger. You 
grow callous, you think you’ve got the better of it, and then suddenly… It’s no good; death is 
something incomprehensible, terrible.”712
Even when Heidegger’s concerns become more cultural-historical in the 1930s and 
afterward, the point of entry remains the individual thinker or poet. This is more true the more 
apocalyptic his tone (cf. the Contributions), and so it serves as one reason for my examination of 
death as a spur to rethinking our relation to truth as disclosure. By thinking about this in terms of 
what, following Pippin, we have called ‘the failure of mattering,’ we have encountered within 
Heidegger’s own thinking several openings onto a more radical betrayal, one that may not admit 
of integration into the complex phenomenon of truth as he seems to understand it. 
 That incomprehensibility of death is precisely what 
Heidegger’s work on concealment tries to preserve and yet think – to thoughtfully recall it, and so 
to let the incomprehensibility be without mastering it. But how far does he succeed? Does he end 
up simply reincorporating that incomprehensibility into a comprehensible structure of revealing 
and concealing? 
These openings suggest that we should try to understand the human relation to being as 
vulnerable to a different kind of betrayal than the one that Heidegger explicitly takes up. Like the 
betrayal of personal trust, such a failure of mattering would in one sense always be possible, but 
somehow as radically contingent, rather than as an essential possibility of being-there. Here we 
                                                 
712 Rainer Maria Rilke, Stories of God, tr. M.D. Herter Norton (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1963), p. 
90. See Rilke, Sämtliche Werke, Bd. IV (1961). 
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should understand being-there in the sense of everyday, inauthentic being-there (in Being and 
Time), what Heidegger also calls the human, or being-away (in the Contributions). As we have 
seen, when he introduces in the 1930s some distance between being human and being-there – so 
that the human is not yet being-there, not yet mortal, or not yet thinking – this opens space for an 
articulation of the danger. On this account, continuing on as we have been – remaining merely 
human, essentially free and essentially mortal but not owning up to that essence – can be 
understood as an unnoticed evisceration of our essence. But we need to ask if this thinking of 
danger does not yet capture the way in which even continuing on as we have been is radically 
threatened for each one of us. We are vulnerable to a different sort of death: a death to the very 
possibility of becoming authentic. This would be a separation from our essence (i.e., from being-
there) that exceeds being-away, since being-away is still interpreted as a privation or deficient 
mode of that essence. 
This difference has come into view for us over the course of our encounter with 
Heidegger’s thinking because we introduced a distinction between background assuming and 
trusting proper into the context of his work. That distinction allows us to think differently about 
his consistent claim that we are essentially those who wait, even if we mostly fail to wait 
authentically or in the attunement of restraint. For to be essentially those who wait is to be those 
who find ourselves given over to the world and to being through primitive trust, even if we 
mostly fail to trust well. But we have seen that primitive trust is usually understood by Heidegger 
as a form of background assuming, and that trusting well therefore involves making better 
background assumptions, reorienting ourselves through being attuned by restraint. We can 
recognize that this is not quite what Heidegger is after, since he at least sometimes wants to 
articulate a radically contingent, existential belonging, but we have seen that because of the way 
he understands our relation to being, he can only work out primitive trust as another kind of 
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background assuming. This is why I have claimed that his account of truth remains a kind of self-
assuring (chapter 3, part II). 
We have seen that Heidegger’s account is not adequate to what he himself sometimes 
wanted to say, but it does not seem to be faithful to what the phenomena demand, either. The 
problem becomes evident in this way: when Heidegger interprets being’s givenness both 
phenomenologically (in terms of essential structures, especially errancy) and hermeneutically (as 
contingent and capable of widespread failure), these two modes of interpretation fall apart, and 
the danger remains merely disclosive (i.e., essentially always overcomable) rather than possibly 
disintegrative. This should lead us to wonder whether Heidegger’s thinking gives us a way 
faithfully to account for the humanity of those who do suffer disintegration. Must he simply deny 
the extent of the collapse? Or do the openings we have traced offer the possibility of thinking 
with Heidegger about madness while attending to the limits of his account? For we have 
proceeded this far with Heidegger because his thinking of originary truth – as a kind of self-
investment that exposes us both to what-is and to concealment in a patterned way – is the best 
anyone has yet done at articulating the essence of truth. 
We have thus staged an encounter between my account of the varieties of trusting and 
Heidegger’s thinking of the danger as inherent in the structure of truth’s happening. The very 
fruitfulness of this interpretive standpoint both further confirms the connection of originary truth 
with primitive trust (each is a way of addressing phenomenality itself as a hidden phenomenon) 
and calls into question Heidegger’s account of truth as a self-concealing that reveals. The task 
now is to turn more rigorously to the matters themselves, to think through this danger that would 
not simply be able to be incorporated into truth’s historical structure, but to do so without falling 
back into the dichotomization of presence and absence that Heidegger designates ‘metaphysics.’ 
What, then, might a radical betrayal of one’s investment in and by being be like? Does it 
ever happen? And how is it related to our initial entry into this investment in the world as a 
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whole? We have already seen indications from other readers of Heidegger (Harries, Sallis, and 
Dastur, in section I) that such a betrayal might involve something like madness. To follow these 
hints, we will need to work out an account of madness that is both committed to interpretation 
(not only neurological explanation) and yet oriented primarily toward the variety of failures to 
which we are exposed as human beings. I thus turn next to some insights from Freudian 
psychoanalysis that I take to be exemplary of the phenomena of breakdown (and, sometimes, 
recovery) in which I am interested. The combination of an orientation to human meaning with an 
orientation to recognizing failure at the individual level has produced a healing practice that is 
heavily dependent on very unusual (hence both visible and interesting) relationships of trust. 
Moreover, led back to earliest childhood by the phenomena themselves, Freudian thinking has 
tried to articulate the complex interpersonal relations involved in individually taking up the 





When the World is Too Much With Us 
wherein Phenomenality itself cracks under the Strain of Betrayal, 
and We Freudians are faced with an Interpretive Task 
requiring a Strange Mix of Trust and Distrust 
 
“Behind, or, better said perhaps, beneath every object, every representation, 
every physical or metaphysical ideality lies a phenomenon, which is the 
flesh and the blood of the world, the life that continues to live in and 
through being as it is represented in itself. This is being as it is lived. 
Lived by whom? By ‘us.’ But who is this ‘us,’ and what is this life? 
This is precisely what needs to be clarified: the meaning 




 In the previous three chapters (2-4), I have tried to make clear what is at stake in 
Heidegger’s account of originary truth by reading it in light of the four levels of trust with which I 
began this investigation (chapter 1): relying, assuming, personal trusting, and primitive trust. This 
strategy allowed us to open up an internal tension that pervades Heidegger’s work at least after 
the Marburg period (i.e., beginning around 1929), a tension between the hermeneutics of our 
historical situation in relation to being, on one hand, and a certain phenomenology (understood as 
a mode of access to the essential, hidden structure of being’s own presencing), on the other. I 
tried to show that the stronger strain in Heidegger’s work is on the side of essence, and that this 
constrains him to think that our openness to the world is, most basically, inevitable. For 
Heidegger, this openness is characterized by what we might call minimally organized disclosure: 
we are affectively attuned to things in a way that opens them up according to a given pattern of 
what is essential and inessential; both the attunement and the pattern are grounded in the logos 
that lets things belong to each other and lets us tell them apart.714
                                                 
713 Miguel de Beistegui, Truth and Genesis, p. 110. 
 So long as we are alive and 
714 Cp. BT §§29-34 on affectivity (Befindlichkeit), projective understanding (Verstehen), and logos or 
telling (Rede) as existentials of being-there. See also my chapter 2, section II.C, and chapter 3, section I.A. 
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human, according to Heidegger, the world shows up for us with at least minimal coherence. 
Being must appear, if only (ever) as withdrawing, so as to let entities appear in their being. 
 But if we look to the matter itself, there may be good reason to doubt certain features of 
Heidegger’s account of being-there (Dasein), as we have already begun to see (chapter 4). 
Specifically, over the course of the next three chapters, I want to show that world-disclosure is 
much less secure than Heidegger’s existential analytic – or even his later work on pain – seems to 
assume. One especially promising place to look for discussions concerning the fragility or 
instability of our relation to being is at the work of Sigmund Freud, including the tradition of 
psychoanalysis he inaugurated. 
Where Heidegger tries to think first what is joyful, mystery-laden, and gracious – that is, 
as Aristotle might say, the form – and in that light to think the malevolence of evil715 (i.e., the 
privation or distortion) as a negative mode, Freud sets out from pathology. Freud claims, for 
example, that “[u]nless we can understand these pathological forms of sexuality and can 
coordinate them with normal sexual life, we cannot understand normal sexuality either.”716
This psychological ambivalence is close to Heidegger’s thinking of being-there as opened 
up by an ontological clearing that conceals itself – i.e., the tension of existence as claimed both by 
being and by what is – but I want to show that attending to the psychological tension involved in 
 In 
Freud’s thinking, failure or absence does not only reveal the context within which a useful thing 
normally functions, the way a broken or missing hammer discloses the horizon of use-references 
in Being and Time; failure also shows that success is a fraught achievement. To put it more 
bluntly, Freud claims not only that world-disclosure structurally includes erring (i.e., attending to 
what is only by concealing the disclosive horizon), but that world-disclosure as such is always 
already a kind of compromise, an ambivalence of wanting-to-know and not-wanting-to-know. 
                                                 
715 Heidegger, GA 8:32/WHD? 31.  
716 Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, volume 16, p. 307 of The Standard Edition 
of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, editor James Strachey; hereafter, SE. 
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world-opening allows us to think the danger of an ontological break with coherent disclosure. 
Such a break, the descent into madness, would be a betrayal of a different kind than mere 
deprivation. Heidegger, however, understands madness as just such a deprivation: it is being-
there as being-away, a kind of supreme distractedness or lostness among beings.717
I have already explained
 
718 why a more careful reading of Freud’s work would be 
thoroughly justified on Heidegger’s part. In these final three chapters, I will begin to carry out 
some of what we might expect that reading to be. It will be a matter of originary truth: namely, of 
the entrance into (and possible exit from) being-in-the-truth. Jacques Lacan, for example, avows 
this quite explicitly, claiming that Freudian psychoanalysis “is absolutely inseparable from a 
fundamental question about the way truth enters into the life of man.”719
Most of us find ourselves, when we bother to ask the question, already within the cleared 
realm of this truth, already opened up to what-is in a more or less coherent and shared way. Truth 
has already invaded our lives by shaping them; it is hard to see how that could change. Examining 
the real possibility of the loss of this truth, the disappearance of the world, is therefore a way to 
let the nature of our relation to it – and thus to being – become most visible. This approach is not 
only in keeping with Heidegger’s frequent strategy of bringing hidden phenomena into view by 
attending to their absence; it is also taking up a question raised by Heidegger himself, when he 
asks in Being and Time, “must sickness and death in general – even from a medical point of view 
 
                                                 
717 Cf. GA 29/30:95/Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 63. See also Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 
95/73, trans. mod.: “The way of being that pervades all openness [Offenständigkeit] is our immediate being 
alongside [Sein bei] things that affect us physically [leibhaft]. In schizophrenia the identifiable loss of 
contact is a privation of this just-named openness. Yet this privation does not mean that openness 
disappears, but only that it is modified to a ‘lack of contact.’” 
718 See part IV of the Introduction. 
719 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses (1955-1956), ed. J.-A. Miller, 
tr. R. Grigg (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1993), p. 214. Hereafter, Seminar 3. In an echo of 
Nietzsche, Lacan adds: “The dimension of truth is mysterious, inexplicable, nothing decisively enables the 
necessity of it to be grasped, since man accommodates himself to non-truth perfectly well.” 
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– be grasped primarily as existential phenomena?”720
Heidegger writes, for example: 
 If we grasp them existentially, however, we 
find that a certain kind of sickness, something quite similar to death, threatens to upset our very 
characterization of the human as essentially existing (standing in the clearing). I will try to show 
that this extreme illness, named psychosis by psychiatry, constitutes a betrayal of our very being-
in-the-world, one that is not already integrated into the existential structure of being-there. 
This everyday way in which things have been interpreted [through idle conversation] is one into 
which being-there has grown in the first instance, with never the possibility of extrication [vermag 
… nie zu entziehen]. […] In no case is a being-there, untouched and unseduced [unverführt] by 
this way in which things have been interpreted, set before the open country of a ‘world’ in-itself, 
so that it just beholds what it encounters.721
 
 
According to Heidegger, then, being-there is not capable of withdrawing (entziehen) from 
the way one interprets things, for the latter is what seduces us into the shared world. Yet I will 
show over the course of the next two chapters both that, and in what way, it is possible for this 
seduction to go radically wrong. It is sometimes rejected or foreclosed from the outset, due to 
being enacted either insufficiently or over-enthusiastically. I shall thus begin my discussion of 
psychosis by characterizing the latter as a failure of common sense, i.e., of one’s connection to 
precisely ‘this everyday way in which things have been interpreted.’ 
We will also see, in the course of this Heideggerian reading of Freud, that it is a matter of 
trust. Recovery from such a break with the organized, shared world, if it happens, seems to 
require a re-forging of trust, which I take to be evidence that precisely what has gone wrong or 
been betrayed in psychosis is a global or primitive form of trust. Moreover, our attempt to 
understand something about what takes place in psychosis will be oriented by questions of how to 
                                                 
720 Heidegger, BT 247/291, trans. mod. He adds that “[m]edical and biological investigation into demise 
can obtain results which may even become significant ontologically,” on the condition that “the basic 
orientation for an existential interpretation of death has been made secure.” 
721 Heidegger, BT 213/169-70. This is what Lacan refers to as the symbolic order, and it is this that Lacan 
thinks is rejected in psychosis (section I.G.1, below). See Lacan, Seminar 3, p. 124, where he speaks of 
having recently translated Heidegger’s essay on Heraclitus entitled “Logos,” in which Heidegger claims 
that Heraclitus’s One (hen) and language (logos) are the same. Lacan then points out that Judge “Schreber’s 
delusion is in its own way a mode of relationship between the subject and language as a whole.” 
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trust its sufferers, in their speech and especially in their (often subsequent) accounts of the 
experience. 
 Although it falls far short of the richness of Heidegger’s thinking, it may help, as we 
work through what follows, to keep in mind a straightforward phenomenological characterization 
of normal conscious experience as “streamlike, continuous, first-personal, tied to a point of view, 
embodied, action-oriented, coherent, and intentional.”722
we live within our own skin and […] the prereflective perceptual awareness we have of our bodies 
and our coordinate movements (including kinesthesis) is (developmentally) one of the oldest and 
(epistemically) one of the most faithful connections to the real, upon which all other relations are 
founded […]. Even when we are lost in thought or imagination, the lived body and the lived space 
of the perceptual world it orients are always marginally present.
 We could add, from Heidegger’s own 
work, that normal experience gathers up the real via an ever-renewed unification of the temporal 
ecstases (past, present, future), a unification structured by the gathering and setting apart that is 
the manner of the world’s address to us. We may combine these as interpretations of what it 




Contrast to that a literary description of being overtaken by acute psychosis: 
The walls dissolved and the world became a combination of shadows. […] All direction became a 
lie. […] She did not know whether she was standing or sitting down, which way was upright, and 
from where the light, which was a stab as it touched her, was coming. She lost track of the parts of 
her body; where her arms were and how to move them. As sight went spinning erratically away 
and back, she tried to clutch at thoughts only to find that she had lost all memory of the English 
language […]. Memory went entirely, and then mind, and then there was only the faster and faster 
succession of sensations, unidentifiable without words or thoughts by which to hold them. These 
[sensations] suggested something secret and horrible, but she could not catch what it was because 
there was at last no longer a responding self. The terror, now, could have no boundary.724
 
 
Or consider the following situation, in which a woman suffering from long-term schizophrenia is 
about to fall into such an episode:  
                                                 
722 David A. Jopling, “A ‘Self of Selves?’” in The Conceptual Self in Context, eds. U. Neisser and D.A. 
Jopling, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 249-267. Quotation from p. 253. 
723 Ibid., p. 263. 
724 Hannah Green, I Never Promised You a Rose Garden (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964), 
p. 103. This text is Joanne Greenberg’s fictionalized autobiography, published under a pen name, of her 




When I took her to the hospital, she became calm, subdued, and depressed. […] “This is my soul,” 
she said, handing [a little amulet] to me. “My soul is gone, my self is gone, I lost it. I am dead. 
Take it, keep it for me till I shall come out.” Then, in sudden panic: “I don’t want to die,” and she 
began to attack and to beat me, only to fall back again into her depressed mood.725
 
 
In the latter case we find an illustration of far-reaching ambiguity (to say nothing of 
ambivalence) about one’s own death – maybe even explicit recognition of something like the life 
between two deaths that I mentioned earlier (chapter 4, part I). She experiences herself, and 
explicitly her soul rather than her body, as already dead. And yet there is another mention of 
death, one that is yet to come and that induces panic. The relation between the two deaths is not 
clear, but neither seems to be in anything like a distanced, theoretical mode. I would like to 
suggest, thirdly, that there may be some hope she is clinging to in the gift of the amulet: 
entrusting her soul to her doctor, as if to some dear Charon. We shall have to consider what 
genuine hope there may be (along with what may be its origin, and even its ground). 
 I will do so (1) by laying out a rather eclectic account of the phenomenon of psychosis, 
following the lead of some Freudian diagnostic claims and emphasizing the philosophical (and 
therapeutic) problem that the non-psychotic will have in understanding what is going on for the 
psychotic person. In keeping with my theme, I focus on the betrayal of trust and the failed 
relation to truth that are centrally implicated in a person’s falling out of the world. 
(2) This will lead me to link the question of trusting the psychotic person’s speech 
(especially the therapist’s trust of what the patient says) to the more complex problem of trust in 
psychoanalytic therapy more generally, which of course involves the transference relation. That 
link will make clearer the central role of trust for opening up the truth of the subject in Freudian 
psychoanalysis. In this latter section, I focus on Freud’s comments on therapeutic technique – 
                                                 
725 Edith Jacobson, “On Psychotic Identifications,” in Essential Papers on Psychosis, ed. Peter Buckley 
(New York: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 131-142. Quotation from p. 135. 
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I. “I Wake and Feel the Fell of Dark, Not Day” 
 I showed earlier (chapter 2, section II.C and part III) the extent to which, for Heidegger, 
the human being is essentially free, by which he means essentially engaged in (eingelassen) the 
world, even if only inauthentically. It can happen, however, that one is overwhelmed by the very 
world in which one is engaged. In such cases, one suffers one’s freedom, one’s investment in 
what matters, with special acuity, undergoing it as an exposure – i.e., as a vulnerability that 
cannot be mastered.727
We know that Heidegger himself had such an experience, after his experiment in 
complicity with National Socialism resulted in a ban from teaching at the university.
 
728 Not only 
his time but his own life of thought had for many years been structured by and worked out in his 
teaching. He was both angry at the way National Socialism had (he thought) betrayed him and 
guilty about the ways he had misled others by his own errant wager.729
                                                 
726 “During his perusal of the theoretical, ‘metapsychological’ works, Heidegger never ceased shaking his 
head. He simply did not want to have to accept that such a highly intelligent and gifted man as Freud could 
produce such artificial, inhuman, indeed absurd and purely fictitious constructions about homo sapiens. 
This reading made him literally feel ill. Freud’s ‘Papers on Technique’ [by contrast] made Heidegger more 
conciliatory. He immediately discovered the crass mutual contradiction […] between the absolute, natural 
scientific determinism of [Freud’s] theories and the repeated emphasis on the freeing of the patient through 
psychoanalytic practice.” Medard Boss, quoted in Richard Askay, “Heidegger’s Philosophy and Its 
Implications for Psychology, Freud, and Existential Psychoanalysis,” a “Translator’s Afterword” to 
Zollikon Seminars, p. 309. 
 His homeland was 
727 The title of this part of the chapter is borrowed from the first line of an untitled poem by Gerard Manley 
Hopkins. See The Poetical Works of Gerard Manley Hopkins, ed. N.H. Mackenzie (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p. 181, poem 155, line 1. 
728 Heidegger checked himself into the sanatorium supervised by Dr. von Gebsattel, who treated him for 
three weeks in 1946-1947. Cf. Heidegger’s letter to Medard Boss of Sept. 1, 1947, in Zollikon Seminars, p. 
238. 
729 Heidegger’s anger is clear in, for example, The History of Beyng (GA 69), §§61 and 64. His sense of 
guilt is more difficult to establish, since he famously refused to apologize and mostly pled not guilty, but 
one can hardly read his accounts of errancy without hearing some declaration of Guilty! to which he was 
responding. For discussion, see William J. Richardson, “Heidegger’s Fall,” in From Phenomenology to 
Thought, Errancy, and Desire, ed. B. Babich, Phaenomenologica 133 (Springer, 1995), pp. 277-300. 
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occupied by foreign powers and in shambles; his sons were still prisoners of war in Russian 
camps. So it is understandable that he would be a bit overwhelmed, although at one level he 
seems to recover after a bit of talking and a bit of walking. 
The name for that experience is trauma, which we might characterize more generally as 
the break with oneself that comes with being broken-in upon, overwhelmed by the conflicted 
relation between one’s desires and the world in which one finds oneself. If Heidegger and Husserl 
are right that originary temporality [Zeitlichkeit] is the primary mode of self-integration – how 
being-there most fundamentally is – then trauma is what cannot be gathered up in temporalizing 
(zeitigen), what cannot be integrated.730
But trauma can prove more recalcitrant to healing. Being overwhelmed may mean 
finding all one’s prospects and one’s place in the world crushed by those to whom one is most 
attached. Shakespeare has dramatized such a calamity in the character of Ophelia.
 In Heidegger’s case, as in many cases, a level of re-
integration seems to have been possible, so long as help is available to establish an appropriate 
context for that integration. 
731
                                                 
730 Rudolf Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” pp. 174, 178. 
 Prince 
Hamlet, her erstwhile suitor, pretends to have gone mad, forswears his love for her, accidentally 
kills her father, and is shipped off to England. In a very short time, she has lost her future husband 
and her current protector – all she has in the world, since we neither meet nor hear of her mother. 
To make matters worse, her father was doing something shameful – hiding and spying – when he 
was killed, and he was killed by the very man to whom she was preparing to transfer her loyalties. 
Finally, it is unclear how much Hamlet can be blamed for the murder, so her ambivalence toward 
him cannot even find a margin of rest in assigning definite blame. 
731 Quotations are from “The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,” in The Oxford Shakespeare: The 
Complete Works, eds. J. Jowett, W. Montgomery, G. Taylor, and S. Wells (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
2005). Citations are parenthetical, as follows: (Act.Scene.Line number). 
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In light of all of this, it is not exactly surprising, although a bit startling, when she is next 
announced on stage as one whose “speech is nothing” (4.5.7), who is marked by a pitiable mood. 
This is the first of only four more instances in which Ophelia appears or is mentioned in the play: 
first, and primarily, she appears in order to sing (and occasionally to speak) about love, death, and 
abandonment; second, to communicate through the language of flowers, some of which she 
interprets verbally; third, as the object of a report that she has drowned in a river (one that may as 
well be named Grief – cf. “the weeping brook” [4.7.147]), seemingly too insane even to notice or 
care as she was drowning; finally, she appears as a corpse, the reified body of grief over which 
her brother and her lover, Laertes and Hamlet, fight to prove their devotion. 
 In Ophelia’s case, it remains at one level quite understandable that she should go mad. 
Who could endure such a situation without being overwhelmed? At another level, however, such 
a turn thwarts understanding – what exactly has happened here? Why has she been reduced to 
singing, to her seemingly nonsensical phrases (“They say the owl was a baker’s daughter. Lord, 
we know what we are, but know not what we may be” [4.5.41-43]), to flower-symbolism, and to 
what is either an inability or a refusal to care about her own welfare? Why is she both somewhat 
coherent and somehow inaccessible to everyday understanding? 
 Madness proper, which I will call psychosis, is – like the trauma that can provoke it – a 
problem of integration. As Ophelia’s case suggests, however, the failure of integration here 
reaches a much more fundamental level than is seen elsewhere: the problem of integrating the 
events of the world into oneself recoils into a question about the possibility of oneself being 
integrated into the shared world. That more radical question opens up the ontological level; it 
emerges as a question, in different ways, both for the psychotic person herself and for us who 
encounter, love, or only observe her. For Ophelia, what is at stake is betrayal: she sings of a maid 
taken advantage of (4.5.47-65), speaks of a “false steward that stole his master’s daughter” 
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(4.5.172-173), and proclaims that the violets (symbols of faithfulness or constancy) “withered all 
when my father died” (4.5.183-184). In other words, she speaks of herself as betrayed. 
To others, however, she is a mystery: the queen’s report of her drowning in the river of 
grief characterizes Ophelia as either “incapable of her own distress, / Or like a creature native and 
endued / Unto that element” (4.6.150-152). This focuses our attention on Ophelia’s awareness of 
her own situation – and hence on her desire, whether consciously recognized or not, to drown. 
Likewise, before her physical death (but perhaps after another kind of death), when Horatio 
announces the mad Ophelia to the queen, he describes her mad speech as puzzling:  
… [Ophelia] speaks things in doubt, 
That carry but half sense. Her speech is nothing, 
Yet the unshaped use of it doth move 
The hearers to collection. They aim at it, 
And botch the words up fit to their own thoughts, 
Which, as her winks and nods and gestures yield them, 
Indeed would make one think there might be thought, 
Though nothing sure, yet much unhappily (4.5.6-13). 
 
As Shakespeare indicates here, the psychotic person seems to speak about something shared, 
aiming her hearers toward a matter, but then things get mixed up. It turns out to be unclear (both 
syntactically and experientially) whether we are aimed at collection, the work of speech that 
gathers things in the world, or at the speech itself as a set of words. For we, understanding too 
quickly, anticipate what she means and end up grasping a thought that we cannot be confident 
was hers. It is clear that she suffers deeply, but how much of that does she know or allow herself 
to recognize? In psychiatric terms, how extensive is her thought-disorder? 
 
A) On the Possibility of Understanding 
“This child is dead and not dead.”732
 
 
 I pointed out (chapter 4, part IV) that Heidegger’s work is an effort thoughtfully to let-be 
the incomprehensibility of death. Since I want to show that psychosis is a kind of death – a way 
                                                 
732 Proclaimed by a woman about herself, speaking in the persona of her older sister. See R.D. Laing, The 
Divided Self (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 219. 
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of no-longer-being-there, a radical plunge out of the world that cannot be accounted for by 
Heidegger’s thinking of being-there – it is appropriate that psychosis, too, should bear the 
thoughtful weight of a certain incomprehensibility. This, at least, is how Naomi Eilan sets out the 
philosophical task of understanding the most radical form of psychosis, schizophrenia. Somehow, 
she says, we have to “solve simultaneously for understanding and utter strangeness.”733 Her paper 
responds to Karl Jaspers’s claim (in General Psychopathology) that schizophrenic phenomena are 
– or, let us point out, schizophrenic speech about experiential phenomena is – incomprehensible. 
Jaspers means by this, she explains, that while we can gain one kind of understanding of such 
phenomena (‘static understanding’) simply by listening to and recording first-person accounts, 
what we cannot achieve is an empathic or ‘genetic’ understanding, in which we would 
comprehend, from the first-person point of view, how one psychical state emerges from or 
generates another in schizophrenia.734
Let us take as a clinical example a case of schizophrenic autism cited by Eugene 
Minkowski. ‘Paul’ is a 17-year-old who has become unable to spend fewer than several hours on 
each visit to the restroom. Paul explains as follows: 
 The things that psychotics say and do, as Shakespeare has 
already articulated, often seem to be tending toward rationality; but then something arises within 
the discourse that abruptly leaves us radically unsure whether we have understood. 
When I have to go to the bathroom, I first check the time in order to not stay too long. It takes a 
certain amount of my time to look at my watch; I check exactly how the hands are placed. The 
little hand is sometimes not exactly in the middle between two numbers as it should be when it is 
half past the hour; this observation gives me something to dwell on. So I watch to be sure of the 
time. If the little hand is a bit farther or a bit closer than where it should be in relation to the big 
hand, I am no longer sure of anything; that is it.735
 
 
Here there is an extreme bit of obsessiveness, but it is not simply incomprehensible. I as listener 
can play along as if it were a fictional story, even identifying to some extent with the protagonist 
                                                 
733 Naomi Eilan, “On Understanding Schizophrenia,” in Exploring the Self, ed. Dan Zahavi (Philadelphia: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000), p. 97. 
734 Ibid., p. 99. 
735 Eugene Minkowski and R. Targowla, “A Contribution to the Study of Autism: The Interrogative 
Attitude,” tr. S. Ziadeh, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8.4 (December 2001): 271-278, p. 272. 
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(we all have our compulsions), until the last line pulls me up short, and I realize that something 
more has been going on than I could follow. He is ‘no longer sure of anything’? There is more at 
stake here than seems even distantly appropriate. The experience is repeated a bit later, when we 
read further in Paul’s explanation of the same phenomenon. 
After entering the bathroom, I am not sure of having closed the door. Then I look at the fanlight 
and think of the possibility of a draught. I pull the door several times to be sure that it is shut. […] 
Then, I look at a small nail that I noticed, since the beginning, in the door. The paint has come off 
the nail, but a small bit of paint remains. I look every time to see whether the nail is still in the 
same place and whether the spot is still the same size. I then look at the door and wonder whether I 
will be seen. Deep down, I do not mind being seen; it is on principle that I reassure myself and 
think about it. The thing has to be either done or not done. I must be sure that the door is closed or 




Once more, things proceed relatively smoothly at the level of understanding; it seems 
within normal experience to be concerned about getting a door closed or to habitually notice a 
quirk about one’s surroundings. It is perhaps a bit more strange not to mind being seen and yet to 
reassure oneself nonetheless, as if on principle (where the principle remains obscure); but none of 
this is simply inconsistent with our own experience. Yet something has definitely gone wrong for 
my empathic understanding when Paul seems to indicate that it is certainty as such that he is 
seeking with regard to the door, rather than a particular state of affairs. (It may be open or closed, 
no matter; the important thing is being sure which it is.) 
With the final sentence of the excerpt, however, things really go off the rails; indeed, to 
my eye as a reader, it is especially the ultimate, justifying clause that opens onto a world I cannot 
share. Not only is he straightforwardly considering what I would think of as a kind of imaginative 
counterfactual – the fantasy that the flush might spontaneously flood everything – he then feels 
the need to generalize, to provide a reasonable space for this counterfactual in the real world. 
Suddenly, the earlier concern about being ‘no longer sure of anything’ lends its full weight to the 
possibility of the flush inundating everything, and it is no longer at all clear that he means some 
                                                 
736 Ibid., p. 273. 
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limited set of everything: that the flush might inundate the bathroom, presumably, or perhaps a bit 
of the rug outside. He could well mean a much more existentially fraught ‘everything,’ a kind of 
global flood…. While I can fleetingly feel a kind of sympathetic, inchoate terror, I do not know 
whether he is terrified,737
 There have been three basic philosophical attempts to deal with this Shakespearean 
juxtaposition of ‘utter strangeness’ and seeming coherence, according to Eilan.
 or even what he could mean, at least in the same literal register in which 
he had seemed to be speaking. 
738
A second move, following Wittgenstein, is to take psychotic claims literally but to 
recognize that they have no content. As I suggested earlier (chapter 1, section III.C), for 
 One move is 
simply to shift registers: to interpret the especially strange claims, and perhaps even the whole 
discourse about clocks and doors and toilets, as a kind of metaphor that was simply not well-
signaled. In that case, the global weight that I was tempted to give to ‘anything’ and ‘everything’ 
in reading Paul’s words might well be the point of the conversation – he is displaying his world, 
in which everything can be at stake at any moment, and his obsessive checking, although 
dispassionate, is a way of dealing with that. This sort of path is most famously taken by R.D. 
Laing, although more recently George Atwood, Robert Stolorow, and Donna Orange have 
advocated a similar style of interpretation. I will come back to this way of thinking later; for now, 
let me just note that for Eilan, this is a way of normalizing schizophrenic speech that fails to 
adequately respect its strangeness. 
                                                 
737 A major symptom of schizophrenia is flat or blunted communication of affect, meaning that tone and 
body language may not have made Paul’s terror or lack thereof any clearer in the live interview than in the 
written version. Minkowski argues, however, that this particular patient wonders about such things quite 
indifferently. “Paul is not anxious; he seems to be immersed in an unusual apathy. Sometimes, one gets the 
strong impression that he is speaking not about himself, but about a third party.” Hence, “not only is the 
emotional factor lacking, […] but the personal element is almost entirely gone as well. The questions he 
poses are first and foremost concerned with the objective order of things […].” Ibid., pp. 272-3. 
 Minkowski’s point is to differentiate Paul’s behavior from (neurotic) obsessional behavior, since 
the latter would be accompanied by anxiety; I can agree, so long as we specify: accompanied by 
communicated anxiety. That leaves open the possibility that a feature of psychosis (though not, of course, 
unique to psychosis) is precisely to hide or to be unable to share one’s anxiety. 
738 Eilan, “On Understanding,” pp. 101-107. 
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Wittgenstein such claims are not candidates for correctness or mistakenness, but rather empty 
speech acts, mere noise, with regard to which nothing could count as evidence either for or 
against. In this approach the strangeness is maintained, but ‘genetic’ comprehensibility is 
abandoned – we look for causes of the person’s utterances, not psychological reasons why she 
spoke as she did. Eilan’s worry about this strategy is that it goes too far in the opposite direction 
from the normalizing reading: it fails to attend to the hinting measure of comprehensibility that is 
available. It certainly seems like normal empathy, after all, that allows us to understand some 
amount of what is said by people suffering from psychosis. 
The third and more recent attempt, then, has been to take schizophrenic claims literally 
and to maintain that they are rational beliefs. Following Donald Davidson, this path recognizes 
that reasons just are causes, albeit of a particular sort, so what we do in our various attempts to 
understand schizophrenic utterances (including searching for disturbing physiological factors) 
remains throughout a matter of rationalizing ‘from inside,’ as it were, even if it cannot always 
involve normal empathy. This strategy relies on distinguishing between experiences, as input for 
beliefs, and connections between beliefs themselves. Considered in themselves, schizophrenic 
beliefs can be fully rational and their connections coherently understandable, even if the input 
pathways of experience are faulty or very strange.739
I am not at all confident that we can separate input and beliefs neatly enough for this 
account to work. Leaving that problem to one side, however, I think Eilan’s own, rather different 
concern about this third attempt is also on the right track. Eilan’s claim has to do with the level of 
 Thus, it seems, we have managed to ‘solve 
for both strangeness and understanding’, as Eilan had originally characterized the project. 
                                                 
739 Davidson himself, Marcia Cavell, and Linda Brakel all take this approach to irrational (or a-rational) 
beliefs, although in rather different ways. See Donald Davidson, Problems of Rationality (Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press, 2004), as well as “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” in Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 2001); Cavell, The Psychoanalytic Mind: From Freud to Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Brakel, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and the A-rational 
Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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generality of the utterances in question. It is certainly strange, she admits, to encounter someone 
who is ‘visually disoriented,’ who identifies visual objects but maintains that these objects are not 
given as located in space. Such a situation plausibly involves a kind of malfunctioning of visual 
experience. Eilan claims, however, that the kind of ‘utter strangeness’ we need to account for in 
schizophrenia is on the level of someone maintaining “that she does not believe that physical 
objects in fact have location in space,”740 presumably regardless of how they are given in her 
experience. Eilan’s point is that our shared world is ineluctably structured spatially as regards 
physical objects, so any attempt at genetic understanding in this case seems inherently blocked, 
even if we appeal to faulty visual experience.741
I think we can see a similar difficulty in the example from Minkowski. Paul maintains 
that if his watch does not match up quite correctly, he is no longer sure of anything (at all). When 
he looks at the toilet, he thinks that it might operate by itself and inundate everything, since (as 
we all know, the implication seems to be) ‘such things can happen.’ The level of generality to 
which the boy seems to appeal, especially in the latter claim, is similar to Eilan’s spatial location 
example. If Paul had said that he needed to be sure about the door’s being open or closed, then 
added, after all, bathroom doors are not really in space, would we know any better how to 
understand this? Or he might have said the following, which is at least a plausible construal of his 
earlier claim: my knowledge of anything is contingent on the behavior of my watch. It does not 
seem like the assumption that his perceptions of his watch are odd, even very odd, can get us 
anywhere; confusing one’s time-keeping device for originary temporality, or for God, or for 
whatever reasonable guarantor of knowledge you like is not an input malfunction. It is a 
confusion on the level of meaning.
 
742
                                                 
740 Eilan, “On Understanding,” p. 108. 
 
741 Ibid., pp. 107-8. 
742 For an example that is more confusing right from the start, we might take R.D. Laing’s patient Julie, so 
long as we do not forget that the following is already somewhat translated and organized by Laing: 
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Since none of these three philosophical options works very well, Eilan then proposes a 
fourth way out, which involves a sort of hybrid taken from the literature. Following John 
Campbell, she understands primary delusional beliefs to be orientations for a whole framework of 
thinking, starting from which one necessarily ends up with a different world than the shared 
one.743
Eilan then complements Campbell’s account by citing Louis Sass (whose work on 
psychosis has been prolific over the past 20 years) to the effect that we can understand 
schizophrenic utterances if we first do our best to think in line with philosophical solipsism (i.e., 
 This would yield a person rather like Don Quixote. In trying to understand such a person, 
then, we can adopt those primary beliefs as restricted hypotheses, on the basis of which we can 
then join the psychotic’s world (via a sort of suspension of disbelief, as one does in joining a 
fictional or virtual world). But since we cannot really reorient our whole framework around them, 
we remain surprised by the way that other claims get worked into the whole. This inability on our 
part to fully step out of the world would account for the surprising twists we encountered in 
Paul’s story. 
                                                                                                                                                 
“[S]he said she had the Tree of Life inside her. The apples of this tree were her breasts. She had ten nipples 
(her fingers). She had ‘all the bones of a brigade of the Highland Light Infantry’. She had everything she 
could think of. Anything she wanted, she had and she had not, immediately, at the one time. Reality did not 
cast its shadow or its light over any wish or fear. Every wish met with instantaneous phantom fulfilment 
and every dread likewise instantaneously came to pass in a phantom way. Thus she could be anyone, 
anywhere, anytime. ‘I'm Rita Hayworth, 
I'm Joan Blondell. I'm a Royal Queen. My royal name is Julianne.’ ‘She's self-sufficient,’ she told me. 
‘She's the self-possessed.’ But this self-possession was double-edged. It had also its dark side. She was a 
girl ‘possessed’ by the phantom of her own being. Her self had no freedom, autonomy, or power in the real 
world. Since she was anyone she cared to mention, she was no one. ‘I’m thousands. I'm an in divide you all 
[sic]. I'm a no un’ (i.e. a nun: a noun: no one single person). Being a nun had very many meanings. One of 
them was contrasted with being a bride. She usually regarded me as her brother and called herself my bride 
or the bride of ‘leally lovely lifely life’. Of course, since life and me were sometimes identical for her, she 
was terrified of Life, or me. Life (me) would mash her to pulp, burn her heart with a red-hot iron, cut off 
her legs, hands, tongue, breasts. Life was conceived in the most violent and fiercely destructive terms 
imaginable. […] Notwithstanding having the Tree of Life inside her, she generally felt that she was the 
Destroyer of Life. It was understandable, therefore, that she was terrified that life would destroy her” 
(Laing, The Divided Self, pp. 221-2). 
743 M.G. Henriksen points out that these are not really beliefs (in the sense of affirmed propositions) but 
assumptions, or action-guiding certainties that are merely implicit in our activities. See Henriksen, “On 
Incomprehensibility in Schizophrenia,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12.1 (2013): 105-129. 
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not by engaging normal empathy), then recognize (perhaps with Wittgenstein) the paradoxes that 
this generates. 
Eilan’s crucial move is to remind us of the affective component involved in one’s world 
crashing down around one: the terror that shows up in some psychotic patients, and is later 
reported by others who had presented flattened affect at the time of their acute suffering. She then 
suggests, tentatively, that we think about Campbell’s and Sass’s accounts in light of the 
tremendous affect somehow involved in what can rightly be called ‘annihilation states.’744 Thus, 
Eilan proposes that we could expand Campbell’s theory to attend to the way that affective charge 
is involved both in making (or maintaining) something at the level of a framework belief and in 
orienting the ways that other beliefs get incorporated into the framework. We could also 
recognize that terror is in part constituted by isolation, which is precisely what existing 
solipsistically in a non-solipsistic universe would involve and (as is clear from testimony) 
psychosis does involve.745
These suggestions seem very promising, and I will return to them shortly in more detail, 
but I would like to dwell for a moment on Eilan’s reintroduction of the question of affectivity in 
psychosis. Her general concern is that all five of the other proposed models are overly cognitive 
(including those of Sass and Campbell), which seems to me already an important point. But she 
additionally wants to make use of this observation in pursuit of her original aim, which was to 
‘solve simultaneously for understanding and utter strangeness.’ As she concludes, then, “the 
reason we find normal empathy [with schizophrenic utterances] psychologically impossible is not 
(only) the cognitive distance from everyday beliefs, but, rather, our very deep resistance to 
allowing ourselves to engage fully, [empathically], with the kinds of world- and self-losing 
 
                                                 
744 The term is from George E. Atwood, The Abyss of Madness (New York: Routledge, 2012), passim. 
745 Eilan, “On Understanding,” p. 112. 
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emotions embodied in these states.”746
Eilan freely admits that for this claim to make sense, we would have to supplement it. 
“The nature of such glimpses into the emotional ingredient in schizophrenia [i.e., of the kind of 
understanding at work here] needs an explanation, and I do not have one to hand.”
 In the presence of a psychotic person, we tend to be 
frightened by the other person’s abyss, as if we had a distant sense that such a fall is possible for 
us, as well. It is thus our normal affective investment in (or even as) the structure of the shared 
world that makes for the utter strangeness of psychotic utterances.  
747
The abyss lies on or just beyond the horizon of every person’s world, and there is nothing more 
frightening. Even [physical] death does not hold a terror for us comparable to the one associated 
with the abyss. [… That abyss] is the end of all possible responses and meanings, the erasure of a 
world in which there is anything coherent to respond to, the melting away of anyone to engage in a 
response. It is much more scary than death, and this is proven by the fact that people in fear of 
annihilation – the terror of madness – so often commit suicide rather than continue with it.
 We might 
turn for help to a group of claims that George Atwood makes in his beautiful (and relentlessly 
clinical) recent book, The Abyss of Madness. He, too, refers madness to terror or anxiety, only he 




This terror that lurks at or beyond the horizon of our participation in the shared world, 
then, would in part constitute our affective investment in the holding-together, the structural 
wholeness and order, of the shared world. And the panic that we feel at times when we are 
overwhelmed, when the world threatens to slip away, would not be categorically different from 
that experienced by people suffering from psychosis, people in annihilation states. That, perhaps, 
is why some understanding of psychotic speech is possible – why, as Atwood puts it, someone 
who is “fall[ing] away, limitlessly, from being itself into utter nonbeing,” someone who “has 
                                                 
746 Ibid., p. 113. 
747 Ibid., p. 112. 
748 Atwood, The Abyss, pp. 41-2. 
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fallen out of the world” and may “live in a felt state of non-being,” is somehow nonetheless “not 
for that reason inaccessible to communication.”749
We will shortly discover puzzles aplenty in the nature of both ‘annihilation states’ and 
this problematic ‘communication.’ We will also have to ask whether and in what way it makes 
sense to speak of a psychotic person’s ‘world.’ But let us not fail to notice that, phenomenally 
speaking, we are not maintained in the common world merely by a flight from anxiety or terror, 




 As we saw (chapter 2, 
section I.B), there is a positive holding-oneself- (or being-held) in-the-truth at work here, a 
holding which is likewise affectively tuned, and one which (I contend) has its negative mode in 
the specific shape or tenor of psychotic terror. To put it quite plainly, then, our normal affective 
investment in the world, that fundamental affection or attunement [Grundstimmung], is trust – 
more specifically, what I have called primitive trust. Its destruction, in which one plunges out of 
the world and thus into the terror of annihilation, takes place as some sort of betrayal. 
B) Psychosis Suffered as Betrayal 
“In psychopathology the absence of basic trust can best be studied in infantile schizophrenia, while 
lifelong underlying weakness of such trust is apparent in adult personalities in whom withdrawal into 
schizoid and depressive states is habitual. The re-establishment of a state of trust has been found to be 
the basic requirement for therapy in these cases.”751
 
 
For one sort of confirmation of my thesis, we should listen to the stories of those who 
have survived such states,752
                                                 
749 Ibid., pp. 40, 46, and 59. 
 beginning with Susanna Kaysen. Although she was ‘only’ borderline 
psychotic, she explains that even at that level, “[s]omething had been peeled back, a covering or 
shell that works to protect us. […] And this was the main precondition, that anything might be 
750 Were this the case, authenticity would not give us back the shared world in a new light but some other 
world, solipsistically severed from the upshot of Heidegger’s lengthy discussion of being-in (in the first 
division of Being and Time). Whatever one thinks of his account there, authenticity as solipsism is much 
too simplistic. 
751 Erikson, Childhood and Society, p. 248. 
752 Throughout, unless it confuses the sense excessively, I leave the grammar of first-person accounts 




The susceptibility of all things to radical change is echoed by Wilma Bovink, whose 
schizophrenia is partly rooted in the trauma of abuse. “A psychosis involves a severe distortion of 
meaning. It renders the world unfamiliar, unrecognizable, a threat. […] Nothing can be taken for 
granted.”
 As we saw with ‘Paul,’ a major feature of the abyss is an utter lack of 
trustworthy structure in the world. 
754 Included in the set of things that can no longer be taken for granted, of course, is the 
self. “I distrusted myself because at any moment my disorder could get worse. I had a dark side 
inside myself, a side I didn’t know and didn’t dare to explore.”755
I don’t think that abuse itself is a strong cause for psychosis. It hurts, but it is rather simple. I think 
that the threat and the betrayal that come with it feed psychosis. The betrayal of the family that 
says, ‘you must have asked for it,’ instead of standing up for you. That […] forces the child to 
accept the reality of the adults. […] You are forced to betray yourself. That is what causes the 
twilight zone. What makes you vulnerable for psychosis.
 Once the bottom has fallen out, 
it is never clear how deep the rabbit hole could go. But Bovink, in particular, identifies her 




 In Bovink’s argument, we begin to see the central role that adults play in providing the 
child’s world with minimally coherent structure. (Recall Wittgenstein’s claim about learning how 
to make judgments: “From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.”)757
 Peter Chadwick, a psychologist who fell into paranoid schizophrenia while qualified for 
practice, explains that already in the pre-psychotic stage (in his case, schizotypal personality 
 When the 
child has to play along with the (false) story told about her, in such a way that the very reality or 
importance of the difference between truth and falsity comes into question for her, then a person 
is especially vulnerable: then the shattering of the world into globalized confusion can come at 
any moment. 
                                                 
753 Susanna Kaysen, Girl, Interrupted (New York: Random House, 1993), p. 42. 
754 Wilma Bovink, “From Being a Disorder to Dealing with Life: An Experiential Exploration of the 
Association Between Trauma and Psychosis,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 32.1 (2006): 17-19, p. 17. 
755 Ibid., p. 18. 
756 Ibid. 
757 Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §128. Cited in chapter 1, section III.B. 
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disorder), his judgments about what was probable had become “incredibly skewed by 
betrayal.”758 With the shift into full-blown psychosis, his paranoia became acute. “After all 
betrayal was what I was used to, why should it not be carrying on now? […] I was alone and now 
trusted no one (if indeed my capacity to trust people had ever been very high).”759 He felt 
“transparent, invaded, betrayed,”760 since what he thought of as The Organization swept away all 
privacy and all loyalty in a concerted effort to destroy him. “Sadly[,] normal feelings of trust in 
other people are terribly damaged. One is no longer really quite sure that anything (even a hearse 
going by) is quite what it seems or anyone quite what he or she seems. One is on the lookout for 
deception, practical jokes, lies or misleading information.”761 One of M.L. Hayward’s patients 
agrees, saying quite bluntly that “[t]he problem with schizophrenics is that they can’t trust 
anyone. They can’t put their eggs in one basket.”762
We can find a hint about why mistrust must be so prevalent for people in such situations 
in psychoanalyst Harold Searles’s claim that for someone with paranoid schizophrenia, “his 
suspicion provides his only mode of processing, of sifting out, the data from a world which is as 
bewilderingly complex as the adult world is to a little child.”
 
763
                                                 
758 Peter K. Chadwick, “Peer-Professional First-Person Account: Schizophrenia From the Inside – 
Phenomenology and the Integration of Causes and Meanings,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 33.1 (2007): 166-
173, p. 169. 
 We already know that mistrust 
can be a positive epistemic tool, but when the structure intrinsic to the world falls apart, it turns 
out to be the only tool remaining. (Glancing ahead, we should note that, however helpful 
Searles’s analogy may be in indicating how utterly overwhelming life is for a schizophrenic, the 
759 Ibid. 
760 Chadwick, “Psychotic Consciousness,” International Journal of Social Psychiatry 47.1 (2007): 52-62, p. 
56. 
761 Ibid., p. 58. 
762 Quoted in Laing, The Divided Self, p. 180. 
763 Harold F. Searles, “Sources of Anxiety in Paranoid Schizophrenia,” in Essential Papers, pp. 98-117. 
Quotation from p. 104. 
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situation is precisely not the same as that for a child, whose primary orientation to the excessively 
complex adult world is normally one of trust.764
One of the most vivid witnesses to the role of betrayal in psychosis is the famous Judge 
Schreber, whose published Memoirs of a Nerve Patient Freud wrote about in 1911 (the year 
Schreber died) as if they were a case study. There is some debate about whether Schreber’s 
illness should be classified as paranoia or as paranoid schizophrenia, but Freud at least takes him 
to be straightforwardly paranoid. Over the course of the Memoirs, it emerges that Schreber’s 
principal concern has to do with being forsaken or abandoned.
) 
765 He tells us that “the dread of 
‘being forsaken’ played a major role, so that every night I went to bed in my padded cell I 
doubted whether the door would open again at all in the morning.”766 In the course of his 
delusional elaboration, this dread is eventually referred to a kind of self-defensive plot carried out 
against him by God, whose workings Schreber accordingly describes as unfaithful.767 Similar to 
the patient cited earlier (see the introduction to the present chapter), who gave her dead soul to the 
doctor in an amulet, Schreber tries to understand this betrayal as a soul murder.768
[A] plot was laid against me (perhaps March or April 1894), the purpose of which was to hand me 
over to another human being after my nervous illness had been recognized as, or assumed to be, 
incurable, in such a way that my soul was handed to him, but my body […] was then left to that 
human being for sexual misuse and simply “forsaken,” in other words left to rot. One does not 
 He elaborates 
as follows: 
                                                 
764 See below (section I.F), for discussion of the relation between schizophrenia and childhood. Notice that 
children who find themselves in a basically secure environment have a remarkable ability to simply let 
something too complex pass them by, to take it as unimportant for the time being, although this is in 
tension with their curiosity. 
765 “Always the main idea […] was to ‘forsake’ me, that is to say abandon me [liegen lassen, d.h. 
verlassen]; at the time I am discussing it was thought that this could be achieved by unmanning me and 
allowing my body to be prostituted like that of a female harlot, sometimes also by killing me and later by 
destroying my reason (making me demented).” Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, trs. 
Ida MacAlpine and R.A. Hunter (New York: New York Review of Books, 2000), p. 96. 
766 Ibid., p. 99. 
767 Ibid., p. 205 and fn 97. 




seem to have been quite clear as to what was to happen to such a “forsaken” human being, nor 
whether this actually meant his death.769
 
 
Schreber here displays a confusion over his own death that we should recognize as 
overdetermined. On one hand, he is terrified of being abandoned, left to fall apart (to decompose). 
With this fear of a planned ‘soul murder’ he must cope continually. On the other hand, he is 
already in some way betrayed: his sense of this oscillates between the feeling that he has died 
previously and the feeling that the rest of the world has perished. Thus, Schreber at one point has 
a vague experience of encountering his own obituary in the newspaper, followed by the sense that 
he existed in a new, lesser shape – in which lesser shape he remembers quietly expiring one day. 
And, in contrast, he was for a while convinced that the world would soon end in a great 
catastrophe, before he came to believe that this had already happened during the course of his 
illness. Freud characterizes the situation like this: “He himself was the ‘the only real man left 
alive,’ and the few human shapes that he still saw – the doctor, the attendants, the other patients – 
he explained as being ‘miracled up, cursorily improvised men’.”770
On what is now a third hand – and here the sense of overdetermination grows strong – in 
the quotation above, Schreber admits to being (now) and having been (at the time) ‘unclear’ as to 
whether the planned soul murder that he fears, namely, abandonment, was supposed to involve 
his own death. He, like the patient with the amulet, also seems unclear about whether or not the 
soul murder has already happened. Death itself becomes ambiguous. The voices that speak to him 
tell him of “somebody having committed soul murder” (and indeed latterly of his own 
responsibility for this murder, which he denounces as revisionist history), yet he is convinced that 
 
                                                 
769 Ibid., p. 63. ‘Rot’ translates verwesen, which means to decompose but also (in a philosophical context) 
could mean a distortion of something’s essence (Wesen) or an essential distortion. 
770 Freud, “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides),” SE 12:68. Hereafter, “Schreber.” Regarding the obituary, Schreber adds: “I took this as a 
hint that I could no longer count on any possibility of a return to human society” (Memoirs, 85). Regarding 
the death of his mentally inferior shape, he says, “I can recollect that […] I was lying in bed with the 
distinct feeling that my soul was slowly expiring” (Memoirs, 78). In both instances, he adds the caveat that 
he cannot now decide whether it really happened. 
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someone unsuccessfully tried to murder his soul. He resolves the contradiction by positing a 
successful soul murder sometime in the past involving his family and Flechsig’s.771
It seems to me that it is just this overdetermined flailing about among worldly entities in 
an attempt to describe what has happened that attests to the ontological status of Schreber’s 
transformation. The catastrophic end of the world is not separate from the death of his self that he 
nonetheless survives; this unique event is primarily a matter of being forsaken by a world that 
thereafter shows up as chaotically untrustworthy.
 
772
We can find further evidence that primitive trust is at stake in psychosis by attending to 
the importance of a trusting relation to the therapist for the chance of recovery. Psychoanalyst 
Norman Cameron reports on a woman he calls ‘Grace,’ who was tormented by hallucinations, 
including voices with persistent, identifiable characteristics. Cameron claims that “the slow 
growth during therapy of a new sense of trust made it possible for the patient to dare regress to a 
point where [her] mother appeared as a hallucinated, separate existence outside herself.”
 
773
                                                 
771 Schreber, Memoirs, p. 34. Cf. p. 67, original italics: “All attempts at committing soul murder, at 
unmanning me for purposes contrary to the Order of the World (that is to say for the sexual satisfaction of 
a human being) and later at destruction of my reason, have failed.” 
 That 
is, a certain amount of trust was required in order to gain some mediating distance from her 
mother’s voice. At a later stage in her recovery, Grace began hallucinating her therapist, as well. 
Cameron’s interpretation is that it was helpful for her to be able to put her mother and her 
therapist on equal footing, both outside of herself. He writes: “When my image was hallucinated, 
in a moment of urgent need, it could stand for the first time as an entity on the threshold of the 
patient’s psychic system before entering it – to make use of Grace’s imagery, [my image was] 
772 This ‘showing up’ implies minimal reintegration into the world; I have tried to indicate both sides of the 
limit here by marking the situation as both chaotic and disclosive of the whole as untrustworthy. 
773 Norman Cameron, “Introjection, Reprojection, and Hallucination in the Interaction Between Patient and 
Therapist,” in Essential Papers, pp. 233-255. Quotation from pp. 249-50. 
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like a trusted friend about to be invited in.”774
In a similar vein, the following appeared anonymously in The New York Times, 
introduced as a first-person account of schizophrenia: 
 Grace no longer had to be transparent, invaded, and 
betrayed, as Chadwick had been, because she had found someone she could come to trust. 
Life for most schizophrenics is a nightmare full of fears and doubts about oneself and about 
reality; they have a distorted view of that most profound question of how they relate to the world 
around them. Boundaries become unclear and other people are frightening and not to be trusted. 
Thus, the very thing which could bring relief – closeness to other people – is shunned as 
something horrible and dangerous. For this reason it is absolutely essential to have someone to 
depend on, to draw the schizophrenic out of his jungle of terrors and eventually more into the less 
frightening world of reality. 
One of the hardest issues for me to deal with has been trust. My mind has created so 
many reasons to fear the real world and the people in it that trusting a new person or moving to a 
new level of trust with a familiar person presents a terrifying conflict that must be hammered out 
over and over until I can find a way to overcome my fears or in a few cases give up the battle, 
even if just for the time being. The intensity of this conflict makes it hard to build relationships. 
[…] 
Therapy with schizophrenics can go on for years before a level of trust is built up 




To begin to understand these last two examples, recall my earlier, phenomenological 
typology of different levels of trust (chapter 1). It is due to a failure (or betrayal) of primitive 
trust, that which integrates one into the shared world (what this anonymous author in the Times 
calls ‘reality’), that the particular difficulties with trusting people emerge. Note that the problem 
is not simply a complete inability to trust people, since ‘familiar’ people are still trusted at a 
certain level (even if much less than previously). Rather, there is something going on in the 
background that inhibits but does not completely rule out trusting people – and this something is 
precisely a failure of trust in the world as a whole. That is also why it is possible for a therapist to 
become a bridge, after long years of work, back to gradual trust in the world (i.e., to a rebuilding 
of primitive trust): because the ability to form trusting relationships is impaired but not simply 
                                                 
774 Ibid., p. 251. 
775 “I Feel I am Trapped Inside My Head, Banging Against Its Walls, Trying Desperately to Escape,” The 
New York Times, March 18, 1986. I owe the reference to Peter Buckley, from p. xvi of the editor’s 
introduction to Essential Papers on Psychosis. 
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gone (indicating that the problem is not primarily located at the interpersonal, or even ontic, 
level), and because the transcendental relation of genesis between particular trusts and global 
trusts goes both ways, just like the genetic relations between trusting a person in the full sense 
and relying on a person in some way (see chapter 1, part IV). I can be moved to rely on someone 
because I trust the person as a close friend, but I can also come to trust a person more fully 
through instances of relying on him, even though this is not a calculable process. (Since I can 
decide to rely but cannot simply decide to trust, there is no determinate predicting of how reliable 
someone must show herself to be before I find myself trusting her.) 
All these various witnesses, then, attest to the centrality of the problem of trust for 
psychosis, but they do not yet tell us why it is central. For that, we shall have to say more clearly 
what goes on in the development of a psychosis – what it means for a person to fall out of the 
shared world. 
 
C) Modes of Addressing the Psychotic 
When contemporary psychiatric medicine tries to come to grips with the variety of 
annihilation states, it seeks some bounded disease entity amidst the chaos. This involves 
identifying similarities across cases that seem very different, thus reducing the bewildering 
volume of unconceptualized material through which the practitioner must sort. To this end, 
psychiatric medicine produces lists of symptoms, just as physical medicine does, which it tries 
then to gather or correlate into diagnostic syndromes. Even if this way of generating a common 
language makes a certain amount of sense practically, it will not be of much help philosophically, 
since it purposefully sets aside the lived experience of the particular sufferer. Hence, although we 
will need to begin by locating our own discussion within that common language, I will then offer 
some evaluative remarks indicating the limitations of this medical model, leaving the ground 




Positive symptoms are the most visible signs of psychosis. They include delusions 
(beliefs that are in no way open for discussion) and hallucinations (sensory experiences that do 
not correlate with real happenings) of various sorts.
 (Those already familiar with the symptoms of psychosis and willing 
to suspend psychiatry’s categories may wish to proceed directly to section I.D, below.) 
777 Paranoid delusions involve breaches of 
psychic integrity – your thoughts are known to me, or mine to you. Schizophrenic delusions add 
breaches of bodily integrity – pieces of my brain are in your head.778
Negative symptoms mark the failure of assumed cognitive functions. They include alogia 
(not talking much or not responding to questions), affective flattening (a general lack of social 
responsiveness, including facial and gestural expressiveness, verbal inflection, and eye contact), 
 Such delusions may include 
alienation of control: a sense that there is a grand conspiracy against me, an automatism of 
movement, speech, or thought, or even the inability to distinguish between oneself and others 
(called ‘transitivism’). The most common kind of hallucinations are auditory-verbal: hearing 
voices or running commentary, even voices arguing with one another, independently of one’s 
own input; hearing one’s thoughts as if spoken aloud; experiencing one’s thoughts as broadcasted 
to others. Hallucinations can, of course, affect any of the five senses. 
                                                 
776 The terms in the three-part schema are very common in the literature, but they have been conveniently 
gathered in Louis A. Sass and Josef Parnas, “Schizophrenia, Consciousness, and the Self,” Schizophrenia 
Bulletin 29.3 (2003): 427-444; see also Louis A. Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self-Experience, and the So-Called 
‘Negative Symptoms’,” in Exploring the Self, pp. 149-182. 
777 Including hypochondria (or somatic paranoia: an intense focus on the body and fear that it is breaking 
down), conjugal paranoia (or paranoid jealousy: absolute conviction that my significant other is cheating), 
erotomania (conviction that another person, often someone who does not even know me, is deeply in love 
with me), persecutory paranoia (someone – or everyone – is out to get me), megalomania (or grandiose 
paranoia: I am the spouse of God, or I am God, or the fate of the universe depends on my actions), and 
shared psychotic disorder (or folie a deux: a delusion shared between two people who are very close). More 
specific varieties of delusions include the Capgras delusion (that people close to me have been replaced by 
impostors) and its inverse, the Fregoli delusion (that my persecutors have disguised their faces to resemble 
people familiar to me), the Cotard delusion (that I am dead, rotting, lacking all internal organs or a brain, 
etc.), and several others without proper names, including the delusion that others are exact replicas of me, 
impostors (subjective doubles). Cf. Alistair Munro, Delusional Disorder: Paranoia and Related Illnesses 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
778 Cf. Johan Cullberg, The Psychoses, p. 32. 
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avolition or apathy (a lack or slowing of spontaneous activity, surprisingly poor grooming, or a 
lack of initiative and persistence in goal-directed activity), anhedonia (a lack of energy or 
motivation for work, recreation, socializing, and sex, or an inability to feel intimacy), and 
asociality (general inattentiveness to the social and practical world). 
Finally, disorganization symptoms deal with thought, speech, and attention. They include 
inabilities to focus, speech that runs off the rails, incoherence, and a kind of pressure to speak. In 
mania, one finds a racing of thoughts and an inability to stay with particular objects; in 
schizophrenia, the difficulty is with sticking to one frame of reference or perspective. Similarly, 
schizophrenic speech involves confusion about what is public and what is private – which things 
count as already understood (shared) background and which things need to be provided as 
context.779
A young nurse had said too loudly, “That kid looks through me as if I’m not here at all.” Trying to 
give comfort, Deborah [the teenaged patient in question] had later whispered to the nurse, “Wrong 
not.” She was saying that it was not the pretty nurse who was not there but the ugly patient.




The nurse, however, fails to understand, in part because of a lack of shared context. 
These three general kinds of symptoms may be combined in any given psychotic person, 
and may show up singly in various non-psychotic situations. For completeness, we would also 
have to add mood extremes – the depths of depression (melancholia) and the heights of mania – 
to the list. 
As has already become clear, there are then various syndromes into which this variety of 
symptom-types have been gathered. Considered from this perspective, in what follows I will be 
interested in just four syndromes: schizophrenia (including its pre-psychotic variants: schizotypal 
                                                 
779 One study found that diagnoses of thought-disorder in schizophrenia are strongly correlated with high 
degrees of implicit reference in the patient’s speech. ‘Implicit reference’ assumes that the context is 
sufficiently public that one’s interlocutor will understand. See S.R. Rochester and J.R. Martin, Crazy Talk: 
A Study of the Discourse of Schizophrenic Speakers (New York: Plenum Press, 1979), summarized (pp. 
171-174) in R.W. Rieber and Harold Vetter, “The Problem of Language and Thought in Schizophrenia: A 
Review,” Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 23.2 (1994): 149-195. 
780Green, I Never Promised, p. 116. 
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and schizoid personality disorders),781 paranoia (or delusional disorder, along with its pre-
psychotic variant: paranoid personality disorder), mood disorder (the depressive spectrum, 
including bipolar disorder and major depression/melancholia), and reactive psychosis (arising 
from evident trauma, like Ophelia in the example from Shakespeare). I am restricting 
consideration to the ‘functional’ (or ‘endogenous’) psychoses.782 The first two syndromes may be 
combined (in paranoid schizophrenia), as may the second and third (in schizoaffective disorder). 
Mood disorders usually do not reach the level of psychosis, and some reactive psychoses are quite 
brief, lasting for less than a month with full recovery.783
Although these lists provide some orientation to what is meant by psychosis, they also 
begin to emphasize just how badly a more structural account is needed if we are to understand 
what is given in the phenomena. Psychiatric medicine, after all, focuses on managing symptoms 
by modifying the body’s neurochemical interactions. This is accomplished via trial and error 
adjustment of the same 8-12 medications, more or less regardless of the diagnosis. For such a 
practice, a rough definition of functional psychosis as ‘anything involving delusions or 
hallucinations that is not due to brain damage or drug use’ suffices. As an example of the mode of 
differential diagnosis involved, take the DSM-5 criteria for schizophrenia: 
  
Two (or more) of the following, each present for a significant portion of time during a 1-month 
period (or less if successfully treated). At least one of these must be (1), (2), or (3): 1) Delusions. 
2) Hallucinations. 3) Disorganized speech […]. 4) Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior. 5) 
Negative symptoms […].784
                                                 
781 Schizotypal individuals are more eccentric in their behavior, thoughts, and perceptions than schizoid 
individuals. I will treat schizophreniform disorder, which is basically a short-course (1-6 month) 
schizophrenia with unusually good social integration, as a combination of schizophrenia and schizoid 
personality disorder. See “Schizophreniform Disorder,” “Schizoid Personality Disorder,” and “Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder,” in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th edition (Arlington, 
VA: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), online at dsm.psychiatryonline.org. Hereafter: DSM-5. 
 
782 Arguments from the side of neurochemistry that all psychic problems are caused by brain problems 
notwithstanding, there remain noticeable differences between psychosis arising from traumatic brain injury 
or dementia and psychosis arising endogenously, even if we take the latter to mean no more than ‘caused 
by neurochemical imbalances.’ As a matter of interpretive access, certainly, the distinction makes a 
tremendous difference, but there are also obvious differences in psychiatric medical treatment. 
783 DSM-5, “Diagnostic Criteria” for Brief Psychotic Disorder. 




Additionally: there must be social or occupational dysfunction (“markedly below the level 
achieved prior to the onset”); the duration must be at least six months; mood disorders, substance 
use, general medical conditions, and pervasive developmental disorders (like autism) must be 
ruled out.785
This way of looking at things seems largely uninterested in why a person with a 
particular life-history has a delusion with particular features. At most, one wants a category of 




We have already emphasized the affective dimension of psychosis (section I.A) – 
namely, that it is marked by terror or anxiety. Since this will become important for my claim, 
against Heidegger, that in psychosis anxiety stretches on endlessly, beyond all possibly disclosive 
bounds (chapter 7, part I), a few reservations about the consistency of these diagnostic criteria are 
in order. 
 
First, we may follow Sass and Josef Parnas in noting that the difference between positive 
and negative symptoms, although meaningful on its face, is not especially sound. Positive 
symptoms do indeed involve the presence of something normally absent, but they also involve the 
absence of something normally present: “the sense of ownership or intentional control.”787 
Likewise, negative symptoms may seem to be simply deficits, but appearances may be deceiving. 
“Asociality [for example] is often accompanied by the presence of strange or socially 
inappropriate, self-directed behavior.”788
                                                 
785 Ibid. 
 Moreover, as Kaysen points out, although madness may 
be experienced as velocity (radical speeding up of thoughts and experience) or viscosity (radical 
786 The DSM-5 provides such a distinction: “Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible 
and not understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experiences” (in “Key 
Features” for Psychotic Disorders). 




slowing down of the world, vanishing of time), both can be manifest to the outside observer in 
roughly the same way: as lack of movement or engagement, the extreme of which is called 
catatonia. This ‘lack’, however, which seems from the outside like completely flat affect, may be 
the stillness of fascination (velocity, an excess of stimulation) or the stillness of utter 
disinclination (viscosity, closer to a genuine complete lack of stimulation).789
Bovink, for example, reports that for her, “the world, including myself, began to move in 
slow motion. […] The strange thing is that time did not exist for me in that situation. Time was 
also in thick water. It is a kind of vacuum, no-man’s-land.”
 
790 As an example of velocity, by 
contrast, we may cite an anonymous general practitioner, author of a first-person account of 
bipolar disorder, who explains that although sometimes in a manic state she is “sociable, 
talkative, and fun, focused at times, distracted at others,” in other periods of mania, her “thoughts 
speed up and I can lie in bed for hours at a time watching pictures on the inner sides of my 
eyelids. Sometimes words are present and I read them as if engrossed in a good novel. […] They 
are a fascinating blur of words and pictures, snatches of poetry and music.”791
We should recognize, second, that what is observed as avolition or disinterest can have 
many origins. One patient claims, “The professionals call it apathy and lack of motivation. But 
they don’t understand that giving up is a highly motivated and highly goal-directed behavior. [… 




                                                 
789 Kaysen, Girl, Interrupted, pp. 75-78. The terms ‘velocity’ and ‘viscosity’ are Kaysen’s. Cf. I Never 
Promised You a Rose Garden, in which Deborah Blau has far too much stimulation going on and yet 
presents her face as a stiff mask to everyone around her. She herself is still able to be surprised by another 
patient, Sylvia, who usually seems catatonic but reveals, in brief moments of communication, that she is 
somehow registering perceptual details even in the midst of her catatonia. 
 And it is worth noting that people in annihilation states, for whom self, 
others, and world are all highly problematic, are unlikely to make communication of the 
790 Bovink, “From Being a Disorder,” p. 17. 
791 Anonymous, “On Madness: A Personal Account of Rapid Cycling Bipolar Disorder,” British Journal of 
General Practitioners 56(530): 726-728. 
792 Quoted p. 334 in Paul Lysaker and John Lysaker, “Schizophrenia and Alterations in Self-Experience: A 
Comparison of 6 Perspectives,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 36.2 (2010):331-340. 
313 
 
distrusted self to distrusted others a high priority. A schizophrenic patient interviewed by 
Matthew Broome in 2008 reports that although he felt emotion, he could not communicate it 
because he was so cut off from other people, even if they were his family and sitting right beside 
him. “I felt sad but I didn’t feel like I could express to [his mother] how sad I felt about it. … 
There was sort of a mental block, I couldn’t really interact. I had so much stuff going on in my 
head – so much fear and paranoia – that I couldn’t talk and I couldn’t show people how I felt 
about them.”793
It should be clear by now that even if the psychiatric medical model were logically 
consistent and appropriately fit the experiential data, we would want a philosophical account of a 
different kind. But since it does not seem to accomplish even those goals, after acknowledging its 
usefulness as a starting-point and generator of common language, we have every reason to turn 
elsewhere. And there are many other places to turn. 
 According to these patients, for one reason or another, what presents clinically as 
a lack does not necessarily indicate a genuine void but could, for example, indicate quite the 
opposite: too much is going on for the person to be able to select out something determinate and 
communicate it or visibly respond to it. 
Psychoanalytic practice, for example, addresses itself to the delusional content of a 
particular person, in light of that person’s own psychic history. It is still looking for a more or less 
causal explanation, but it does so via interpretation: seeking another context or set of motivations 
in which these specific delusions would make sense. Although Freud himself thought that 
analysis of psychotics was impossible, due to their inability to form trusting, affective (i.e., 
transference) relationships with the analyst and their resultant refusal to speak in accord with the 
                                                 
793 Quoted, with elision, on p. 372 of Matthew Ratcliffe and Matthew Broome, “Existential 
Phenomenology, Psychiatric Illness, and the Death of Possibilities,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Existentialism, ed. S. Crowell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 361-382. 
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fundamental rule, abundant experience since then has shown that such analyses are possible, if 
difficult, and can sometimes be very helpful.794
Phenomenological psychiatry, at a slightly more general level than the individual’s own 
psychic history but still in contact with reports of individual experience, begins by trying to 
describe the individual patient’s world and ends by describing a world in which the kinds of 
experiences typically encountered within a diagnostic category would make sense. Thus, the 
phenomenologist sets herself to imagining or describing the altered experiential structure of the 
world in which a given sort of delusion arises. Sass’s proposal for understanding the psychotic 
world by thinking solipsistically and attending to the paradoxes thereby generated is an important 
example of this approach.
 
795
Finally, philosophy and psychoanalytic metapsychology try to account for the structural 
modifications of subjectivity that are at work in psychosis as such, or at least in its major 
varieties, and to say what this entails for philosophical anthropology – or, in the present study, for 
the relation between thinking and being. 
 
 
D) Regression as Withdrawal from Common Sense 
We can glimpse why psychosis gives rise to such a plethora of approaches796
                                                 
794 Cf., inter alia, Herbert Rosenfeld’s 1969 survey of the history of psychoanalytic approaches to 
psychosis, “On the Treatment of Psychotic States by Psychoanalysis,” in Essential Papers on Psychosis, 
pp. 147-176; Silvano Arieti’s psychoanalytic textbook, Interpretation of Schizophrenia, Revised and 
Expanded (New York: Basic Books, 1974); and any number of publications in the Lacanian tradition. The 
principal technical debates have to do with whether (and how) to interpret the transference. 
 if we 
recognize one of its central confusing features: as a splitting or shattering of the self in relation to 
795 See especially Louis A. Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic 
Mind (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). By a careful reading of Wittgenstein’s work, Sass can 
go really quite far in making sense of what is going on for the schizophrenic. 
796 I have not even mentioned psychosocial rehabilitation, dialogical psychology, or the distinctions within 
phenomenology between existential psychiatry, phenomenological psychiatry, and post-Cartesian 
psychoanalytic contextualism. For an account of most of these, see Lysaker and Lysaker, “Schizophrenia 
and Alterations of Self-Experience.” For an account of contextualism, see Atwood, The Abyss, or Robert 
Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma (New York: Routledge, 2011) and Trauma and Human Existence 
(New York: Routledge, 2007). 
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the world, it confronts us with a series of inconsistencies (or even absurdities) when we try 
faithfully to account for its structure. (Sass refers to a subset of these as the ‘paradoxes of 
delusion.’) To display that structure, I will first give what I propose is the most helpful general 
account of the functional psychoses: as failures of what, following Wolfgang Blankenburg, we 
will call common sense. I will then work out a more specific account, with attention to these 
major inconsistencies, which are inherent to the phenomena. For the latter task, I will take as a 
starting-point certain claims made by Freud. His claims will require interpretation, in the course 
of which I will bring to bear insights from the other fields of inquiry into psychosis. This means 
that I will go as far as possible with phenomenological psychiatry, since it is heavily influenced 
by Heidegger’s philosophy, but eventually I will need to leave it behind in order to get clearer 
about the structure and genesis of psychosis as a phenomenon. Since I take it that psychoanalysis 
is uniquely helpful in talking about and accounting for suffering, and since phenomenological 
psychiatry in some ways is also indebted to Freud’s insights, I shall mainly follow his lead. 
 
1. General Account of Psychosis 
I have suggested that the terror of psychosis is only subsequent to an original failure, one 
which is undergone as a betrayal of trust in the world and which issues in such sheer terror 
because of the global implications of the break. (As we saw Atwood put it earlier, the fall away 
from the world is endless.) I say that the implications of this betrayal are global because it affects 
one’s relation to the self, to others, to the world’s meaningful connections, to language, to 
(propositional) truth and falsity, to time and space, and to one’s own body. What normally 
integrates and maintains these relations has been termed common sense in the philosophical 
tradition,797
                                                 
797 Cf. Aristotle’s koinē aisthēsis, St. Thomas’s sensus communis, Descartes’s bons sens, Kant’s gemeine 
(or gesunde) Menschenverstand and Hannah Arendt’s reflections on this whole tradition in The Life of the 
Mind, vol. 1: Thinking, where she ascribes to the common sense the discrimination of objects’ reality.  
 and Blankenburg is the phenomenological psychiatrist who has best characterized 
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psychosis as a failure of precisely this common sense, or, as he also names it, natural self-
evidence.798
Since our investigation of psychosis is ultimately meant to put into question Heidegger’s 
claim that one cannot cease to be-in-the-world short of physical cessation (see chapter 4, part II, 
and chapter 7, parts I-II), we should make clear that ‘common sense’ is another name for the 
phenomenon of openness that Heidegger interprets as care (Sorge). We can see this by attending 
to three features of Blankenburg’s conception. First, common sense is inherently withdrawn from 
conscious awareness;
 
799 second, it is “a pre-predicative, nameless understanding and 
communicating” (308); third, it is “an original unity of thinking, feeling, and willing [that] is 
primarily related to a shared world [mitweltbezogen]” (307, trans. mod.).800
The first of Blankenburg’s characterizations should remind us of Heidegger’s talk of 
being’s withdrawal, as that which is given only in remaining tacit (chapter 3, section II.B).
 
801
Blankenburg’s second characterization should remind us of Heidegger’s discussion of 
being in the truth as a kind of pre-predicative belonging (chapter 2, section I.B), always already 
shared with others who are being-there along with me – especially when Blankenburg clarifies 
 It 
also explicitly recalls the difficulty with articulating trust that we have already encountered 
(chapter 1). There, we met the challenge by attending to various levels of failure of trust (i.e., 
betrayal); Blankenburg, similarly, claims that in order to research common sense, “it is best to 
start with examining when it fails. In doing so, we enter the realm of psychopathology” (305). 
                                                 
798 Cf. Wolfgang Blankenburg, Der Verlust der Natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit (Stuttgart, Germany: 
Enke, 1971), and Blankenburg, “First Steps Toward a Psychopathology of ‘Common Sense’,” tr. A.L. 
Mishara, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8.4 (December 2001): 303-315. 
799 Blankenburg, “First Steps,” p. 305; further citations parenthetical in the text. 
800 We could add to these a characterization from Parnas and Sass that recalls Heidegger’s discussions of 
affectivity: common sense is a “non-reflexive, automatic attunement to the world.” See Josef Parnas and 
Louis A. Sass, “Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 
8.2-3 (June/September 2001): 101-120, p. 105. 
801 Blankenburg quotes a patient to the effect that “[t]his mysterious ‘something’ [i.e., common sense] 




that “[t]he ‘what’ and the ‘how’ of this knowing are inextricably related” (308). He seems to be 
getting at something like this: common sense involves a kind of everyday and socially necessary 
knowledge (about what is appropriate when, what things are probable or improbable) but also 
involves the very modes of picking up on such things (how to sort the relevant from the 
irrelevant, how to determine levels of shared context). The latter are not so much matters of 
content-knowledge as ways of understanding that first enable content. This should recall the 
analysis we saw Heidegger work out in the Contributions about an originary knowing (Wissen) 
that would be a faith or a believing (Glauben), an unjustifiable but invested holding-oneself-in-
the-truth that enables any higher-level knowledge for which one could give a reasonable account. 
Thus the subject of Blankenburg’s main case study, Anne, says of natural self-evidence, “It is not 
the question of knowledge; it is prior to knowledge.”802
Blankenburg’s third characterization emphasizes the role of common sense in structuring 
our experience. Koinē aisthēsis for Aristotle unifies the various particular senses so that we 
encounter objects in a world, rather than unrelated colors, smells, tastes, etc. We might call it the 
unity of bodily intentionality. Similarly, Blankenburg assigns the unity of mental intentionality – 
thought, affectivity, and volition – to common sense as he understands it. (We may add that the 
Aristotelian version assigns to it perception of time and motion,
 
803
Blankenburg’s account tallies well with Sass’s conception, according to which what fails 
in schizophrenia (at least) is what Edmund Husserl referred to as operative (fungierende) 
 two crucial integrative 
relations that often go wrong in psychosis.) This is why Blankenburg can claim that the life-world 
is the intentional correlate of common sense (306) – meaning that common sense is another name 
for the phenomenon that Heidegger calls being-in-the-world. 
                                                 
802 Quoted in Parnas and Sass, “Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions,” p. 106. 
803 And sensing motion lets us perceive rest, place, shape, magnitude, and even number, according to 
Aristotle. See On the Soul III.1.425a15ff on the perception of motion (and its components or derivatives); 
on the perception of time, cf. On Memory and Recollection 1.451a17. 
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intentionality, that which “constitutes our primary presence to the world.” Even prior to 
perception, it “procures a basic texture or organization, and hence a coherence and familiarity, to 
the field of experience” (105). We could say that it simultaneously structures the world and 
structures the self, precisely by integrating the self into that world. In Heidegger’s terminology, 
this is the event (Ereignis) of originary temporality, which constitutes a sphere of ownness 
(Eigentum): that is, it discloses the world to me as more or less coherent, and it does so not only 
cognitively but affectively. I encounter the world as coherent, as mine, only insofar as it matters 
to me. Thus, the world is disclosed as coherent in virtue of my being disclosed to myself as 
invested in that world – which is always also a world that resists or disowns (enteignet) me. This 
is what we have so far designated ‘primitive trust.’ 
We can see more clearly what Blankenburg means if we consider his particular accounts 
of schizophrenia and of bipolar psychosis. Both involve what could be called failures of common 
sense – the dissolution of being-in-the-world – albeit in different ways. In schizophrenia, 
common sense is straightforwardly lost, or even abdicated. In psychotic depression, by contrast, 
the person is often too strictly attached to the dictates of common sense (before falling ill), while 
the illness itself involves “an enveloping loss of affective relationships to [the] world” (305). In 
psychotic mania, there is a different kind of misrelation to common sense: the latter “enables an 
astonishing accuracy in [a manic person’s] ability to provoke, even hurt those around them” 
(305). 
Blankenburg’s work focuses mostly on schizophrenia, which involves the withering of a 
sense of tact or of the feeling for the proper thing to do in the situation, along with a general 
indifference to what might be disturbing to others (305). (Psychotic mania, by contrast, involves 
retaining this sense of tact but disregarding it.) The sense for nearness and distance, i.e., for 
relevance in general as well as pertinence to oneself; the sense of proportion; the sense of what 
can be taken for granted or understood as a matter of course – all can be lost in schizophrenia, 
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leaving an inability to play along with the unstated rules of social behavior. (Recall that psychotic 
speech typically involves an excess of implicit reference, which is just the other side of confusion 
about the assumed, shared context.) Judgment is fundamentally impaired in distinguishing 
between the probable and improbable, and while logic and abstract thinking are often quite good 
– since these are like games whose rules are made explicit – Blankenburg claims that the 
schizophrenic has great difficulty adhering to the boundaries of a topic because the ordinary 
judgment of relevance is impaired (306-7). 
According to Blankenburg, Anne complains, “Every child knows these things! It is the 
kind of thing you just get naturally” (308), although she does not know them. He gives the 
example of her attempt to choose a dress for a given occasion: 
This becomes a tortured asking herself which material the dress should have. She tries to make 
clear to herself up to the smallest detail why it should be precisely this color and this material for 
this occasion. It is quite easy to see how this becomes an endless undertaking. After all, the 
particular qualities that one finds pleasing in the material of a dress are, in part, complexly 
determined by processes of social judgment. We should not suppose that it is possible to 
completely analyze – i.e., without remainder – these processes into their component parts (309). 
 
It is as if there were an inability to invest in the kind of background assumptions that 
guide everyone else, except that we would have to understand ‘inability to invest’ as an 
experience of oneself as not given over (i.e., of distrust). It is not that Anne’s assumptions are 
wrong. She is not simply disoriented; rather, she does not find herself within a minimally 
coherent, shared world, unless she actively forces coherence upon it. Hence, these deficiencies in 
the background for everyday living give rise to attempts at recovery that oscillate between 
stereotyped use of maxims and retreat into non-interaction (autism).804
                                                 
804 Blankenburg credits Kant with already having seen this in the Anthropology: “The only universal 
characteristic of madness [Verrücktheit] is the loss of common sense (sensus communis) and its 
replacement with logical private sense (sensus privatus).” Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic 
Point of View, ed. R.B. Louden (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 113. 
 As an extreme case of the 
former strategy, take an example from Michael Schwartz, who tells us of a gentleman 
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hospitalized many times over a stretch of ten years with paranoid delusions, but now free of 
hospitals for twenty years, completely without medication. 
He does nothing but listen to radio commentators; he refers to them as “professionals of speech.” 
From their broadcasts he writes his own “principles” on little scraps of paper. Gradually he 
became more stable “by following the principles.” He introduces himself as a “philosopher” and 
always has a small bundle of notes that represent the latest copy of his “principles.” No delusions 
have been noted in his file for over 20 years; at most there are brief periods of anxiety that bring 
him to the outpatient mental health service when “a new idea brings disorder” to his principles. He 
explains, “My principles allow me to effect a rational reconstitution of my biography after the 
event.” He is now capable of a stable mode of daily living – his routines and behaviors are best 
characterized as idiosyncratic rather than as negligent. When his mother went to hospital, S.A. 
proved perfectly capable of living alone and had some contact with neighbors.805
 
 
Certainly, the very fact that this gentleman manages to live literally from a set of maxims 
testifies to his loss of common sense, but the content of his principles also supports 
Blankenburg’s theory. They are divided into three sections, namely, ‘natural method,’ 
‘psychology,’ and ‘corporal ergonomics,’ of which the last is necessary because he has to think in 
a rule-governed way about how to move. The first principle of his psychology is that “for others 
life is simple”; another is, “the schizophrenic has lost sovereignty over himself; he is obliged by 
his illness to hang on to simple principles.”806
Examples of the other strategy, autistic retreat, are numerous, but one that has been 
explored at some length and is intriguing because it involves what seem like interactions was 
already cited from Minkowski (section I.A): ‘Paul,’ the 17-year-old who is indifferently curious 
about everything, not only taking hours for every bathroom trip but avoiding all real interaction 
by asking endless (often unanswerable, certainly publicly irrelevant) questions about whatever 
object happens to present itself. 
 
                                                 
805 Michael Schwartz, Osborne Wiggins, Jean Naudin, and Manfred Spitzer, “Rebuilding Reality: A 
Phenomenology of Aspects of Chronic Schizophrenia,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 
(2005): 91-115, p. 105, italics removed. 
806 Ibid., pp. 105-6. 
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2. Specific Account of Psychosis 
I will have much more to say a bit later (section I.E) concerning these symptom-
producing attempts at recovery, but let me now introduce some reflections from Freud, as an aid 
to developing a more specific account of psychosis. If it can be generally characterized as the 
failure of common sense, what is involved in that failure? How does it come about? As a way in, 
we might notice from the previous three examples that, despite all appearances, the bizarre-
sounding assertions made by sufferers from schizophrenia (at least) are not simply due to lack of 
reflection on their part. Indeed, one could almost say there is a good deal too much reflection – 
but reflection misused or misplaced, along with an (often panic-producing) inability to bring 
reflection to rest through reinsertion into the shared world of what is already understood. Recall 
that I characterized this earlier (chapter 1, section III.C) as the snowball effect of distrust, if that 
distrust is not constrained by primitive trust. 
It is this excessive reflection, and specifically self-reflection – one could almost say, a 
fixation on the self – that leads Freud to talk about regression in psychosis and brings 
phenomenological psychiatry to highlight self-disorder as central to schizophrenia. It will be 
helpful to think of the failure of common sense as a radical withdrawal from what is normally 
lived-through or inhabited, what mediates our relation to the world; the theoretical difficulty is 
then to specify the sense of this withdrawal.807
Regression for Freud may be understood as a motivated retreat and retrenchment under 
the pressure of conflict (i.e., of frustration, Versagung). It is, in other words, a defensive measure 
taken against something overwhelming. He distinguishes three types of such withdrawal.
 
808
                                                 
807 In what follows, I elide important distinctions in just what is withdrawn – especially the distinction 
between ego drives (‘interest’) and sexual drives (‘libido’) – but I take them up in some detail in chapter 6, 
section I.C ff. Sass puts the ‘defensive regression’ interpretation into question in Paradoxes (pp. 12, 44, 
113-17, and 129). 
 There 
808 See Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE 5:548, and J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, “Regression,” 
in The Language of Psychoanalysis, tr. Donald Nicholson-Smith (London: The Hogarth Press, 1973). 
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is topographical regression, which is a retrograde change of register between intrapsychic 
systems that would normally proceed from perception to responsive motion. For example, the 
regression in dreams takes an idea (understood as a linguistically formed thought) and turns it 
“back into the sensory image from which it originally derived.”809
There is also temporal regression, in which a person returns to previous phases of 
development or of satisfaction. This may pertain to the organization of desire in different libidinal 
stages (i.e., what activity one desires to do) or object relationships (i.e., with whom or with what 
one wants to perform that activity), or it may involve earlier identifications with other people or 
patterns of affect. One might see a non-psychotic version of this kind of regression in, for 
example, an adult who feels the acute, a-rational need to be physically held and comforted when 
confronted with a situation that he would normally be quite capable of handling; or, again, in 
someone engaged in a desperate search for affirmation concerning an activity about which she 
would normally have no fear. 
 Thus, topographical regression 
usually involves a move from the linguistic order to the order of images, from what is 
preconscious to what is unconscious. That is to say: the movement begins in an ordinary 
engagement with the realm of the implicit (in dreams, this is the collection of thoughts I have had 
during the day, along with their near associations). These implicit thoughts can be brought to 
thematic consciousness (if one lays awake, for example), but they work primarily by providing 
the structured background or context for our attention. The movement terminates, then, by 
enmeshing me in the realm of nonverbal memory, perception, and (involuntary) imagination. 
When I am awake, these functions are normally mediated by differential investments in the 
preconscious, which then disallows some of them from entering into consciousness, lest they 
become overwhelming.  
                                                 
809 SE 5:543. 
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Thirdly, there is formal regression, which involves a return from differentiated psychic 
structures (i.e., later developmental achievements) to archaic modes of thought, especially when 
one moves from an emphasis on identity of meaning to a focus on perceptual identity. This 
includes the fight-or-flight response (to the extent that it takes over and suspends rational 
deliberation), but it can also manifest in, for example, the free association involved in creativity, 
or an unusual concern about the omnipotence of thought. (Think of an otherwise mentally mature 
adult who categorically refuses even to think about his mother’s cancer, for fear that he will 
thereby make it spread.) 
 These three types of regression are meaningfully bound together but need not all occur in 
any given regression, either at all or to the same extent. Indeed, one can have a temporal 
regression with regard to libidinal objects (e.g., a concentration of one’s desire on one’s primary 
caretakers) without switching libidinal stages at all, as Freud claims happens in hysteria.810
 Now Freud is principally interested in the psychoses (or the narcissistic neuroses, as he 
calls them at some points) insofar as they reveal things about the self 
 
811 – specifically, about the I 
(the ego), which for Freud is early on invested as a love-object and hence always bears a certain 
amount of idealization.812
                                                 
810 Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 16:343.  
 And the psychoses are particularly suited to give us information about 
this because the break with the world that they involve is, according to Freud, precisely a 
withdrawal of one’s worldly psychic investments back into the body, i.e., a regression. The 
energy one had previously invested in other people and the world as a whole then has to go 
somewhere, and it is invested in the self. But investing the self (and particularly the unified body) 
811 SE 16: Lecture 26. 
812 For more on the development of the ego, see chapter 6, section II.A. 
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as an object was a very early psychic accomplishment.813 The withdrawal of worldly investments 
is thus a temporal regression to (at least) what Freud calls primary narcissism.814
 We have already looked at that from which psychotic regression withdraws: common 
sense, as Blankenburg has understood it. Now we must get clear about the destination, as it were, 
of the temporal regression: the place of retrenchment. In general, for Freud, this is known as a 
fixation-point, an especially intense investment of drive energy that has been superseded but not 
simply abandoned. We have already suggested that psychotics’ excessive self-reflection seems to 
constitute some sort of fixation on the self. To understand specifically psychotic regressions, we 
shall follow Paul Moyaert in distinguishing two different senses of narcissism. 
 
 
a) Prodromal Hypochondria 
There is a broad sense of narcissism in which the body (as source of the drives) just is the 
place where the tension of the drives is concentrated when they are withdrawn from interactions 
with other objects. We may think of this as a kind of forced interest in the self, or what Sass calls 
‘hyperreflexivity.’ It is the excess of self-reflection mentioned above, and it shows up in 
something called hypochondria. As Moyaert explains, in hypochondria “[b]odily sensations 
emerge in the foreground through the fact that the libido has been cut off from objects in the 
external world and has been withdrawn into the self. The horizon of existence is narrowed down 
to an over-sensitivity for corporeal sensations.”815
                                                 
813 Freud describes it as a self-integration carried out by imitating others, who were thus taken as ideal ‘I’s 
– as those who seemed to have gotten themselves together in their coordinated motor functioning. 
 Or, as Sass puts it, the tacit dimension of life 
(the workings of the body through which we interact with the world) becomes both derealized (as 
814 Freud’s language for this is that megalomania results from a “reflexive turning-back” of libido from 
objects to the self (SE 16:415), and that paranoia is “almost invariably accompanied” by such 
hypochondriacal symptoms (“Schreber,” SE 12:56n3). 
815 Paul Moyaert, “Body, Drive, and Affect in Schizophrenia, From the Psychoanalytic Perspective,” tr. Jo 
Köhler, in Psychosis: Phenomenological and Psychoanalytical Approaches, eds. J. Corveleyn and P. 




it is moved out of its familiar context, the implicit realm) and objectified (as it is observed from a 
distance: externalized, reified, and spatialized). Background phenomena no longer withdraw, so 
they can no longer constitute or structure the world.816
 At the level of hypochondria, however, we have not yet reached the clinical situation of 
psychosis. We remain in the prodromal phase (literally, the ‘run-up’ to psychosis).
 Instead, they precisely obtrude themselves 
and command one’s concern. 
817 Most of the 
following phenomena are experienced (and reported) in the ‘as if’ modality (I feel as if…); many 
of them subsequently continue in the psychosis proper, but subject to a loss of the modal 
inflection. Here, according to recent in-depth patient interviews, we can situate the following 
prodromal (schizoid and schizotypal) phenomena:818
In general: There is a nonspecific pressure toward something impending and inevitable 
(a sense that something big or disastrous is coming) or a sense of profound but still 
unspecifiable change (no particular entity has changed). 
 
Self and World: One feels depersonalized, as if one is bereft of the foundations of one’s 
being. Nothing is any longer self-evident; a dominant point of view is lacking. One is not 
immersed or absorbed in the world, which seems derealized. One “witnesses [one’s] own 
sensory processes rather than living them.” With the fragmentation of meaning comes an 
inability to be affected by things or people (indifference). 
Thought: “Mental content becomes quasi-autonomous, bereft of its natural dimension of 
myness.” Thoughts intrude that may bear excessive significance. They are still 
understood to be one’s own, though not experienced as such. Inner speech is no longer a 
medium of thinking but becomes objectified. It acquires quasi-perceptual qualities 
(acoustic or location in space). There is a tendency to obsessively reproduce 
conversations or events that do not even seem important, perhaps to maintain continuity 
of self-awareness. One is bombarded by the pressing-in of chaotic thoughts. 
Corporeality: One encounters one’s body mainly as an object, opening up a “distance 
between corporeality and subjectivity.” There is difficulty in localizing oneself, 
                                                 
816 Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self-Experience,” pp. 158, 171. 
817 The remainder of this subsection is intended to serve as a further introduction to psychopathology for 
those laymen who, like me, require more introduction to the realm of psychotic phenomena if they are to be 
convinced by the argument. Those already suitably familiar may wish to move ahead to section (b), on 
narcissism. 
818 Integrated from two (not really independent) sources: 1) From Henriksen, “On Incomprehensibility,” pp. 
121, 123-4, who mostly extracted them from J. Parnas, P. Møller, T. Kircher, J. Thalbitzer, L. Jansson, and 
P. Handest, “EASE: Examination of anomalous self-experiences,” Psychopathology 38 (2005): 236–258. 2) 
From Parnas and Sass, “Self, Solipsism, and Schizophrenic Delusions.” All direct quotations are from this 
latter source. Most of the material in (2) reappears in J. Parnas and P. Handest, “Phenomenology of 
Anomalous Self-Experience in Early Schizophrenia” (2003), which was used by Henriksen and presumably 
by the authors of EASE. 
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especially in relation to mirrors. Movements are mechanical. Self-estrangement and self-
detachment take over, including a sense that one’s body somehow does not fit quite right 
– as if it were clothing. This initiates self-monitoring, followed by a loss of bodily 
coherence and a feeling of morphological alteration. Motor or verbal action may occur 
without or despite one’s own intention (but is not yet felt as caused by external forces). 
One is unable to live spontaneously because one must consciously consider how to move 
one’s body, even in everyday motions. 
Self-demarcation: One finds an inner emptiness or lack of identity, along with an 
inadequacy of the body-ego as a separating boundary. This produces social anxiety 
centered on immediate confusion of oneself with others (i.e., ‘transitivism’) and a sense 
of complete exposure to others. 
Solipsism: One is preoccupied with metaphysical or supernatural themes in order to 
explain the sense that everything pertains to oneself, accompanied by feelings of 
centrality and solipsistic grandiosity. 
 
One reason for pausing over this prodromal phase is that it gives us clues about the 
underlying vulnerability in psychosis. If it can be recognized before the elaboration of a full-
blown psychotic system, one is afforded greater insight at a time when communication with a 
patient – or from a patient to a therapist – is still quite possible. It seems to be a time of 
questioning, seeking to discover whether the world (or some central feature of it) has really 
betrayed me. 
Let me note that this phase has its phenomenal parallel in the time between beginning to 
suspect that a person has broken my trust in a particularly important way and the never-quite-
predictable dawning of the full force of the betrayal. The latter moment marks a decision (made 
somehow affectively, not directly by volition) as to whether I will still trust the person despite the 
particular betrayal. But in between, I still want to cover (to myself) for the person; I still assume 
that the event is justifiable or that I am mistaken; I preserve a kind of space for the testing of my 
trust. There is a sense that something big is coming, a sense of profound but non-specifiable 
change in our friendship.  
R.D. Laing speaks of this period for schizoid (pre-schizophrenic) individuals in terms of 
ontological insecurity, in which the person “may feel more unreal than real; in a literal sense, 
more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of the world, so that his identity 
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and autonomy are always in question.”819 Such a person must spend his time contriving ways to 
be real (which may include inflicting suffering on himself or others so as to be evidently a ‘real’ 
cause), to keep himself and others alive (including protecting them from what he fears as his own 
magical destructiveness), and to preserve his identity.820
Laing’s argument is that these defensive strategies cohere in a fundamental experience of 
the being of the self as under attack from the demands of the world and of others. They are 
structured by the ultimately self-defeating attempt to preserve an inner (abstract) ‘true’ self over 
against a bodily, false self that complies with social norms and the expectations of others. This 
attempt at withdrawal to a place of safety is self-defeating because it only makes the self feel less 
real and thus makes reality more threatening. Furthermore, it issues in an experiential oscillation 
between the transcendent, ‘true’ self and the false, compliant self (or selves). 
 
Schizophrenia, according to Laing, can then emerge from this pre-psychotic division 
when these efforts at protective self-alienation reach a crisis that provokes the murder of one side 
or the other.821 At that point, a decision defiantly to express one’s inner, ‘true’ self by dropping 
the external façade means that a secret, decayed, attenuated self abruptly appears to others with a 
kind of shattering force. Alternatively, an attempt to kill off the ‘true’ self, while not necessarily 
suicidal in the strict sense (since the body is already alienated from the inner self), shows up to 
others as a kind of shutting down or ultimate withdrawal from the shared world.822
                                                 
819 Laing, Divided Self, p. 43. 
 This death of 
the self (in one version or another) is what Laing takes to be the basic defense in all psychosis: 
dying so as to avoid either killing or being killed, hence preserving a margin in which one can 
remain alive after this death. 
820 Cf. Ibid., pp. 99 and 156. 
821 “Even the efforts of the self to become separated and non-identified with the body and practically every 
thought, feeling, action, or perception, have failed to free it in the long run from being subject to anxiety; it 
is left with none of the possible advantages of detachment, and is subject to all the anxiety it originally 
sought to evade.” Laing, Divided Self, p. 161. 
822 Ibid., pp. 158ff. 
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George Atwood corroborates this latter claim by giving a very similar account of (at least 
one) prodrome for bipolar psychosis.823
Descent into depression is, correlatively, a matter of resubordination, the reinstatement of 
a self-annihilating tie to particular others. The self-hatred observed in bipolar depression is thus 
doubly determined: it is like the self-hatred in melancholia (major depression), which arises from 
the systematic rejection of the autonomous self in order to please others, but it is also related to 
the revelation of the suppressed, independent self as an out-of-control manic. Depression is thus a 
matter of sacrificing one’s independence because one’s real self can only be seen as an 
unmanageable monster. 
 He speaks of enmeshment with caregivers, in which the 
autonomous person vanishes under a structure of compliance with others’ expectations. Her 
desire, lacking space to flourish independently, is instead subordinated to that of others, until 
some event or memory triggers a sudden re-emergence of her buried possibilities. The eruption of 
a manic state is, on this account, a transitory liberation from a long enslavement. Of course, it is 
not a mature autonomy that is revealed, for the independent self never found the space to mature; 
as such, mania can be both exhilarating and terrifying for the sufferer. 
We can find support for this way of thinking about the prodrome for mood disorders in 
separate papers by Giovanni Stanghellini and by Michael Schwartz and Osborne Wiggins. Both 
papers recall Blankenburg’s claim, mentioned earlier, that depression and mania are failures of 
common sense by being excessively or rigidly attached to it. These papers interpret 
Blankenburg’s insight in terms of the self as mediated by social roles, which a person both is and 
can shape.824
                                                 
823 See Atwood, The Abyss, pp. 26-8, 33-4, 60, 104, 172-4, and 178. His account is an elaboration on 
Bernard Brandchaft’s. 
 Mood disorders would then arise from overidentification with social roles – i.e., 
with the expectations of others – by contrast especially with the schizotypal person, whose main 
824 Michael O. Schwartz and Osborne P. Wiggins, “Pathological Selves,” in Exploring the Self, pp. 257-
277. See p. 264. 
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concern is to preserve her inner self as pure, separated from the false, compliant self that has to be 
role-identified. 
Stanghellini goes so far as to say that the bipolar type “cannot distance himself from the 
other’s mind”825
 Investigations of the prodromal, hypochondriacal period thus help show what 
recognizably human motivations are at work in bringing about full-blown psychosis. But 
narcissism as hypochondria or hyperreflexivity is only the broader sense of the word. 
 – and when he does, we may add, he swings all the way into mania. As beings 
dependent on our caregivers, we are all attuned initially to the other’s expectations. Depression 
arises from hypercompliance with this attunement, being so thoroughly attuned by it that it alone 
or primarily shapes the experience of the self. Schizophrenia, by contrast, arises on the ground of 




There is also a second, narrower sense of narcissism, in which one’s body (as imagined) 
becomes the object of love, care, or idealization. Here we find a response to or defense against the 
betrayal that has been encountered prodromally, the betrayal in which withdrawal from the world 
took place. This is a reinvestment, but a reinvestment of (a certain image of) the self as central – 
an overvaluation. According to Freud, this is what happens in paranoid psychosis: it is a 
regression to narcissistic investment, a retrenchment at the last successful or reliable object 
investment. The purity of this imaginarily unified I (which Freud calls the pleasure ego) is then 
preserved at all costs, over against the thoroughgoing and constant threats of whatever is ‘bad,’ or 
fragmenting. These threats have been (and must continue to be) expelled from the self, located in 
the external world (as persecutory delusions or hallucinations). Normal ambivalence about the 
                                                 
825 Giovanni Stanghellini, “The Phenomenology of the Social Self: The Schizotype and the Melancholic 
Type,” in Exploring the Self, pp. 279-294. Quotation from p. 290. 
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self is grossly exaggerated here, but in order to handle that inflation, the hatred side of 
ambivalence is simply refused. All doubts and concerns about the self are henceforth rejected 
before they can even be thought, condemned to be encountered only as hallucinatory intrusions 
from the outside.826
 Alternatively, it may be the case, as Moyaert points out, that even the imagined unity of 
the body is overwhelmed, and the regression must move back still further.
 In the retreat to narcissism, even that very outside, the not-me, is modeled on 
the ego as its counterpart. 
827 In schizophrenia, 
the body, too, has betrayed me, insofar as the drives themselves (my own desire) are experienced 
as evil, as only a source of destruction. Since the body of drives cannot be expelled – there is no 
unity prior to it that would be adequate to make a stand – it is in this case a fragmented body that 
is invested, the body of the infant with minimal motor control and unintegrated desire. Moreover, 
here it is not the image but the real body that is at stake in every interaction. This presents us with 
the clinical picture of schizophrenia: temporal regression to autoerotism, a collection of libidinal 
investments in the self that are not yet unified. Thus Moyaert can mark the difference between 
paranoia and schizophrenia in this way: “The schizophrenic is perforated by evil. The paranoiac 
is persecuted by it.”828
 Another way of describing the same experiential phenomena has been worked out by 
Sass, who understands the schizophrenic response to the breakdown of the world to be a 
combination of hyperreflexivity and altered ipseity. In other words, it combines an attempt to 
recover or preserve the self through constant, minute attention to what are no longer implicit 
processes – an attempt that is ultimately misplaced because it only further alienates one from the 
 That is to say, the schizophrenic lacks even a unified body by which to 
keep the persecution outside himself. 
                                                 
826 Cf. Freud’s famous conclusion: “what was abolished [das Aufgehobene] internally returns from 
without.” Freud, “Schreber,” SE 12:71. 
827 Moyaert, “Body,” p. 45. 
828 Ibid., p. 53. Cf. Kimura Bin’s account, as summarized by Sass, “Self and World in Schizophrenia: Three 
Classic Approaches,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8.4 (December, 2001): 251-270, p. 265. 
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shared world – with an experience of diminished auto-affection, the derealization and 
objectification of what would normally be “inhabited as a medium of taken-for-granted 
selfhood.”829 Sass accordingly defines schizophrenia as “a self-disorder in which phenomena that 
would normally be inhabited, and in this sense experienced as part of the self, come instead [i.e., 
ipseity alters] to be taken as objects of focal or objectifying awareness [i.e., hyperreflexivity].”830
Schizophrenic experience, on this account, is hypochondria to a psychotic degree. Self-
preservation, at the most physical level, is taken to be entirely up to the individual’s conscious 
effort. There is a breakdown in the autonomic or “preconscious processes that sustain connections 
between embodied feelings, judgments, and a world shared by others.”
 
831 It feels as if one’s very 
temporal continuity (one’s originary temporality) can only be attained by constant thought; 
breathing must be purposefully maintained; in general, the constant need to think is matched only 
by a constant failure to understand. We can get a first glimpse of this via an example from Laing: 
“I must never forget myself for a single minute. I watch the clock and keep busy, or else I won’t 
know who I am.”832
human face flattened out, deflated, as if sucked up by shriveling leeches. And this lubricating 
membrane will go on floating in the air, […] this double membrane of multiple degrees and a 
million little fissures, […] so capable of multiplying, splitting apart, turning inside out with 
glistening little cracks, its dimensions…
 A different example given by Sass, however, shows more clearly that the 
question of reflexivity is not so much a matter of reflective thought as it is a matter of the 




                                                 
829 Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self-Experience,” p. 170. 
830 Ibid., p. 152. 
831 Cf. A.L. Mishara, “Disconnection of External and Internal in the Conscious Experience of 
Schizophrenia,” Philosophica 73 (2004):87-126. Quotation is from a summary of this paper in Lysaker and 
Lysaker, “Schizophrenia and Alterations in Self-Experience,” p. 335. 
832 Quoted in Laing, Divided Self, p. 116. 
833 Quoted in Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self-Experience,” p. 171. 
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According to Sass, then, we can say more than that schizophrenia is frantic hypochondria. 
It is a self-disorder in which Cartesianism is almost literally lived out,834 a strange combination of 
objectivism (altered ipseity) and subjectivism (hyperreflexivity). In a paper comparing the famous 
“Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl” with Heidegger’s account of Cartesianism, Sass shows 
why the psychotic relation to the world would lack relationships between objects as well as those 
between subjects. The internal relations between things in the world are given in part by the 
human context in which they are meaningful, and these structured contexts have been destroyed 
or abandoned in schizophrenia. But human contexts are, of course, oriented by modes of 
interactions between persons (taken here as subjects), so the defensive isolation spoken of by 
Laing finds its psychotic flowering in the general disappearance of genuine human interactions.835
 
 
E) The Meaning of ‘Symptoms’ 
We have now seen that psychosis involves a temporal regression from mature common 
sense back to an infantile fixation-point. But this is only part of the psychotic phenomenon; we 
can think of it as the break with reality. We have yet to address what I take to be Freud’s greatest 
contribution to the understanding of the psychoses. 
The clinical picture of [schizophrenia] (which, incidentally, is very changeable) is not determined 
exclusively by the symptoms arising from the forcing away [Abdrängung] of the libido from 
objects and its accumulation in the ego as narcissistic libido [i.e., from regression]. A large part, 
rather, is played by other phenomena, which are derived from the striving of the libido to attain 
objects once more and which thus correspond to an attempt at restitution [Restitution] or recovery 
[Heilung]. These latter symptoms are indeed the more striking and noisy; they exhibit an 
undeniable resemblance to those of hysteria [i.e., hallucination] or, less frequently, of obsessional 
neurosis [i.e., compulsive doubt], but nevertheless differ from them in every respect.836
 
 
                                                 
834 Cp. the thesis of Sass, “Consciousness Machine,” p. 222. In schizophrenia, my consciousness haunts my 
body like a ghost in a machine – a machine whose parts are easily exchangeable with other items in its 
environment. 
835 Louis A. Sass, “The Truth-Taking-Stare: A Heideggerian Interpretation of a Schizophrenic World,” 
Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21.2 (Fall 1990): 121-149, pp. 132-4. The paper’s title is a play 
on the German term for perceptual rigidity (Wahrnehmungsstarre), which names a frequent symptom of 
schizophrenia. 
836 Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, SE 16:422. See section I.G.1, below, for a discussion of the 
difference between ‘forcing away’ (Abdrängung) and repression (Verdrängung). 
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These ‘more striking and noisy’ symptoms are precisely what psychiatric medicine 
names “positive symptoms” (hallucination and delusion) and “disorganization symptoms.” 
According to Freud, they are in fact repeatedly elaborated attempts to reintegrate oneself into the 
world after psychic death (‘soul murder’); that is to say, they are attempts at recovery, in some 
measure of conflict with the initial, overwhelmed regression. Restitution in paranoia takes the 
form of projection, by which it seems we have to mean something like expulsion from the ego of 
all that is bad, false, or even uncertain.837 Restitution in schizophrenia, by contrast, which 
involves a further regression, is accomplished through hallucination.838
 By taking psychotic symptoms as restitutive, Freud both warns against mistaking the 
symptoms for the disease and maintains his general insight that symptoms are compromises in the 
midst of a conflict.
 
839
If correct, this account shifts the question of what has gone wrong in psychosis back onto 
the prodromal phase, or at least highlights the (unseen) transition between prodrome and full-
blown psychosis. Once a person presents with delusional formations or hallucinations, these are 
already responses to the end of the world. Focusing on the prodrome, as we did earlier (section 
 In the case of psychosis, there is the withdrawal and retrenchment in the 
face of overwhelming betrayal, but there is also the desire to return to the world; much of the 
mental suffering of the psychotic is thus the violent undergoing of this tension. (Hence, for 
example, Schreber’s uncertainty as to whether soul murder had already occurred or still 
threatened to occur.) 
                                                 
837 My gloss here takes into account Lacan’s critique in Seminar 3, which accuses Freud of overhastily 
applying the term ‘projection’ to paranoia and substitutes Freud’s discussion of the pleasure ego’s 
identification with all that is good and foreclosure of all that  is bad, found in the essay “Negation” (SE 19). 
For my reading of the key moves in Freud’s essay, see chapter 6, section II.A. For Lacan’s critique and 
substitution, see Seminar 3, pp. 41-47, 81-86, and 148-51. For Freud’s original argument, see “Schreber,” 
SE 12:66, 71. 
838 For this distinction, see SE 12:77. 
839 “The delusional formation, which we take to be a pathological product [i.e., the disease process itself], is 




I.D.2.a), is a way of getting close to the catastrophe without overshooting it. It reveals, above all, 
the stakes of a person’s bid to rebuild a livable world. 
Already in an early letter to Wilhelm Fliess, Freud included a diagnostic scheme sensitive 
to the observation that “the delusional idea is maintained with the same energy with which 
another, intolerably distressing, idea is warded off from the ego. Thus they love their delusions as 
they love themselves.”840 There is something inadmissible, something that is fled or withdrawn 
from (the ‘idea’ here may be quite complicated or quite simple), and the delusion is a kind of 
remodeled world, intended to maintain (or recover) some connection to reality by substituting for 
it a coherence that would not have to recognize this overwhelming idea.841 That substitute 
coherence attempts a connection with the shared world by making use of the remembered 
investments – loves, hates and stories – even if it has to alter their value in order to avoid what is 
inadmissible.842
As Freud puts it, “everything has become indifferent and irrelevant to him, and has to be 
explained by means of a secondary rationalization […] his subjective world has come to an end 
 If I am right that one becomes a self by integration into a world (usually, the 
shared world), then the delusion is loved (or clung to) ‘as the self’ because it is the propping up of 
the self, what enables a minimal level of self-coherence. 
                                                 
840 Freud, “Draft H,” in The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, ed./tr. J.M. 
Masson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Belknap Press, 1985), p. 111, original italics. 
841 Cf. Freud, “The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis,” SE 19:185, where he characterizes 
psychosis in two ways: as an initial flight from intolerable reality followed by an active phase of 
remodeling (umbauen), and as a disavowal (Verleugnung) of reality that seeks to replace or substitute for 
(ersetzen) it. 
Here we draw quite near to Lacan’s account of foreclosure, in which the rejected ‘idea’ is some 
particular signifier that cannot be accepted by the infantile pleasure ego. Bound by the structure of language 
to all other signifiers, this foreclosed signifier, by going missing, may pull apart all the rest of the world’s 
symbolic structure if that signifier is vigorously demanded at some point in the person’s life. See Lacan, 
Seminar 3, and my summary via de Waelhens (section I.F.1, below). 
842 Freud claims that “the transforming [Umarbeitung] of reality is carried out upon the psychical 
precipitates [or ‘registrations’: Niederschlägen] of former relations to it – that is, upon the memory-traces, 
ideas, and judgments which had been previously won from reality and by which reality had been 
represented [vertreten] in mental life.” SE 19:185, trans. mod. (GW 13:366). 
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since his withdrawal of his love from it.”843 The attempt to rebuild the world is never wholly 
successful, but it can produce something at least minimally livable. “But the human being has 
recaptured a relation, and often a very intense one, to the people and things in the world, even 
though the relation is a hostile one now, where formerly it was hopefully affectionate.”844
 We may see this in the case of Judge Schreber’s extensive delusions. Rosemary Dinnage 
explains, in her introduction to the Memoirs, that Schreber’s “own identity having been invaded, 
fragmented, distorted, and annihilated, a story had to be found that made sense of it. The more 
massive the violations, the more grandiose the explanations.”
 
845
Both aspects are visible in Schreber’s attempts to account for the plot against him: he first 
blames his doctor, Professor Flechsig, but is careful to maintain that the antagonist was a sort of 
spiritual version of Flechsig, not the real, incarnate, conscious one with whom Schreber must 
interact. Later, however, the persecutor’s identity changes (or perhaps gets absolutized) into God 
– albeit a god who is explicitly constructed as Schreber’s double. Thus Lacan can claim that 
Schreber is governed by an “essentially ambivalent relation”: namely, that 
 The weight of this ‘had to be 
found’ can be measured by the strength with which Schreber clings to his story, modifying it 
when absolutely necessary, but more often retreating into metaphysical distinctions. 
                                                 
843 “Schreber,” SE 12:70. 
844 SE 12:71. 
845 Schreber, Memoirs, p. xvii. Dinnage traces this (pp. xvii-xviii): “He was forsaken; so ‘since the dawn of 
the world there can hardly have been a case like mine, in which a human being entered into continual 
contact … with the totality of all souls and with God's omnipotence itself.’ He was shut away and 
forgotten; so ‘since God entered into nerve-contact with me exclusively, I became in a way for God the 
only human being, or simply the human being around whom everything turns.’ Nobody cared if he lived or 
died; so ‘what detailed measures God would have to adopt after my death I feel I can hardly as much as 
speculate on.’ All meaning had left his life; so ‘it is still my conviction that this is the truth – that I had to 
solve one of the most intricate problems ever set for man and that I had to fight a sacred battle for the 
greatest good of mankind.’ He was totally lonely; so crowds of shadowy figures flitted in and out of his 
body (at one time, no less than 240 Benedictine monks, led by a Jesuit Father!). His mind had been 
emptied; so it was taken over by compulsions – ‘the nature of compulsive thinking lies in a human being 
having to think incessantly; in other words, man's natural right to give the nerves of his mind their 
necessary rest ... was from the beginning denied me by the rays.’ So the emptiness of his cell was filled up 
with tormenting activity.” 
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whatever the painful, weighty, troublesome, unbearable character of these phenomena, 
maintaining his relationship with them constitutes a necessity the rupture of which would have 
been absolutely intolerable to him. When this rupture is realized, that is, whenever he loses contact 




A psychotic person loves his delusion as he loves himself because the minimal coherence of his 
self depends on the delusion as a reconstructed mode of access to the world. This is why 
psychotics seem to non-psychotics both to have a world and not to have one. It is also why a 
psychoanalysis can be helpful, insofar as it attends to a) the person’s particular symptoms, which 
are attempts at recovery, b) within his particular life-history, which can yield clues about the 
conflict and what has forced the regression, c) in the context of an affective relation to the 
therapist, in which the terror can be managed but not denied and personal trust can be rebuilt. 
 
F) Some Inconsistencies 
Following Freud in distinguishing between the moment of rupture (regression) and the 
moment of recuperation (psychiatric symptoms) in the phenomenon of psychosis allows us to 
make sense of two central puzzles about that phenomenon. First puzzle: if psychosis involves an 
annihilation state, a falling out of the world (as I am claiming), why is it episodic? This itself is 
really two questions: why, even in long-term schizophrenia, paranoia, or bipolar disorder, does 
one go through acute episodes as well as what could be called stabilizations? And, secondly, how 
can something like brief reactive psychosis (as in Ophelia’s case) make sense? 
To answer the first version of this first puzzle, we can appeal to the typical inadequacy of 
the rebuilding effort. Schwartz and Wiggins follow Freud in pointing out that although the 
overwhelmed person does manage to rebuild some coherent world, through a combination of 
delusion/hallucination and new genuine investments, this neither fully reaches the shared world 
                                                 
846 Lacan, Seminar 3, p. 127. 
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nor eliminates the failed synthetic connections that dissolved the world in the first place.847 This 
means that the person’s connection to the shared world will be both tenuous and somewhat 
misaligned – or, as Parnas and Sass put it, psychotic developments are “progressive organizations 
of novel coherence patterns with various degrees of stability.”848
To respond to the second version of this first puzzle, it will be helpful to think about the 
context-dependence of such a rebuilding project. We have already seen that it is possible, even if 
difficult, for a psychotic to form a trusting relation to a therapist, and that this plays a major role 
in recovery from full-blown schizophrenia or paranoia. In reactive psychosis, by contrast, the 
inciting trauma is fairly clear, opening the possibility of support from those around one. This cuts 
away at the acute loneliness of most psychoses by making one less of a mystery to others. 
Further, it means (in most cases) that one has not followed the developmentally predisposing path 
that I will lay out shortly (I.G.1). What cannot be borne happens more nearly all at once – some 
intense, global betrayal pushes a person’s merely neurotic predispositions beyond all bounds – 
rather than also involving an initial, dramatic weakening of the person’s connection to the shared 
world.
 Subsequent crises, therefore, are 
likely to expel the person from the shared world once more. This vulnerability opens onto an 
oscillation that will mark the lives of most long-term sufferers from psychosis. 
849
                                                 
847 See p. 278 of Osborne P. Wiggins and Michael A. Schwartz, “‘The Delirious Illusion of Being in the 
World’: Toward a Phenomenology of Schizophrenia,” in Founding Psychoanalysis Phenomenologically, 
Phaenomenologica 199, eds. D. Lohmar and J. Brudzinska (New York: Springer, 2012), pp. 269-281. They 
interpret these new investments as ‘passive syntheses,’ i.e., as our fundamental receptivity to an organized 
world. 
 
848 Parnas and Sass, “Self, Solipsism,” p. 117. For a (complex, Lacanian) psychoanalytic account of such 
stabilizations phenomena, see Fabien Grasser’s paper “Stabilizations in Psychosis,” in Ornicar? 85 
(February 1999). 
849 My account retains the Freudian double structure of trauma, in which later experiences become 
traumatic by repeating certain conflicts from earlier in one’s life, by distinguishing between a genuinely 
psychotic predisposing conflict (see section I.G.1, below) and a neurotic predisposing conflict that can be 




Second puzzle: on one hand, after the dissolution of the world, psychotic experience is 
inherently chaotic; on the other hand, in response to this chaos, people suffering from psychosis 
tend to be immediately certain of things that do not seem at all evident to the observer. We may 
put the same puzzle again in a different way by reference to what has been called ‘double 
bookkeeping’: people with psychotic delusions seem to be deeply convinced by them, to organize 
life in terms of them, yet a ‘dead’ person will walk around, a person convinced she is being 
poisoned will eat, and a person whose ‘tongue has fallen out’ will use it to tell you this. In some 
ways, then, people do not seem compelled to act on otherwise firmly held delusions. One more 
version of the difficulty, related but slightly different: unlike the buried fantasy underlying 
neurosis, it seems quite clear what fantasy structure is at work in psychosis – patients report it 
more or less directly in delusional claims and reports of hallucinations. Yet it is much easier to 
find and restore the repressed portion of reality in neurosis than it is to restore an appropriate 
relation to reality in psychosis.  
All three versions of this second puzzle trade on a baffling split between certainty and 
reality. We are back to Eilan’s challenge to solve for both familiarity and utter strangeness (from 
section I.A), now interwoven in confusing ways. The phenomenon at issue is quite simply the 
following: someone who is hallucinating can come to recognize that others do not hear or see 
what she does; even someone who is delusional can act as if she were not. Lacan is worth quoting 
at length here for his forcefulness of presentation: 
Reality is not the issue. The subject admits, by means of all the verbally expressed explanatory 
detours at his disposal, that these phenomena are of another order than the real. He is well aware 
that their reality is uncertain. He even admits their unreality up to a certain point. But, contrary to 
the normal subject for whom reality is always in the right place, [the psychotic] is certain of 
something, which is that what is at issue – ranging from hallucination to interpretation – regards 
him. / Reality isn't at issue for him, certainty is. Even when he expresses himself along the lines of 
saying that what he experiences is not of the order of reality, this does not affect his certainty that 
it concerns him. The certainty is radical.850
 
 
                                                 
850 Lacan, Seminar 3, p. 75. 
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 It seems to me that we can find something like a key to this puzzle in Lacan’s last 
sentence. When someone in the grip of psychosis tries to rebuild an inhabitable world, the 
problem motivating this construction effort is precisely the radical uncertainty of everything. 
Anything could be different at any time. So, the first criterion for the world’s new structure, the 
condition lying at the root, as it was for Descartes’s philosophy, is certainty. From this 
perspective, of course the real is uncertain (which is also how a healthy person understands it: the 
real is what allows for me to be wrong, allows me to be at a distance from it without it 
disappearing) – for the person in an annihilation state, the uncertainty of reality is so radical that 
the difference seems uncrossable. That is precisely the problem. The psychotic solution cannot 
simply fix that, so it tries to smooth it over by substituting a world that is structured by certainty. 
 We can see, then, why someone might be quite certain about a delusion and yet not act on 
it. If one lives in a private world that is barely holding together, there is the possibility that action 
may destroy it. Furthermore, at the times when one can distinguish between the real world and 
one’s private world, it may not even make sense to act in the shared world in a way consistent 
with the private world. What good could that do?851
 The difficulty of making sense of the situation is not simply one for the observer; it is felt 
in a way much more acutely by the sufferer. Depending upon the level of elaboration of the 
delusive system, he approaches the limit in which there is nothing that does not fit, that is not in 
some sense him, and yet everything that is so crucially meaningful in the delusion is somehow 
 And if the shared world (reality) is so 
radically uncertain that anything could be different at any time, then most of the time the 
boundaries between one’s private world and reality are not going to be very clear or easy to 
discern, which is likely to make one even more hesitant to act. 
                                                 




empty, void of the living person.852 Thus Schreber is participating in the redemption of all 
mankind, but everyone around him is a fleeting, improvised person. He is on intimate terms with 
God, but God turns out to know only corpses and nothing of living people.853
  The chief way in which the observer or the therapist feels the difficulty is articulated in 
the third version of this second puzzle: although that which takes so much work to locate in 
neurosis is right on the surface in psychosis, neurosis is much easier to cure. Freud says that “in 
schizophrenia a great deal is expressed as being conscious which in the transference neuroses can 
only be shown to be present in the Ucs. by psychoanalysis.”
 
854
I warned you against becoming friendly with me. I told you you’d find out that I am an unbearably 
hostile person. Do you think it pleases me to behave that way? I assure you it does not. Why then 
do you trespass that way by forcing me to let you see what I’d rather not see myself… ?
 This nearness of the unconscious 
to the surface is quite vivid in an excerpt of a patient’s direct speech provided by Frieda Fromm-
Reichmann, an excerpt that sounds just like Freud’s paraphrases of the unconscious motivations 




Here the fantasy world and the resistance to relationship need no digging to discover. But 
this does not help the patient in giving them up. Joining Freud with Lacan, perhaps we could put 
the matter this way: the psychotic is somehow ignorant of the very language he speaks, and this 
puts him and the analyst in the same situation with regard to his speech – to begin with, neither 
knows how to interpret it, but both bear witness to it.856
                                                 
852 Cf. Lacan, Seminar 3, pp. 79-80, emphasis added. 
 Even the partial discovery of how to 
interpret it, however, does not necessarily make any claim on him, any more than reality already 
does. He remains, rather, in the same position as the analyst. But Freud tells us, somewhat 
ruefully, that the analyst’s knowledge cannot directly become effective knowledge for the patient; 
for knowledge to be healing, there must be an affective investment in what is known. This 
853 Schreber, Memoirs, pp. 24, 62, 135, 278. 
854 Freud, “The Unconscious,” SE 14:197. 
855 Quoted in Lysaker and Lysaker, “Schizophrenia and Alterations in Self-Experience,” p. 334. 
856 Lacan, Seminar 3, pp. 11-12. 
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investment is precisely what Freud found he could not bring about in those suffering from 
psychosis. They remained affectively indifferent.857
 
 
G) Schizophrenia as Infantilism? 
“Is the brittle fragility of common sense merely a matter of pure deficiency[,] or does it involve, rather, 
a basic risk or vulnerability which belongs to the very structure of being human?”858
 
 
So far, we have considered psychosis as in part the failure of common sense, which we 
specified as a withdrawal from the shared world in the form of a temporal regression to 
narcissism (or beyond, to autoerotism). We have then recognized in the full phenomenon of 
psychosis a second part, consisting of ‘noisy’ attempts to rebuild the world. But what is the real 
import of this regression? The developmental strand of psychoanalytic theory suggests that it is a 
return to infancy, but some phenomenological reservations about that seem warranted. 
Withdrawal of investments from the world back into the self is quite different from becoming an 
infant once more. Sass, for instance, points out that attempts at restitution, at least for the 
schizophrenic, tend to involve the intensification of abstractions that would be impossible for 
even a young child, not to mention a pre-linguistic infant. And he thinks that primary process 
living should involve increased affect, not flat affect.859
                                                 
857 Introductory Lectures, SE 16:281, 436, 447. Nevertheless, he says with regard to delusions that 
eventually “every little fragment of knowledge will be transformed into power, and into therapeutic power 
as well” (SE 16:256), thus granting hope to those analysts who wished to find a way to analyze psychotics. 
 Yet Freudian psychoanalysis nevertheless 
maintains not only that schizophrenia involves a retreat to infantile or archaic ways of thinking, 
but even that the childhood developmental achievement of language – precisely what brings one 
out of in-fancy – is vulnerable to the breakdown involved in withdrawal from the world. 
858 Blankenburg, “First Steps,” p. 312. 
859 See Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion: Introduction, note 12, and pp. 12, 114, 121ff. 
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I take there to be two replies to the objection available for psychoanalytic theory.860
 
 By 
addressing them each in turn, we can take two more important steps toward revealing how 
psychosis works. 
1. The Failure of Primitive Trust Leaves a Person Outside of the Truth 
A first response is to agree with the objection that regression is inadequate by itself to 
account for psychosis, although it does describe how the failure of common sense happens, 
making clear that this failure is a defensive withdrawal from what cannot be endured. In an 
attempt to sort out the structure of hallucinations, for example, Freud first suggests topographical 
regression, then immediately discounts this as a false trail. “If the secret of hallucination is 
nothing else than that of regression, every regression of sufficient intensity would produce 
hallucination with belief in its reality.”861
This something more awaits us in a pair of observations already made in the previous 
section: namely, 1) that something is radically unbearable or inadmissible, i.e., rejected point-
blank from integration into the person’s life, and 2) that the most florid symptoms of psychosis 
are attempts to rejoin the shared world, albeit on one’s own terms. In other words, what is needed 
 But strong memories are regressions without being 
hallucinations, and much less severe regressions (including sometimes hallucinations) also appear 
in neurosis. So, something more is needed at the structural level of the account. We need to be 
able to say what is involved when psychotic regression goes so much farther back than neurotic 
regression. Furthermore, if it really is a matter of returning to some prior state, how are we to 
differentiate between the situation of the real infant and the situation of the adult who flees back 
into infantile modes of relation? 
                                                 
860 Sass acknowledges the possible rapprochement between his account and some version of psychoanalysis 
in Paradoxes of Delusion (chapter 1, note 30), but his reading would inflect the problem epistemologically 
(see his Conclusion). Schreber’s “homosexuality,” then, would be more a matter of the imaginary dual 
relation Lacan articulates (Seminar 3) than a sheer being-overcome by unconscious sexual desires. 
861 Freud, “A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams,” SE 14:231. 
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in addition to regression has to do with the person’s fundamental intrapsychic conflicts. We have 
already seen certain shapes of that conflict, as described by Laing and by Atwood (section 
I.D.2.a); now we must make sense of it at a structural level. 
To do so, let us follow Alphonse de Waelhens862 by beginning with Freud’s attempts to 
distinguish between repression and primal repression. Repression in general is a form of flight, in 
which what is fled from always returns in the form of a symptom. Put another way: this flight 
involves reinscription into a different register. But in order for us to be drawn to repression as a 
solution to conflict (rather than other possible defenses), Freud recognizes that there must be 
something already in that other register that attracts whatever I am repressing. So, typical (or 
neurotic) repression turns out to require a more originary flight, one that has already occurred and 
that functions in me as a center of gravity. De Waelhens characterizes this prior flight as a more 
basic excision, or perhaps acceptance of excision, in which one pays a price for fully joining the 
ordered, shared world. It is in his study of Schreber’s Memoirs that Freud distinguishes between 
these ways of fleeing as two (of three) stages of repression. Here he calls the earliest, primal 
repression (Urverdrängung) a ‘fixation’ and posits it as “the precursor and necessary 
condition”863 for repression proper (Verdrängung); the latter may thus also be called ‘after-
pressure’ (Nachdrängen).864
This initial fixing of a center of gravity that cannot be integrated (i.e., primal repression) 
is a way of taking distance from one’s drives by first establishing the difference between 
conscious and unconscious. It “consists in the psychical […] representative of the drive being 
denied [versagt] entrance into what is conscious.”
 
865
                                                 
862 For the following, see de Waelhens and Ver Eecke, Phenomenology and Lacan, pp. 143-166. 
 It means, in other words, that what I want 
863 Freud, “Schreber,” SE 12:67. Cf. “Repression,” SE 14:148. 
864 Or, in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” Nachverdrängung (‘subsequent repression’), SE 23. 
865 Freud, “Repression,” SE 14:148, trans. mod. (see GW 10:250). 
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(the object of the drive) and the way things are (the real situation of which I am conscious) can 
sometimes be different, without producing catastrophe. 
We will have much more to say about what this denial involves developmentally later 
(chapter 6, section II.A), but for now let us attend to its effects. With this fixation, an experience 
of unreflected immersion in or immediate identification with the real (an experience that is 
probably only ever fantasized) is definitively given up, substituted for by a coherent world within 
which the real appears as meaningful and (relatively) bearable. Primal repression functions, 
therefore, as the source (for me) of the world’s structure. In order for consciousness to function as 
part of a shared world, some desires and ideas must be repressed. 
The distance from one’s drives opened up by primal repression is thus the origin of 
mediation (as de Waelhens calls it), a person’s access to the shared world as minimally coherent, 
structured by an interrelation of presence and absence (what I earlier called ‘the juncture,’ 
following Heidegger [chapter 2, part II]). I may desire something in that thing’s absence, and this 
desire need not therefore either vanish or take over the entire world; I may, in other words, make 
the thing present for myself in its very absence. The reverse, however, is also true: even when the 
thing is present, it will in some ways be absent or grounded on an absence.866
                                                 
866 Cf. Richard Boothby, Freud as Philosopher: Metapsychology After Lacan (New York: Routledge, 
2001), p. 50: “Every moment of revealment is ineluctably bound up with a moment of concealment. 
Presence is inseparable from concomitant absence. The openness of Dasein to being involves at the same 
time a closedness and loss.” (The addition of ‘loss’ here seems already to move us away from Heidegger 
and toward Freud.) 
 Furthermore, I may 
have a desire without being (wholly) that desire. And since desire is often (if not always) a 
wanting to be desired by others, I may also be in relation to others – ‘have a relationship,’ as we 
say – rather than fully identifying with and being nothing other than whatever (I imagine) those 
others desire. Even my own experience will be open to interpretation, a space of meaning-
making, without it ceasing thereby to be my own; I can from now on recognize a difference 
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between reality and fantasy; I am aware of reality as such, not merely engulfed in it, even if I 
have a long way to go in learning which entities are real. 
Acceding to, fully entering, this shared and limited world is known psychoanalytically as 
accepting castration, since it introduces a limit or cut into the fantasized bodily plenum of 
immediacy; phenomenologically, it is understood as recognizing and accepting one’s finitude. In 
either mode of thought, this acceptance is a matter of more or less, never simply finalized. One is 
always more or less in protest, more or less inauthentic, and clothed with the possibility of further 
change. What Freud shows us, however, is that an absolute mode of rejection is possible – a 
complete refusal of finitude. This would be precisely the failure to accede to primal repression, 
according to de Waelhens. 
Freud thus distinguishes between neurotic repression, in which one splits the memory of 
the thing or event from the affect that accompanied it,867 and psychotic repudiation or foreclosure 
(Verwerfung), in which one refuses or throws out both idea and affect “and behaves as if the idea 
had never occurred to the ego at all.”868
castration involves both an anxiety of fragmentation, as it implies the giving up of the imaginary 
unity of the ego, and a corresponding anxiety of separation, insofar as it requires tolerating the 
 Such repudiation, which he elsewhere refers to as 
‘forcing away’ (Abdrängung) by contrast with repression proper (Verdrängung), is the refusal of 
castration. Put differently, it is the refusal to submit to the world as structured by language – a 
language that I do not create, but in which I am always already caught up. It can be understood as 
a motivated solution, if not necessarily a conscious decision, when we think about the costs of 
entering the world. Richard Boothby explains those costs by reminding us that 
                                                 
867 Cp. Boothby’s reading of repression as a Gestalt switch (a displacement in the order of images) plus a 
verbal translation (a symbolic reinscription). Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
868 Freud, “The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence,” SE 3:58. Cp. the Wolf-Man case study, where Freud says 
that “repression is something very different from a rejection [Verwerfung]” (From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis, SE 17:79-80, 84-5, 109), and Lacan’s reading of it in Seminar 3 (pp. 12-13, 46, 83, 
149). Lacan interprets GW 12:117, daß er von ihr nichts wissen wollte im Sinne der Verdrängung, as ‘that 
he did not want to know anything about it, [not even] in the sense of repression,’ which is possible and fits 
with Freud’s earlier distinction, but it is not the only possible reading, since ‘in the sense of repression’ 
could be epexegetical for not-wanting-to-know. 
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To enter the shared world, then, is to let the world’s laws apply to me, to internalize them 
as structuring me despite my uniqueness, as well as to give up on having it all under control. I 
must make use of words that do not perfectly present things; indeed, things themselves, including 
what and who I love most, must be structured by absence. It means that I must suffer absence 
with regard to myself, both the absence that is my eventual death (including the irreversibility of 
my temporal passage) and the absence that is an imperfect, destroyable body or a limited identity. 
If I am to pay such prices for world-entry, I must find myself suffused by a deep trust in that 
world on whose cusp I stand – a world in which I as yet participate only very imperfectly, and 
which both oppresses and excites me. As we will eventually make clear (chapter 6, sections 
II.A.3-4), it is in a circulation with trust in one’s caretakers that such primitive trust emerges. 
But not to trust in this way, as has become evident, is no better option. To forgo 
castration is both to remain at the immediate mercy of the world – crushed by impossible 
demands, which are initially and (in such a case) irrecoverably embodied by one’s caretakers, 
from whom one is not psychically well-differentiated – and to remain alienated from a reality that 
is somehow structured linguistically and socially for everyone else. It is a failure of primitive trust 
that manifests in the rejection of the organizing force of language. 
I speak of the ‘organizing force’ of language, and not of ‘language’ simply, because 
foreclosure does not rule out the use of words or reason, but does leave a kind of hole or weak 
spot in the system of language, at the place where the organizing principle should be.870
                                                 
869 Richard Boothby, Death and Desire: Psychoanalytic Theory in Lacan’s Return to Freud (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 152. 
 One’s 
(linguistic) center of gravity goes missing or comes up empty, so that one feels oneself at some 
870 Cf. Grasser, “Stabilizations in Psychosis,” who points out that although we are all embedded in the field 
of language, one can be “lacking in the organizer for this tongue. This is what prevents the separation 




level to be playacting, participating explicitly in a game, rather than dwelling in language.871 
Metaphor in a broad sense, as the substitution of word for thing, has been repudiated. To 
compensate, one has to place excessive weight on some other symbol, some other phrase or piece 
of language, which then remains essentially enigmatic because it stands in for – it signifies – the 
whole system of language itself.872
Foreclosure of some inadmissible element, then, bears the weight of a structural refusal 
of finitude. Henceforth, the person is exceptionally vulnerable to being overwhelmed, should the 
meaning that was refused be demanded too rigorously at any point in the future. Of course, it is 
not evident from the outside (nor even, many times, from the inside) that this foreclosure has 
taken place, still less what was foreclosed, until the symbol in question is required of the person – 
and she is thoroughly overwhelmed. Until then, at most what appears is a brittleness or fragility to 
her psychic achievements, at least those that go beyond the fixation point. Her structural 
weakness may, however, remain simply hidden, as we saw in the prodromal accounts above. Or 
maybe she will be clinically recognizable as having a personality disorder. 
 As an example, maybe I become convinced above all that 
‘Money can’t buy happiness,’ but I have no idea what follows from this. (Can something else buy 
it? Is it not for sale at all?) Now I have this proverb, this refrain, on which depends for me the 
whole weight of the world’s structure. 
Let us be more concrete. What is it that happens in this being-overwhelmed? A question 
is posed, a problem arises, something is demanded by my situation in life, and the only adequate 
response would be that symbol which I have not only not understood, but have rejected out of 
hand, have avoided as the bane of my very life. For Schreber, it was paternity, or perhaps more 
                                                 
871 Boothby adds (Death and Desire, p. 152): “From a Lacanian point of view, castration is the central 
moment of the child's acquisition of language not in the sense of its becoming able to voice words or to use 
them in some way (of this both the pre-Oedipal child and the psychotic are capable) but rather in the sense 
of becoming able to dwell in language, to rely on language for the guidance of thought and action, 
genuinely to appropriate language and to be appropriated by it.” 
872 Lacan, Seminar 3, p. 194. 
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basically procreation, into which he could not integrate himself. Lacan describes the basic 
psychotic phenomenon in this way: “the emergence in reality of an enormous meaning that has 
the appearance of being nothing at all – insofar as it cannot be tied to any [other meaning], since 
it has never entered into the system of symbolization – but under certain conditions it can threaten 
the entire edifice.”873
We have already said (section I.D.2) that this collapse involves a temporal regression, a 
return to the point of the fixation – to narcissism (melancholic, manic, or paranoid) or 
autoerotism. We may add that it also involves formal regression: a return to primary process 
connections, immediate and fully fluid identifications.
 The world’s tentative structure implies a certain flexible coherence, a safety 
in being wrong up to a certain point. But put too much pressure on one point, and if it collapses, 
the rest of the threads get pulled down, as well. Language, as a system of words that have 
meaning in terms of each other and contexts that operate by mutual implication and exclusion, 
falls apart. When I find myself thoroughly betrayed, I reinterpret all of what used to be evidence 
of good faith as evidence of an even more cunning trap (see chapter 1, section III.C). 
874 To the extent that it further involves a 
topographical regression,875 there is a move from preconscious word-presentations to 
unconscious thing-presentations: what cannot be symbolized but is demanded anyway can only 
show up in terms of images – in hallucinations, feelings of complete exposure, and transitivism. 
There is, as Boothby puts it, “uncontrolled slippage of the signifier, compensated for by 
delusional overgrowths of the imaginary.”876
                                                 
873 Ibid., p. 85.  
 And there is a confusion of these registers: 
everything claims me as symbolically meaningful, as if everything were part of language, and 
everything is meaningful for me, as if everything bore an immediate, narcissistic relation to me. 
874 For further discussion of the primary process, see chapter 6, section I.. 
875 Freud claims explicitly that it does not (SE 14:229), but I am inclined to follow Lacan in thinking that it 
must. 
876 Boothby, Freud as Philosopher, p. 122. Following Lacan, Boothby understands the ‘imaginary’ as the 
realm of images. 
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To complete this structural articulation of psychosis as something more than simply 
temporal regression, let us draw out the consequences of the psychotic break for a person’s 
relation to the truth. We shall look first at schizophrenia, then at paranoia, and last at affective 
psychoses. 
If we were right to follow Blankenburg in saying that all psychosis is a failure of 
common sense, we should not fail to notice his claim that common sense is what allows one “to 
put things in their proper place” – i.e., to see what is essential, what belongs to what – and to 
distinguish “the probable from the improbable.” For “the probable is encompassing and provides 
the basis for what is true, which is here meant in the sense of what is correct and demonstrable. 
[…] Without [common sense], all manner of correctness simply hangs in the air” (306). Having 
this sense for the probable is included in what Heidegger calls ‘originary truth,’ being-held or 
holding-oneself in the truth, which I have argued may also be called primitive trusting (chapter 2, 
part I). Hence, as we saw more recently (section I.D), common sense is here a name for 
Heidegger’s being-in-the-world,. When it fails, propositional truth and falsity do not simply 
become impossible, but the person is no longer appropriately related to them. 
A person suffering from schizophrenia, de Waelhens claims, borrowing an image from 
Francoise Dolto, “talks about the real the way a blind man talks about colors. This does not 
necessarily imply that what he says about it is false, but, in any case, he does not know the truth 
of the matter, because truth has disappeared for him.”877
                                                 
877 De Waelhens and Ver Eecke, Phenomenology and Lacan, p. 246. 
 Such a conclusion may be drawn from 
Blankenburg’s account, in which the loss of natural self-evidence involves a failure of appropriate 
distance, or from de Waelhens’s, in which mediation and negation are rejected. Language no 
longer represents and therefore mediates bodily sensations, so words move immediately to 
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corporeal sensation. As Moyaert puts it, even “the images and perceptions that arise in [the body] 
are too close to the skin and, as it were, break through it.”878
A person who suffers both language and imagination in this fashion is just indifferent to 
the fact that speech is structured as an appeal to public evidence, an attempt to show something in 
a way that would in principle make sense to any observer. (To see this, try to make sense of a 
propositional truth “which I alone could know and express,”
 
879 i.e., one that can have no other 
witness, real or imagined.) Speech has such immediate effects for such a person that propositional 
truth, as correctness, is no longer worth getting excited about, even if the ‘truth-game’ is one that 
can be played. Someone with schizophrenia speaks only a dead language, since words gain their 
life from lived contexts, and it is just such contexts from which she is alienated.880
Someone suffering from non-schizophrenic paranoia, by contrast, is in one way 
excessively concerned with propositional truth. Words do not have such immediate, bodily effects 
as for the schizophrenic, but they are straightforwardly equivalent to the things they indicate. 
They are not signs that point beyond themselves to a partially opaque (i.e., absent) meaning. 
Their meaning, rather, like the meaning of every possible occurrence, is immediately clear, fully 
given to anyone of good faith – and unquestionably given to the paranoid person.
 Human 
discourse requires engagement, since attention to tone and context is what allows for transcending 
the literal meanings of words toward their partially hidden meanings. It is just this engagement 
that has become foreign for the schizophrenic, who may be able to get along linguistically at 
various times in life but feels like the rules of natural-language engagement are never quite clear. 
881
                                                 
878 Moyaert, “Body,” pp. 47-48, original emphasis. 
 Not only that, 
but any number of occurrences, physical objects, and so on, which most people would not take as 
signifying anything, are without any doubt meaningful, even if it is not entirely clear to the person 
879 De Waelhens and Ver Eecke, Phenomenology and Lacan, p. 237. 
880 Ibid., p. 288. 
881 Ibid., pp. 238-241. 
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just what they mean.882 That is to say, everything has to fit within the delusional story. No risk is 
tolerable with regard to the truth; nothing can be partially right and partially wrong. Thus other 
people cannot play a real role in reaching the truth, for truth is not something to be sought. Truth 
is already possessed, fully, by the person who is paranoid, and others are simply called upon to 
testify that it is so, especially those who bear some official capacity in the shared world.883
A person in the grip of psychotic mania or depression is not attuned to the world in a way 
that allows her to care about propositional truth one way or the other. Speech does not have the 
kind of immediate bodily effects it does in schizophrenia, nor is the speaker the immediate 
guarantor of truth. Instead, the submission to a judgment of correctness is just not worth the effort 
in depression and requires an unattainable coherence in mania. In both cases, the failure of affect 
regulation – of the experienced submission of affect to any boundary at all – yields wholesale 
reorganizations of even the familiar world. 
 
In mania, on the one hand, there is an uncontrollable chaos of meaning characterized by 
racing thoughts. “My thoughts were going so fast that I couldn’t remember the beginning of a 
sentence halfway through,” Jamison reports. “Fragments of ideas, images, sentences, raced 
around and around in my mind [until] they became meaningless melted pools. Nothing once 
familiar to me was familiar [anymore].”884
In depression, on the other hand, the world takes on a deeply malevolent cast, and things 
offer themselves to one’s desire only in terms of destruction. 
 
I become unable to recognise something as familiar as the palm of my hand or my children's faces. 
My sense of space alters and rooms that are familiar appear to have changed dimensions. Simple 
objects in a room can take on sinister meanings for me. […] I become passionate about one subject 
only at these times of deep and intense fear, despair and rage: suicide.885
 
 
                                                 
882 Lacan, Seminar 3, p. 78. 
883 Ibid., pp. 241-2. 
884 Jamison, Unquiet Mind, p. 83. 
885 Anonymous, “On Madness,” p. 727. 
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To the extent that psychosis is a betrayal of trust, then, it is also an ejection from the 
realm of originary truth, from that which enables a mediated relation to propositional truth and 
falsity, although this takes place in different ways for different psychoses. 
 
Thus, we can see that the psychoanalytic account does not wish only to understand 
psychosis as a matter of temporal regression, as if one simply reverted to infancy. The world 
comes apart due to both an initial foreclosure that solves an intense conflict and a later crisis that 
demands what has been foreclosed. These are two distinct psychical steps, the first one lending 
itself to psychic structuring and thus understandable as predisposing, the other a contingent event 
that arises only partially due to the predisposition. When the world splinters, however, it does so 
in such a radical way (i.e., a way that reaches back into the roots of oneself) that one retreats into 
modes of functioning that cannot provide an appropriate distance from and mediation to things. 
The resulting excessive exposure is still freighted with the meanings accrued over one’s lifetime, 
but they now threaten one’s extinction unless one can artificially rebuild something coherent from 
them. The fragmented drives and body of those who suffer from schizophrenia are therefore not 
merely traversed by things without organization – they are invaded by things that bear various 
remnants of previous, fragile organization, to which the real infant could have had no access. 
While it may be true to say of both the small child and the schizophrenic that he “has a body, but 
he does not inhabit it; his body does not belong to him,”886 or that he is “able to voice words or to 
use them in some way [without being] able to dwell in language,”887
the influence of childhood makes itself felt already in the situation at the beginning of the 
formation of a neurosis [or, we may add, of a psychosis], since it plays a decisive part in 
 still the child and the 
schizophrenic are as different as the ‘not yet’ and the ‘no longer.’ Freud’s formulation in a 
different context turns out to be helpful here, too: 
                                                 
886 Moyaert, “Body,” p. 51. Notice that in neither case does this prevent some awareness of one’s having a 
body. 
887 Boothby, Death and Desire, p. 152. 
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It marks out, in other words, the extent and shape of a person’s fragility. 
 
2. The Failure of Language Brings Overwhelming Meaning 
Now we come to the second response to phenomenology’s objection about regression. It 
involves pointing out that in approaching the question of infantile thought we encounter a 
problem genuinely belonging to the inconsistent experience and expression of schizophrenia – 
something Sass acknowledges as the “characteristic combination of what seem to be 
hyperconcrete as well as hyperabstract tendencies.”889
On one side, Freud, for example, “attempt[s] a characterization of the schizophrenic’s 
mode of thought by saying that he treats concrete things as though they were abstract.”
 Let us see what this means. 
890 As one 
of Minkowski’s patients testifies, “I feel that I can reason quite well, but only in the absolute [i.e., 
abstractly], because I have lost contact with life.”891
[A] girl who was brought to the clinic after a quarrel with her lover complains: ‘The eyes are not 
straight [richtig], they are twisted [verdreht].’ She herself explains this by producing, in coherent 
[geordnet] language, a series of reproaches against her lover. ‘She cannot understand him at all, he 
looks different every time; he is a hypocrite, an eye-twister [Augenverdreher]; he has twisted her 
eyes [verdreht], which are no longer her eyes; she now sees the world with different eyes.
 On the other side, however, we have clinical 
examples, including some given by Freud, which at least on their face suggest that schizophrenia 
involves the exact opposite: treating abstract situations (or verbal stimuli) as though they were 




Furthermore, George Atwood makes the case that for people in annihilation states – i.e., 
for people whose very existence is highly fraught – new insights or feelings usually emerge very 
                                                 
888 Freud, Wolf-Man, SE 17:54. Italics removed from entire passage. 
889 Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self-Experience,” pp. 160-1. Cf. Paradoxes of Delusion, ch. 3, where Sass 
characterizes the schizophrenic atmosphere as a combination of “phantom concreteness” and “mute 
particularity.” 
890 Freud, “The Unconscious,” SE 14:204, emphasis added. Cf. his famous comparison of abstract 
philosophy to schizophrenia, on the same page. 
891 Quoted in Parnas and Sass, “Self, Solipsism,” p. 116. 
892 Freud, “The Unconscious,” SE 14:198, trans. mod. (see GW 10:296-7).  
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concretely because they are very tenuous, and the concrete is more easily held on to.893 This very 
concretization would indicate the way that delusions and hallucinations can be understood as 
attempts to restore a connection to the shared world, on condition that the world will not simply 
destroy one. “By casting the danger to a person’s sense of being in highly concrete, particular 
images, the delusion expresses an effort to resurrect oneself and be protected from the possibility 
of obliteration.”894
Atwood speculates, for example, that one patient who would not speak except to say that 
there were four children in her bedroom (when in the shared world she had none) “concretized the 
fragmentary state of her soul into the image of actually living children [because] she could not, at 
her center, sustain any sense that she was an actually existing, alive, real person.”
 
895 When asked 
by her psychiatrist whether these children were real, however, she became confused and would 
not respond. Atwood interprets this to be because she knew that they were not real in any sense 
that her psychiatrist would understand, and yet she deeply needed them to be real – in an 
immediate way, they were her very self. If Atwood is right, then the consequences of 
electroconvulsive therapy on this patient are quite troubling: she remained silent, except to say 
that there were no longer any children in her bedroom.896
 So it is hard to say whether schizophrenia involves a tendency to abstract or to concretize. 
Indeed, it seems as if both take place. We have already seen that the psychoanalytic account 
 
                                                 
893 Atwood, The Abyss, p. 30. 
894 Ibid., p. 100. 
895 Ibid., p. 40. 
896 Ibid., p. 38. We might add a further example from the same paper that presented the man who lives 
entirely by maxims: A different gentleman, hospitalized for a year with paranoid delusions, then treated 
with medication for nearly ten years because of hallucinatory voices, has since then been free of medication 
and mostly free of voices. He speaks almost entirely in clichés and proverbs. At a certain point, deciding 
that he was ‘lacking a seat in life,’ “he started building an armchair on which he engraved proverbs so as to 
‘have his place, like the others, in everyday life.’ […] In rare times of crisis, he threatens to destroy his 
‘proverb armchair’ on which he sits every day. Sometimes he does partially destroy it in order to better 
rebuild it. […] This armchair locates him in life literally because he carves on it the proverbs on which he 




involves recognizing, as the underlying structure of psychosis (the psychical predisposing cause), 
a refusal of mediation. The psychotic has language in a way, but lacks the organizing principle for 
it; she does not inhabit language or dwell in the world through it, even if she can play the game 
with some facility. It is not a matter of deficient language learning but a disruption of the basic 
relation to discourse (logos or Rede for Heidegger). In such situations, language is not linked up 
to affect appropriately, and so does not adequately structure the world – language and things 
primarily oppress me or are utterly indifferent for me. But when the world is not structured by 
language, there is no mediating distance between what is presented and what is. I am thrown back 
on immediate identifications with (i.e., investments of) images. If we think about the situation 
from that direction and realize that, for Freud, language as a background phenomenon is 
preeminently preconscious,897
But then schizophrenia would be a matter of treating abstract things (words and their 
meanings) concretely (as perceptual things), not the other way around (as Freud has claimed). So, 
from the standpoint of theoretical consistency, it is not surprising when Freud claims a) that in 
schizophrenia communication between the unconscious and the preconscious is severed,
 we would expect that Freud’s account of schizophrenia would 
involve a retreat from words to (unconscious) memory images – i.e., to things. Indeed, we already 
saw that in psychosis generally, the unconscious is in a way on the surface, directly legible. 
898 and b) 
that schizophrenia consists in a withdrawal of investment from the unconscious (i.e., from things 
as remembered, as minimally related to the self).899
                                                 
897 Cf. Freud, “Unconscious,” SE 14:203. 
 This allows for a sort of differential diagnosis 
oriented to the relations between the preconscious and the unconscious: in dreaming, the split 
between the two is relaxed, so that unconscious wishes take sensory form but involve little motor 
response; in schizophrenia, the split is completed, so that the unconscious wishes are conscious 
898 The “free communication between (Pcs.) word-cathexes and (Ucs.) thing-cathexes […] is cut off.” 
Freud, “Supplement,” SE 14:229. 
899 “Supplement,” SE 14:235. 
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without the mediation of words (thus in hallucination, but not necessarily in self-movement); in 
hysteria, the split is maintained but with one-way communication, as unconscious wishes get 
expressed in bodily movement. Thus, Freud claims that Tausk’s patient, if hysterical, would have 
“in fact convulsively twisted her eyes […] instead of feeling the impulse to do so or the sensation 
of doing so,”900
On one hand, then, it seems as if psychosis involves abstraction on a grand scale; on the 
other hand, it seems that it takes everything as immediately concrete. This suggests that such a 
distinction is inadequate to the phenomenon under discussion. But it was precisely that distinction 
on which the phenomenological objection was based. Let us instead recognize that we can make 
some headway by thinking about the examples just cited as evidence of a refusal of metaphor in 
psychosis – a failure to accept the substitution of words for things. 
 but also would have entirely lacked access to the unconscious meaning of her 
movements. 
Earlier, I claimed that Freud’s most important insight into psychosis was to take the 
‘positive symptoms’ as restitutive efforts. Precisely in order to try to deal with the theoretical 
problem currently at issue, he adds to the theory that language is the first such re-investment.901
                                                 
900 Freud, “Unconscious,” SE 14:198-99, trans. mod. (see GW 10:297). 
 
Since the normal use of language most crudely involves using words to try to get at things, when 
one has fled from worldly things and now wants them back, it is reasonable to try to get to them 
by investing in words. Unfortunately, this is very difficult, since we saw (section I.G.1) that it 
was upon language and its organization that the first blow fell, in the failure of primal repression. 
The tendency, then, will be to realize one’s desparate (but conflicted) desire to belong to things 
901 See Freud’s own characterization of the problem (“Unconscious,” SE 14:203, trans. mod.): “If, in 
schizophrenia, this flight [i.e., regression] consists in withdrawal of drive investment from the points which 
represent the unconscious presentation of the object, it may seem strange that the part of the presentation of 
this object which belongs to the system Pcs. – namely, the word-presentations corresponding to it – should, 
on the contrary, receive a more intense investment. We might rather expect that the word-presentation, 
being the preconscious part, would have to sustain the first impact of repression and that it would be totally 
closed for investment after repression had proceeded as far as the unconscious thing-presentations. This, it 
is true, is difficult to understand.” 
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by prematurely investing those words as things.902
We should not forget that words have their own materiality – that they are also 
perceptible things. This materiality is normally quite transparent for native speakers of a natural 
language.
 This results in a situation for the 
schizophrenic, at least, in which all she has is language, but its internal relations remain radically 
disorganized and oppressive. 
903 Sass quotes Artaud again, when the latter laments his lack of “that fusion … of the 
expression with the thought, that instantaneous forgetting which is given to all men and allows 
them convenience of expression.”904
 Why are words and things confused in this way, which de Waelhens calls a “confusion of 
signifier and signified”?
 Schizophrenia involves getting hung up on the word as 
material, sometimes failing to transcend it toward its meaning, sometimes taking all its meanings 
at once, and sometimes taking its meaning(s) materially, in relation to the body. If it is at all 
possible to generalize here, maybe we can say that the schizophrenic confuses things and words 
(including word-things and meaningful words). 
905 The split between conscious and unconscious, founded simultaneously 
with the difference between the linguistic world and the perceptual world, has either not taken 
place with the requisite strength in someone who is psychotic, or it has been subsequently 
surrendered. Instead of serving to organize the relation between past experience (memory), 
present perception, and future possibilities,906
                                                 
902 To the extent that the schizophrenic succeeds at reaching memory-traces of things (although not yet full 
intentional relations to real things), the desperate and disorganized re-investment of these memories 
produces hallucinations, which are often verbal (hearing voices, for example). 
 language’s own structure has splintered. This 
means that different strategies for successful language use, rather than being coherently 
903 Freud: “But word-presentations, for their part too, are derived from sense-perceptions” (“Unconscious,” 
SE 14:202). Cf. the proposal of verbal residues as a subcategory of mnemic residues in The Ego and the Id, 
SE 19:20-1. 
904 Sass, “Schizophrenia, Self,” p. 166. Quoted from volume 1 of Artaud’s Oeuvres Completes (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1976), p. 210 (Sass’s translation and elision). 
905 De Waelhens and Ver Eecke, Phenomenology and Lacan, p. 231. 
906 I take this to be a faithful extrapolation from Freud’s distinction between unconscious thing-




employed, will be tried at different (often inappropriate) times. Sometimes, understanding what is 
said requires taking it literally, sometimes it requires attending primarily to a tonal inflection, 
sometimes it involves holding multiple meanings in tension at once. Normally, picking the right 
strategy does not really involve sorting and choosing – it is part of being already oriented to the 
meaning of the situation. It does not seem that people suffering from psychosis explicitly sort and 
choose strategies, either, but their strategies conflict, get inappropriately isolated, and fail to fit 
the shared context. This failure to be attuned to the shared situation, and its concomitant clutching 
at straws, is one result of the failure of common sense. 
 What happens when the schizophrenic fails to recover things via words? With regard to 
linguistic thought and speech, words float free of their bindings to reality.907 They are emptied of 
personal meaning (connection to one’s past and future) and no longer experience resistance, 
either from their worldly referents or from repressed unconscious drive resonances.908 That means 
that free association can proceed unhindered; “words are subjected to the same [primary] process 
as that which makes the dream-images out of latent dream-thoughts […]. They undergo 
condensation and by means of displacement transfer their investments to one another in their 
entirety.”909 As Moyaert puts it, “language here does not circle [productively] around a 
symbolically articulated emptiness but looks for protection against a real emptiness.”910
As an example of this sort of free association, Thomas Freeman reports that one patient, 
in an interview setting in which the doctor was taking notes, suddenly broke her silence to say 
that she was thinking about the drug Largactil. Asked why, she explained that the word had three 
parts: Larg (presumably because of its sound) meant the three Rs – reading, writing, and 
 
                                                 
907 “Words glide over everything and hang in empty space. [They] are no longer supported by a meaning-
intention that in turn rests on the libido that aims to realize itself in [investing] objects” (Moyaert, “Body,” 
p. 56). 
908 Ibid., p. 55. 
909 “Unconscious,” SE 14:199. 
910 Moyaert, “Body,” p. 57. 
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’rithmetic – and hence verbalized her concern about what she said being recorded (and perhaps 
added up in a calculating manner?); Act meant that the doctors, nurses, and patients were all 
playacting certain parts; Til meant the till (the money box) in the hospital cafeteria. Further, she 
was looking at a bottle of Largactil tablets on the desk.911
 This free floating of words also explains why there is too much meaning in psychosis. 
Everything claims me, is addressed to me. My options are: struggling to filter according to 
invented rules, forcing everything to fit into one fairly rigid delusional scheme, or just giving up, 
ceasing to care, so far as this turns out to be possible. As with the strategies for using language 
correctly, these are hardly mutually exclusive. Here is an articulation of the experience of two 
different strategies from someone on the edge of psychosis (‘on the edge’ inasmuch as she was 
not hallucinating): 
 That single word, the name of the drug, 
condensed all of these anxieties into one verbal expression, the meaning of which could be made 
determinate but only by quite a bit of coaxing. 
I was having a problem with patterns. Oriental rugs, tile floors, printed curtains, things like that. 
[…] When I looked at these things, I saw other things within them. That sounds as though I was 
hallucinating, and I wasn’t. I knew I was looking at a floor or a curtain. But all patterns seemed to 
contain potential representations, which in a dizzying array would flicker briefly to life. […] 
Reality was getting too dense. / Something also was happening to my perceptions of people. When 
I looked at someone’s face, I often did not maintain an unbroken connection to the concept of a 
face. Once you start parsing a face, it’s a peculiar item: squishy, pointy, with lots of air vents and 
wet spots. This was the reverse of my problem with patterns. Instead of seeing too much meaning, 
I didn’t see any meaning.912
 
 
It is not surprising that this person (Kaysen) unconsciously adopted the strategy of 
abandoning significance especially for faces, which can be overwhelming due to the complexity 
of their meanings and the stakes of catching those meanings. In fact, the latter situation is pretty 
nearly the way that Chadwick describes his experience of paranoid schizophrenia. In addition to 
                                                 
911 Thomas Freeman, “Narcissism and Defensive Processes in Schizophrenic States,” in Essential Papers, 
pp. 78-97. Example from p. 79. Freeman does not tell us the significance of the third term; perhaps the 
patient did not report it. Likely it had something to do with economic relations, but it could also have been 
something completely different. 
912 Kaysen, Girl, Interrupted, p. 40-1. 
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increased perceptual sensitivity and a narrow and darting attentional beam, he reports, there is 
meaning everywhere, and the stakes are high for noticing it and making sense of it: “to save one’s 
very life, and in my case my soul.” “One is surrounded by signs, nothing is trivial or mundane, 
words in particular have an intense significance, one must miss nothing – it could be a clue to 
one’s destiny.”913
Stanghellini provides the rather different case of a 30-year-old paranoid schizophrenic 
man, for whom “almost every time he perceived an object, the perception evoked in him one 
concept or word, and that word [set off] an overwhelming trend of word associations. It was like 
a ‘flood of words’ that made him lose his grasp on the actual situation.”
 
914
 Of course, language never floats free completely. There will always remain some 
vestigial connections, stereotyped phrases drawn from real social interactions. It remains 
“possible to handle[,] with apparent correctness, ‘constructions’ which have survived the 
catastrophe but whose use no longer corresponds to anything for the person concerned” or else 
means something other than it would in the shared world.
 Here, instead of the 
word’s various meanings and associations remaining in the background, giving context to the one 
or two meanings that are thereby foregrounded as situationally relevant, all the meanings are in 
play. 
915
                                                 
913 Chadwick, “Psychotic Consciousness,” pp. 59 and 57, respectively. 
 The combination of these recalled 
phrases with the high stakes of finding meaning and the inability to screen for relevance yields 
one final inconsistency observable in psychotic speech, one which has been highlighted by Lacan: 
914 Giovanni Stanghellini, “At Issue: Vulnerability to Schizophrenia and Lack of Common Sense,” 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 26.4 (2000): 775-787. Quotation from p. 775. Cf. Kaysen’s example of madness as 
velocity, in which the thought “I’m tired of sitting here in front of the nursing station” gives rise to an 
uncontrollable proliferation of thoughts by association to each part of the sentence, in a failing attempt to 
decide whether or not to stand up (Girl, Interrupted, pp. 76-7). 
915 De Waelhens and Ver Eecke, Phenomenology and Lacan, p. 233. The example given (on the same page) 
is of a woman whose remarks about the weather, though usually appropriate to the shared situation, were 
understood by her to carry disproportionate significance. ‘It is hot today’ meant ‘the sun’s heat is too strong 
for me to approach you and shake your hand.’ ‘The sky is grey this morning’ meant ‘the sun will never 
shine as in other times and the end of the world draws near.’ 
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intuition and formula both function for the psychotic to give meaning a stopping-place. On the 
one hand, there is the intuited word (often a neologism) that reaches the soul of the situation, 
unlocks its overflowing meaning, opens a new and privileged perspective. Meaning here takes 
flight into the ineffable, withdrawing toward the core of the delusion. On the other hand, the 
formulaic refrain, reiterated with stereotyped insistence, tries to hold onto some fragment of 
common speech so as to reconnect with the world.916
 
 
H) Conclusions: On Psychosis as Failure of Primitive Trust  
Let me sum up. We have tried to think through psychosis in some detail so as to articulate 
how radical a break with the world can be, and to indicate that in some way we are all vulnerable 
to it. (We will take up that second task again, more rigorously, in chapter 6). We have done so 
with an eye toward questioning Heidegger’s account of my being always already invested in a 
world, with others, in virtue of which things matter to me more or less coherently, according to 
shared patterns of import. This cleared space in which things can present themselves to us, and 
we can respond to them well or poorly, is how he understands originary truth. I have shown this 
level of truth to be the same as primitive or basic trust. But we have seen that psychosis involves 
a phenomenologically endless fall away from the world as such, one that is experienced as global 
mistrust, in which things either matter intensely or show up coherently, but not both. 
Certainly this does not mean that Heidegger’s interpretation is simply wrong, as if we all 
had to first find our way into the world beginning from something like psychosis. We made clear 
that psychosis, although centrally involving regression, is not simply a return to an infantile state 
(section I.G).917
                                                 
916 See Lacan, Seminar 3, pp. 33, 255, and 260. 
 But Heidegger’s beautiful account of our essential situatedness within a 
minimally coherent world interprets that situatedness as ineluctably given for the human being, at 
least short of physical death. On that account, the character of our investment in the world, I have 
917 I will investigate this question with more care in chapter 6, part II. 
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argued (chapter 2, part II, and chapter 3, part II), is one of assumption-trust, which has foreseen 
and incorporated into its assumptions what would otherwise be a terrible betrayal – namely, that 
originary being in the truth (as unconcealment) is also, always already, being in the untruth (as 
concealment). 
Our investigation of psychosis therefore supports my claim that Heidegger’s position is 
too self-assured. For psychosis seems to be primarily a matter of radically betrayed trust in the 
shared world as it is structured by language. This means that the essential problem in psychosis is 
an inability to responsively receive the question or the demand that comes from the world at a 
critical moment. In brief reactive psychoses, the inability seems to be sheerly a matter of 
unbearable trauma (the world itself as overwhelming), but in more long-term cases, there has 
been a predisposing foreclosure of the world’s structure, a hesitancy toward primitive trust that 
has lasting effects. 
We saw initially (section I.D) that the phenomenon of psychosis involves a failure of 
common sense, which in paranoia and schizophrenia takes the form of a withdrawal from 
inhabiting the shared world. This was understood as a temporal regression to previous 
organizations of love and interest, either focused wholly on the unified body-image (the ego) in 
paranoia, or fragmented into desperate investments of words taken as things that directly 
influence and invade the body in schizophrenia. Affect is unable to be contained or adequately 
processed, and this comes to the fore in schizoaffective and bipolar psychoses. In these situations, 
unbounded affect from which one cannot take distance throws the world into chaos, and the 
bipolar sufferer especially clings to common sense as to an anchor in rough seas – too tightly, it 
turns out, since it tends to produce an oscillation between overidentification with a social role and 
uncontrollable lack of all determinacy. 
We saw, further (section I.G), that this regression can best be understood as a flight from 
a current crisis that puts excessive pressure on the solution to an old conflict. That solution had 
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been a repudiation of something inadmissible, an inability to trust fully (and primitively) in the 
structure of the shared world; the present crisis then demands more than such shaky trust can 
bear, and there is a break, a splintering of language’s ordering function. Such a repudiation is 
only one kind of solution to a universal human difficulty. The fragility of one’s personal solution, 
however, is by no means always apparent prior to the initiation of the break (i.e., prior to the 
prodromal phase of the illness), which means that the level of being-overwhelmed that is 
involved in psychosis could befall any of us. 
Crucially, we saw (section I.E) that the most evident symptoms, those that earn a person 
the psychiatric label ‘psychotic,’ are actually more or less inadequate attempts to return to the 
shared world. As Freud says vividly, “the delusion is found applied like a patch over the place 
where originally a rent had appeared in the ego’s relation to the external world.”918
If we had to put it into an overly simple formula, we could say that psychosis typically 
involves a childhood solution to conflict that leaves one vulnerable (a predisposition), an 
overwhelming pressure or demand in the midst of one’s current life (a betrayal), a defensive 
regression to the last reliable mode of world-relation, albeit with non-infantile content (the 
withdrawal from common sense), and desperate attempts to rebuild a rigidly coherent world out 
of that fragmentary content (psychotic symptom-formation). 
 It was by 
extending this insight, again following Freud, that we were able to partially illuminate some of 
the most confusing inconsistencies of psychotic speech. 
 
II. Trust and the Psychoanalytic Inference to the Unconscious 
 Freudian psychoanalysis has aided us thus far in working out a structural account of 
psychosis without losing sight of the importance of the sufferer’s peculiar life-history, as well as 
the specifics of his speech. But this has already involved us in a problem about how to interpet 
                                                 
918 Freud, “Loss of Reality,” SE 19:151. 
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that speech, whether it takes place in the midst of the break or at some level of recovery. Can we 
trust it? Is there anything sufficiently meaningful there to trust? We can respond more adequately 
to this kind of question if we attend to one further consequence of Freud’s insight. We initially 
discovered an intrapsychic conflict at the root of psychosis (and thereby realized that the most 
visible psychotic symptoms are in fact restitutive attempts) by attending to such phenomena as 
symptoms in the psychoanalytic sense, i.e., as compromises in that psychic conflict (section I.E). 
If we once more attend to them as such symptoms, we can recognize in them another central 
feature: the Freudian neurotic symptom, as the return of the repressed, is a way of speaking – 
hence, it is addressed to someone, even if only to whoever has ears to hear. Perhaps delusions, 
hallucinations, and psychotically disorganized speech, too, are addressed to someone, even if only 
in a roundabout way.919
Such a claim faces risks on all sides. I have already discussed some of the risks of 
understanding too quickly (section I.A); here we may add to Eilan’s concerns those of Lacan. He 
echoes Freud’s repeated worries about getting stuck in what seems understandable about the 
dream – failing to work back to the latent dream-thoughts, then failing to attend primarily to the 
dreamwork, the mode of distortion – by calling on us not to take the bait offered by the peculiar 
rationality of the delusional system itself. We are back to Horatio’s characterization of Ophelia’s 
speech (see the introduction to part I, above), for Lacan asks the analyst to focus her interest, not 
so much on what the analysand wants her to understand, but on why he wants her to understand 
 
                                                 
919 We may derive this same consequence from Lacan’s account: the neurotic symptom is a reformulation 
or an insistence of the question (who or what am I?), and “[t]here is no question for a subject without 
another to whom he has addressed it.” For the psychotic, too, there is a question (and thus another to whom 
it is addressed, as well as a reformulation of it in the symptom), only this time the question is not asked by 
the subject but comes over the subject, as it were, from the place of the foreclosed signifier. See Lacan, 
Seminar 3, pp. 170 and 202. 
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precisely this, and why he does not say it directly. “What […] has to be understood is why there 
is something there [in the person’s speech or action] given to be understood.”920
But there are dangers from other directions, as well. We saw that in schizophrenia the 
boundary of the skin is too fragile to ward off transitivism and the penetration of words when 
they are encountered as things. This includes the analyst’s interpretations, which may be 
misunderstood as physical attacks or threats. Atwood speaks of being “drawn into [the] delusion”: 
his confusion about what the patient was saying was evident in his face, and she experienced this 
as an attack of death rays flowing out of his eyes, killing her.
 
921 One of Laing’s patients accused 
him of having her brains in his head: he unpacked this to mean that at a moment when she was 
thinking something, he had expressed something closely related, which she had interpreted as 
stealing her thoughts, which was (psychotically encountered) the same as taking her brains.922
On the opposite side, there is the danger of simply being tricked by a mistrustful patient. 
“The appearance of responding normally in social interaction, [a schizophrenic woman] writes, is 
no indication of actual emotional contact with others: ‘It is just an expression of the fact that I, 
purely dialectically, realize how those I am talking with expect that I should react.’”
 
923 It can be, 
in other words, a way of playing the game without appropriate investment. Hayward’s patient, 
Joan, claims, “We schizophrenics say and do a lot of stuff that is unimportant, and then we mix 
important things in with all this to see if the doctor cares enough to see them and feel them.”924
                                                 
920 Lacan, Seminar 3, pp. 48-9. 
 
Laing thinks that this is a defensive mode of protection against both destruction by hatred and 
engulfment by love: “This creates the ironical situation that the schizophrenic is often playing at 
being psychotic, or pretending to be so. […] A good deal of schizophrenia is simply nonsense, 
921 Atwood, The Abyss, p. 15. 
922 Laing, Divided Self, p. 216. 
923 Sass, “Consciousness Machine,” p. 213. 




My investigation so far has emphasized the use first-person accounts as illustrations on 
the assumption, not that the sufferer has the whole story or full self-understanding, but that if we 
are to understand anything, we must attend to the speech of the person involved – no matter how 
transformed it may be, and even if we are looking for unconscious motivations as we do so. 
Bovink, for example, after being helped to discover traumatic abuse at the root of her own 
psychotic suffering, writes (in 2006): 
 But I think that here we should raise some doubts, a) because it is not 
clear that someone in the grip of schizophrenia can be in the kind of control Laing suggests – we 
have seen how the unconscious is right out in the open for such persons – and b) because for all 
the difficulty the doctor has in differentiating the important from the unimportant, it is quite 
unlikely that the patient can accurately discern between them. If such a division is to be made, it 
usually has to emerge over the course of the work, though of course there are always surprises. 
The general idea still is that talking about psychosis increases the risk of a next one and that is 
why you shouldn’t talk about it. […] A psychiatric history with psychosis is considered a 
contraindication for any kind of serious communication. […] Nobody ever asked me: what was it 
that drove you mad? I was observed, diagnosed, and treated as a disturbed person, but nobody ever 
looked at the association with my life history.926
 
 
Laing summarizes the situation rather well when he points to two ways of going wrong in 
understanding a person in an annihilation state. On one side, we are tempted to assume that her 
speech and actions are not responses to the situation, which would be to give up from the outset 
on tracking down the (complex) way in which they are responses, even if primarily responses to a 
different situation; on the other side, we are inclined to presume that “he exists, in the world, like 
the other, as a permanent object in time and place, with others like himself”927
                                                 
925 Ibid., pp. 176-7. 
 – which would 
926 Bovink, “From Being a Disorder,” p. 18. The worry about discussing psychotic episodes, particularly 
what precipitated them, is perhaps overemphasized but far from silly. If something was overwhelming 
once, it may be again, and even patients who have so far only been neurotic sometimes become psychotic 
in analysis as the material is brought up afresh. Cf. Rosenfeld, “On the Treatment,” p. 159. 
927 Laing, Divided Self, p. 34. 
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also be a crucial misunderstanding, since we have seen that psychosis involves the radical 
instability of (and thoroughgoing doubts about) one’s being-in-the-world. 
Between these dangers and the ethical call to find a way of hearing and helping the 
person, how one receives psychotic speech bears an important likeness to the risky situation in 
which Freud decided (with infamous results) to trust his neurotic patients. What is appropriate 
receptivity here? Do we look for meaning? Do we medicate? Or do we apply some combination? 
Do we trust the person’s descriptions of the phenomena? Do we focus on disentangling what is 
real from what is fantasized? 
Atwood compares hallucinations and delusions to dreams, recognizing that within the 
context of an analysis, dreams are a major part of the speech of the unconscious. This speech is 
addressed to the analyst, often quite particularly, as a way of being brought to language. Thus, in 
the very case in which he was drawn into a schizophrenic delusion as a source of death rays, the 
patient presented Atwood with a dream whose analysis pointed the way to understanding the 
delusion. Surprisingly, when he expressed very concretely what he took to be the meaning of her 
words that he was killing her, interpreted within the context of the dream and the delusion, the 
delusion began to recede, just as dreams on a given theme cease once they have been adequately 
interpreted.928 He concludes, from this and other examples, that both dreams and delusions 
“depict the subjective life of the dreamer”929
Another patient reported to Atwood terrifying hallucinations of being absorbed into the 
bloodstreams of various members of her family, trying not to drown, but eventually dissolving 
into their blood. He interprets these by asking whether her family is a group of bloodsucking 
vampires, and with this recognition, her hallucinations came to an end. “I don’t know if 
hallucinations in general can be handled so readily,” he concludes, “but I do know that they often 
 in a way that is seeking to be interpreted. 
                                                 
928 Atwood, The Abyss, pp. 15-17 and 101. 
929 Ibid., p. 105. 
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contain symbolic metaphors, sometimes expressing the very heart of the matter of what has gone 
awry in a person’s life.”930
Atwood’s conclusion bears on how we understand psychotic symptoms as restitutive. 
“What looks like a breakdown into psychosis and delusion thus may represent an attempted 
breakthrough, but the inchoate ‘I’ does require an understanding and responsive ‘Thou’ in order 
to have a chance to consolidate itself.”
 
931 Such symptoms, then, are not only restitutive but 
communicative, invitations to interpret symbolically and thus to help the person reintegrate into 
the symbolically structured world. They are disguised and confusing, since the defensive rejection 
of shared structure remains in play, but they can draw the listener into the person’s conflict. This 
fits, broadly, with Freud’s conviction “that no mortal can keep a secret. If his lips are silent, he 
chatters with his finger-tips; [self-]betrayal oozes out of him at every pore.”932
Let us try to see how it might make sense in the context of treating psychosis, where the 
unconscious is not very hidden. Recognizing the unconscious is thus less a matter of looking for 
self-betrayal and more a matter of direct interpretation. If symptoms are attempts at 
communication, spoken to someone, what kind of receptivity is required? Hearing the person in 
such situations requires attending, via free-floating attention, to what Atwood calls ‘subjective 
truth’ and Freud calls ‘psychical reality.’
 
933
                                                 
930 Ibid., p. 48. 
 This is an area suspended between fantasy 
(understood as imaginative) and reality (understood as objective), an area in which what is 
experienced has the force of reality, even if it is not part of the shared world. (I would add, with 
931 Ibid., p. 61. 
932 Freud, “A Case of Hysteria [Dora],” SE 7:77-8. Cf. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, SE 6:221, 
where Freud admits that he can no longer succeed at lying, since he always betrays himself parapraxically. 
933 Atwood, The Abyss, pp. 47 and 52. Atwood characterizes this free-floating attention as letting what is 
said wash over one like a waterfall (pp. 47 and 49). Freud’s term for it is gleichschwebende 
Aufmerksamkeit, attention that sweeps evenly across what is said, rather than leaping automatically to 




Freud and for reasons explored later [chapter 7, part III], that in neurotics psychical reality 
includes unconscious fantasy.) 
Atwood claims that we miss this subjective truth because “we are hypnotized by what we 
think of as the externally real, and once the fascination sets in, we cannot hear what is said to us 
without judging its degree of concordance with that external reality.”934
We might understand such a task in the following way: in everyday life (Husserl’s natural 
attitude, Heidegger’s everydayness), we normally hear people correctly when we take what they 
say as making a claim on our more or less literal (let us say direct) belief, i.e., on our activities in 
a lived-through way. If we tried the sort of deep listening Atwood is outlining, we would not be 
helpful so much as annoying. This is the basis for what he is calling our ‘hypnosis’ by the 
externally real, though of course it is strengthened by the cultural valorization of the scientific 
attitude, objectivity, and so forth. 
 This would lead toward 
writing off psychosis as failed reality-testing, rather than trying to make sense of what experience 
of self is at stake in the person’s delusion. “It is possible, though, to set such thoughts aside and 
listen to what is being said, in and for itself.” 
But we should note that Atwood’s attention to ‘what is said, in and for itself’ already 
assumes something like Freud’s ‘reality-testing’ on the part of the therapist; it is just that this gets 
taken up into and performed by the context of the encounter. When someone enters the analyst’s 
office or is met as a patient in a hospital, the situation calls on the analyst to make the kind of step 
back that Atwood describes. Here is someone whose claims about needing to hide because the 
dogs are after her should be taken as ‘subjective truth,’ i.e., as symptoms or messages to be 
interpreted obliquely, rather than as direct claims that should be acted on by hiding or defending 
from dogs. In other words, one recognizes that taking the person seriously means “hiding” her 
from the “dogs,” granting her some emotional freedom and safety by discovering what ‘dogs’ 
                                                 
934 This quotation and the next from Atwood, The Abyss, pp. 49-50. 
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means for her, rather than interpreting her words in line with more publicly available meanings. 
The difference is less clear, for example, if the person has just dashed around a corner and 
bumped into me – I will need first to investigate whether there are physical dogs about to come 
around the bend and endanger both of us. 
The crucial move Atwood makes, however, following Freud, is not to get stuck at this 
level of everyday response or reality-testing, not to be primarily focused on whether the patient’s 
words correspond to what is publicly available, but instead to try to enter interpretively into the 
private, disorganized world disclosed by the person’s speech. The initial, superseded moment of 
reality-testing remains in force, since the goal is not simply to join the person’s world more or 
less uncritically (as it could be in reading a novel or watching a play, for example). The goal is, 
instead, to interpret that world, articulating a line of sight that is not (or is only partially) 
available to the patient. 
But what does it mean for this symbolic meaning to be hidden from the patient? In 
psychosis, as we have seen (section I.G.1), it means that the very possibility of effective 
symbolization is foreclosed. I build and build but find no peace, no recognition from a stable 
world. That hiddenness has a parallel in neurosis, where it means that particular symbolizations 
are repressed – at some level, I do not want to know what it means. 
This not wanting to know displays the stakes of Freud’s inference to unconscious 
thinking, and specifically to conflictual unconscious thinking (the ‘dynamic’ unconscious). At 
least some of the time, he has to be able to take it as true, i.e., to trust the neurotic’s speech, when 
she claims not to know (or not to have known). In the Introductory Lectures, Freud gives an 
example of a woman who found herself compelled, many times a day, to run into an adjoining 
room, stand a certain way, summon her maid, and then send her off again on some meaningless 
errand. At first, the patient could not say what this meant, even though it turned out to be derived 
from a memory involving the shame of her husband. This memory was presumably available to 
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her the whole time, but she could not recognize the connection between them, which had been 
repressed. In Freud’s words: “However often the patient repeated her obsessional action, she 
knew nothing of its being derived from the experience she had had. The connection between the 
two was hidden from her.” He then goes on to give the presupposition that allows him to infer 
this hiddenness or repression: “she could only quite truthfully reply that she did not know what it 
was that was making her carry out her action.”935
Already in Studies on Hysteria, it becomes very clear that the oblique appearance of the 
unconscious in the analytic setting – at any rate, the necessity of postulating it in order to explain 
or even to describe the phenomena of that setting
 It is Freud’s taking her at her word – at least at 
one level – that licenses his inference to some kind of interesting, because not simply conscious, 
conflict. 
936 – is predicated on a certain trustworthiness of 
the analysand, and thus on the analyst’s trust that would disclose the patient as trustworthy. Freud 
admits that his method is unworkable (unanwendbar) without the patient’s full cooperation and 
willing attention – again, at the conscious level.937 We should not forget that such an attitude on 
Freud’s part was rather unusual at the time (indeed, it remains unusual), since hysteria was taken 
to be either pretense or hereditary degeneracy, rather than psychologically justifiable suffering. 
For this reason, Freud does quite a bit of work in his early case studies to emphasize the 
earnestness and good character of his patients, along with the lack of any other evidence for 
degeneracy.938
                                                 
935 Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 16:277, emphasis added. 
 Indeed, he consistently tries to engage the reader’s human sympathy, insisting 
936 This is actually James Strachey’s claim, not Freud’s, but it bears repeating. Even an adequate 
description of the phenomena requires the postulate of unconscious thinking, on Freud’s account. See SE 
14:162. 
937 Freud, Studies on Hysteria, SE 2:153. 
938 Cf. the ‘Preliminary Remarks’ to the Wolf-Man case history, where Freud lauds the analysand for 
“patience, submissiveness [Gefügigkeit], insight, and confidence [or trust: Zutrauen]” (Wolf-Man, SE 
17:10, trans. mod.). 
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upon hysterical attacks as a kind of Jekyll-and-Hyde phenomenon and attempting to make 
hysteria seem not only intelligible but almost reasonable as a solution to unbearable conflict. 
We should note that Freud makes an interesting choice here: rather than assuming a kind 
of Sartrean bad faith on the patient’s part (thus besmirching her character), he postulates a 
different level of rationality at work within her. This allows it to be true that even when she says 
that she remembers nothing (or thinks of nothing), she both really is trying to cooperate and yet 
really does or can remember something. If all of his patients were in fact of poor character 
(shamming, say), then his inference to the dynamic unconscious would be indefensible. The 
conflict would remain on the conscious level, simply played out between the doctor who wants 
something and the patient who refuses to cooperate. 
If, however, at least some of the time the patient is genuinely trying to work with the 
analyst, but this effort is punctuated by unintentional failures to cooperate, then Freud can attend 
to these moments of resistance as evidence of internal conflict – places at which the patient is 
both willing and unwilling to cooperate. She both wants to know and does not want to know, at 
two different levels. And if she is not (simply) lying when she claims not to recognize her 
resistance as a conflict, then at least one party to the conflict must be both known (meaning: 
registered) and unknown (meaning: repressed) to her. 
 Oddly, listening for resistances (inappropriateness of speech, action, or affect) requires, 
as Freud puts it, that the analyst “must be mistrustful and remain on his guard against [the 
resistance].”939
                                                 
939 Introductory Lectures, SE 16:287, emphasis added, trans. mod. 
 In one way, then, the analyst must let himself feel “pained astonishment” when 
the patient breaks the fundamental rule of analysis (to say whatever comes into his head without 
concern for relevance or social appropriateness) and in some way censures his own speech. In my 
terms, this would be to rely on the patient’s good will and be disappointed (chapter 1, part I). 
More than once, Freud refers to such “betrayal” as the withdrawal from a pact or breaking of a 
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promise.940 But in another way, of course, this is just what the analyst is waiting for – Freud 
assumes (in the sense we have given to assumption-trust [chapter 1, part II]) that the unconscious 
will show itself by interfering with the flow of speech.941 He is then only disoriented (i.e., 
betrayed by the system) if it turns out to be impossible to locate the resistance and yet the patient 
remains ill. This disorientation is close to what happens to Freud in his encounter with psychosis: 
speech experiences no unconscious resistance, delusions are clearly legible, and yet those 
delusions will not go away.942
 As I am trying to demonstrate, however, Freud can only reach the level of assumption-
trust in the efficacy of the psychoanalytic system
 
943
                                                 
940 Introductory Lectures, SE 16:288 and “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” SE 23:239, where Freud 
posits a wholly fictional ‘normal ego’ that would be “unshakably loyal to the work of analysis,” i.e., fully 
given over to the structure of the analytic engagement, without interference from the unconscious. 
 on the basis of trusting in a personal way at 
least some of his patients. He must minimally trust their character if he is to discover something 
else – something subterranean – at work in them; this is then the precondition for coming to trust 
(in the sense of assume) the intelligibility of many of their symptoms. It is what convinces him 
that even highly resistant patients have a hidden desire to heal in conflict with their desire to 
remain ill. For his broad trust of the person is what allows the analytic relationship to survive the 
disappointments of the resistance long enough to work out a system that incorporates these 
941 SE 16:291. This shift from relying to assuming may also be seen in Freud’s account of dream 
interpretation earlier in the same work, where he introduces the concept of resistance by discussing the 
dreamer’s failure to associate freely to the interpreter despite having agreed to the fundamental rule. 
“Instead of being annoyed by the dreamer’s disobedience [i.e., remaining on the level of disappointment], 
we may take advantage of these experiences by learning something new from them – something which is 
all the more important the less we are expecting it” (Introductory Lectures, SE 15:141). In other words, he 
acts here like we earlier saw Heidegger act (chapter 2, section II.C), stepping back from “betrayal” to 
reorient his investment in a way that now accounts for that very “betrayal.” 
942 See SE 16:439, where he admits, “We are faced here by a fact which we do not understand and which 
therefore leads us to doubt whether we have really understood all the determinants of our possible success 
with the other neuroses.” Cf. SE 16:447. 
943 This assumptive trust moves from foreground hypothesis to background assumption during the analysis 
of Elisabeth von R., just at the point where Freud is discovering resistance. Freud “resolved, therefore, to 
adopt the hypothesis [Annahme] that the procedure never failed [versage]. […] I proceeded as though I 
were completely convinced of the reliability [Verlässlichkeit] of my technique. I no longer accepted her 
declaration that nothing had occurred to her, but assured her that something must have occurred to her. […] 
By thus insisting, […] I derived from this analysis a literally unqualified confidence [Zutrauen] in my 
technique” (Studies, SE 2:153-4, trans. mod.). 
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disappointments – incorporates them to such an extent that he experiences the very lack of such 
disappointments (the lack of resistance) as a kind of deeper resistance. Furthermore, it is Freud’s 
trust in his patients as persons that opens a space in which he can reorganize the system when it 
fails: when, for example, Emmy von N. makes him the support of her repetition-compulsion, or 
when Dora flees treatment – likely for her own safety – before it can be concluded. Both of these 
“betrayals” are system-level failures (disorientations), since psychoanalytic technique did not yet 
take into account the transference, and yet Freud never simply concludes that the problem lay at 
the level of conscious conflict. He maintains, in both cases, that his patients at some level were 
trying to cooperate, but were overcome by their resistances and his own lack of experience. 
 
A) Trust from the Analyst 
 A similarly convoluted layering appears in the most significant betrayal of Freud’s early 
work: his complicated discovery of infant sexuality.944
                                                 
944 See Freud, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” SE 14. 
 Initially, it is his patients’ faithfulness to 
the rule of free association that leads the therapy back into childhood. He demands that they tell 
him whatever comes to mind, and they start remembering quite astonishing scenes of sexual 
abuse from early life. It is on this basis – along with his own memories, arising in self-analysis – 
that he comes to assume that childhood experiences are relevant to present illness. But eventually 
he discovers that at least some (by no means all!) of his patients who have “remembered” stories 
of childhood parental abuse were not abused in a way that would show up in the shared world – 
were not “really” abused. This surely seems like a betrayal of his trust in his patients and in his 
method. Has he been taken in by hysterical tricks? Are his patients not of such strong character as 
he had thought? 
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We might expect this betrayal to produce a profound mistrust. And, indeed, Freud says 
that because of this discovery he came near to giving up psychoanalysis.945 It was a discovery 
“suited [geeignet] more than any other to discredit either analysis [i.e., the system], which has led 
to this result, or the patients, on whose statements the analysis and our whole understanding of the 
neuroses are founded.”946 Freud thus found himself forced to ask whether he trusted more the 
people he analyzed or the system of analysis as it was. He finds himself trusting his patients 
nonetheless, and reconfiguring the system. This trust in them is not necessarily for good reasons. 
It seems to be in part because he is already so invested in them (and in the meaningfulness that 
they are revealing to belong to the world of the neuroses), and in part because he trusts his own 
father too much to suspect him of literal abuse, notwithstanding the Oedipal difficulties the self-
analysis is revealing. (If this were a matter of mere reliance, it would be an ill-advised decision.) 
Freud concludes, then, that the traumatic events must have happened; if not in reality, then in 
fantasy. His trust of his patients thus exacts a certain price from his ideal of objective science, 
since it requires abandoning the presupposition that fantasy is significantly less important than 
shared reality.947
Freud makes this step, remaining faithful to his patients, to his method, and to his father, 
despite what seems like the evidence. Oddly enough, however, his determination to believe his 
 
                                                 
945 Freud describes it as “complete bewilderment,” in which he had “lost the firm ground of reality” (SE 
14:17, trans. mod.). Cf. Freud’s famous letter to Wilhelm Fliess of September 21, 1897, in which he claims 
no longer to believe (glauben) in his theory of the neuroses (“my neurotica”). Freud’s disorientation here 
was approached in personal importance only by his later experience of Fliess’s professional carelessness in 
operating on one of Freud’s patients, who eventually died from the complications. Note that in the 
September 21 letter, it is in part his personal trust in Fliess that allowed him to speak: “I want to entrust 
[anvertrauen] to you the great secret…” (Freud, Complete Letters to Fliess, p. 264, trans. mod./Aus den 
Anfängen der Psychoanalyse, hrsgs. M. Bonaparte, A. Freud, E. Kris [London: Imago, 1950], p. 229). 
946 Introductory Lectures, SE 16:367, trans. mod. Freud follows this up by saying “we are tempted to be 
offended [beleidigt]” by the patient’s inventions; this ‘tempted to be offended’ is a nice characterization of 
what must have been quite fluctuating reactions on Freud’s part. 
947 We might think that it was Freud’s background assumptions about science (not any personal trust) that 
kept him afloat in the midst of the disorientation of his foreground psychoanalytic theories (see chapter I, 
section II.A). But the conviction, which he undeniably maintained, that there must be some explanation for 
his patients’ behavior is in no way sufficiently specific to make sense of his decision to revise one of those 
background scientific assumptions, rather than simply deciding that his patients were willfully lying. 
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patients leads to the discovery that their traumatic fantasies are lies (in the sense of 
embellishments) in order to hide something – just not lies created by his patients in the present. 
Instead, the embellishments were made as small children in order to hide their sexual activity 
from disapproving parents, thus opening up a space for their own desire. Instead of simply 
confirming and restoring his trust, then, the decision to further invest himself by changing his 
presuppositions turns out to lead into mistrust after all, as might be expected with betrayal. He 
really was lied to. And yet the mistrust is not at all due to what he had initially thought was the 
betrayal: namely, that his patients were currently, consciously lying to him. Freud’s mistrust – 
keeping an ear out for childhood deception – is, rather, founded on the initial movement of trust 
itself, the movement of trusting his adult patients. 
There are two consequences of this strange series of discoveries. First, childhood sexual 
interest and fear of castration (i.e., fear of the fragmenting punishment by adults for daring to 
have one’s own desire) appear as the real grounds of the fantasized trauma, but they do so only 
after Freud has given up on the necessity of actually finding such grounds. In other words, just 
when he no longer needs for there to be a strict correlation between trauma and reality in order to 
trust that his patients are telling the truth in the present, he finds one: they genuinely do have the 
“memories” they are reporting, and those “memories” really are connected to something that 
happened in childhood, even if only as screens for it. Second, what he finds shows that in order 
for him to understand his patients as honest in the present, they must have been lying in the past. 
That is, relying on their word now is founded on trusting them as persons, since it requires 
thinking both that they lied in the past and that they had an understandable reason for it (the 
conflict of fear and desire) – thus that they are trustworthy or understandable in general despite 
lying in the specific instance. Here is a kind of ‘kettle logic’ that seems only to lead deeper into 
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the mess,948 yet such trust allows for a real cure in the present by freeing the patient from the 
necessity of the past deception.949
From a theoretical, distanced point of view, we can of course make sense of Freud’s 
complex trusting investments as differences of scope (he trusts x insofar as y, but not with regard 
to z). Historically, we can recognize that his fundamentally trusting relation to his patients as 
persons, once it had justified his inference to the dynamic unconscious, could often fade behind 
his assumption-trust of the theory, even if it remained as ground when the theory ran into 
difficulties. Practically, we can be fair enough (and faithful enough to psychoanalytic insights) to 
grant him ambivalence within the general scope of his personal trust – he loved his patients in 
some ways and at some times and hated them in others; he was immune neither to paternalizing 
condescension nor to what he himself calls “impatient contempt.”
 (Approaching his patients with personal mistrust, a kind of 
generalized suspicion, would simply have provoked a retrenchment of the deception.) It turns out 
that it really is sustainable to cultivate an independent life of desire, and it costs less than the 
destruction of self feared in real castration, even if it does cost something (namely, symbolic 
castration, submission to the laws of the shared world, including those of language). 
950
These are not minor concerns. Yet they should not obscure the thesis I am defending 
here: the basic psychoanalytic insight into the existence and nature of unconscious thinking is 
justified by a particular kind of investment – namely, a personal trust that is really quite stubborn 
 
                                                 
948 Cf. Interpretation of Dreams, SE 4:119-20. If the claim in need of defense is, Psychoanalysis is right to 
infer the dynamic unconscious because (at least some) patients are trustworthy in their present free 
associations, then the ‘kettle’ defense would go something like this: Freud’s claim does not require that 
there be a real correlate to his patients’ freely associated ‘memories’ about trauma, since fantasy is 
subjectively close to reality in importance. And because there is a real correlate. And anyway, although the 
real correlate establishes that the fantasy was a lie at the time, it also shows that the child had trustworthy 
motivations for that lie. 
949 The multiple levels of self-investment at work here (trusting the person, assuming the tenets of 
psychoanalysis, and relying on the person’s particular claims), including the humbling revelations of his 
own self-analysis, allow us to understand how Freud could proceed with his analyses despite frequent 
disappointments and the growing conviction that “in the end one is laying bare the patient’s evil 
inclinations, his will to remain ill” (Freud, “Letter of October 3, 1897,” in Complete Letters to Fliess, p. 
269). 
950 Freud, “Analysis Terminable and Interminable,” SE 23:216. 
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– on the part of the analyst. It is the same investment that grounds persistent efforts to make sense 
out of psychotic speech, to attend to the particularity of a delusion in the context of a life history, 
rather than merely relying on drugs to subdue people’s desperate (and bizarre) efforts to restore 
the world.951
But nor should we let our philosophical interests obscure the fact that the same trusting 
investment, the commitment to spend years seeking meaning in a person’s life that seems like 
nonsense, requires no small investment from the analysand – which is not always available. For 
the patient, too, must trust, and this is also in a complex and unusual way. 
 It is the investment that bears with negative transference in all its destructive glory, 
recognizing that the annihilation of the world may take years of patient work to recover from, and 
even then is neither guaranteed nor measurable. 
 
B) Trust from the Analysand 
Freud himself tries to minimize this requirement in his discussions of technique. He 
claims that the analysand’s “initial trust or distrust [of psychoanalysis] is almost negligible 
compared with the internal resistances which hold the neurosis firmly in place,” and he even says 
that it is better if someone enters analysis with a “benevolent skepticism.”952 His concern is that 
the analysand’s initial approach is both blind to and useful to the resistance – whether an initial 
“happy trustfulness” that is soon forgotten or shattered by the difficulties of analysis, or an initial 
skepticism that, like other symptoms, preserves the current state, either may be a mode of 
resistance.953
                                                 
951 I say ‘merely,’ for there are many analysts who use drugs to enable therapy, and it is not clear that all 
attempts to recover the world should be supported or even only interpreted – some are deeply destructive 
and need to be interrupted as well as interpreted. 
 Freud advises the analyst to tell the skeptic that “the analysis requires no trust 
[Vertrauen], that […] his distrust […] will not be an interference, provided he conscientiously 
952 Quotations from, respectively, “On Beginning the Treatment,” SE 12:126, and Introductory Lectures, 
SE 16:244. 
953 SE 12:126 and SE 16:440. 
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carries out what the rule of the treatment requires of him.”954
Nevertheless, Freud does recognize that the trust of the analysand is eventually necessary. 
Thus, he advises the analyst to warn the patient early on of the coming difficulties so that she 
does not feel tricked later, presumably because her trust matters somewhat to the work (lest the 
resistance grow too great).
 That is to say, at first the analysand 
need not trust the analyst, so long as the former is nevertheless willing to act in a trustworthy 
manner by trying to hold to the rule of analysis and ceding authority to the analyst who embodies 
that rule. The analysand’s proving himself consistently untrustworthy at a conscious level, on the 
other hand, renders analysis nearly impossible, not because the analyst cannot interpret such 
behavior, but because the analysand is inadequately invested in the process to care about the 
interpretations. 
955 Elsewhere, he laments the impracticality of making common cause 
with patients’ relatives to stop them interfering in the process. It is impractical, he says, “because 
of the risk of losing the trust [Vertrauen] of the patient, who – quite correctly, moreover – expects 
the person in whom he has put his trust [Vertrauensmann] to take his side.”956
In a more general but also a more thoroughgoing way, Freud recognizes that speech has a 
“magical [healing] power” only within the context of a certain relationship, in which the patient’s 
desire to know is connected with a desire to belong. Thus he points out in the very first of his 
Introductory Lectures that the material with which analysis works is the most intimate, and that 




                                                 
954 SE 12:126, trans. mod. Cf. p. 138: “[The difficulty] is not so serious if all he has to tell us is how 
mistrustful he is of analysis or the horrifying things he has heard about it.” 
 
955 SE 12:129. 
956 SE 16:459. Cf. the Wolf-Man case history, where Freud “cannot advise too strongly against” filling in 
memory gaps by questioning the patient’s family because “one has disturbed the trust [Vertrauen] in the 
analysis and set up over it a court of appeal” (Wolf-Man, SE 17:14n2, trans. mod.). 
957 Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 15:17-18. We should note that in analysis this attachment, too, is part 
of the ‘psychical reality’ discussed just above. Freud advises analysts that transference-love should be 
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I would add, finally, that the analysand’s relation to the analyst requires a very strange 
trust. In being given over to the analyst, what I need is for her to frustrate me for the right 
reasons, although it is unlikely that I recognize this as the content of the growing trust relation. 
This may begin as simple reliance: if my analyst listens to me as a friend would, understanding 
what I say, commiserating, and proposing lines of action, I need a different analyst. So, I am 
relying on her primarily to listen for what I cannot hear in my own speech, rather than to listen for 
the everyday meaning of what I am telling her. This eventually requires assumptive trust (in 
analysis as a process) as well as personal trust of the analyst, albeit not in the way I would trust a 
close friend. I should not long submit to the frustrations of being misunderstood unless I can 
assume it to be a productive misunderstanding. And even if I as analysand assume that analysis 
works when done well, I must eventually trust this particular analyst as a person, one who seeks 
my good competently (within the bounds of the relationship) even when it seems like what she is 
doing or saying is not what is best for me. In order to remain given over to her judgment of the 
best course against my own wishes, I will have to find myself invested in her in a way that 
discloses her as personally trustworthy (chapter 1, part III). 
 
C) The Dangers of Psychoanalysis 
This trust on my part (as analysand) is required precisely because relationships that are 
structurally founded on trust are open to abuse, even when the abused party remains to some 
degree mistrustful. This is of course the perennial and, according to Freud, inherently 
ineliminable danger of psychoanalysis, much as sophistry is the permanent shadow of 
                                                                                                                                                 
neither repulsed nor responded to: the analyst “must keep firm hold of [it], but treat it as something unreal, 
as a situation which has to be gone through in the treatment and traced back to its unconscious origins” 
(Freud, “Observations on Transference Love,” SE 12:166). 
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philosophy.958 Over and over again, Freud tries to deal with the specter of reducing 
psychoanalysis to suggestion therapy, and while it seems to me that he advances good arguments 
against equating analysis with the particular forms of real hypnotic suggestion, he cannot make 
vanish the concerns about analysands being taken advantage of, simply because analysis can 
always be reduced to abusive suggestion therapy by its practitioners. He puts the danger in the 
following terms, which go right to the heart of the talking cure: the analysand might “not be 
allowed a chance to speak.”959
Freud is at some pains to show that psychoanalysis does not intrinsically prevent the 
analysand from speaking. The most obvious concern is that the analyst’s interpretations work on 
a principle similar to ‘heads I win, tails you lose.’
 
960
I do not mean x = I do mean it 
 For example, Freud gives a series of 
translations for the analyst that seem to override as ‘resistance’ whatever the patient says. 
It was not y = it was 
I would never have thought that = not the conscious ‘I’ but the unconscious involves 
precisely that thought 
No = the interpretation is incomplete 
Yes = ambiguous, depending on other confirmations961
 
 
And if the patient produces an association or slip of the tongue that seems to add to the 
interpretation, this means ‘you are right,’ even if it comes in the course of an explicit denial. 
Now this seems rather perverse. The only two responses that should be translated as ‘no’ 
or ‘that interpretation is wrong’, according to Freud, are indifference and a lack of productivity in 
the further course of the work. How then can the patient have her chance to contradict the 
                                                 
958 “This is the objection that is most often raised against psychoanalysis, and it must be admitted that, 
though it is groundless [unzutreffend – it does not hit the mark], it cannot be rejected as unreasonable [or 
incomprehensible: unverständig]” (SE 16:452). 
959 Freud, “Constructions in Analysis,” SE 23:262, trans. mod. Strachey translates nicht zu Wort kommen 
lassen as “not allowing his patients to have their say”; a literal rendition would be ‘not allowing them to 
come to word,’ which would remind us that the whole of the analytic task involves letting or helping to be 
brought into words that which has been shut off from speech (i.e., the unconscious). 
960 Freud takes on this concern directly in “Constructions in Analysis,” SE 23:257. 
961 Compiled from “Negation,” SE 19:235, and “Constructions in Analysis,” SE 23:261-64. 
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interpretation? Is the analyst not simply free to fantasize aloud about the analysand with no 
resistance from reality?962
Freud gives several answers, most of which presuppose a certain temporal duration to the 
analysis, since interpretations or reconstructions are to be taken as hypotheses awaiting 
confirmation from further material. But his most interesting reply for our purposes is given only 
obliquely. He points to a feature of obsessional neurosis – namely, that as an attempt to be always 
in control, it tries to control the interpretation, as well – that brings about a kind of vicious 
regress.
 
963 This regress takes the following form: something has just occurred to me, and it seems 
like it means x. But then that is probably resistance, so it must not. But what if my assignment of 
resistance is itself resistance…? The obsessional has no way to cut this except arbitrarily, and 
arbitrariness will only produce further self-doubt. Freud does not say this explicitly, but if the 
action or slip I am analyzing in myself really is motivated by something that I would rather not 
know about, then there is no way I can cut this regress on my own. I need another person (in this 
case, the analyst), who is not directly subject to my desires, to introduce the cut for me. If I am 
left to my own attempts, then at least at this level, there is no reason why my ignorance, self-
imposed through repression, should not be invincible. It has been impenetrable for this long, and 
even though it betrays itself in symptoms, for me those symptoms are already compromises, 
made precisely to preserve my ignorance. If this reasoning is right, then a relation in which the 
analyst purposefully misunderstands my speech is as necessary to my health as Socrates claimed 
to be to the health of the Athenian citizens.964
                                                 
962 In the context of reconstructions of very early events, Freud frames the objection this way: “What was 
argued at first was that [very early scenes] were not realities but phantasies. But what is argued now is 
evidently that they are phantasies not of the patient but of the analyst himself, who forces them upon the 
person under analysis on account of some complexes of his own” (Wolf-Man, SE 17:52). 
 Although analysis is inherently frustrating, as the 
963 See “Negation,” SE 19:235. 
964 Plato, Apology, 29d-31a. 
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translations Freud proposes suggest, and although it is potentially abusive, it is not intrinsically 
abusive any more than philosophy is intrinsically sophistry. 
The reason why the danger of abusive suggestion can never be simply excised from 
psychoanalysis, however, is that the power of analysis lies in exploitation of the emotional 
attachment called transference, and this, along with as the desire to belong, is at the root of 
suggestion. Indeed, Freud tells us that suggestibility essentially is the capacity for transference, 
only understood in the limited context of hypnosis.965
 Freud recalls that during his time with Bernheim (the famous hypnotist), he already felt 
 At least from a theoretical viewpoint, the 
necessity of this transference may be understood quite directly in the case of psychosis: the 
patient’s desire to belong to the shared world has to find in the analyst a basically trustworthy 
representative of that world, and this must eventually overcome her desire to avoid the shared 
world. (Practically, of course, the problem of transference in psychosis is far more bedeviling.) 
a muffled hostility to this tyranny of suggestion. When a patient who showed himself unamenable 
was met with the shout: ‘What are you doing? You are counter-suggesting yourself,’ I said to 
myself that this was an evident injustice and an act of violence. For the man certainly had a right 
to counter-suggestions if people were trying to subdue him with suggestions.966
 
 
We could say that this violence haunted Freud for the rest of his life, even at the time when his 
own therapeutic work was explicitly a matter of hypnotic suggestion. Already in the report of his 
first hypnotism case, Emmy von N., he tries to soothe his conscience by explaining hypnosis as 
simply a way to help her trust him enough to speak freely. 
I did not make more impression on her in that state than I might have expected to do [with 
someone unhypnotized] who listened to me with complete trust [die mir mit grossem Vertrauen 
gelauscht]. The only difference was that Frau von N. was unable, in what passed as her normal 
state, to meet me with any such favourable attitude.967
 
 
                                                 
965 SE 16:451. Cf. chapter 4 of Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SE 18:88-92. 
966 SE 18:89, trans. mod. 
967 Freud, Studies, SE 2:99, trans. mod. 
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Emmy had reason to be mistrustful of doctors, and as such, according to Freud, was unable 
without hypnosis to share the necessary attitude of another woman who sought him out, namely, 
the attitude that “one may tell a doctor everything.”968
 I conclude, then, that the analysand must come to personally trust the analyst and to 
assume the efficacy of the analytic process, while the analyst, for her part, can only come to 
believe in unconscious thinking by trusting at least some patients personally, which will then 
allow her to assume the efficacy of the process. Freud claims that his technique requires from the 
analyst “personal concern for the patients,” and from the patients “above all their confidence 
[Zutrauen],” i.e., that they “put themselves in his hands and give their trust to him.”
 
969 It is crucial 
for the functioning of the analytic process, he says, that the analyst trusts (and insists) that the 
patient can remember something, even when the patient thinks he cannot. In this way, the analyst 
provides counterpressure against the resistance. (Indeed, it was in this way that Freud discovered 
the resistance, by observing the costs of his own investment: namely, how unusually tired he was 
after talking with his neurotic patients.970
If my account is correct, then (appearances notwithstanding) it is only through a joint 
personal investment that the unconscious part of the truth of human beings can be integrated with 
the self – or, in the case of psychosis, that the self as fragmented by the unconscious can be 
integrated into the shared world. Lacan is right to say of Freud that he “was taken up in the quest 
for a truth which engaged him totally, including there his own self, and hence also his presence 
with respect to the patient.”
) 
971
                                                 
968 SE 2:127, trans. mod. 
 
969 SE 2:265-6, trans. mod. (German: sich dem Arzte zu überliefern und ihm ein Vertrauen einzuräumen). 
970 SE 2:111-12. 
971 Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-1954, ed. J.-A. 




 Let me briefly characterize what has been my strategy in this chapter. I have sought to 
understand psychosis as a radical plunge out of the structured, shared world, a betrayal of 
primitive trust such as Heidegger’s thinking is unable to account for. In doing so, I began from 
philosophy and the insights of phenomenological psychiatry; much of the latter is indebted to 
Heidegger for its philosophical basis. When that led me to points of contact with Freudian 
psychoanalysis, I took up the latter as my guiding thread, since it is able to give a structural 
account of matters that Heidegger and the phenomenologists cannot address. I also paid close 
attention to the difficulties of understanding psychosis at all, including the basic problem of how 
to trust what is said by people who are disconnected from shared reality. This latter question 
opened the way for an attempt to link up Freud’s theoretical constructions – constructions to 
which Heidegger strongly objects, especially the dynamic, structured unconscious – with Freud’s 
therapeutic practice, which Heidegger finds much more congenial. Investments in the shared 
world, especially an involvement of personal trust and a patient letting-appear of oblique 
phenomena, turned out to be the ground for seemingly objective, distanced assumptions about the 
human subject. 
 What is still needed is a closer look at Freud’s theorizing, his metapsychology, from a 
phenomenological perspective. Is it not, as one often hears, primarily oriented toward a closed-
off, Cartesian consciousness, plagued by inner drive-conflicts that occasionally spill out into the 
world? Robert Stolorow has articulated this concern well: “the Freudian psyche is fundamentally 
a Cartesian mind in that it is a container of contents (instinctual energies, wishes, etc.), a thinking 
thing that, precisely because it is a thing, is ontologically […] separated from its world.”972
                                                 
972 Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma, p. 24. 
 If this 
is the only way of understanding Freud’s theory, it is hard to see how his thinking could have 
much to offer Heidegger. Furthermore, although we have pieced together an account of psychosis 
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guided by some of Freud’s insights, this is at least somewhat counter-intuitive from a Freudian 
perspective. How can specifically Freudian psychoanalysis orient itself to psychosis, when Freud 
himself was mostly convinced his practice could do nothing very helpful for psychotics? Finally, 
we still need to get clear about the entry into originary truth that takes place for each person. If 
Freud is right to take thinking to be a costly achievement, where and why can it go wrong? What 
kinds of conflicts motivate the child’s primary foreclosure or acceptance of the shared world? 




“Getting and Spending, We Lay Waste Our Powers” 
wherein the Drives are found to be World-Oriented despite their Hiddenness, 
Psychic Development looks increasingly Fraught, 
and Poor Investment Decisions leave One Vulnerable to Collapse973
 
 
[W]hat becomes of a subject […] when not only that sense of identity but also 
more fundamentally that sense of existing, in a relationship, in relation to others, 
firmly grounded on land, which upholds all people, is simply not sustainable? 
What becomes of anxiety if it reaches the borders of non-existence, if the 
annihilation process deforms perception of one's body, [of] oneself, of others? 
What then of […] the transference […, if it] perpetually takes place beneath 
the [threat] of the inescapable, of powerlessness, annihilation, 
of that which never happened, or happened too often, 




The previous chapter showed that a Freudian understanding of psychosis affords us quite 
a bit of help in making structural sense of that phenomenon’s various puzzles, including some 
matters that elude phenomenological psychiatry, while still leaving us a way to attend to the 
singularity of the person who is suffering under the pressure of annihilation. It also sketched a 
defense of the inference to unconscious thinking on the ground of the experience of personal 
trusting within the framework of the analytic relationship. In other words, it went some way 
toward bringing together Freud’s metapsychology and his reflections on psychoanalytic 
technique, and it did so in the context of the lived problems of psychosis, i.e., the tremendous 
difficulties as they show up for both the sufferer and the one seeking to understand and help. This 
served to highlight the central importance of trust, both primitive and personal, in the individual’s 
integration (or reintegration) into the world. 
From these considerations, we were able to catch sight of the real possibility of a 
genuinely unpredictable break with originary truth, one that cannot adequately be interpreted as a 
                                                 
973 The title of this chapter is a line from William Wordsworth’s “The World Is Too Much With Us,” in 
Poems, in Two Volumes, and Other Poems, 1800-1807, ed. Jared Curtis (Cornell University Press, 1983). 
974 Lina Balestriere, “The Work of the Psychoanalyst in the Field of Psychosis,” tr. A.-M. Di Biasio, 
International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 88 (2007): 407-421. 
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mere privation of being-there. We saw that this break with the world is a failure of primitive trust, 
usually beginning already in one’s first years of life. But that calls for a more detailed account of 
our entrance into the shared world in those formative years – or rather, as we shall see (part II), an 
account of the owning (affirmation) of or rejection of the shared world to which the infant finds 
itself already exposed. 
In the course of our further investigation, we will see what it means for this affirmation or 
rejection to take place as the resolution of a central conflict: the question of whether or not to 
submit to language as the law of the shared world’s structure. We will find, however, as I have 
already indicated (chapter 2, section I.A), that this is not a choice one can ever make rationally or 
deliberately; rather, it is “made” on the basis of a disposition of trust or distrust, an emotional 
insight about oneself as primitively given over to (or utterly overwhelmed by) the world, where 
that world is figured in one’s primary caretakers. In other words, if it takes place, the event of 
adopting the world as one’s own, coming to belong to it fully, involves a necessary circulation 
between personal trust and primitive trust. My thesis is that this circulation only makes sense if 
these two kinds of trust share the same phenomenological structure, as I claimed at the outset of 
this study (chapter 1, part III). 
But if we are to bring together in one interpretation some of Freud’s various theories 
about the development of psychic structure – the development in which this moment of 
fundamental affirmation or rejection plays a central role – we will have to examine Freud’s 
metapsychology at some length. This unifying interpretation is necessary for at least two reasons. 
One reason is that we need to see whether Freud’s metapsychology, particularly the view 
of the human person upon which his thinking about psychosis is founded, can withstand closer 
scrutiny from a phenomenological point of view. Hence, in what follows, I will read Freud in a 
philosophical way that I take to be faithful to his thinking, without getting entangled in certain 
vexed questions concerning his understanding of psychoanalysis as a science, or concerning the 
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possibility that his conception of science is outdated.975 More specifically, I want to show that the 
Freudian subject is not necessarily closed in on itself in the Cartesian way that Heidegger finds so 
deeply troubling. Instead, Freud is consistently sensitive to the way the world precisely interrupts 
our attempts to close ourselves off to it – and these attempts are defensive in nature. Even 
narcissism, which is a developmental stage consisting precisely of investment in one’s self-image, 
is a development that can never be complete according to Freud.976
The other reason for the following investigation is that Freud’s own thinking needs 
reinterpretation if it is really to come to grips with psychosis. We have said that the real 
possibility of a psychotic break should cause great difficulty for Heidegger’s account (chapter 4), 
and we have articulated a theory of what is involved in such a break by following guideposts 
offered by Freud (chapter 5, part I). But let us be clear: psychosis also creates serious problems 
for straightforward Freudian theory, a fact which Freud himself openly acknowledged.
 
977
That clarification will, in turn, help us to better understand what is involved in our 
originary being-in-the-truth and why it might be, even constitutively, more fragile than Heidegger 
 Those 
Freudians who have tried especially to make sense of psychosis at the level of theory (among 
them Melanie Klein, Jacques Lacan, Wilfrid Bion, and more recently Piera Aulagnier) have done 
so through an interrogation of human psychogenesis, and while we will not simply trace their 
accounts, we will follow the same approach. This will help us to clarify the (meaningful) 
predisposing origins of psychosis that were introduced in the previous chapter. 
                                                 
975 These are the questions with which much philosophy of psychoanalysis concerns itself. See, e.g., 
Jacques Bouveresse, Wittgenstein Reads Freud: The Myth of the Unconscious, tr. C. Cosman (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Brakel, Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and the A-rational Mind, op. 
cit.; Lavinia Gomez, The Freud Wars: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
976 As we saw (chapter 5, section I.D.2), it is also the achievement to which one returns in paranoia. 
977 These problems confront central aspects of Freudian theory and practice. Psychotic speech seems to 
experience little or no resistance from a concealed unconscious; it is rather as if the unconscious were right 
on the surface. Yet interpretation of this easily available material produces either no effect or a 
disproportionally drastic effect, in a way that is hard to anticipate. Freud thought that a transference relation 
with psychotics was impossible; he was wrong about that, but even when it is possible, it tends to be 
negative and violently destructive, and it is difficult to say when interpreting it will be helpful or harmful. 
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thinks. We need to see in what way the vulnerability to a radical break has its origins in universal 
conflicts that are necessarily involved in the constitution of the human being. In other words, we 
will have to explain why the terrifying experience of a few outliers is a danger for all of us, such 
as to license conclusions about the nature of the human relation to being as such. If I can in this 
way show that our fundamental integration into the shared world is one point at which 
psychoanalytic theory has direct ontological implications, then it will be philosophically fruitful 
to attend to Freud’s account of the genesis of thinking in the human being as a precarious 
achievement, one that may cost more than a person can afford. 
  
I. Psychic Achievement as Response 
I begin, then, with what is called the ‘economic’ question of psychic achievement in 
Freud’s metapsychology, prior to the elaboration of his triadic topography in The Ego and the Id 
(1923).978
                                                 
978 I will focus on the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895; first published posthumously in 1950), 
the early essay “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911), and “Instincts and 
Their Vicissitudes” (1915). 
 By interrogating Freud’s theorizing at some length, I will emphasize psychic 
achievement (including both particular disclosures and psychic development) as a response to the 
world. My thesis is that such achievement is always a motivated result, by which I mean a 
purposeful (even if not necessarily conscious) investment (Besetzung) on the part of the self. Such 
investments can themselves only occur on the basis of being already invested in and by the world 
in which the individual finds herself. I have already briefly discussed such achievement in terms 
of its costs: to be permanently exposed to a potentially overwhelming set of solicitations, to suffer 
both the absence of the loved object and the inadequacy of the unified self (chapter 5, section 
I.G.1). The course of the present chapter will in the end return us to that version of the economic 
question in more detail. But first: investment. 
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A) Being-Invested as Being-Driven 
Let me start with an example that will isolate the phenomenal difference between a 
reaction and a response, since this distinction will shortly become important for making sense of 
two different basic modes of relation to the world. In the movie version of J.R.R. Tolkien’s The 
Two Towers, the character Aragorn, after having run for several days in an effort to rescue his 
kidnapped friends, comes across evidence of their death. He kicks a steel helmet lying on the 
ground and yells in frustration. The viewer understands this as a meaningful response to the 
whole situation. In one of the commentaries on the film, however, we are told that Viggo 
Mortensen, the actor playing Aragorn, in fact broke his toe when he kicked the helmet during 
filming. The responsive yell of frustration, then, is at another level (or on another scene) simply a 
reaction of pain, a physiological attempt to remove or cover up unpleasant feeling. It would take 
purposeful effort to smother it, whereas no purposeful effort goes into producing it. 
I take reaction to be the broader category here. Reaction is simply an action that is 
occasioned by the given situation or event; it may be meaningful or absurd, sufficient or 
incomplete (and each admits of degrees). Mere reaction is passivity (e.g., pain) followed by 
activity (yelling); it is reflexive, mostly unconscious or preconscious, thus not consciously 
directed and often not even voluntary. It is not necessarily meaningless, but it is not taken up as 
meaningful. Response is a specific subset of reaction not reducible to mere reaction. It requires 
taking-up and furthering the situation as meaningful, and it is unable to be situated as a dialectic 
of activity and passivity. It must itself be meaningful, although it may be mistaken, and it may be 
sufficient or incomplete. Its meaningfulness rests in an (at least) implicit appeal to norms of 
interaction, even if the response goes contrary to the relevant norms. This means, we should 




There are further striations within the category of response: some responses involve 
conscious, goal-oriented deliberation, but some may be processed at the unconscious level. 
Although ‘response’ has a verbal connotation in English, it seems to make sense to speak of many 
other (non-verbalizing) animals being capable of response as I have characterized it here, and it is 
likely that the importance of the connotation lies in communication, which emphasizes 
meaningfulness. 
Neurotic behavior, for example, is in some way a reaction to the current situation. Even 
though it is meaningless in the present context – it makes no appeal to the situationally 
appropriate norms – this context has somehow occasioned it, and so it presents itself as mere 
reaction. Nevertheless, Freud interprets it as a response to another situation (either remembered 
or fantasized), one whose norms it does take into account. But since it is a response to a situation 
too fraught with conflict, it is governed from a level of the psyche other than that of 
consciousness. 
As a mostly non-neurotic example, think of a car accident. There may be intertwined 
iterations of reaction and response: the initial affective reaction may involve a release of 
adrenaline (wanting to fight or flee), anger, shock, the impulse to scream or cry, and so forth; but 
there is an interruption. One has to call the police, trade insurance information, or something 
similar – i.e., one is called to respond meaningfully – and so a fuller affective reaction may be 
deferred. Later, when the situation is safer, a more sufficient processing of affect can come about 
(actually screaming or crying, fighting or fleeing). This delayed reaction may be technically a 
response (emotionally processing and sorting out how to understand the meaning of the event), or 
it may take place on the merely reactive level (blowing up at a family member on slight 
provocation). Either way, there remains a need to get something off of one’s chest. This means 
that one cannot simply absorb the violence of the encounter – including the violence of one’s own 
reaction to it – but must channel it somehow (what Freud calls sublimation). It may also be that 
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such channeling happens only much later, provoked by the ways in which the traumatic event has 
given rise to symptoms that disrupt one’s life. In that case, Freud thinks of the affective reaction 
as partially taking place in those symptoms themselves, and he calls the channeling a working-
through of the patterns that one’s life is now neurotically displaying. He understands this latter 
version as the very task of psychoanalytic therapy. 
But what is being channeled here? What is it that needs to be discharged? It is what Freud 
thinks of as psychic energy: this is a quantity of affect, but it arises from a set of conflicts within 
myself and a set of conflicts directly with the world. The simplest version of the latter might be 
the wish to arrive at my destination, in conflict with my car’s no longer being operable. Examples 
of internal conflicts might include anger at the other driver, warring against frustration with 
myself, my wish to scream or cry, struggling with my wish to respond like an adult, or my wish 
to hide the humiliation that nonetheless bubbles up in me, reminding me of the relation between 
this situation and previous significant situations in which I have been helpless. 
‘Drive’ (der Trieb) is the concept that Freud employs to make sense of this affect that 
calls (imperatively) for expression, or for what we have been calling investment. My affective 
relation to the world in each case lays claim to some response. The internal conflicts suggested in 
the car accident example are thus (fairly superficial) manifestations of drive-conflicts. But if 
drives are the Freudian way of thinking our investment in and by the world, on the basis of which 
our response is claimed in particular ways, then we might suggest that being-driven is another 
name for what Heidegger has called affectivity (Befindlichkeit) and interpreted as an existential 
structure of being-there. 
In his 1911 examination of Judge Schreber’s psychosis (already discussed in chapter 5, 




But the question of the extent of the regression is a question of how radical the break with 
the world is for the psychotic, and this is precisely what is at issue in our general investigation. If 
we are to understand psychosis in a more rigorously Freudian manner, then, we need to examine 
the drive-theory that he did subsequently work out. 
 Why? One reason might be that this would enable him to make more sense of the 
infantile drive-conflict that can initially weaken our belonging to the world – that is, severely 
weaken our stance within originary truth by preventing or weakening primitive trust. A second 
reason, one that he announces explicitly, is that a theory of how the sexual drives relate to the 
self-preservative (or ego) drives would allow him to clarify the extent of the regression in 
psychosis. Which kinds of drives can influence which? Are all investments in the world 
withdrawn in psychotic regression, or only certain kinds? 
For Freud, all internal psychic energy comes from the drives.980
Freud makes his most interesting attempt at answering the question four years after the 
Schreber reading, in his 1915 paper “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (more literally: “Drives 
and Drive-Fates”). The paper situates the drives within a modern version of Aristotle’s four 
causes (‘modern’ because it lacks an intrinsic telos), then articulates on that basis the various 
possible ‘fates’ or alterations of those drives. Of particular interest in the present context is the 
characterization that Freud gives of what he calls an “indispensable” yet “conventional” “basic 
 This means, as we shall 
see, that all instances of disclosure, as well as all psychic development, arise somehow through 
the drives. (This is a way of saying that my very belonging to the world in part takes place in 
being-driven.) What then is a drive? 
                                                 
979 Freud, “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Schreber],” SE 
12:74. 
980 Cf. among other places, Freud, “The Question of Lay Analysis,” ch. 3, SE 20. 
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concept” (Grundbegriff) of psychoanalysis: the drive itself, or (as Strachey has translated it) the 
instinct.981
 After some remarks about the theory-ladenness of observation and the necessary initial 
indeterminacy of an investigator’s basic concepts, Freud approaches the concept ‘drive’ via four 
terms that are “used in connection [Zusammenhang]”
 
982 with it. (He does not say more about their 
relation to it at this stage.) These terms are well-known: ‘pressure’ (Drang), ‘aim’ (Ziel), ‘object’ 
(Objekt), and ‘source’ (Quelle).983 I shall focus here on ‘pressure,’ since this is what Freud 
designates as essential to a drive. “Every drive,” he says, “is a piece of activity.”984 In other 
words, a drive is what it does, and what it does is to exert pressure, to lay claim to work from the 
mind “in consequence of [the mind’s] connection [Zusammenhang] with the body.” Thus, he 
defines drive as a psychical representative of an organic stimulus: it is, we could say, the very 
expression of psychosomatic unity.985
But we shall have to proceed with caution, since one of Heidegger’s principle criticisms 
of Freud is that the latter’s emphasis on such internal conflicts presupposes a subject that is closed 
off from the world. This would be a version of the Cartesian subject, transformed from a thinking 
 The ‘pressure’ or essence of the drive is then simply a 
measure of the intensity of the body’s claim. Just how urgent is this need for, say, water? And 
how much water will be required to satisfy it? It is this character of drive as a claim that I would 
like to interrogate. 
                                                 
981 Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes,” SE 14:117-118. Freud also thinks we also have instincts more 
strictly speaking, for which he uses the Latinate term der Instinkt.  
982 SE 14:122. 
983 One might interpret these four as transformations of the four Aristotelian causes, according to this 
schema: eidos, the Aristotelian essence or formal cause, becomes Drang, the psychic pressure or claim to 
work, which is the essence, activity, or ‘shape’ of the drive; telos, the goal or final cause (intrinsic in 
natural things, according to Aristotle), becomes Ziel, the contingent and temporary but nonetheless 
determinate satisfaction at which the drive aims; hulē, the material cause, becomes Objekt, the material 
support of the aim (i.e., the material for its activity) as its object (what either does or receives the action); 
hothen hē arkhē kinēseōs, that from which the principle of motion arises in a thing (i.e., what has come to 
be called the efficient cause), becomes Quelle, the somatic need at the origin of the drive. Cf. Aristotle, 
Metaphysics A.3 and Δ.2; the latter repeats and expands Physics β.3. 
984 SE 14:122. 
985 SE 14:122. This definition was already at work in 1911: see “Schreber,” SE 12:74. 
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thing (res cogitans) into a desiring thing, perhaps, but still a theater of private urges sealed up in a 
container. Thus, in a conversation with psychotherapist Medard Boss, Heidegger argues: 
In the customary, psychological representation of the ‘I’, the relationship to the world is absent. 
Therefore, the representation of the ego cogito [I think] is abstract, whereas the ‘I-am-in-the-
world’ lets the ‘I’ be conjoined with the world, i.e., as something originarily concrete.986
 
 
This is a version of Heidegger’s broader critique of Cartesian philosophy, in which he 
characterizes the human being as essentially care (Sorge), always already thrown into the world, 
temporally opened up to things and other people as mattering in various ways (see chapter 3, 
section II.A). Because we are originarily exposed to things (we are in the truth), we cannot 
practically engage in the kind of radical skepticism that Descartes employs; so to maintain that 
kind of skepticism in theory is a confusion arising from abstraction. In terms of our present 
investigation, we can say that for Heidegger getting things right (truth and falsity understood as 
correctness) always matters to us prior to any theoretical endeavor in which we might uncover 
their meaning or value (unless, perhaps, one is psychotic).  
Heidegger is thus worried that Freud has simply taken over a certain set of philosophical 
assumptions about the human being as subject.987 On Heidegger’s account, Freud discovered that 
he could not give a complete explanation of the psychological causal chain by staying at the level 
of the conscious subject, so he posited the unconscious as that subject’s hidden underbelly.988
                                                 
986 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 220/175, trans. mod. 
 In 
order to account for the content of that unconscious and its causal force on us, Freud then 
explained the human being on the basis of equally hidden drives, some of which are unconscious. 
Heidegger’s brief rejoinder to this move is methodological: “Drive is always an attempt at 
explanation. Yet what is at issue initially is never an attempt at explanation. Rather, first one must 
pay attention to what the phenomenon to be explained generally is and to how it is. With ‘drives,’ 
987 Zollikon Seminars 260/207. 
988 Zollikon Seminars 260/207-8, 319/254. 
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one is always attempting to explain something one did not ‘see’ in the first place.”989 If Heidegger 
is right about Freud’s account, “what happens if this Cartesian model is scrapped? Does not the 
unconscious [and the drive theory] go, too? Of course it does – and that is exactly Heidegger’s 
position.”990
So, in pursuing the essential feature of drive as a claim on the mind for work, I want to 
respond to Heidegger by showing that Freud’s thinking of the human does not imply our being 
closed off from the world, despite the latter’s focus on “internal” or “psychological” conflicts. (I 
cannot deal here with Freud’s later account of the life drive [Eros] and the death drive 




1) First, how can the drives, which Freud contrasts explicitly with external, physical 
stimuli, be thought of nonetheless as inherently open to the shared world (section 
I.B)? What might Heidegger’s originary truth mean for Freud? 
) We can articulate this in terms of our general investigation by posing three 
questions: 
2) Second, what is the relation between the sexual and the self-preservative drives, and 
is this a purely internal difference, or does it, too, depend on the shared world 
(section I.C)? How is our exposure to things inherently conflictual, in a way that 
would require primitive trust as a support? 
3) Third, in terms of psychogenesis, how can the sexual drives, which obey what Freud 
always calls ‘the primary process,’ in fact emerge after the self-preservative drives, 
which obey ‘the secondary process’ (section I.D)? Is such an account self-consistent? 
 
In contrast to other common readings of Freud,992
                                                 
989 Zollikon Seminars 217/172, trans. mod. For further discussion of the methodological differences, see my 
Introduction, part IV, and chapter 7, section II.A. 
 according to which the drives – and the 
subject generally – would be oriented primarily inward, to internal objects largely unrelated to the 
990 William J. Richardson, “Heidegger Among the Doctors,” in Reading Heidegger: Commemorations, ed. 
J. Sallis (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993), pp. 49-63. Quotation from p. 54; Richardson’s 
helpful summary of Heidegger’s critique of Freud spans pp. 53-56. 
991 For discussion of Freud’s later drive theory, see Jean Laplanche, Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, tr. 
Jeffrey Mehlmann (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 
992 Not only Heidegger’s. See Stolorow, World, Affectivity, Trauma, chapter 3, but also compare the 
summary of similar views that are common even among strict psychoanalysts, in Dodd W. Cohen, “Freud’s 
Baby: Beyond Autoerotism and Narcissism,” International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 88 (2007): 883-93. 
He cites Karl Abraham, Marjorie Brierley, Jay Greenberg, and Stephen Mitchell as proponents of the 
reading that Freud thought the infant was originally closed off to the world. He does note Melanie Klein, 
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external situation, my argument will be the following: for Freud, since all psychic energy comes 
either directly from the external world or from the drives, and since the drives are essentially 
psychic presentations of organic claims, then all psychic achievement is ultimately an interaction 
with the shared world. I will establish this by showing, first, that for Freud a drive is a claim on 
me for specific action, a claim that is formed in response to the solicitation of the external world; 
second, that the classification of the drives is thus determinable in light of different kinds of 
solicitation by the world beyond the self; finally, that although psychic achievements (both 
psychogenesis and specific intentional fulfillments) are founded on reaction as simple openness to 
the world, they are nonetheless always already responses to the drives’ claims, not mere 
reactions. This foundational relation is a crucial complication and will necessitate quite a bit of 
work to articulate. 
All of this will prepare the way for an investigation of the universal conflicts involved in 
the affirmation of our primary openness. That investigation will involve working out a version of 
the psychogenetic narrative that Freud tells over and over, in a way that will highlight the 
(perhaps dubious) consistency of his repeated formulations.993
                                                                                                                                                 
Hannah Segal, and Michael Balint as exceptions to the trend; we could add Jacques Lacan to the second 
list. 
 Since the narrative combines 
(dynamically) the problem of reality-testing with that of the emergence of the drives, however, I 
should first set the stage by laying out (statically) the elements involved. I will begin with Freud’s 
account of the two kinds of drive-pressures that call for psychic processing, then turn to the two 
modes of psychic processing that govern them. 
993In the “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895), The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), the Three 
Essays on Sexuality (1905), “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning” (1911), “A 
Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams” (1915), and even in the later essay on “Negation” 
(1925). For a detailed reading of this last text, see below, section II.A. 
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B) Drives Are Essentially Responses to the World 
Let us follow Freud in working out the fine structure of drive, so as to bring into view its 
origin. Freud consistently differentiates two fundamental kinds of stimuli on the basis of their 
sources, although both are at work in any full, lived experience. From the viewpoint of the 
psyche, we encounter (a) stimuli originating within ourselves as living beings, or what we might 
call physiological stimuli  – Freud calls these ‘internal’ and ‘organic’ – but we also encounter 
(b) stimuli originating from without, or what we might call physical stimuli – Freud names them 
‘external’. Physiological stimuli in principle cannot be escaped by motor action (screaming or 
fleeing does us no good), whereas physical stimuli, at least in principle, can be so escaped.994
We can think of this as a difference between a prompt (a stimulus that arises from outside 
and is processed using that external energy) and a drive (which arises inside and generates its own 
energy by reaching out for something). A prompt might be the sun’s coming out from behind a 
cloud: we say that it ‘causes’ me to blink, or to sneeze.
 
995 On the other hand, both prompt and 
drive appear in the case of procuring food: a physical stimulus (a small animal) jumps in front of 
me, and a physiological stimulus (hunger) calls for a ‘specific’ or ‘adequate’ action (Freud’s 
terms) that changes the external situation in a determinate way – the animal is rendered into food, 
which then can be organically assimilated. Performance of the action gets rid of the physical 
stimulus (the animal) altogether but only temporarily quiets the drive.996
                                                 
994 Freud, “Instincts,” SE 14:119. As we shall see below (section II.A), Freud is trying to explain repression 
(or neurosis in general) as a kind of flight, treating something intrapsychic as if it were external to the 
psyche – hence the impression of the split-off portion of consciousness as alien (Fremd) in the Studies on 
Hysteria. 
 
995 The shape of the distinction between prompt and drive (he uses ‘impulse’ and ‘instinct’) and the 
explanation of Freud’s sunburst example are from Tomas Geyskens, Our Original Scenes (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2005), p. 55. Cf. SE 14:118, where Freud uses ‘stimulus’ and ‘instinct’. 
996 Notice that some physical stimuli can also arise from one’s own body when irritated by the world: 
itching (most people do not have a drive to scratch), breathing (in the presence of oxygenated air), and 




Freud’s interest is in how we psychically experience these stimuli. We encounter physical 
stimuli through perception, so the simplest account of our interaction would go something like 
this: an external stimulus is perceived by the various five senses and psychically imaged – i.e., 
given to our awareness and remembered in terms of parts and wholes, relations, etc. This psychic 
image is then connected (in one who understands language) with what Freud calls a word-
presentation (Wortvorstellung), and that connection is retained in the memory. 
By contrast, we encounter physiological stimuli as internal claims – i.e., as the pressure 
of the drives. These are never presented to our awareness just as such (as dryness of a mucous 
membrane, for example). They are always presented in terms of an external object of satisfaction 
or frustration, which Freud calls a thing-presentation (Dingvorstellung).997
To be a bit more precise: in the latter case of a physiological stimulus, the thing-
presentation is what is stored in the memory, but the drive is presented to our awareness as a 
concrete claim to that object, a wish-impulse (Wunschregung) – what we might colloquially call 
the ‘pull’ of desire. Thus Freud says that a dream-wish, for example, “gives expression [Ausdruck 
gibt] to the unconscious impulse,”
 This object is 
remembered from a previous ‘experience of satisfaction’ (Befriedigungserlebnis) in which the 
pressure of the drive was previously released through some specific action. The experience of 
satisfaction itself is (in the language-user) retained as a word-presentation plus an association 
with the thing-presentation. 
998
                                                 
997 The term ‘physical’ as contrasted with Freud’s ‘physiological’, as well as the general outlines of the 
difference between the modes of presentation, are taken from A. Fayek, “Psychic Reality and Mental 
Representation: Contemporary Misapplications of Freud’s Concepts,” Psychoanalytic Psychology 19 
(2002): 475-500, p. 490. Cf. Freud, “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” SE 1. 
 using as its material what it finds in the preconscious, 
whether that be images, thoughts, or non-repressed wish-impulses (all of these are what he calls 
in this context ‘day-residues’). 
998 Freud, “Supplement,” SE 14:226. 
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As a representative (Repräsentant) of the unconscious drive’s claim (Triebanspruch), the 
wish-impulse may express that claim (i.e., call for psychic investment) in at least three ways.999 
First, it may be converted directly to physical movement without first coming to awareness: thus 
Freud analyzes botched actions in everyday life, hysterical symptoms, and ‘acting out’ within the 
transference (doing rather than speaking) as motor expressions of the unconscious, and he 
suggests that this kind of expression is also part of the explanation for sleep-walking. Secondly, 
the impulse may be presented to conscious awareness by combination with a word-presentation 
from our preconscious relation to language, thus becoming a (verbal) wish, fulfilling more 
directly its destiny as the speech of the unconscious – in the form ‘I want a drink,’ for example. 
Or, thirdly, the wish-impulse may (in sleep or psychosis) regress to perceptual hallucination, 
which then uses words only as things (i.e., as images, independent of semantics), and must be 
brought to association with word-presentations in the course of analysis. To summarize: a drive 
can only be experienced as a concrete claim on me for some specific activity in the world, in 
other words, a wish-impulse (Wunschregung), which then can sometimes be joined to a word-
presentation to form a verbal wish.1000
In keeping with this account of the drives as psychically presented primarily in terms of 
their aims and objects – in terms, we might say, of the eternal parental question, “You want to do 
what? With whom?” – Freud characterizes the situation of the very early infant as one of 
helplessness (Hilflosigkeit), in part because it cannot satisfy its own real, biological needs, but 
primarily because it cannot possibly even know what it needs.
 
1001
                                                 
999 Laplanche and Pontalis characterize this ‘representative’ as a delegate, one who acts as proxy but with a 
certain flexibility, since he enters a “system of relationships which is liable to change his perspective and 
cause him to depart from the directives he has been given” (The Language of Psycho-Analysis, p. 365 fn.). 
 It has organic needs, of course, 
but because for most of those needs it has never yet experienced either satisfaction or frustration 
1000 Ibid., pp. 226-7. 
1001 This point is made by Jean Laplanche, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, tr. David Macey (Basil 
Blackwell, 1989), p. 99. Cf. Freud, Introductory Lectures (SE 16:408). 
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of them in the world outside of the womb, there is as yet no psychic presentation for many of 
them; at most, the infant may feel a kind of vague anxiety. Hence the adults on whom it is 
dependent, in providing for what they know (or imagine!) to be its real needs, also make possible 
many of its future claims to specific things (i.e., the very experience of wanting something, 
whether as mere psychic presentation or also as outward expression). In other words, the 
specificity of the drives is due to the parents’ own actions, since drives just are the psychic 
presentations of claims to the repetition of a specific external situation. 
We are indebted to Lacan for pointing out that this role of the adults is soon enough 
recognized by the child, who begins to imitate those adults in articulating the claims of its drives 
as what can be called ‘demands.’ Now not only does the child want something specific (which is 
always true of the drives) on the basis of its originary immersion in sociality, but this impulse is 
also inflected socially for it. The child wants a specific person to provide the thing (‘I want 
mommy to give it to me!’), such that the thing is now functioning also as a sign of her love for the 
child. Lacan is thus right to say that demand is always also a demand for love.1002
But I think it is clear in Freud’s text that there must be a moment prior to the articulation 
of the drives as demands, the moment of emergence of those drives as concrete impulses laying 
claim to the repetition of some experience of satisfaction. Even before the drives are articulated 
socially, they are already given shape by the world in which the child is immersed, even though 
this has not yet been recognized by the child, who only feels the pressure of the wish-impulses. 
 
Let us leave aside questions of infancy and genesis for the moment and consider that 
Freud reaches firm ground at least in saying that (even as adults) we become aware of the drives 
                                                 
1002 The corralling of drives into the linguistic articulations offered by adults for expressing demand is what 
Lacan calls ‘the defile of the signifier.’ Desire proper can emerge out of the inevitable difference between 
demand and need, since desire for Lacan seeks what the other person wants from me, what I could be in 
order to provoke an adequate expression of her unconditional love. Demand, in fact, is an attempt to 
concretize my desire into what I fantasize the other wants me to be. For an especially clear presentation of 
these distinctions, see Philippe van Haute, Against Adaptation: Lacan’s “Subversion” of the Subject, trs. P. 
Crowe and M. Vankerk (New York: Other Press, 2002), chapter 5. 
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first in terms of their specific objects – i.e., in terms of what may be able to satisfy or frustrate a 
concrete claim.1003
Furthermore, although we do experience excessively general claims (e.g., the sense that 
‘something must change’; or ‘I want something, but I don’t know what’), at least in adults and 
older children Freud takes this to be a case of free-floating anxiety. Such anxiety is affect that was 
originally attached to – but through repression has been displaced from – a more concrete claim 
to work.
 Such claims may be somewhat general – ‘a drink’ is hardly very specific – but 
they nonetheless indicate something other than simple, disinterested diagnosis of a problem 
without any proposed solution (e.g., dryness of a mucous membrane). Although it is possible to 
experience the basis of my own need in this third-person manner (‘hmm, my mouth is dry; how 
interesting; I wonder if eating salt will dry it out more’), such an experience does not manifest 
any drive-pressure. To experience a need just is to experience a claim on me for action, one 
which is already specified by reference to some previous experience of satisfaction. Notice that 
even if I experience some less-specific discomfort (my stomach hurts), I try to discover what it is 
precisely through attending in turn to each of a series of possible satisfactions/frustrations. (Am I 
hungry? Do I need to stretch? Do I need to remove waste? Do I want painkillers? Did someone 
injure me?) 
1004
But if a drive is always experienced as such a claim, then Freud’s contention that a drive 
is a psychical representative of internal, organic, constant stimuli already implies that the 
 In other words, even in this case the drive remains a concrete claim; it has merely 
been pushed (or perhaps maintained) underground, in(to) the unconscious. 
                                                 
1003 Of course, Freud wants more than this: his is decidedly not a theory only about how objects come to 
conscious awareness. Nevertheless, if he is right in terms of what we can observe in everyday experience, 
this lends a certain plausibility to his accounts of the unconscious workings of the drives. 
1004 Cf. Freud’s definition of repression as “transformation of affect” (The Interpretation of Dreams, SE 
5:604), in which the secondary process reinterprets certain wishes as productive of pleasure rather than 
unpleasure, setting free the affect previously bound to them so that it can return in (sometimes very 
confusing) connection with other ideas. This has the upshot that if there were a time in which the infant had 
psychic experience but no remembered experiences of satisfaction at all, then its psychic life would be 
marked by a pure flow of affect (what Freud calls primary process). 
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psychical representations of such stimuli are always shaped (in their origin) by specific 
possibilities of satisfaction and frustration:1005
 
 the claim is initially a claim of the shared world 
insofar as it affects me. Such shaping by external reality is not necessarily direct, inasmuch as our 
desires are also modified by fantasy (see chapter 7, part III), but at least indirectly, every drive 
arises in response to the shared world. Surprisingly, then, although the drive is a claim on me for 
internal or psychic work (i.e., a meaningful call seeking a response of specific action), it is itself 
already a response to the availability of the external world. 
C) Sexuality and the Interpretation of Helplessness 
There are, of course, different kinds of responses to the world. It is well-known that 
Freud revised and adjusted his theory of the drives and their relations repeatedly. Let us pass over 
the complications here in favor of focusing on his persistent conviction that there are two kinds of 
drives: self-preservative and sexual.1006 In making this division, I think Freud approaches the 
Aristotelian distinction between motion (kinesis) and activity (energeia or entelekheia). The 
former is a general term including both action and making [praxis and poiēsis]; its goal is a state 
(of the self, for example) or a product, something reached as the completion of the motion. 
Activity, by contrast, is complete at every moment because its goal lies in the activity itself.1007
The self-preservative (or vital) drives seek those things that keep the organism alive and 
flourishing: they have as aims eating, drinking, breathing, exercising, recovering, loving, being-
sheltered, being-touched, being-loved, and so on. They are, it seems to me, ways of organizing or 
 I 
should note, however, that Freud himself does not acknowledge any connection to Aristotle here. 
                                                 
1005 Heidegger would say: in terms of my projects. 
1006 For Freud’s account of the theoretical transformations in this portion of his theory, see Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, ch. 6 (SE 18), and Civilization and its Discontents, ch. 6 (SE 21). In the “Drives” essay, 
Freud explicitly acknowledges the possibility of several kinds of drives and leaves the question of how 
many there are open (SE 14:124). In general, he seems to need at least two distinct kinds so as to make 
sense of the evident psychic conflict from which he begins his investigation. 
1007 For the distinction, see Aristotle, Metaphysics Θ.6, but compare the distinction between kinds of 
pleasure in Nicomachean Ethics 7.12, 7.14, and 10.4. 
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prioritizing the many things in the external world that solicit my attention. As such, they orient 
me to the world in terms of survival, which carries with it a certain kind of pleasure that is, 
arguably, narcissistic.1008 But it is not sheer narcissism. In order for me to be an embodied self at 
all, the imperious call of various mutually exclusive things for my attention must be somehow 
negotiated. Rather than getting lost in the blooming, buzzing confusion of perceptual stimuli,1009
Since the needs that are met in the satisfaction of these drives are generally external to the 
activity of meeting them, the pleasure characteristic of this kind of drive is that of satiety, the 
release of the (physiological) tension built up by need. Sometimes Freud writes as if this were the 
only kind of pleasure that exists, a perspective which has drawn appropriate criticism. For one 
thing, it is evidently wrong in cases where pleasure is at its greatest in tension rather than release. 
For another, it suggests that either drinking or an intravenous fluid injection would satisfy my 
thirst equally well, and the same would go for all pleasures: the point is only the release. 
 I 
respond to the call of any particular object first in terms of my vital interests, if any of those 
interests have grown too urgent to be ignored. This is the initial context from which the external 
situation and the objects it includes receive their meaning (though it is certainly not the only 
context). For example, I may want to continue writing, but at some point the requirement to sleep 
becomes too great to be put off any longer, and then the page to which I am attending loses its 
very coherence as anything other than a frustration of my need to sleep. 
Nevertheless, we would want to distinguish between thirst and dehydration, since thirst 
may not be simply self-preservative – there seems to be a certain pleasure associated with the 
activity of drinking itself, and not only with having one’s need for fluid quenched. This is one 
                                                 
1008 Cp. Hannah Arendt on the pleasure belonging to labor, especially in the essay “Labor, Work, and 
Action,” reprinted in The Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (Penguin, 2000), pp. 167-181. 
1009 This is a danger even if we take such stimuli to be given from the first as structured unities rather than 
some kind of raw sense-data. There is a good reason why Aristotle says, in another context, that one must 
have leisure (i.e., one’s necessities provided) before philosophic wonder can emerge (Metaphysics A.1). Cp. 
also Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of things as competing for my attention in the essay “Eye and Mind.” 
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reason why people go to excess: not primarily because we fail to notice that we are sated, but 
because we are enjoying the activity and not only the result. 
Fortunately, Freud does attend to this second kind of pleasure, and in fact it defines a 
primary interest of his entire theory: for this is the pleasure characteristic of what he calls the 
sexual drives.1010
If we consider this from the perspective of Aristotle’s distinction between motion and 
activity, we can see why it makes sense for Freud to claim that intellectual work, religious 
devotion, artistic enjoyment, and play in general are inherently sexual (‘sublimated’).
 This second kind of pleasure is immanent in the activity. The enjoyment of the 
activity itself (drinking, e.g., or tasting), regardless of the nourishment thereby attained – and 
frequently even to the detriment of what we might take to be a person’s adaptive needs – is 
distinctly sexual in Freud’s sense. 
1011 Such a 
claim does not mean, for Freud, that we are genitally aroused by such things – although that is 
never simply out of the question – but rather their pleasure resides in the very doing of them: as 
Aristotle puts it, the pleasure of seeing, thinking, or feeling is inherent in the activity. “The 
pleasure brings the activity to completion […] as something that comes over it, like the bloom of 
well-being in people who are at the peak of their powers.”1012
                                                 
1010 Some may find it surprising to understand the distinction between the two kinds of drives in this way, 
since pleasure as ‘release of tension’ seems so clearly to be modeled on the male orgasm. Tomas Geyskens 
has shown (Our Original Scenes, chapter two) that Freud’s own criteria for distinguishing between 
sexuality and self-preservation come from evolutionary biology, in which Charles Darwin (and, following 
him, Ernst Haeckel) had posited both natural (preservational) selection and sexual selection as forces 
necessary to account for biological plurality, since this includes plurality that is not evidently advantageous 
for survival. The biological difference may be how Freud in fact distinguishes, but it does not hold up to 
much scrutiny, as Freud himself discovered in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, when he altered the 
distinction to one between life-drives and the death-drive. Thus, I am trying to render the distinction 
between sexuality and self-preservation more plausible by presenting it as a difference of two kinds of 
pleasures. This does not make the sexual drives any less urgent or less physiological; it only makes them 
more focused on the activity itself, as Freud himself suggests most plainly with his account of autoerotism. 
 Hence, we engage in such activities 
1011 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, ch. 2 (SE 21). Cf. the hint he drops in “Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes” (SE 14:126). 
1012 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b32-34, tr. Joe Sachs (Focus Publishing, 2002). Note that 
Freud’s thinking of all such pleasures as sexual (and thus, for example, as caught up in the drives) 
importantly modifies Aristotle’s theory. 
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regardless of their adaptive benefits, and the enjoyment itself has an endless quality to it, even if 
practically it must be interrupted or reach an end.1013
Furthermore, thinking about the classification of drives in terms of Aristotle’s distinction 
between motion and activity can help make clearer what it would mean for the sexual and self-
preservative drives to be in conflict, which is what Freud often blames as the source of neurosis. 
In fact, it can clarify this at a fairly basic level, prior even to the renunciations of enjoyment 
required by society. The continuous quality inherent in activities (properly so-called) – wanting to 
go on endlessly playing, thinking, praising, or touching – is necessarily interrupted by 
physiological needs that require motion (again, properly so-called). But even these physiological, 
internal needs, as I have tried to show (section I.B), are by no means necessarily cut off from the 
context in which they arise. Instead, when people have compulsions inappropriate to their current 
environment, Freud consistently locates their source in previous contexts in which those wishes 
would make sense. That is, he recognizes that vital drives, too, are defined by a responsiveness to 
environment and context, not only by reaction to them. 
 
From the example of drinking, however, it may seem that the two kinds of pleasure are in 
fact closely bound together: there comes to be something satisfying in the activity of drinking just 
because it quenches my thirst. And this is precisely how Freud accounts for the emergence of the 
sexual drives, which he says begin by “leaning on” (anlehnen) the self-preservative drives, at 
least some of which were there more or less from the beginning of psychic life.1014
                                                 
1013 Peter Hadreas has provided a phenomenological account of sexuality that I think is likely to be right, 
according to which the temporality of sex is peculiar due to its privileging of touch (for which meaning 
happens in series, by contiguity) over vision (which interprets all at once). Cf. A Phenomenology of Love 
and Hate (Ashgate, 2007), ch. 2. Such an interpretation would have to come to terms with the voyeurist and 
exhibitionist dimensions of sexuality, but I think this could be done through Hadreas’s examination of the 
phenomenon’s peculiar temporality. Perhaps it could be said that the sensual gaze lingers and slides, as if it 
were a mode of touch.  
 He postulates 
the derivation of one kind of drive from the other, which Jean Laplanche – whose account I 
1014 I follow Laplanche’s account of this process in chapter two of Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, which 
chapter is itself a reading of Freud’s Three Essays on Sexuality (SE 7). 
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follow here – describes as a peeling away (like paint) or stripping off (like wallpaper). The 
experiences of satisfaction to which the sexual drives lay claim take their character from the 
satisfactions of vital drives. So, in our example, there is a movement from drinking as thirst-
quenching, through a middle ground of enjoying one’s thirst-quenching activity, to drinking fine 
scotch purely for the enjoyment of the activity, even though it actually makes one more 
dehydrated. And, as in all of Freud’s genetic accounts, none of these stages are completely left 
behind – we can continue to enjoy drinking in all of its various modes.1015
 But what is responsible for this peeling away of one drive from the other? Why would 
one ever begin to take pleasure in the activity, and not only in the result? The self-preservative 
drives are responses to previous satisfactions of real needs, as we saw in the first section, but to 
what are the sexual drives a response? At the origin of specific sexual drives (as very local organ-
pleasures, they are all specific at first, only later consolidated around the genitals)
 
1016
The adult who provides for the child’s needs, performing some of the specific actions to 
which the vital drives lay claim, already has sexual drives, and thus a) takes both conscious and 
unconscious pleasure in the activities of caring for the infant, and b) treats the erogenous zones in 
ways inevitably overlaid with sexual meaning. The infant, presumably, cannot fully understand 
these surplus investments – indeed, even the adult does not recognize the unconscious ones – but 
Freud finds through analysis that infants must nevertheless be able to apprehend such investments 
as peculiarly significant, even if they misunderstand the meaning. The pleasure taken by the adult 
in the activity of feeding or cleaning – which is clearly not only pleasure in the release of tension 
when the child stops crying – is evident to the child, but only in what Laplanche has called an 
“enigmatic” way. Thus the child responds to the enigma of a pleasure that it does not understand 
 we find 
once again a solicitation, but this time of a different order. 
                                                 
1015 Nor should we forget, in a discussion of sexuality, the original mode of drinking from the breast. 
1016 Three Essays, SE 7:197; “Instincts,” SE 14:126. 
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by finding in it a solicitation (or seduction) also to enjoy the activity itself, investing it with a 
certain surplus of meaning related to the love of the caretaker, even if this surplus must remain 
misunderstood. Here we could be said to have one unconscious in communication with another. 
Hence the love expressed to the child, through all of its complicated, proto-Oedipally ambivalent 
undertones, gradually teaches the child, too, to love, by finding pleasure in shared activity.1017
One upshot of such a theory of the sexual drives is that adult sexual pleasure (in the more 
popular, limited use of ‘sexual’) is necessarily highly overdetermined. If we take as an example 
the caress, it is a kind of touch that has mostly set itself free from any self-preservative need 
(although perhaps, like the hug, it is always in part a response to the vital need to be touched). 
The pleasure is thus primarily in the activity itself – the touch that seeks to go on touching, the 
being-touched that seeks to go on being touched – or at any rate the pleasure lies in the complex 
of sexual activities in which the touch plays a part. But this pleasure will also be part of a 
dialectical relation: the pleasure of giving pleasure to the partner, and of realizing the partner’s 
desire for one’s own pleasure. Furthermore, that dialectic will always be complicated by relation 
to one’s own early caretakers, as well as to the partner’s relation to his or her early caretakers, no 
doubt at both a conscious and an unconscious level for all parties involved. The essential point 
here is that this kind of drive-pressure grows ever more complex as a response to what we might 
call the primary seduction: implicit solicitation by the caretaker (and, let us not forget, also 
explicit solicitation in cases of abuse). 
 
I would claim, then, that for Freud the two kinds of drives can be distinguished by the 
kinds of external solicitation to which they constitute responses – one from the field of objects 
generally as sources or hindrances of life, and one from specifically human (i.e., split by their 
unconscious) caretakers as sexual beings. The former involves (or at any rate solicits) a kind of 
                                                 
1017 My account here makes it sound as if this all goes quite smoothly, but I will revisit (and further 
complicate) it in part II, below. 
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assumption-trust in the stability of objects and their relations, while the latter both involves and 
solicits personal trust. Laplanche characterizes this difference in terms of channels of 
communication, since the child expresses its self-preservative needs and the caretaker expresses 
love: “The child … evolves from adaptation to sexuality, but Freud unhesitatingly states that in 
her relationship with the child, a mother moves from sexuality to affection,” that is, toward a 
primarily preservative or adaptive concern.1018
 
 I think we must add simply that the movement in 
either direction is capable of failure. 
D) Two Kinds of Psychic Functioning 
So far, it looks reasonable to think that Freud’s theory presents the drives in general as 
structured responses to the external world, and to think that those drives can be differentiated by 
appeal to different kinds of pleasure arising as responses to different kinds of worldly solicitation. 
This provides us with at least initial evidence that the Freudian subject is not primarily closed in 
on itself. But I am claiming that all psychic accomplishment, including psychic development, is at 
least partly a response to the external world.1019
                                                 
1018 Laplanche, New Foundations for Psychoanalysis, 98. 
 Here we run into at least two problems. First, 
there is the well-known psychogenetic narrative, alluded to at the beginning of Freud’s essay on 
drives, in which an originally non-world-related organism is forced out of its shell into interaction 
with the external world. The narrative is so prominent in psychoanalytic literature that I can 
hardly fail to treat it here. Second, there is Freud’s claim that sexuality, which we have just seen 
to emerge secondarily, on the basis of self-preservation, obeys what he calls ‘the primary 
1019 Cp. Heidegger’s brief account of infantile being-there as amidst beings (Sein bei) and directed 
(gerichtet auf zu, hin zu, weg von), even if not yet oriented by a determinate goal (ausrichtet auf Ziel). 
Children thus are not closed in on themselves, even if their being amidst things is hazy or cloudy (noch 
umwölkt), and they are certainly structured by affectivity from before the very first yell. “What one is 
alongside [is something that] arises for being-there. This is a clarification of a previous having” 
(Introduction to Philosophy, GA 27:125-6, my translation, emphasis added). 
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process.’ That seems to be backwards, especially since ‘the secondary process’ is designated 
primarily as self-preservative.1020
These two problems hang together. In order to address the developmental account, I shall 
have to begin by saying something about a second set of structures, those by which we actually 
do the processing. My intention here is to show that Freud understands the structures of 
subjectivity as a) primarily open to reality through mere reaction and b) nevertheless always 
meaningfully responsive to the claims of the drives that arise from within itself. This will suggest 
that we try to interpret the infant as in one way dwelling in the truth from the beginning, 
affectively and proto-understandingly immersed in the world, but in another way as not yet in the 
truth in a full sense, since there remain important and unavoidable hurdles on the path to its 
developmental fulfillment of the existential structures of being-there that Heidegger has 
articulated. Our investigation of the psyche’s fundamentally conflicted functioning will also set 
into relief the situation of psychosis, in which the primary process seems somehow to reassert 
itself as primary, but now in a mode inflected by the loss of the world. 
 
Beginning already in the unpublished “Project for a Scientific Psychology,” from 1895, 
Freud consistently organizes his developmental account by distinguishing between two basic 
kinds of psychic functioning, both of which include a dimension of interaction with the world. 
These are supposed to account for how we can meet the claims of the drives for psychic work. 
We have already seen that sexual and the self-preservative drives differ as responses to 
different kinds of worldly solicitation, and that this can produce conflict between them. We might 
think, however, that since the drives call for two different modes of engagement, we could simply 
divide up our time between one and the other. This is, after all, mostly what we In fact do. 
Conflicts between, say, the (self-preservative) drive for nourishment and the (sexual) drive for 
enjoying the eating activity would then be relatively easily moderated. But if this were the whole 
                                                 
1020 For my attempt to sort out the temporal confusions here, see part II, below. 
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story, then Freud would not be able to make sense of the deep levels of conflict in his analysands, 
since the account would overlook the imperative nature of the drives’ claims. 
The sexual drives, Freud thinks, lay claim to nothing but continuous enjoyment of their 
aims, and are even quite plastic in the objects that will satisfy those aims. Their claims, then, 
really take no account of the need for self-preservation; no quarter is given to exhaustion, illness, 
or impracticality. And as many an addict has discovered, there is one mode of psychically 
investing those claims that involves no hindrance or inhibition. Something appears here that 
Freud calls ‘the primary process.’ By contrast, our initial assumption that we could simply divide 
our time between satisfying different kinds of drives lets appear a different way of psychically 
dealing with the drives’ claims, which Freud calls ‘the secondary process.’ It is precisely a matter 
of inhibition, a distribution (or even distraction) of drive energy so that we can carry on without 
destroying ourselves. 
I want to try to make sense of these processes as what perpetuate drive-conflicts in us, but 
we should note philosophically that there is some separation between the drives themselves and 
the psychic processes that govern our investments in them. Freud assigns the primary process to 
the sexual drives and the secondary process to the self-preservative drives, but this is a general 
statement. Although the primary process seeks the immediate removal of all tension, the sexual 
drives as we encounter them in life, for example, involve some claims for the heightening of 
tension, for attention to the setting of the activity, and so on, which clearly require the secondary 
process. Moreover, while specific drives can be temporarily satisfied, the processes are 
continuously functioning – this is just part of what it means to be alive as a human being. 
The primary process, then, is explicitly modeled on the functioning of dreams, 
parapraxes, jokes, neurotic symptoms, and other modes in which what Freud calls unconscious 
thinking shows itself by betraying the smoothness of conscious thought. He characterizes it in 
terms of a simplified reflex arc, primarily marked by the complete dissociability of “affect” 
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(psychic energy,1021 or a kind of intensity of feeling) from particular ideas or memories.1022 This 
“total displacement of affect” (Laplanche’s term),1023 or what Freud calls its “free outflow” (freies 
Abströmen),1024 is part of an attempt to account for the seeming absurdity of unconscious 
phenomena when they appear in conscious life – as they do most vividly in psychotics. But 
unconscious, primary processing is not only visible when it is right out on the surface. When a 
neurotic both avoids like the plague and yet repeatedly circles back toward and around a phrase 
that no one else would find particularly upsetting, or a dreamer finds herself inexplicably 
horrified by the image of an ordinary red wagon, or an otherwise normal person is overwhelmed 
with anxiety about having forgotten a marginally important name, it seems that the strength of the 
affect – the psychic energy with which the given idea is unwarrantedly invested – must be coming 
from elsewhere. Freud’s attempts to map the logic of the primary process are precisely attempts 
to explain the associative rules according to which affect flows (freely or via detours) from one 
idea to another.1025
                                                 
1021 Freud speaks here, as always in the “Project,” of quantities of energy – specifically, of ‘Qη,’ quantity of 
internal energy. It is philosophically more fruitful simply to take ‘energy’ in a very broad sense, somewhat 
as we mean it in everyday language: ‘I don’t have the energy for that’ does not strictly mean ‘I have not 
taken in sufficient nutriment or rested sufficiently for my nervous system to stimulate my muscular system 
to the requisite action.’ Instead, it may include not knowing enough about the situation, feeling the world 
generally as too daunting, not having received much relevant encouragement from others recently, being 
preoccupied with something else, and so on. Freud at this point in his thought would have translated all of 
these into Q, so we may as well translate them back into their lived richness. It was, after all, only through 
noticing both his patients’ strong resistance to his attempts at curing them (experienced in terms of the 
energy he had to spend combating it, cf. Studies on Hysteria, SE 2:111) and the relation between the 
‘amount’ of psychical trauma and the seriousness of the symptoms that he first decided it was “impossible 
any longer at this point to avoid introducing the idea of quantities (even though not measurable ones)” (SE 
2:86). 
 
1022 Laplanche, among others, has shown the correlation of meaning between the “Project’s” ‘quantity of 
excitation’ and ‘neurons’, on the one hand, and the clinical categories of affect and ideas (or presentations), 
respectively (Life and Death, p. 56). 
1023 Ibid., p. 38. 
1024 Interpretation, SE 5:599, trans. mod. 
1025 Thus Fayek can say that the forging of links between an idea and its affect, a drive and its presentation, 
or the aim of a drive (the activity sought) and the object of that drive (the support of that activity) is 
precisely what Freud means by the primary process (“Psychic Reality,” 489). Freud’s name for this 
unconscious, free-flowing affect is anxiety. 
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Freud posits that the logic of the primary process is governed by what he calls the 
‘pleasure/unpleasure principle’ (Lust-Unlustprinzip), which sets up this psychic process along a 
single axis of movement. This axis is that of increase and decrease (or release) of psychic tension, 
which we experience consciously as unpleasure and pleasure, respectively. These are the only 
qualities of which we are aware with regard to this process.1026 As the names ‘pleasure’ and 
‘unpleasure’ might suggest, this process moves energy always and only in one direction along the 
axis.1027 Put colloquially, in this process the psyche flees whatever brings unpleasure and seeks 
whatever brings pleasure, so that Freud can also characterize it as pure wishing (wünschen).1028 It 
cannot, he says, “pull anything uncomfortable [Unangenehm, unpleasant] into the context of 
thought”;1029
Yet since, as we shall see, everything here is processed at the same level – everything 
perceived is equally real – the primary process can technically be said neither to flee nor to seek, 
as if it were a subject relating to objects; rather, it takes place as mere reaction, an engagement 
with the world that does not reach the level of meaningful response. It is purposeful, but it is 
simply a full outflow of any energy received, regardless of the affect’s source or meaning, since 
at this level all affect is equivalent. This is to say, I think, that there is a dimension of primitive 
sensory openness to things, not yet as things, that works unnoticed in our relations with the 
world. It is what Freud calls ‘irritability,’ and it is not qualified on the one hand by any psychic 
resistance, nor on the other by any special attention or emphasis: it is the pure sharing of the real, 
 it can only wish, that is, seek pleasure in discharge. 
                                                 
1026 According to Freud, consciousness just is awareness (the sensation of intrapsychic processes according 
to pleasure/unpleasure and of perceived things according to sensory categories), and what it is aware of are 
(by definition) qualities. During the period in which he is committed to a purely quantitative (energetic) 
explanation, he claims that these qualities are really the frequencies (the periods of oscillation) of the 
quantities of energy as taken up by the system Cs. But because Cs. can direct attention, consciousness for 
Freud is neither a mere epiphenomenon nor the necessary subjective correlate of all psychic activity 
(“Project,” SE 1:308-311). 
1027 But these names do not determine the direction. Freud runs into trouble here, as we shall see in the 
second part of this chapter. 
1028 Freud defines a wish as a kind of “current” (Strömung) in the apparatus, a directed flow of affect, that 
departs or flees from unpleasure and seeks or aims at only pleasure (Interpretation, SE 5:598). 
1029 Interpretation, SE 5:600, trans. mod. 
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which (if it could be left to itself) would sensibly take in whatever comes and completely react 
with movement. 
Thus Freud can characterize the (mythical) situation of an isolated primary process 
organism as a “state of psychical rest,”1030
Let us see how this works. Freud always tries to think the subject as a conflicted unity, 
suspended in tension between at least two structures. So, we have one process that keeps affect 
moving, tending toward complete removal of energy through full discharge, and one that brings 
affect to a halt, maintaining it within the psyche (instead of physically reacting to it) and 
preventing it from investing with affect (and thus bringing to conscious awareness) certain ideas 
that it recognizes as causing unpleasure. This is evidently a translation into theory of Freud’s 
analytic experience: sometimes, what he calls therapeutic ‘material’ (speech about free 
associations, dreams, self-interpretations of everyday activities) flows freely, as if flooding forth; 
other times, there is very clearly a kind of blockage, a confusing combination of inability and 
refusal to speak, a stasis in the analysis due to resistance and repression. 
 in which there is no build-up of affective tension. 
There is, instead, homeostatic equilibrium, in which a kind of envelope or surface is simply 
awash in real stimuli. Here the raising and lowering of energy levels in a reactive attempt to 
maintain homeostasis just is what comes to awareness as unpleasure and pleasure (respectively). 
Thus the psyche operating according to the primary process can be said, loosely, to ‘flee’ 
memories and perceptions that cause unpleasure, but this means, quite precisely, that it fully 
displaces psychic energy (affect) away from them and out of the system. 
But it is not only because he needs to account for observed psychic conflict that Freud 
has to posit this second process. It is also because the primary process is clearly insufficient either 
to describe or to account for human activity, even of the pleasure-seeking kind. We do not simply 
react to stimuli via energy discharge, and we do not think only according to the psychic logic 
                                                 
1030 “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,” SE 12:219. 
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governing free association (i.e., the differential pathways laid down by previous processing of 
stimuli). Instead, we respond to a determinately structured world through specific, adequate 
actions, and we think by comparing and contrasting current intentionally structured perceptual 
experiences with previous ones.1031 We recognize that reality does not function merely according 
to pleasure and unpleasure, and that the world requires that we stick around to deal with – rather 
than simply fleeing – the unpleasant as well as the pleasant. In fact, we are usually concerned 
with the truth of things, with knowing the world in ways appropriate to its ways of being, and this 
is often precisely for the sake of seeking (long-term) pleasure and avoiding unpleasure. That is 
why Freud thinks that something he calls the ‘reality principle’ (Realitätsprinzip), which itself 
serves the pleasure principle in a kind of roundabout way,1032
Freud says that, clinically, one must get used to the fact that unconscious processes (i.e., 
those obeying the pleasure principle) entirely disregard what he calls ‘reality-testing’ – that is, 
they unproblematically equate psychic reality (fantasy) with external reality.
 governs all secondary processing. 
1033 This disregard 
for testing means not that nothing is real but rather that (in an important sense) everything is 
real.1034
                                                 
1031 I mean ‘intentionally structured’ here in the sense of classical, Husserlian phenomenology, in which 
consciousness is always consciousness of objects, implying both a correlation and a distinction between the 
appearing of something and that to which it appears (subject and object, noesis and noema). Freud refers to 
it in the late paper on “Negation” (SE 19:237) as “the antithesis between subjective and objective,” which 
he confirms is not present in primary process thought. My use of phenomenological terminology, however, 
should not be taken to indicate that I think phenomenology and psychoanalysis are the same. 
 According to the primary process, thinking makes it so, since wishing (which, as the 
1032 “Actually the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle implies no deposing of the 
pleasure principle, but only a safeguarding of it. A momentary pleasure, uncertain in its results, is given up, 
but only in order to gain along the new path an assured pleasure at a later time” (“Formulations,” SE 
12:223). This is simply a presentation of the everyday strategy of delaying gratification. I will not deal here 
with the problems of subordinating both of these principles to a single principle of homeostasis, which is 
precisely the problem of the death drive in Freud’s later work  (i.e., the question: is there a categorical 
difference between seeking zero-energy and a constant, minimum energy?), but see Laplanche (Life and 
Death, pp. 113-119) for a more thorough discussion by way of contrast with Fechner and Breuer. 
1033 “Hence also [Freud’s own] difficulty of distinguishing unconscious fantasies [of seduction] from 
memories [of real seductions] which have become unconscious” (“Formulations,” SE 12:225). I will 
consider this ongoing clinical puzzle in the next chapter. 
1034 Like Hegel’s ‘night in which all cows are black,’ this formulation only really makes sense from a 
standpoint outside of it, once we have seen that reality-testing occurs by designating certain things as not-
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motor of the primary process, simply repeats the previous movement of energy through the 
system – i.e., invests the incoming energy in the memory-paths of a previous discharge and brings 
about the same discharge) is the same as fulfillment of the wish (experiencing again the same 
discharge, or satisfaction). Hallucination is just as good as genuine perception, since both receive 
the same imprimatur of the indication of reality.1035
 
 But since no living creature can survive this 
way while immersed in a real environment – in Freud’s terms, not all stimuli can be removed 
through a simple reflex arc – in any real organism the pure flow of energy must be inhibited from 
proceeding as if the world called only for mere reaction. The very wish for pleasure, as avoiding 
unpleasure, must be submitted to reality-testing so that I can respond to a coherent world. 
E) Some Terminological Clarifications 
As a final preparation for the account of psychogenesis, let me gather together the various 
terms introduced so far and schematize their relations. We have now seen that Freud thinks there 
are two modes of psychic processing (primary and secondary), each of which is governed by its 
own principle (pleasure and reality, respectively, although we noted that the reality principle also 
serves the pleasure principle in a roundabout way). We should understand ‘principle’ here as the 
goal that organizes a mode of processing. Since I am arguing that we should understand all 
psychic activity as founded in an interaction with the shared world, even when that activity is a 
defensive withdrawal from the world, we could think of both modes of processing as modes of 
reaction, understood in a broad sense. The primary process, however, does not deal with the 
world as meaningful (as a coherent world), so it is a mere reaction. The secondary process 
precisely does react to the world in terms of meaning, so it involves response; it alone can 
properly be designated ‘thinking.’ These modes of processing are the ways in which we take up 
                                                                                                                                                 
real, which indicates reality as a starting-point, rather than by designating certain things as real, which 
would indicate the opposite. 
1035 As we will see below, this is why one flees one’s own thoughts through repression: if fantasy is 
indistinguishable from shared reality, then wishing my father dead is the same as killing him. 
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the claims of (at least) two different kinds of drives (sexual and self-preservative, again 
respectively). I have proposed thinking of the difference between these two kinds of drives as the 
difference Aristotle marks between activity (which has no goal outside of itself but is complete at 
every moment) and motion (the goal of which is a different state or a product, either of which 
lasts once the motion itself is over). 
Finally, and no longer aligned with the previous series of distinctions, drive as such is to 
be distinguished from a purely physical stimulus (what I called a ‘prompt’) that acts on me as if 
externally, even if my own body is involved. Such is the case with reflex actions and, it seems, 
some other autonomic nervous system functions. 
Freud tries to prioritize within the distinctions between processes and between drives, but 
he does so differently in each case. So, with regard to the processes, he admits at each repetition 
of the developmental account of the psyche that what he calls the primary process could not really 
have been chronologically prior in any real living being – that it is interrupted “from the first”1036 
– but yet he insists on calling the one ‘primary’ and the other ‘secondary’. Why? He says in the 
Interpretation of Dreams that “the primary processes are given [gegeben] in the psychic 
apparatus from the beginning onward [vom Anfang an].”1037
Freud himself provides two ways to understand this. The first is a difference in the 
temporal structure of the two processes, rather than a difference in when they appear in 
chronological development. Thus he claims that the secondary processes always arrive in a way 
too late (“verspätet”), since the primary processes, given from the first, govern desire, which is 
 How can they be given as primary? It 
is as if one said, in phenomenological terms, that the secondary process is only a founded mode. 
                                                 
1036 “Project,” SE 1:296. Cp. Interpretation (1900), SE 5:598, 603; the famous footnote of “Formulations” 
(1911), SE 12:219-20n4; and “Supplement” (1915), SE 14:231 – in all of which Freud explicitly 
acknowledges that the positing of an organism operating purely on the pleasure principle is necessarily a 
myth or theoretical fiction (Fiktion). 
1037 Interpretation, SE 5:603. 
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the “core of our being [Kern unseres Wesens], consisting of unconscious wish-impulses … 
derived from infancy, which can neither be destroyed nor inhibited.” 
What Freud is pointing to here is that there is no development in the primary process. 
There is change, of course, as memory pathways are deepened or fall into disuse, but there is also 
a kind of permanence that goes along with the indestructibility of infantile wishes and the 
disregard for real distinctions. We may detour or replace primary processing with secondary 
process thinking, but there is no way to make the primary process itself ‘grow up,’ – it simply 
does the same thing all the time. Thus Freud’s impression of the timelessness of the unconscious: 
experiences of many years prior, long repressed, may suddenly appear, and with greater clarity 
than something that happened earlier this morning. And for some people, the same failed pattern 
of relating to others faithfully repeats itself in relationship after relationship, never learning to do 
something better. 
All development happens with (and in) the secondary process. The ego, which permits 
secondary processing by inhibiting the primary process, is a basic disturbance in the purity of the 
primary flow. All thinking, learning, and maturing take place within this secondary process; it is 
continually modifying itself, yet it can only ever overlay (überlagern) the foundation that is the 
primary process. 
The other way of understanding Freud’s claim appeals to a difference in extent of 
mastery. Freud says that precisely because the secondary processes always come on the scene too 
late, the primary process kernel of our being “remains inaccessible to the understanding and 
inhibition of the preconscious.”1038
                                                 
1038 SE 5:603-4. 
 The primary process governs the deepest parts of us, where 
the secondary process has no authority. Furthermore, the very energy for the work of the 
secondary processes comes from unconscious wishing (i.e., the drives). The primary process is 
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primary, then, as transcending the realm of the secondary processes, and the secondary processes 
are only possible as founded upon the primary. 
In the case of the drives, on the other hand, Freud does claim chronological priority for 
the self-preservative drives, but we are about to see that this is complicated by the nature of the 
sexual drive, which seeks to return to a mythical origin and thus pretends to a temporal priority it 
cannot have – a pretense that is strengthened by its being joined to the primary process. 
 
II. Psychic Development: Counting the Cost 
“The possibility of disruption is built into the very idea of mindedness. This becomes especially clear if we 
think of the mind as a differentiated unity capable of growth. For how could a differentiated unity grow 
other than by disrupting itself and then, as it were, healing over that disruption?”1039
 
 
We are now prepared to examine Freud’s theory of psychogenesis. Our philosophical 
concerns with primitive trust and originary truth, and especially our intention to expose those 
concerns to the challenges of psychosis, require us to address psychogenesis as a theory of 
subjectivity in its birth, development, and essential conditions. These various themes are brought 
together by Freud himself in his important essay on “Negation.”1040
In order to keep track of these modes of negation, it will be helpful to delineate, very 
quickly and in preliminary fashion, the various German terms for negation at work in Freud’s 
texts (not all of which appear in the essay). Verneinung is the broad term used in the essay’s title. 
It can mean ‘negation’ or ‘denial,’ and (following Hyppolite) we should keep the distinction in 
mind, since ‘negation’ suggests the content of a judgment, while ‘denial’ suggests an attitude of 
 Let us therefore proceed in 
the manner of that essay, studying psychic development through various modes of negation. 
                                                 
1039 Jonathan Lear, Open Minded: Working Out the Logic of the Soul (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1998), p. 90. 
1040 Jean Hyppolite tries to show that at stake in this essay is the very birth of thought. See “A Spoken 
Commentary on Freud’s Verneinung,” included as the Appendix to Lacan, Seminar 1: Freud’s Papers on 
Technique, especially pp. 290-1. 
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protest.1041 Verdrängung, repression, we saw (chapter 5, section I.G.1) to be the strategy of 
neurotic illness. It consists in the psyche’s conscious flight from unpleasant thoughts by forcing 
them into a different register (the unconscious), in which they appear as symptoms. Recall that 
we also distinguished an originary (or primal) instance of such repression from any subsequent 
instance; this more fundamental move is a renunciation of (mythical) complete unity, in which 
the individual accepts a mediated, limited relation to things in exchange for subsequently being 
driven by a fantasy of that unity. Verleugnung, which Freud uses in other texts, is a kind of 
refusal or rejection of what has been encountered. As such, he uses it technically to mean 
‘disavowal,’ as when one knows something but somehow proceeds as if one did not (this is the 
structure of perversion), but he also occasionally uses it more loosely. Verwerfung, finally, is a 
second version of refusal that Freud does not rigorously distinguish (at least in his usage) from 
Verleugnung. We have already encountered this Verwerfung as a complete rejection of or 
foreclosure on some element of language (and hence of the whole of language as a system in 
which one can dwell) – in other words, as a refusal of primal repression.1042
 
 
A) From Indications of Reality to the Reality-Ego 
In this 1925 essay of only about five pages, Freud’s topic is judgment, which he analyzes 
into various, increasingly sophisticated kinds of negation and affirmation.1043
                                                 
1041 As his presentation is in French, Hyppolite does not use these terms for the distinction, but he insists 
upon the distinction itself as crucial for understanding Freud’s essay. See “A Spoken Commentary,” p. 290. 
 He begins from 
what is encountered clinically, claiming that what is unconscious can only be allowed into 
consciousness on the condition that it be negated. Some lifting of the repression must have 
happened for an association to an unconscious idea to enter my awareness, even if I can only 
1042 Freud’s terms for it here, it seems to me, are ausschliessen (‘to keep out’), and Ausstossung 
(‘expulsion’). Verwerfen makes an appearance in a probably non-technical use, when Freud claims that the 
obsessive is ‘rejecting’ “the correct meaning of the obsessive idea” (“Negation,” SE 19:235). 
1043 Cp. Heidegger’s indication that one would need phenomenologically to distinguish rejection or turning-
away (Abkehr) from defense or fending-off (Abwehr), and both from resistance (Gegenwehr), in order to 
make sense of children’s intentionality (Introduction to Philosophy, GA 27:126). 
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speak that association under the sign of negation. (E.g.: ‘I thought of my sister’s old necklace, but 
that obviously has nothing to do with what you asked about.’) 
Both in this essay and in his paper on “The Unconscious,”1044 Freud characterizes this 
speech under negation as ‘partial intellectual acceptance’ of what is repressed. He distinguishes it 
from full intellectual acceptance, in which I may even be able to explain my neurosis to a great 
extent, although I have not yet experienced the unconscious thoughts with their proper affect. The 
latter can only happen in the transference and is necessary for recovery.1045 On the basis of these 
clinical distinctions, then, Freud further distinguishes between various modes of judgment, taking 
it that “to negate something in a judgment is, at bottom [i.e., indicating its psychological origin], 
to say: ‘This is something which I should prefer to repress.’”1046
Judgment is thus a more developed mode of negation than simple repression, and it 
indicates a level of successful psychic achievement. It implies some recognition of the difference 
between thought and external reality: thinking of someone with hatred is not the same as killing 
the person, so I can at least allow myself to become aware of the thought I hate my father, even if 
only as negated (‘partial intellectual acceptance’): I don’t hate my father. There is then a 
continuum of growth in recognition of the difference between psychic presentation and reality: 
thinking (affirmatively) that I hate someone does not kill the person; speaking my thought aloud 
is not equivalent to murder; nor is telling the analyst (making my thoughts known generally) even 
 (In the example just used, ‘that 
obviously has nothing to do with what you asked about’ is the negating judgment that allows the 
thought about the necklace to appear and be spoken.) 
                                                 
1044 Cf. “Unconscious,” SE 14:175. 
1045 As we saw in chapter 5, Freud thinks that even if full intellectual acceptance is possible for psychotics, 
the curative power of transference is not. We also saw that he is wrong about this. 
1046 “Negation,” SE 19:236. 
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the same as telling the person whom I hate; and so on. It is along something like this scale that the 
progression of intellectual acceptance proceeds.1047
Freud then follows the traditional classification of judgments as predicative or existential. 
The former seeks object-unity: the unity of substance with attributes. The latter instead seeks 
unity between the psychic presentation of an object and perception of that object. (In 
phenomenological terms: existential judgment concerns the fulfillment of an empty intention.) 
Freud takes the originary version of the former, predicative judgment, to be valuation (i.e., the 
object is good, and therefore should be in me, or bad, therefore alien to me, according to the 
pleasure-ego). Likewise, the originary version of existential judgment is reality-testing (the object 
I am psychically intending is given externally as perceived, as discerned by the reality-ego).
 
1048
Thus do we arrive, perhaps inevitably with Freud, at the very origin of development: at 
the processes that are given – we saw above in what ways – as primary. 
 
But both of these more originary versions are evidently ego-functions – as judgment always is – 
and I will argue here that both presuppose more fundamental distinctions in how the world is 
given. Namely, both presuppose the division between internal and external, since this is a 
condition of all ego-functioning, while that division itself presupposes the initial ‘indication of 
reality’, which is independent of the ego. 
 
1. Negation as ‘Flight’ 
 
[A]ll presentations [or ideas: Vorstellungen] originate from perceptions and are repetitions of 
them. Thus originally [ursprünglich] the mere existence of a presentation was a guarantee of the 
reality of what was presented. The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from 
the first [von Anfang an].1049
 
 
                                                 
1047 There is much more to be said about the other crucial step, the regression to experiencing the hate-
filled rage as in tension with the possibilities created by intellectual acceptance, but that is, as Freud 
discovered, no longer simply in the realm of judgment. 
1048 “Negation,” SE 19:236-7. 
1049 “Negation,” SE 19:237. Cp. “Project,” SE 1:296; Interpretation, SE 5:565ff,  598ff; “Formulations,” 
SE 12:219; “Supplement,” SE 14:231-2. 
424 
 
Nor, by extension, does the distinction between perception and psychic presentation yet 
exist, at least not for the psyche. I take this to be Freud’s attempt to establish our primary 
openness to beings as pre-intentional – that is, as independent of the correlation between a 
separate subject and its object. Everything perceived is psychically presented (and processed); 
everything presented is invested as if it were perceived. Said another way: there is as yet no 
distinction for the psyche between internal and external. Thus, as I put it earlier, all input and 
processing is on the same level, that of reality. The flow of affect is uninhibited, being transferred 
completely between ideas according to the pathways laid down by prior experiences of 
satisfaction or frustration, and so ‘memories’ of satisfaction-experiences (i.e., previously traveled 
pathways toward discharge) are completely invested with affect. What is ‘remembered’ is as 
vivid as what is perceived (i.e., the former is hallucinated), and psychic images of things that 
produce unpleasure are reacted to just like perceptions of things that produce unpleasure. 
Here, negation is what we have mythically called ‘flight’ from tension. It appears 
between quotations because ‘flight’ is understood as complete but uncoordinated motor 
discharge, and because it is only so interpreted after the fact, by contrast to repression.1050
We could try to interpret the primary processes in terms of intentionality. We could, for 
example, take the homeostatic principle to mean (as Freud sometimes implies) that in the primal 
situation, the organism seeks rest. But this will be meaningless. Strictly speaking, at this level of 
description we cannot yet account for a living organism; the process under discussion neither 
‘seeks’ nor ‘finds’ (at very most it wishes, and this can also be described, from the perspective of 
later development, as fleeing); and the organism’s ‘aim’ on such a construal would not be rest 
 
                                                 
1050 Freud will also register this by saying that in the unconscious there is “no negation, no doubt, no 
degrees of certainty” (“Unconscious,” SE 14:186); “in analysis we never discover a ‘no’ in the 
unconscious” (“Negation,” SE 19:239); there is only movement toward, as wishing, even though this may 
be judged consciously (by analyst or analysand) as a flight from. 
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(continuing to exist while temporarily without motion) but simply nothingness, the cessation of 
the organism as alive. 
In Freud’s terms, then, our primary access to the world occurs with “entire disregard of 
reality-testing.”1051 And yet this disregard for testing means not that nothing is real but rather that, 
for the (mythical) ‘primitive organism,’ everything is real. In the “Project,”1052 Freud explains 
that consciousness reacts to perceptions with a discharge, and this discharge is a kind of stamp or 
ding! that indicates the reality of the thing perceived (i.e., it is registered in memory as ‘given in 
perception’). This ‘indication of reality’ (Realitätszeichen), as Freud calls it, is completely 
independent of the introduction of the ego, which latter alone provides “a criterion from 
elsewhere in order to distinguish between perception and idea [Vorstellung].”1053
The clinical phenomenon for which Freud is trying to account is that of the strong sense 
of reality in dreams and hallucinations – a sense of reality strong enough to persist past any 
intellectual identification of them as unreal. In fact, they seem to share the kind of immediate 
sense of reality given along with all perception, which sense is itself both curiously strong and yet 
incomplete. We have already seen (chapter 5, section I.F) that, just as with optical or acoustic 
illusions, we can be convinced that dreams or hallucinations are illusions without thereby being 
able to see through them. I may, for example, become convinced that I am dreaming, while I am, 
 Thus, 
independently of the ego, whatever is “abundantly invested” will be taken as perception; it will be 
experienced as real. This means that we can become conscious of the primary process in terms of 
two different qualities: pleasure/unpleasure (which is in a sense only one quality, but with 
degrees) and reality (which is not a continuum but simply an absolute value, granted to anything 
over a certain intensity). But neither of these, according to Freud, yet implies an object for a 
subject (at least not in a robustly epistemic sense). 
                                                 
1051 “Formulations,” SE 12:225. 
1052 “Project,” SE 1:325. 
1053 Ibid. As Laplanche has shown (Life and Death, pp. 59-62). 
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in fact, dreaming, and yet be unable to wake myself. I then have to negotiate the environment of 
the dream with a kind of reluctant engagement, since I in some sense know that it is not really 
there, but its immediacy still requires a certain respect. They retain an ‘indication of reality’ due 
to their strong perceptual presentation even if we do not, upon reflection, believe them to be real. 
This suggests that, at the most basic level, things are simply given as real or not. Laplanche 
emphasizes this point with regard to hallucinations: one may convince a psychotic that the voices 
in her head are not real, but they do not thereby go away.1054
In this regard Freud himself conducts a very interesting phenomenal investigation.
 I would add that she may be able to 
ignore them, but only in the way that anyone may be able to ignore an external, genuinely 
perceived object (a human being of the wrong color, for example, as in Ellison’s Invisible Man): 
via an effort of attention, which can eventually become habitual but does not cease to be a 
positive intentional act. 
1055 In 
describing the characteristics of dreams (a subset of hallucinations in general), he points out first 
that they often differ from mere presentation (Vorstellen) by being more imagistic (in the sense of 
perceptual). Thus it is not enough to say simply that what is censored during the day comes out at 
night, for in that case we “should have dreams which were in the nature of ideas 
[Vorstellungen].”1056
Secondly, however, hallucinations set themselves apart from recollection and imagination 
by their intensity, the way that they induce belief. As pointed out a moment ago, they give 
 All dreams would proceed as only a few in fact do: in language, like 
everyday thinking, which uses only the haziest of images and perhaps uses even them only as 
symbols and placeholders. So dreams are more like purposeful recollection (absichtliche 
Erinnern) and other parts of our normal thinking that summon up specific remembered or 
invented images. 
                                                 
1054 Laplanche, Life and Death, p. 61. 
1055 “Experience shows us…” Interpretation, SE 5:542. 
1056 SE 5:542. 
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themselves as immediately real in just the way perceptions do. Freud attributes this to their 
following the primary process: “the intensities attaching to ideas [Vorstellungen] can be 
completely transferred by the dream-work from one idea to another,”1057
We have, then, three categories. At one extreme, hallucinations (including dreams) 
present things as real and for the most part as perceptible. Such presentations are not 
straightforwardly about anything other than themselves, even if they may be interpreted as 
embodying a wish. Occupying a middle realm, recollections and imaginations present things in a 
perceptual manner, but not as currently, externally given (‘real’). These presentations may or may 
not be about something else, as in the case of imaginarily rehearsing for a future performance or 
mentally composing a sketch that is of a particular person. At the other extreme, normal, verbal 
thoughts mostly present named or symbolized things rather than perceptions of those things. 
Following Husserl, we can say that they are necessarily about whatever subject-matter they 
present.
 so the stored memory-
images are invested with the intensity of the wish, becoming thereby just as intense as 
perceptions. 
1058
The upshot is that one cannot find an independent court of appeal to which to compare 
what we perceive or hallucinate, to check whether or not it is real. Yet we do continually 
distinguish between perception and memory, and even between real and unreal perceptions. So, 
as Freud puts the question, what gets us out of the (mythical) situation of hallucinatory 
fulfillment? Where does psychic development begin? In my terms, how does mere reaction 
become specified as response? 
 
Strictly speaking, the answer is: nothing gets us out. If we really had to move from the 
mythical, changeless primary givenness of reality to something else, nothing could ever bring that 
                                                 
1057 SE 5:543. 
1058 Even thoughts that are self-evidently true are true rather than real because they are about what is real. 
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about. Freud implicitly admits as much when he says that the only way for hallucinatory 
satisfaction to be successful would be for the hallucination to be sustained just as continuously as 
the drive-pressure – and that this is precisely what happens, albeit with regard to only a part of 
life, in hallucinatory psychosis and hunger fantasies, “which exhaust their whole psychical 
activity in clinging [Festhaltung] to the object of their wish.”1059
Of course, Freud acknowledges that the psyche does develop, and so we see that the 
primary process organism, in its pure form, can be only a theoretical fiction (though primary 
processing in a more complex organism is not a fiction, on Freud’s account). It is theoretically 
useful as an effort to think about all the implications of a very basic level of processing, but as a 
fiction it sometimes gets him into difficulties because of its superficial similarities with real 
infants. 
 
If we wanted to maintain something like the primary process situation for the real infant, 
we could follow Laplanche and interpret the very early organism as a kind of permeable 
membrane, an envelope embedded in reality. This would be fruitful in that it could give us an ‘I’ 
to accompany every psychic structural moment, without attributing more psychic structure to the 
neonate than seems plausible. We could think of this initial formation as a literal “body-ego” that 
“coincides … with the periphery that delineates the individual.”1060
                                                 
1059 Interpretation, SE 5:566. We saw in chapter 5, section I.G, that in fact even such psychotic episodes do 
not fulfill the mythical situation, since they arise through regression (whether collapsing or fleeing) from a 
more complex state and retain traces of that state. 
 In other words, this ‘ego’ 
would not yet include a unified sense or image of itself, even though for others it delineates an 
inside and an outside of the individual. In thus treating the body-ego as the person, the adults 
around it contribute to the real infant’s psychic investment of itself as an I – they suggest to it the 
contours of its own budding self-image. 
1060 Laplanche, New Foundations, p. 134. We could also think of it, along with Dan Zahavi, as simply an 
experienced dative of manifestation, not yet cognitively reflexive. See Zahavi, “Self and Consciousness,” in 
Exploring the Self, pp. 55-74. 
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Whichever way we go, we have to recognize that in fact the psyche develops as a series 
of complications of judgment, or a series of levels of reality-testing. We saw earlier (part I) that, 
initially, the infant is so helpless that it does not even know what it needs; it has needs but no idea 
what they are (i.e., no psychic presentation thereof). As soon as those needs are met by the 
specific actions of a caretaker, however, psychic development has already begun in response.1061
 
 
The experience of satisfaction is recalled, reinvested with the intensity of the desire, the psychic 
tension is discharged completely in screaming, flailing, crying … and nothing changes. The 
caretaker is asleep, or fails to guess what is needed, has his/her own (unconscious) desire, or 
whatever it may be. Psychic ‘flight’ (as the repetition of a previous discharge), which worked 
well enough in the case of external, physical stimuli, fails to make the physiological pressure of 
the self-preservative drives go away. The real organism has a body with real needs, whether it 
knows what they are through previous satisfactions or not. The needs may be appeased, and in 
this sense disappear (temporarily), through further specific actions in the external world. To 
respond to these constant claims, and not only to the occasional impinging of external irritation, 
the primary process is insufficient: one must also engage with what brings unpleasure, not simply 
flee from it. 
2. Negation as Rejection (Verleugnung, Verwerfung)  
 
Expressed in the language of the oldest – the oral – instinctual impulses, the judgment is: ‘I want 
to eat that’ or ‘I want to spit it out’; and, put more generally: ‘I want to take this into myself and to 
keep that out.’ That is to say: ‘It shall [es soll] be inside me’ or ‘it shall be outside me.’1062
 
 
Here we have a second version of negation, one which seems to accept the irreducibility 
of a distinction between internal and external that is not given in the primary process. In this 
passage from the essay we see that even the most ancient situation of the drives – the oral phase 
                                                 
1061 There is something unexplained here, but let us simply recognize that Freud is not going to solve the 
Meno problem for us. 
1062 “Negation,” SE 19:237, trans. mod. 
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that is only postulated by Freud but not in fact remembered by his analysands1063 – presupposes a 
division between internal and external. A paragraph later in the essay, Freud will say explicitly 
that the reality-testing performed by the ego is “once more a question of external and 
internal.”1064
Freud summarizes the distinction itself in the “Metapsychological Supplement” to his 
book on dreams. “A perception which is made to disappear by means of an action is recognized 
as external, as reality; where such an action changes nothing, the perception comes from within 
the individual’s own body – it is not [externally] real.”
 
1065
Freud offers the following analogy: consciousness ‘perceives’ internal psychic processes 
as the sense-organs perceive the shared world.
 
1066
Within the primary process, there is no difference between the two; this is what Freud 
calls hallucination. All intentions are ‘satisfied’ by fully invested presentations as they are 
 Consciousness ‘perceives’ what is happening 
psychically in terms of pleasure/unpleasure (from the unconscious, primary process) or 
reality/unreality (from the preconscious secondary process). By contrast, perception of the world 
through the sense-organs may or may not be conscious. We perceptually register quite a bit that 
we do not consciously notice. But we saw that the drives are defined as psychic representatives of 
physiological impulses. Thus, the distinction between internal and external sources of stimuli – 
between physiological and physical stimuli – is precisely the difference between what is given as 
currently perceived (physical) and what is given as calling for some action (physiological: i.e., in 
terms of wishes), between what is fulfilled and what is emptily intended. If I want to see the 
football game (empty intention), I must turn on the TV (action) if I am to watch it (fulfilled 
intention). 
                                                 
1063 See Three Essays on Sexuality, SE 7:198, where Freud calls it a “constructed phase of organization.” 
1064 “Negation,” SE 19:237, my emphasis. 
1065 “Supplement,” SE 14:232. 
1066 “The Unconscious,” SE 14:171. 
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formed, since the process of forming the intention (investing oneself in a remembered 
satisfaction) is identical with the process of ‘satisfying’ it (overinvesting the memory, 
experiencing it as presently given). But insofar as a constantly invested sense of self is taken up 
(an ego), hallucination is inhibited, and the distinction between internal and external, what the 
drives claim and what I perceive, has sense. What Marie Leclaire has labeled “immediacy-
testing” is now possible: that is, the indication of reality that a strongly invested memory would 
receive under the primary process is now inhibited, allowing the person to recognize such a 
memory as ‘given (originally) in perception but not so given right now,’ whereas a current 
perception would continue to receive the stamp real.1067
Furthermore, secondary process thinking inhibits investment in a drive until what is 
desired can be brought to perception in the external world. This ‘bringing to perception’ just is 
the specific, more or less coordinated motor action that is initially provided by the infant’s 
caretakers, but gradually becomes the child’s own (in part through developing what once were 
reactive discharges, like screaming, into specific, responsive, communicative actions). From this 
perspective, that which can be removed by means of action is external – hence, it always only 
was really there – whereas what remains, to be temporarily satisfied or not by the results of the 
action, is internal. My body and desires are the parts of reality that are inescapable. 
 
But they do not come to be inescapable, even if they must come to be recognized as such. 
Their inescapability is just part of what it means to be embodied. On one hand, then, we have 
Freud’s claim that “a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the individual from the start; the 
ego has to be developed.”1068
                                                 
1067 Following a suggestion of Freud’s in “Supplement” (SE 14:233n2), Marie Leclaire rigorously and 
persuasively differentiates between immediacy-testing (Aktualitätsprüfung) and reality-testing 
(Realitätsprüfung). See Leclaire, “The ‘Mad Scientists’: Psychoanalysis, dream, and virtual reality,” IJP 84 
(2003): 331-346. See also Leclaire and Scarfone, “Vers une conception unitaire de l’epreuve de realite,” 
Rev. franc. psychanal. LXIV (2000): 885-912. 
 Thus he tries at various points to work out “the most obscure 
1068 “On Narcissism,” SE 14:77. 
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problem: the origin of the ego,”1069
On the other hand, it seems as if there can be no real development or psychic change 
except through the ego, and Freud repeatedly qualifies the departure point for the passage from a 
single-process organism to one that is a tension between two processes as a myth or theoretical 
fiction. I said above that Freud was not going to solve for us the Meno paradox (i.e., how does 
learning get started?), and in fact I think there is no unified resolution of this problem to be found 
in his work. 
 and he tells over and over a story of passage (through 
disappointment) from the primary process to the secondary process. 
Nevertheless, we can see that the problem itself makes some sense as a phenomenon if 
we return to the clinical situation out of which Freud theorizes. In analysis, the ego (the I) appears 
both as that which is capable of learning and growing – becoming less repressive, for example – 
and as that censor which prevents speech or produces empty speech and thus resists analysis, 
refusing to change, often with great vigor. It presents itself as a) the source of primary defense 
against the real-life failure and consequent unpleasure that would be precipitated by allowing the 
individual to be completely governed by premature discharge (mere reaction) rather than specific 
action (response). This makes it seem originary. But it also turns out to be b) often a bit too late 
with this defense, like an overworked fire brigade with flames repeatedly springing up behind its 
lines. This makes it seem secondary.1070
Upon returning our attention to clinical phenomena, however, we are also struck by the 
models from everyday life (normale Vorbilde) on which Freud explicitly relies in characterizing 
 
                                                 
1069 “Project,” SE 1:369. 
1070 It is in this context that the deferred action (Nachträglichkeit) characteristic of sexuality – as 
intrinsically marked in human beings by an interregnum (the latency period) – comes to the fore. Thus, in 
the section of the “Project” dedicated to psychopathology, Freud describes the ego as betrayed from inside 
by the proton pseudos: the ego’s attention is invested outward, in monitoring perceptions; it does not 
defend against innocuous perceptions; but an otherwise-innocuous perception that only becomes traumatic 
when combined with a memory “unexpectedly releases unpleasure, and the ego discovers this only too 
late” (“Project,” SE 1:358). 
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the ego: grief, infatuation, sleep, and dreaming. Freud claims that in our preparations for sleep, 
we put aside both physical and mental acquisitions so as to “approach remarkably close to the 
situation in which [we] began life. … The psychical state of a sleeping person is characterized by 
an almost complete withdrawal from the surrounding world and a cessation of all interest in 
it.”1071 Characterizing sleep as a withdrawal from reality that brings us close to the beginning of 
life should remind us of the plight of the mythical primary process-governed psyche: there is too 
much reality (everything is fully invested, so everything receives the ‘indication of reality’) and 
no distinction between exterior and interior, i.e., no stable, distinct self. The demands for attention 
from objects in the external world, especially when combined (and mixed up) with the pressures 
from the self-preservative drives that may or may not be presented by conflicting memories of 
satisfaction,1072 would certainly be exhausting and overwhelming. The emergence of the ego, 
then, which solves both of these problems merely by its existence, would be the individual’s 
response to being overwhelmed: withdrawal from the solicitations of reality into the developing 
self; a temporary loss of interest in anything other than the private image of oneself as a 
competent, unified whole (i.e., the forerunner of the Freudian ego-ideal).1073
If we follow this line of thinking, taking ego-formation itself to be a defense against a 
primal, overwhelming reality, we can go quite far in making sense of certain of Freud’s 
pronouncements. For example, he admits that he owes the postulate of the primary process as 
hallucinatory to the phenomenon of dreams: dreams “are wish-fulfillments – that is, primary 
processes following upon experiences of satisfaction… It is precisely from this that I am inclined 
 
                                                 
1071 “Supplement,” SE 14:222. 
1072 The claims to nourishment that require the infant to suck and swallow, for example, are frequently 
prejudicial to the claims to continued breathing, and the coordination of both must be learned. 
1073 Here I am following a suggestion of Laplanche’s with regard to sleep (New Foundations, pp. 94-5), one 
that – as we shall see – is far from foreign to Freud’s texts. Laplanche later claims directly that “[t]he stage 
(or repeated stages) of the emergence of the ego … has to be described as a period of primary narcissism” 
(134, original emphasis). 
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to infer that primary wishful investment, too, was of a hallucinatory nature.”1074 Furthermore, as 
we saw in chapter 5, Freud’s own investigation of the ego as such (in, e.g., “On Narcissism”) only 
becomes possible in the context of studying psychosis, which he takes to be precisely a 
withdrawal from the world. Similarly, he compares the wish to sleep to the rejection or refusal 
(Verleugnung) of reality in amentia, when the ego simply denies a real loss that it finds 
unbearable.1075
Here we find a second mode of negation – one proper to the internalization of the 
organism in ego-formation, and one that is central to the structure of psychosis. As we saw 
(chapter 5, section I.G), Freud compares rejection (Verleugnung or Verwerfung) to repression 
(Verdrängung): the latter “treats internal unpleasurable stimuli as if they were external – that is to 
say, reckons them as belonging to the external world,”
 
1076
In sleep, however, such rejection is incomplete. What Freud calls the day’s residues 
(Tagesreste), the thoughts and impulses and emotions not adequately worked over from the 
previous day, retain a certain investment, even when all other investments are withdrawn and 
turned to the ego. These day’s residues, then, function in one way as Trojan horses, threatening to 
betray the withdrawal into sleep by giving the other drives vehicles of expression in the psyche. 
Dreams, which present the residues as if they were external perceptions (i.e., as hallucinations), 
are thus the psyche’s way of defending its sleep against its restless drives.
 while the former rejects the external 
world as having any import or interest for the psyche at all. In other words, just as repression 
makes use of the internal/external distinction by treating drive-pressures as alien, something 
escapable, so rejection in fact does its best to escape from the demands of the shared world. 
1077
                                                 
1074 “Project,” SE 1:340, original emphasis. 
 This projection 
1075 “Supplement,” SE 14:233. Cp. “Formulations,” SE 12:219n3: “a prerequisite of sleep is a deliberate 
Verleugnung of reality (the wish to sleep).” 
1076 “Formulations,” SE 12:219n4, trans. mod. 
1077 “Supplement,” SE 14:223-24. In another way, the day’s residues provide an outlet for the tension of 
repressed wishes, which would otherwise wake us up, and so actually aid our sleep. 
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(externalization of an internal claim) mimics the process of repression, only in reverse, and 
complements the rejection of reality that is involved in fulfilling the claim to sleep. 
If this line of thought is supportable as a reading of Freud, we can make two 
observations. First, the self-preservative drives, which appeared to function so smoothly in the 
static account given earlier, now show themselves, in their emergence and intramural conflict, to 
be overwhelming and frightening as well as useful. (We shall see in a moment something similar 
with regard to the sexual drives.) Openness and responsiveness to reality may be good and 
beautiful, but it is a significant achievement (known as primal repression) to reach the point of 
psychic structuring from which they appear that way (see section II.A.4, below). In Freud’s 
words, “[a] strong egoism [i.e., a flight inward] is a protection against falling ill.”1078
Second, we may observe that if ego-formation is itself already a defense against 
overwhelming reality, then reality for Freud is not understood merely as a correlate of internal 
representations, somehow to be reached from a kind of Cartesian closure.
 
1079 It is, rather, a kind 
of baseline, to which all psychic formation is a series of responses.1080
To this second claim, which sums up one major thesis of the present chapter, someone 
might object that Freud’s accounts of reality-testing frequently characterize what stems from the 
self (including the body) as unreal, in contrast to external reality. In the very paper that I am 
interpreting here, he says, for example, “What is unreal, merely presented, subjective, is only 
internal; the other, what is real, is also there outside [Draußen].”
 
1081
By this he means only that everything unreal is also internal – in other words, only we 
can make things up. I have argued above that the drive-pressures themselves in a way come from 
outside (since they present themselves as oriented to real satisfactions), so that what seems 
 
                                                 
1078 “Narcissism,” SE 14:85. 
1079 This much is Cohen’s thesis; see “Freud’s Baby.” 
1080 Lacan, too, recognizes this. Cf. Seminar 1, p. 49, on the porosity of the child. 
1081 “Negation,” SE 19:237, trans. mod. 
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internal is in a way external; but perhaps this is a sophistical distinction. At any rate, even if this 
objection holds, it says nothing about whether or not the originary situation – which is not auto-
erotism – is awash in reality or closed in on itself. 
But someone might further object that when Freud compares sleep to the primary 
process, he takes the autistic closure of sleep to mimic the originary situation of the organism 
itself, not just primary process functioning as an aspect of a more complicated organism. In a 
footnote to “Formulations,” for example, he claims that “the state of sleep is able to re-establish 
the likeness [Ebenbild] of mental life as it was before the recognition [Anerkennung] of 
reality.”1082
I can respond to this second objection in three ways. 1) First, by pointing out (following 
Laplanche) that if the originary situation were really like sleep, there would be no difference for 
the infant between sleep and waking.
 
1083
Its being nonsense, however, by no means entails that Freud did not say it, especially 
since I have been emphasizing the mythical quality of this originary situation. So, 2) let us recall 
what I have tried to show above: that for Freud (at least at certain moments) the originary relation 
to reality is pre-intentional
 This is surely nonsense. Even in the womb, the infant is 
sometimes awake and sometimes asleep. 
1084
                                                 
1082 “Formulations,” SE 12:219n4. 
 – i.e., one does not experience a coherent ‘reality’ as such, but only 
a conflicting mass of claims and solicitations, of which only the weak ones fail to be marked as 
real. This is still a relation to what is real (not a closed-off, purely hallucinatory state), but as 
awash in it; it is logically prior to the birth of the as-such, so there is no difference between 
dreams and perceptions. Full-fledged reality-testing, which can properly be called a ‘recognition’ 
of reality, only emerges subsequently. 
1083 Laplanche, New Foundations, p. 95. 
1084 In Heidegger’s terms, it is not oriented by an understanding of being. 
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Indeed, it is to something like this fragmented pressure of solicitations that one regresses 
in psychosis, except that (as we saw in chapter 5, section I.G), psychosis remains haunted by the 
dispossessed fragments of meaningful relations to the shared world. Such fragments are cut adrift 
from worldly organization, and thus are primarily oppressive, but this is not the same as simply 
being awash in disorganized stimuli. 
3) My third response requires an account of the emergence of the sexual drives. This is 
appropriate to the objection, since Freud claims that, in sleep, “the libido [regresses] to the point 
of restoring primary narcissism, while [the ego] goes back to the stage of hallucinatory 
satisfaction of wishes.”1085
But focus on the activity as the locus of enjoyment means that the object – the support for 
the activity, for example the person with whom one does it – begins to matter less and less. The 
pleasure comes from stimulation of the organ (touching of the lips, for example), with less regard 
for the object (who does the touching). Indeed, it may be best if one does it oneself. At any rate, 
one can do it oneself, in many cases, and so the organ becomes its own object, the support for its 
own pleasure. This is what Freud refers to as the auto-erotism
 The ‘libido’ to which he refers here is psychic energy stemming from 
the sexual drives, which, we saw above, emerge by being stripped off of the self-preservative (or 
ego) drives. This stripping-off is occasioned by the enigmatic quality of the caretaker’s sexual 
investment of certain activities and of certain zones of the body. And it takes place as a more or 
less gradual relocation of pleasure in response to seduction, from enjoyment of the meeting of a 
self-preservative need (pleasure of satiety) to enjoyment of the activity itself, including 
enjoyment of the sheer stimulation of the erogenous regions. 
1086
                                                 
1085 “Supplement,” SE 14:222-23, trans. mod. 
 (or, here, as the primary 




the first beginnings of sexual satisfaction are still linked with the taking of nourishment, the sexual 
instinct has a sexual object outside the infant’s own body [which, we may add, is itself not yet 
well-defined psychically] in the shape of his mother’s breast. It is only later that the instinct loses 
that object […]. As a rule the sexual instinct then becomes auto-erotic.
) of sexuality. It is important, however, that auto-erotism is primary to sexuality 
only insofar as the latter comes to be fully distinct from the self-preservative drives. Hence, Freud 




A second contributor to this auto-erotic turn that marks the emergence of a new kind of 
drive is related very precisely to the formation of the ego that is taking place in this step of the 
developmental story. Freud says less about this, but Laplanche and others have filled it in for us. 
Just as the solicitations of the external world can be oppressive, turning the infant in on itself, so 
can the enigmatic sexuality of the caretakers. There is a helplessness of love, as well, 
complementary to the omnipotence of the caretaker.  
On one hand, because the person who provides for the infant’s needs communicates love 
to the infant precisely thereby, and is occasionally evidently disappointed in the child, the infant 
will feel the difference between the capacity of the caretaker to love and its own capacity to love, 
and will nonetheless want (and, increasingly, feel responsible) not to disappoint. On the other 
hand, because the caretaker both provides and refuses to provide for reasons that the infant cannot 
understand, it will feel itself completely at the mercy of the caretaker’s whim – in other words, 
without any realm over which it has control or in which it can have its own desires.1089
                                                 
1087 Geyskens points out that it is in his further investigations of psychosis that Freud will come to designate 
auto-erotism as a turn away from objects altogether (like schizophrenia), reserving the term ‘narcissism’ for 
a turn away from currently external objects toward the self (like paranoia) (Our Original Scenes, ch. 4). 
 This two-
fold feeling of its own helplessness, as excessively responsible and yet as divested of any realm 
under its own control, fearful of being crushed by the love of the caretaker, motivates it to 
withdraw into itself. 
1088 Three Essays, SE 7:222, my addition in brackets. 
1089 Cf. Philippe van Haute, Against Adaptation, pp. 112-19. 
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Let us mark this as a felt betrayal, which is one meaning of what Freud calls ‘frustration’ 
(Versagung), from which the child mentally flees back to its own self. This makes clear that the 
child’s relation to its primary caretakers is always a question of trust, but also that it is really a 
question of trust, that whatever assumptive security-trust (see chapter I, section II.A) the infant 
may have is structurally challenged here. It seems that a personal trust in the parent is called for, 
one that can survive such betrayals. Should such personal trust fail to arise, the child’s full 
adoption of the parent’s world is at risk. 
Since the sexual drives emerge from a multitude of particular enjoyable activities, they 
are initially dispersed and multiple. Eventually, and even then only to a certain extent, these 
drives may come to be united upon a single loved person, more or less organized around the unity 
of genital pleasure. Initially, however, they are simply claims to (bodily as well as temporally) 
isolated re-enactments of previous satisfactions – what may be called organ pleasures.1090 They 
may be more or less concentrated on the typical erogenous zones, but Freud goes so far as to say 
that pretty much any motion or activity can become eroticized for the child.1091
Thus, it is in the primary auto-erotism of sexuality, along with the sleep-like retreat into 
ego-formation, that we do find something like the infant closed in on itself, concerned only with 
satisfying its sexual drives, perhaps with little reference to the external world. The very existence 
of those drives is not originary – they emerged by leaning on the externally oriented self-
preservative drives, and they were peeled off by the solicitations of other people – but they are 
 This means that 
the involvement of another person, while perhaps necessary for one or a few such pleasures, will 
certainly not be necessary for all of them. So it is their very style of emergence that makes 
possible their initial auto-erotism, neither centered on a singular object nor (at least in some 
cases) necessarily involving another person. 
                                                 
1090 Three Essays, SE 7:168, 204, 233; “Instincts,” SE 14:126. 
1091 Three Essays, SE 7:233. Laplanche also emphasizes this in Life and Death. 
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originary insofar as the sexual realm is concerned. Furthermore, with their emergence, the psyche 
defensively regresses to being governed by the primary process, which presents itself as originary 
for the reasons given earlier. This is the same regression that the psychotic break retraces, should 
it later occur. 
In this circumstance, then, there lies a confusing ambiguity that leads to frequent, perhaps 
unavoidable confusions on Freud’s part and gives rise to the objection – namely, that Freud takes 
the autistic closure of sleep to mimic the originary situation of the organism itself. For it is this 
‘primary narcissism’ to which the sleeper’s libido regresses that Freud then pairs with the ego’s 
regression to hallucinatory satisfaction.1092
Although sexuality, too, obeys the pleasure principle as if free of the reality principle, it is 
not the same as the (mythical) primal moment; it is necessarily a turn to primary process 
functioning precisely as an abandonment of the secondary process. Indeed, as suggested by the 
analogy with sleep, this same regression occurs as part of the ego’s formation. When the external 
world and the omnipotence of the caretaker become too overwhelming for the infant, it withdraws 
(rather imperfectly) into its newly formed self-image, refusing (as far as possible) to engage with 
anything external. 
 But in “Narcissism,” written roughly a year before the 
“Metapsychological Supplement,” he makes clear that primary narcissism belongs to the sexual 
drives, not the self-preservative (or ego) drives. There he says that it presupposes the auto-erotism 
of the libido, but we have already seen that the sexual drives emerge only from the self-
preservative drives. The realm of sexuality only pretends to be originary; in fact, it occurs only 
after the initial formation of the ego. 
Perhaps we can see best what Freud means about this from a rather vivid description in 
Civilization and Its Discontents: “the frequent, manifold, and unavoidable sensations of pain and 
                                                 
1092 See the quotation above, from “Supplement” (SE 14: 222-3): in sleep, “the libido [regresses] to the 




unpleasure” act as “incentive[s] to a disengagement of the ego from the general mass of 
sensations.” Just as we continue to do periodically in sleep, early on we respond to overwhelming 
reality through a withdrawal, an attempt “to separate from the ego everything that can become a 
source of such unpleasure, to throw it outside and to create a pure pleasure-ego”1093
 
 – i.e., an ego 
with (partially developed) secondary processing capacities that nonetheless lives by the pleasure 
principle. 
3. Negation: Repression (Verdrängung) as Refusal to Think 
 
[T]he original pleasure-ego [Lust-Ich] wants to introject into itself everything that is good and to 
eject [werfen] from itself everything that is bad. What is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is 
external are, initially [zunächst], identical.1094
 
  
Here we have the third step of the process: the ego as defensively obeying the pleasure 
principle, making judgments for the first time, but only of the predicative sort (e.g., ‘x is bad,’ 
regardless of x’s status as real). I list this as a third step, differentiating it from the second step 
(ego-formation as distinguishing between internal and external), in order to mark a moment in 
Freud’s work when he refers to that second step as “the original ‘reality-ego’.”1095
                                                 
1093 Civilization and Its Discontents, SE 21:67. 
 His distinction, 
made only in the essay on drives, is based on two ways of differentiating between internal and 
external. The reality-ego does so in the terms laid out above: what can be made to go away by 
specific action (external) vs. what is inescapable (internal). As we saw, this is what Leclaire calls 
‘immediacy-testing’. By contrast, the pleasure-ego, as is by now evident, differentiates on the 
1094 “Negation,” SE 19:237, trans. mod. 
1095 “Instincts,” SE 14:136. As an indication of Freud’s confusion about this, see his footnote (and 
Strachey’s editorial addition) to “Instincts” (SE 14:34-35n2). Freud claims in 1911 (“Formulations”) that 
there is a progression from pleasure-ego to reality-ego; in 1915 (“Instincts”) that both proceed, in the same 
order, from a more originary reality-ego; in 1925 (“Negation”) that “the definitive reality-ego … develops 
out of the initial pleasure-ego.” He repeats this last position in Civilization, SE 21:67-8. Cf. Cohen’s article, 
“Freud’s Baby,” which discusses this uncertainty on Freud’s part and follows David Rapaport in 
considering the pleasure-ego and reality-ego to be “simultaneous processes,” response options between 
which the ego chooses in any given conflict. My own solution (which follows) is inspired by Laplanche’s 
emphasis on the self as structurally self-deceptive in fantasizing (i.e., creating myths about) its own past. 
(Although I think Cohen is right insofar as psychic structures are never simply abandoned.) 
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basis of the primary process: what is pleasurable (internal) vs. what is unpleasurable (external). In 
other words, where the reality-ego asks, ‘Is it really inside or outside me?’ the pleasure-ego asks, 
‘Should it (in terms of my wishes) be inside or outside?’ 
Whether or not the original reality-ego is formed defensively, as I argued above, what 
Freud designates here as the pleasure-ego is clearly defensive in its orientation. Although it 
presupposes both of the steps we have seen so far, it responds to the frustrations inherent in 
reality not by thinking but by fleeing to the pleasure principle, leaving the reality principle 
behind. That is, it “can do nothing but wish, work for a yield of pleasure, and avoid 
unpleasure.”1096 Wishing, as we have seen, is simply investing a memory-image of a previous 
satisfaction. And as Freud says in the book on dreams, the primary process aims “to produce a 
‘perceptual identity’ – a repetition of the perception which was linked with the satisfaction of the 
need.”1097 Thus, the question is only one of matching up what is perceived with what I remember, 
aiming at predicative unities.1098 The general formula for such judgment is given in the “Project”: 
“[T]he dissimilarity between the wish-investment of a memory and a perception-investment that 
is similar to it … gives the impetus for the activity of thought, which is terminated once more [in 
action] with their coincidence.”1099 A presentation has the intensity – and thus the status – of a 
perception.1100
                                                 
1096 “Formulations,” SE 12:223, original emphasis. 
 Does it satisfy? In other words, does it belong to the set of presentations that are 
1097 Interpretation, SE 5:566. 
1098 Obviously, not all predicative judgments are to be ascribed to the pleasure-ego. The important point is 
only that predicative unity in terms of one’s claims for satisfaction is prior to the more complex and ascetic 
predications of secondary process thinking. 
1099 “Project,” SE 1:328, trans. mod. 
1100 Here Freud’s own description of the pleasure-ego betrays the latter’s pretense. Freud says that the 
question is “whether something perceived (a thing) [etwas Wahrgenommenes (ein Ding)] shall be taken 
into the ego or not” (“Negation,” SE 19:237, trans. mod). I take this to mean ‘something with the intensity 
of a perception’ (i.e., including a hallucination) because he says elsewhere that the pleasure-ego seeks 
hallucinatory fulfillment, but it is also the case that the pleasure-ego, as ego, at some level differentiates 
between what is perceived and what is hallucinated; thus it is also fitting that its question be put in terms of 
uniting a real, perceived Thing (the ‘constant perceptual component’ of the “Project” (SE 1:328)) with its 
relevant attribute (‘good’ or ‘bad’). The process might be imagined along the following lines: Here is a 
thing. Is it tasty? (Prior to language, this means something like: satisfying or not? To be consumed or not?) 
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good (hence, to be joined to the ego)? Or does it belong to the set of those that are bad (hence, 
alien to the ego)? 
This means that although, being an ego, the pleasure-ego does in fact inhibit 
hallucination, presenting things as perceptions (real) or fantasies (unreal), it does not let this 
distinction make a practical difference. Rather, it indulges freely in fantasies of satisfaction and 
pretends like they are sufficient.1101
Moreover, because the pleasure-ego is formed as a response to frustration – the 
frustration that arises when it seems like the need-satisfactions are being refused – its regression 
to the primary process appears as an attempt to regain a fantasized originary state: that of itself as 
a plenum, containing all and only goodness. This is a modification of the ego’s basic fantasy of 
being completely self-unified. As specifically a pleasure-ego, it seeks to include in that 
unification the good caretaker (or, rather, all the things that bring it pleasure, including some 
facets of the caretaker). Rather than a world split between the stable self and permanent object(s), 
between which there could be a relation – and both of which could be at times satisfying (‘good’) 
and at times not – the world (in fact a kind of hybrid self-object) is split between good and bad. 
Like auto-erotism as a pretended self-sufficiency of sexuality, then, the pleasure-ego’s repeated 
attempt to completely reinvest a never-extant primal state of unity with the mother – in which 
 For, in fact, with the emergence of sexual pleasure (whose 
relation with fantasy Freud always acknowledges to be very close), fantasies can be sufficient for 
satisfaction in the auto-erotic realm of sexuality. Although this does not make them sufficient for 
self-preservative pleasure, we saw from their manner of emergence that the sexual pleasure and 
the self-preservative pleasure taken in an activity can be joined in confusing ways, and perhaps 
can even pretend for a time to substitute for one another. 
                                                 
1101 Cp. Cohen’s characterization: “The pleasure-ego replaces realistic recognition of dependency on the 
part-object [e.g., the breast] with omnipotence and persecutory anxiety: recognition of drives pressing from 
inside and the need-satisfier as absent gives way to delusions of possession and the perception that all 
unpleasurable tensions originate from without” (p. 887-8). 
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satisfaction would never be denied – by proceeding according to the primary process appears in 
analysis as a kind of pretense to originarity (i.e., a kind of Romantic fantasy: ‘this is how things 
used to be’).1102
If the form of negation in the previous step was rejection (Verleugnung or Verwerfung), 
i.e., keeping out what is already out, refusing it completely, the pleasure-ego continues this at a 
certain level but adds to it repression (Verdrängung): treating as alien what is within, ejecting 
(von sich werfen) it. In other words, where ‘flight’ is simply independent of thought, and rejection 
forecloses on a condition for the possibility of thought, repression is a refusal to think about (in 
the sense of recognizing or accepting) whatever might sully the self’s goodness. It is a response to 
the infant’s own frustration (Versagung), one which projects that frustration onto whatever seems 
to be denying it satisfaction. Like the pleasure-ego itself, this form of negation is a primary-
process reaction (a version of fleeing) in an individual otherwise governed by both psychic 
processes. 
 
Here we can get some purchase on Freud’s repeated story: that of the failure of the 
primary process to avoid unpleasure (its frustration), which leads to an acceptance of the reality 
principle. For now both kinds of principles are available to the individual. It has an ego that is 
constantly trying to more thoroughly unify itself by expelling whatever it considers ‘bad’, but as a 
pleasure-ego it is trying to get by with using only one of the two principles of psychic 
engagement with the world. It makes sense, then, that within an environment where its needs are 
mostly but not completely (and certainly not immediately) met by its caretakers, it could 
gradually learn that the reality-principle is necessary. It can realize that satisfaction really is not 
hallucinatory, even if it would prefer things otherwise. 
                                                 
1102 Cp. Lacan’s account of fantasy as maintaining desire by substituting partial objects for the 
unapproachable Thing (Seminar 6). 
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This realization is a matter of coming to trust the world as a whole, to belong to it, to let it 
be disclosed as capable of sustaining me and worthy of my full investment in it. That investment 
centrally involves moving beyond the pleasure ego, letting reality (truth and falsity) matter to me 
as something other than a frustration. I have said that such primitive trust emerges in a circulation 
with personal trusting, and here we can see what that means. If the child is taken care of by more 
or less trustworthy adults (‘good-enough parents’), then these adults act as representatives of what 
will show up as a good-enough world. The child is then seduced into (involuntarily) transferring 
its trust to that world. But it must already have had some measure of primitive trust in order to 
come to personally trust its parents, in such a way that its trust could survive the inevitable 
frustrations and the structurally overpowering situation. So the two kinds of trust seem to emerge 
together, or perhaps they are simply not differentiated until later – maybe there is not yet a 
difference for the child between its parents as people and the structure of its world. (Maybe at 
first they do not act as representatives of but simply as the world’s structure.) 
However we wish to parse those details, if I am right that the pleasure ego is a defensive 
retreat from an already available reality-principle, and that the child must be solicited or seduced 
into affirming the shared world by trust in its parents, then this is strong evidence that primitive 
trust and personal trust belong together in a kind of circulation. 
Before moving on to the final step, let me give an example at least of the phenomenon in 
adult life to which Freud is pointing. For simplicity, recall Sartre’s café scenario (cf. chapter 2, 
above): 
I am expecting to meet Pierre at a certain café. (This, then, is my wish, correlated in this 
example to the internal claim of the drive to the enjoyment of seeing or speaking with Pierre.) I 
walk in, and my gaze searches the room. I see someone who looks like him and move toward the 
person, but as I draw nearer I notice that it is not really Pierre. (The perceived person is similar to 
but not identical to my presentation. There is a mismatch between intention and satisfaction, 
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already noted by immediacy-testing.) Now, according to Freud, there are two ways to respond to 
this disappointment. I can simply decide that in fact it must be him, repressing all frustration, and 
continue on as if it were him, taking the person to be Pierre and even treating him accordingly. 
This is the response of the pleasure-ego. Alternatively, I could examine the situation more 
closely, comparing my presentation of Pierre with the man in front of me, keeping open both the 
possibility of a mistake in my memory, such that this is Pierre, and of a mistake in location (one 
or the other of us got the time or place wrong), such that it is not. The result of my reality-testing 
may well be that I end up waiting for Pierre or going to another café in an attempt to bring my 
presentation into unity with my perception. This is the response of the reality-ego. 
The pleasure-ego tries to cover up the fact that there are two steps here. There is first the 
mismatch between the invested presentation and its lack of satisfaction, and only then the 
(probably unconscious) decision to reject disappointment. The pleasure-ego, however, carries on 
more or less delusionally, as if this really were Pierre, pretending that the moment of immediacy-
testing never happened. Thus, the confused stranger’s attempts to convince me that he is not 
Pierre are either ignored or interpreted as a kind of conspiracy against me – he is playing a trick 
on me, and the more insistent he is, the more unkind the trick. Above all, it must not be my fault 
for arriving at the wrong café or at the wrong time. 
  
4. Symbolic Negation 
 
[T]he final [endgültig] reality-ego […] develops out of the initial [anfänglich] pleasure-ego. It is 
now [a question of] whether something which is in the ego as a presentation [Vorstellung] can be 
rediscovered in perception (reality) as well. It is, we see, once more a question of external and 
internal. […] In this stage of development, regard for the pleasure principle has been set aside. 
Experience has taught that it is not only important whether a thing (an object of satisfaction) 
possesses the ‘good’ attribute and so deserves to be taken into the ego, but also whether it is there 
in the external world, so that one can get hold of it whenever one needs it. […] The first and 
immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to find an object in real perception which 
corresponds to the one presented, but to refind such an object, to convince oneself that it is still 
there.1103
                                                 





Now we have reached the ego that acknowledges its need for the consistency of external 
reality (what is called ‘object-permanence’). Having been exhausted by its efforts to maintain 
hallucination long enough to outlast the constant drive-pressures (without any sufficient source of 
energy for those attempts), the psyche as pleasure-ego finds itself betrayed by its own attempt to 
live by the primary process and has to “resolve [entschließen] to form a conception of the real 
circumstances in the external world and to exert itself to alter them.”1104 The symbolic ‘forming 
of conceptions’ differs from hallucination as dipping one’s foot in the water differs from leaping 
in: it allows for what phenomenology would call emptily intending, thinking of something 
without its being present perceptually. As the entrance of symbols into the order of images, it 
allows one to remain at a certain distance from imagination. It is a measure not of how involved 
one is in reality as a whole but of how much one is willing to commit to some entity as real in the 
current situation. In Freud’s terms, forming a conception involves only tentatively investing a 
presentation, so as to delay (and thereby bring about more reliably) satisfaction.1105
Negation at this stage is no longer repression (refusing to think about something, not 
wanting to know it) but precisely thinking something: purposefully attending to it as a 
presentation, at first somewhat independently of its instantiation in reality but eventually adding a 
judgment as to the propositional truth or falsity of the presentation. Thus, I can consciously think 
about getting revenge on someone, and even plan it elaborately, without actually doing it: I both 
affirm it (as a wish) and negate it (refusing to invest the relevant motor actions, even if only for a 
time). Further, I can consider whether or not (or, later, in what ways) I am bad; I can subject that 
 By ‘exert 
itself to alter’ the real circumstances, Freud means acting specifically or adequately in a 
coordinated response to both the internal claim and the external situation. 
                                                 
1104 “Formulations,” SE 12:219, trans. mod. 
1105 “[T]hinking possesses the capacity to make present once more [wieder gegenwärtig zu machen] 
something that has once been perceived, by reproducing [Reproduktion] it as a presentation [Vorstellung] 
without the external object having still to be there” (“Negation,” SE 19:237). 
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presentation (myself as the source of frustration) to the judgment of truth or falsity, precisely as a 
presentation that may or may not match reality. 
It is with this final step that truth as correctness appears in its full force. The negation 
(and thus mediation) made possible by symbolic thinking characterizes the rest of the ego’s 
reality-submitted development throughout its life, even though that submission to reality is never 
simply taken over whole-heartedly. As a founded mode of activity, we find that thinking logically 
presupposes each of the first two steps. What is encountered perceptually must be taken as real 
(the ‘indication of reality’), and what is not perceived but only presented must be taken as unreal 
(immediacy-testing, an inhibition which requires the ego). The distinction between internal and 
external must also be in place, since it is marked out in the very formation of the ego. 
According to Freud’s psychogenetic account, thinking also temporally presupposes the 
third step (the pleasure-ego), for it is constituted as a way of tentatively exploring the situation 
before fully investing a memory of satisfaction. It is, in that sense, a response to the failure of the 
pleasure-ego: this version of the reality-ego emerges in the resolute taking-up of the realization 
that sheer intentional givenness (e.g., a memory-presentation) is not yet enough to satisfy the 
claims of the drives. Giving thought to something, which for Freud obeys the reality principle, is 
thus in fact a roundabout way of satisfying the pleasure principle.1106
                                                 
1106 “Formulations,” SE 12:223. 
 It is the process of delaying 
action (i.e., the full investment of motor neurons) by small investments of memory and perceptual 
neurons. One casts about, both in the presently given external world and in one’s memories, 
seeking certain unities. Where the pleasure-ego stopped with the discovery of unities between its 
psychic presentations and its wishes – this is the precursor to predicative judgments – the reality-
ego additionally delays full investment until it finds a sufficient unity between the whole object as 
psychically presented (the ‘empty intention’, along with the pressure of the internal claim) and 
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the perceived, external situation. This latter unity is an existential judgment, founded on but 
transcending the various predicative judgments. 
As a temporary delay of action, then, thinking for Freud is preeminently practical. Its sole 
work is to “strive for what is useful and guard itself against damage”1107; or, as he puts it in the 
passage from “Negation” quoted at length above, to ensure that one ‘can get hold of the object 
whenever one needs it’.1108 Freud takes this way of engaging with the situation to be an extension 
of reality-testing. It is an advance over mere presenting (Vorstellen), or what I am calling 
predicative judgments, but it need not yet be what Freud understands by conscious thought, 
namely, proceeding at the level of awareness. We process and judge any number of things every 
day without attending to that processing as such, and so Freud calls it the ‘unconscious thinking-
process’ (unbewusstes Denkprozess).1109 Conscious thought, for Freud, implies by contrast the 
use of language, which requires the further association of objects (both presented and perceived) 
with word-presentations.1110
 This primary practical orientation can, according to Freud, give way to theoretical 
consideration either in the absence of strong drive-pressures
 
1111 or in the presence of significant 
differences between the object as psychically presented (remembered) and the object as 
perceived. The “reproduction of a perception as a presentation is not always a faithful one; it may 
be modified by omissions, or changed by the merging of various elements. In that case, reality-
testing has to ascertain how far such distortions go.”1112
                                                 
1107 Ibid., original emphasis. 
 To return to our example by modifying it 
a bit, I might be led, after failing several different times to meet up with Pierre, to a more 
1108 In Heidegger’s terms: thought is at first and most of the time about the ready-to-hand (Zuhandenes). 
1109 Heidegger agrees here as well, although he would call this version of ‘unconscious’ simply the 
structure of concealment upon which disclosure is founded. Freud’s ‘unconscious thought-process’ is not 
repressed but only unnoticed or pre-linguistic, so he and Heidegger disagree on this point only in 
terminology. 
1110 “Formulations,” SE 12:219. 
1111 Through satisfaction or sublimation. See the first chapter of Civilization (SE 21) for a catalogue of 
ways to deal with the drives. 
1112 “Negation,” SE 19:238. 
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fundamental consideration of the whole situation, although still ultimately with a practical 
orientation. Nevertheless – modifying once more – if I were to arrive at where I thought there was 
a café and discover that there was just nothing there, this might push me out of the practical 
orientation entirely, into something like the pathlessness (aporia) in which the ancient Greeks 
began their reconsiderations of basic assumptions. At that point, I would respond with a very 
complex attempt to compare some of my more fundamental presentations to the experienced (and 
baffling) reality. Hence we have here reality-testing in its full, two-fold complexity: not only 
seeking whether certain intended objects are real, but also considering the nature of reality as 
such (i.e., the meaning of being). 
What of this claim of Freud’s that reality-testing proper proceeds by trying to ‘refind’ an 
object already once given perceptually? What can this mean for our relation to being? From one 
perspective, this can be understood as a general, psychological description of what has just been 
described as the thinking process – i.e., as ‘convincing oneself that the object is still there’. From 
another perspective, however, it also refers to the specific situation of the infant’s helpless 
dependence. When the psyche becomes capable of full intentional life through this fourth step, 
then the primary caretaker can emerge as a whole, self-unified object, over against the ego’s 
distinct self (a self which can now also be unified as one ego, since it is allowed to be recognized 
as something other than the sum of all good). Rather than a series of part-objects, some good, 
some bad, the primary caretaker becomes available as something like a real person, functioning 
with her own desires in various shared contexts that fill out a world. 
Yet Freud points out that just at the moment of accepting the other as a self-unifying 
person separate from the self, one’s fantasized complete unity with her (the retrospective goal of 
the pleasure-ego) appears as impossible. “This object [the mother’s breast] is later lost, perhaps at 
the very time when it becomes possible for the child to form a total presentation of [himself, i.e., 
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of] the person to whom the organ granting him satisfaction belongs.”1113
The reality-ego thus gives up the fantasized satisfaction of the pleasure principle in order 
to submit to the more complex consistency of the reality principle. Being is both pleasant and 
unpleasant, objects are unities that both satisfy and frustrate, and reality has its own, 
differentiated unity, one that can be generally trusted, even when it is disappointing to my wishes. 
Thus, mediation – access to the world that can be rebuffed by and learn from that world – is 
gained at the cost of enjoyment. The ego accepts partial satisfactions because it recognizes that if 
its demand is all-or-nothing, it will end up with nothing. This is what we earlier designated 
‘accepting castration’: there are laws of reality that force compliance; these laws are symbolically 
enforced by other people; thus one cannot have everything, beginning with the fantasized fusion 
with one’s primary caretaker. 
 With the emergence of 
the ego, which makes possible the sexual turn from sheer auto-erotism to primary narcissism, 
inevitably comes the irretrievable loss of the fantasized object. All real unity now must be 
acknowledged – practically, even if not theoretically – to include difference. 
Notice, then, what else is presupposed by this emergence into the realm of mediated truth 
and falsity: a summons into the shared world, and enough trust in the person making the 
summons that one can thereby trust that the world will provide something if one gives up the 
demand for everything. That summons, furthermore, cannot simply be peremptory, or it will be 
suffered as only another overwhelming demand made by the world. It must rather have the 
character of invitation – we could even say, of seduction. For a child is invited not only into some 
world, some structured way of relating to things, but into a specific world, a particular 
clearing.1114
                                                 
1113 Three Essays, SE 7:222, trans. mod. 
 
1114 I return to this below, chapter 7, part III. 
452 
 
This way of putting the matter should remind us that submission to the reality principle 
must also, eventually, be undergone by the sexual drives. I said above that these kinds of drives 
are not less intense, only more inward. In Freud’s words: “The continuance of auto-erotism is 
what makes it possible to retain for so long the easier momentary and imaginary satisfaction in 
relation to the sexual object in place of real satisfaction, which calls for effort and 
postponement.”1115 Because the sexual drives begin with a turn away from objects, they are not so 
susceptible to being denied by the caretakers (although their being symbolically forbidden will 
give rise to other problems). And because the child is inherently unprepared for its encounter with 
adult sexuality, there is a latency period until puberty, during which sexuality remains 
undeveloped in comparison to the rest of the child’s psychic functioning. Thus, Freud indicates 
that “the sexual drive is held up in its psychical development and remains far longer [than the 
ego-drives] under the dominance of the pleasure principle, from which in many people it is never 
able to withdraw.”1116
These structural features allow for a more gradual transition (never fully completed) into 
the realm of the reality-principle. But precisely as stretched out over time, that transition also 
highlights the complexity of a mediated relation to reality. Questions about one’s own origins 
from one’s parents, about sexual difference, and about the differences between kinds of love give 
rise to childhood sexual theories that get worked into fantasy (chapter 7, part III). Confusing 
desires, painful renunciation, overwhelming attachment first to one and then to another person, 
defiance, and fantasy itself all play their roles in this transition. And that is only a description of 
the Oedipal complex, which has to be sorted out (initially) in early childhood! The self has not yet 
even reached puberty. Yet the structural problem of the Oedipal situation can be put quite 
generally: we must somehow navigate the role of a third, an interloper, in the middle of – and as 
 Fantasy continues to reign in the realm of sexuality. 
                                                 
1115 “Formulations,” SE 12:223. 
1116 Ibid., p. 222, trans. mod. 
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part of – being seduced into a full affirmation of the shared world that transcends a merely dual 
relation. 
The structurally necessary loss of this fantasized object (i.e., of complete unity) thus 
affects both sets of drives in a way that could be called traumatic, even if it does not constitute 
full-blown trauma.1117 In the case of the ego drives, it reinstates a kind of helplessness and thus 
revives the infantile feeling of panic when abandoned (i.e., radical passivity), which can also be 
named ‘death-anxiety.’ This anxious helplessness is, according to Geyskens, precisely what we 
are compelled to repeat in neurosis – it is the original traumatic structure to which all future 
traumata recur. In the case of the sexual drives, the initial object-loss produces a constant seeking 
of the lost object in various partial objects. Subsequent failure of such objects to satisfy does not, 
in this case, leave one passive (helpless) but instead turns the drive back once more toward auto-
erotism,1118
 If Freud is right about this necessarily conflictual progress of development, then the costs 
of psychic achievement are not trivial. In the course of thinking through Freud’s account, I hope 
to have made it plausible that what one achieves just is ontological freedom, thought in the 
Heideggerian sense as an understanding of being, a structured, responsive openness that allows 
for intentional world-directedness. Although Freud’s account is quite different, they are 
addressing the same phenomenon. Yet the price of this freedom is, according to Freud, at 
minimum either neurosis (a symptomatic and deeply conflicted sexuality) or sublimation (a 
continual reorganization of one’s desires that includes a heavy component of renunciation). 
Perhaps this is nothing new philosophically, but let me press the point. What Heidegger calls the 
 whether in the mild form of frustrated masturbation after a break-up, or in the all-
encompassing form of catatonic schizophrenia after a betrayal by the whole world. 
                                                 
1117 For an argument that it is important to distinguish between ‘traumatic’ and ‘full-blown trauma’, see 
Greg M. Horowitz, “A Late Adventure of the Feelings: Loss, Trauma, and the Limits of Psychoanalysis,” 
in The Trauma Controversy, eds. Kristen Brown Golden and Bettina G. Bergo (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 
2009), pp. 23-44. 
1118 Geyskens, Our Original Scenes, pp. 68-74. 
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anxiety of finitude – the terror of non-being that psychoanalysis also discovers, especially in the 
fantasy of castration – is also included in the price. We might even be able to say, with Geyskens, 
that primal repression – this giving up of the fantasized complete unity that I have been 
describing – implies the following:  
Because of the traumatic kernel of the unconscious [i.e., the loss of the primary object], the subject 
is essentially concerned with its own disappearance, and subjectivity is this continual, compulsive 
repetition of and resistance to its own disappearance in[to] a radical passivity.1119
 
 
If we put that in Heidegger’s terms: our forgetful, distortive relation to being, which opens us up 
to what-is, is maintained and endured in the face of a profound threat to this very relation, i.e., in 
(ontic) anxiety about (ontological) world-collapse. 
 
 Through a consideration of the nature of the drives and the story of their emergence, then, 
I have tried to show that what Freud characterizes as ‘internal’ always emerges in part as a 
response to the shared world, whatever may be its later fate. Thus, even physiological claims to 
satisfaction are structured by the determinateness of their relation to that world, and can be 
systematically differentiated according to the kind of enjoyment taken. I have suggested that 
Aristotle’s distinction between motion and activity gives a helpful model for understanding such 
differentiation. Finally, I have tried to show how Freud’s story about our earliest psychic 
development can be made consistent: by finding in it a kind of pretense at the heart of sexuality, a 
pretense to chronological originality that would support its bid to be central in human life. 
 
B) Implications for Psychosis 
 Let me try now to sum up what this means for our study of psychosis. Jean Hyppolite 
emphasizes that the “Negation” article I have been interpreting concludes with a surprising turn. 
Freud claims that “in analysis we never discover a ‘no’ in the unconscious.”1120
                                                 
1119 Ibid., p. 75. Cf. Bernet, “The Traumatized Subject,” p. 169. 
 Is the 
1120 “Negation,” SE 19:239. 
455 
 
unconscious then the one place free of any form of negation? Yet there is surely destructiveness 
among unconscious wishes. Hyppolite also indicates that Freud has given us a way to make sense 
of that destructiveness just a few lines earlier. For Freud attributes “the general pleasure in 
negation [or desire to negate, Verneinungslust], the negativism which is displayed by some 
psychotics,”1121
Freud differentiates this powerful affective negativism from negation in judgment 
because the latter is made possible by the introduction of a symbol that “has endowed thinking 
with a first measure of freedom […] from the compulsion of the pleasure principle.”
 to a Triebentmischung, a decoupling or disentangling of the drive from its 
objects. By analogy to situations of interpersonal betrayal, we could gloss this as the pleasure that 
someone in despair might take in burning all connections and walking away. It is thus quite close 
to regression, which we have seen is a way of understanding the psychotic withdrawal from 
common sense (chapter 5, section I.D.2). 
1122
The pleasure in destruction that Freud identifies here is attested to by Kaysen, who lived 
for a while on the edge of psychosis. She confesses that the drive to destroy at times seemed to be 
all that was holding her together; though in remaining on the borderline, she still encountered 
 This 
mediating distance opened up by the symbol as a first negation of the thing is precisely what 
psychosis forecloses on. As a rejection of the costs of the symbolically structured world, it is a 
refusal or inability to accept for itself the freeing distance that comes with thinking. The trade-off 
here is thus a matter of the mode that destruction takes: either negation of things by symbols, 
beginning with primal repression, which turns out to expose us to things in a bearable way, or 
rejection of the shared world, refusal of the coherence of reality (and thus of common sense), 
which turns out to expose me to things unbearably by alienating me from their coherent being. 
The latter kind of exposure weakens and can ultimately destroy any stable, integrated self. 
                                                 
1121 SE 19:239, trans. mod. 
1122 SE 19:239. 
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things primarily in language. “My ambition was to negate. The world, whether dense or hollow, 
provoked only my negations. […] All my integrity seemed to lie in saying No.”1123
Affirmation [Bejahung] – as a substitute [Ersatz] for uniting – belongs to Eros; 
 Whether it 
was that she had never made the initial foreclosure – in other words, that trusting affirmation had 
won out from the start – or whether she simply managed to fend off, by this violent verbal 
negation, the demand for a signifier that would have brought the whole system tumbling down, I 
do not know. But the edge along which Kaysen moved, the boundary between the world of 
symbolic negation (mediated openness to reality) and psychosis, is charted in Freud’s essay, 
according to Hyppolite, by a not-quite-parallel indication: 




Affirmation here substitutes for unification, i.e., replaces it or simply takes over the drive 
energy oriented toward unification. Eros can be fully expressed in affirmation. But negation, if 
Hyppolite’s reading is right, requires a break, a succession that would arrive only after some 
delay. This allows us to mark expulsion (or rejection, or foreclosure) as the operation of a 
fundamental destructive attitude that should remind us of the primary process: everything goes 
away immediately; all unities get dissolved. Freud explicitly ties these primordial possibilities 
(affirmation and expulsion) to the pleasure-ego, allowing us to locate the place of the original 
foreclosure within the developmental account we have articulated (section II.A). That foreclosure 
lies in refusing the move from pleasure-ego (which pretends to have only one mode of 
processing) to reality-ego (which owns up more or less to its own internal conflicts) – which is 
the move we have just been discussing under the name of primal repression. Instead of entering 
the world of symbolic structure that opens up through symbolic negation, the individual refuses 
that whole world, which is expelled from the self, only to return, externally, as persecution. 
                                                 
1123 Kaysen, Girl, Interrupted, p. 42. 
1124 “Negation,” SE 19:239. 
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 Hence, we can recognize in the recalcitrant, overwhelmed pleasure-ego the adequately 
unified self-image that we saw as marking paranoia (by contrast with the perforated body of 
schizophrenia). The pleasure-ego, refusing both immediacy-testing and reality-testing, yields 
perceptual certainty with regard to everything, hallucination included. Nevertheless, beyond its 
pretense, it is capable of immediacy-testing, meaning that it can be led to recognize a difference 
between hallucination and reality – only, as we saw earlier (chapter 5), without the certainty 
disappearing concerning what appears in the hallucination. Richard Boothby illuminates this 
situation by pointing out that reality-testing allows for the interweaving of presence and absence, 
in which what is not there can shape what is there. Reality is not simply on or off (like 




 I have argued in this chapter that Freudian drive theory not only begins with an 
understanding of the person as awash in the world and proceeds by understanding the drives to be 
formed as responses to that world, it also reads the withdrawal from reality (in initial ego-
formation or in psychosis) as a failing defensive attempt to avoid what is overwhelming and 
maintain one’s own integrity. This whole picture is summarized nicely by Moyaert, who claims 
that the schizophrenic, for example, is confronted with the following puzzle: 
how do I get the other, who is always already in me, out of myself? With regard to schizophrenia, 
it seems that the point of departure of human intersubjectivity is not a solipsistic ego that wants to 
break out of itself, but a symbiotic entanglement where the outside is in the inside long before 
there can be any talk of an inside that can withdraw into itself.1126
 
 
So much, in a way, only brings Freudian analysis close to Heidegger’s thinking. What 
Freud recognizes additionally is that in some way development is optional; it can break down 
radically, when the costs are too high for a particular person to pay, or when one’s trust in the 
                                                 
1125 Boothby, Freud as Philosopher, pp. 279-80. 
1126 Moyaert, “Body,” p. 52. 
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adults caring for one is broken or insufficient. This means that our finitude and fragility are not 
simply a matter of exposure to things as being-there; rather, we may refuse (or find it impossible) 




“Truth’s Tokens Tricks Like These” 
wherein Heideggerian Objections are entertained and countered, 




 At the end of our previous discussion of Heidegger’s thought (chapters 2-4), I proposed a 
turn to the matters themselves to see what character our fundamental relation to being might have. 
Having now examined the possibility of a break with being in significant detail, it remains for us 
to integrate the insights gained from the matter itself with the discussion of Heidegger’s 
philosophy. Here we must consider Heidegger’s criticism of Freud’s approach, since so much of 
our investigation has been indebted to Freud. It will also be necessary to reconsider the matter of 
trust for Heidegger, so as to articulate more clearly what is questionable in his relation to the great 
thinkers of the Western tradition. 
 
I. The Challenge 
“What does such anxiety, as a destiny of being, have to do with psychology or psychoanalysis?”1128
 
 
In chapter 5, we interrogated some ways in which a person’s relation to reality can 
radically fall apart, usually involving an experience of having died in some way that is not simply 
physical cessation. The intent there was to make sense of psychosis as a limit-experience that 
challenges Heidegger’s account of being-there as being-in-the-world, i.e., to call into question his 
apparent premise that the human being is always both in the truth and in the untruth. Let me not 
neglect to consider a possible response from Heidegger, nor to test one more time the force and 
plausibility of his position. But I want to begin by being quite clear about the nature of my 
challenge. 
                                                 
1127 The title of this chapter is from “Brothers,” by Gerard Manley Hopkins. See Poems of Gerard Manley 
Hopkins, 1st edition, ed. R. Bridges (London: Humphrey Milford, 1918), p. 50, line 22. (The line is altered 
in more recent editions, which follow one of the four other draft variants.) 
1128 Martin Heidegger, “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” GA 9:371/Pathmarks 282. In context, the 
question is rhetorical. 
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Heidegger’s position, as we saw (chapter 3), is that being and the human essence (i.e., 
being-there understood as thinking, waiting, or dying) belong together. We are, essentially, in the 
truth. Even in the midst of his most apocalyptic concerns about the danger that our essence is 
exposed to at this point in history (when thinking, waiting, and dying well seem to be 
disappearing as possibilities), he still interprets that danger as structural to being itself, hence 
merely as further evidence of its relentlessness in requiring us as the place it can show up. Since 
Heidegger does not think essence as constant presence, we had to ask how he understands 
belonging. We discovered that it consistently means being both appropriated and expropriated, 
being in-between or underway. Thus, we cannot be fully alienated from our essence, any more 
than we can thoroughly fulfill it. “Think of the extreme case of madness [or delusion: Wahnsinn], 
where the highest degree of consciousness can prevail and still we say: The person is de-ranged, 
dis-placed, away and yet there.”1129
But in the meantime, we have seen that what happens in a psychotic break, as baffling as 
it is to observers, should probably be understood as just such an alienation from the human 
essence, an endless falling away from the shared world and the organized mattering of truth. In 
other words, it should probably be understood as a kind of death. 
 
Indeed, it looks as if the pure structure of being-there, as described in Being and Time 
(and affirmed much later, in the Zollikon Seminars), were hollowed out in psychosis. In such 
perpetual anxiety,1130
                                                 
1129 GA 29/30:95/Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics 63, trans. mod. 
 a person no longer experiences himself as amidst (bei) real things, 
encountered in their being; rather, he suffers amidst disconnected and oppressive remnants. Nor is 
he with other people (Mitsein; although the fantastic powers that persecute him may emptily echo 
other people), in a meaningful world that is structured by affectivity, projective understanding, 
and language (Befindlichkeit, Verstehen, Rede). Rather, he has fallen (or is perpetually falling) 
1130 Recall my discussion of the psychotic’s presentation of flat affect as often concealing an 
incommunicable excess of affect (chapter 5, section I.C). 
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out of the world: affect is dispersed and appears radically diminished or radically increased, so 
that attunement fails; understanding is caught between utter bewilderment and a certainty with no 
distance, no possibility of being wrong, and thus no reality; language is encountered as if from 
outside, as an immediate bodily effect, or played with as a strange game, not dwelt in as the 
mediating organizer of a coherent world. Together, these modifications yield a fragmented 
experience of too much meaning, which refuses to submit to shared structures. 
This is not to say that people in annihilation states have no contact with things or people, 
but rather that the organization of “normal” or everyday reality, in which meaning is shared, is 
now splintered.1131 What is at stake is not some reality in-itself, which Heidegger has shown to be 
a matter of high-level abstraction for the human being, but meaningful reality, the world as it lays 
claim to me. This is a world, as Lacan puts it, “which doesn’t present us simply with footholds 
and obstacles, but a truth that verifies itself and installs itself as orienting this world and 
introducing beings […] into it.”1132 In other words, what disappears in a psychotic break is the 
reality that should show up in common sense and, according to Heidegger, is organized by a 
given constellation of originary truth, an understanding of being. As he puts it: “Only on the basis 
of the belonging together of thrownness and understanding through language as saying is the 
human being able to be addressed by what is.”1133
 Lest it be thought that I have overstated the essential connection between being-there and 
the structures of ecstatic being-in-the-world, I would point out Heidegger’s clarification in 1928 
 We could gloss ‘understanding’ here by 
specifiying that the address is at least minimally organized, an address to me that does not simply 
dissolve my self. 
                                                 
1131 Cp. Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion, p. 49: “The anxiety of this quasi-solipsistic universe is ontological 
and totalistic …. What is threatening about such [psychotic] experiences concerns the ontological 
framework itself.” 
1132 Lacan, Seminar 3: The Psychoses, p. 204. 
1133 Zollikon Seminars 182-3/139, trans. mod. 
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that “being-in-the-world characterizes the basic mode of being, the existence of Dasein.”1134 Or, 
as he also puts it, “All comportment of being-there […] is as such a being-in-the-world.”1135 What 
this entails, he says, is that “[i]f Dasein in fact exists, then its existence has the structure of being-
in-the-world, i.e., Dasein is, in its essence, being-in-the-world, whether or not it in fact exists.”1136 
My claim is, then, that people in annihilation states undergo the kind of break with being-in-the-
world that exiles them from being-there at all. Their understanding of being (as Heidegger 
interprets it), their experiential access to the as-such, disappears (although not without 
remainder), and the noticeable symptoms of psychosis are attempts to rebuild or to re-enter that 
way of being. “The mode of human existing is to determine itself in and on the basis of the 
whole. Dasein’s being-in-the-world means to be in the whole”; this sort of being-in is to be 
understood “specifically with respect to the how [of existing],” by which Heidegger means 
“comporting itself to what is and to itself, [when this comporting is] taken in its totality.”1137
 Heidegger can allow for a certain amount of distortion in the structure of being-in-the-
world via his thinking of negative modes. As we saw in chapter 4 in the discussion of the human 
essence, it is only because we are essentially ‘there’ that we can mostly be ‘away,’ dispersed 
among things.
 But 
it is precisely this ‘in the whole’ to which I refer in speaking of a structured or organized world. 
1138
                                                 
1134 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr. Michael Heim (Bloomington and Indianapolis, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 169/GA 26:217. Hereafter, Metaphysical Foundations. 
 His early analyses of this aspect of the phenomenon can be represented for 
present purposes by what he says of idle conversation (Gerede) in Being and Time. Heidegger 
claims that it is the way of being of “uprooted” understanding. It “floats unattached,” “cut off 
1135 Introduction to Philosophy, GA 27:179. 
1136 GA 26:217/Metaphysical Foundations 169. Cp. Zollikon Seminars 182/138: “Not only can the human 
being not be separated from his world, but here the idea of separability [Trennbarkeit] and inseparability 
does not have any foundation in the condition of being-in-the-world.” 
1137 GA 26:233/Metaphysical Foundations 181, trans. mod. Cf. his claim in the “Letter on Humanism” that 
“‘world’ does not at all signify something that is or any realm of what is but the openness of being” (GA 
9:350/Pathmarks 266, trans. mod.). 
1138 Cf. GA 29/30:95/FC 63: “the human being has the potential to be away in this manner only if his being 
has the character of being-there.” Cf. GA 65/Contributions to Philosophy §§177, 183, 201-2. 
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from its primary and originarily genuine relationships-of-being towards the world, towards being-
there-with [Mitdasein], and towards its very being-in.”1139 This begins to sound as if it could be a 
serious break. But Heidegger then claims that even in such an inauthentic way of being, being-
there “is always amidst the world, with others, and towards itself [i.e., towards its own being-in].” 
Such an uprooting finds its very possibility, Heidegger claims, in ontological disclosedness – 
what he also calls being in the truth. This disclosedness is “constituted by discourse as 
characterized by understanding and affectivity”; in other words, such disclosedness “is its ‘there’, 
its ‘in-the-world.’”1140
But in the course of examining major depression, Matthew Radcliffe and Matthew 
Broome claim that “[i]f all sense of practical significance were eradicated from experience, along 
with any sense of potential emotional connectedness with others, the structure of projection 
would be radically altered along with that of thrownness.”
 So, being-there is what makes possible the being-away of inauthenticity, 
which would include madness for Heidegger. 
1141 The question is, just how radically? 
Their discussion concerns the destructuring or wholesale loss of certain kinds of possibility, 
where possibility means something like ‘experienced ability-to-be’, not merely logical or physical 
possibility. For example, one may lose the ability to experience others as people at all; that whole 
category of possible encounter disappears. It is in this context that Radcliffe and Broome note the 
repeated description of such an experience “as akin to a living death.”1142
                                                 
1139 Being and Time (BT) 170/214, trans. mod. 
 People speak this way 
when their very temporal structure has been altered or closed down. “Without significant 
differences between past, present, and future, without a sense of possible activities transforming 
one’s situation in a meaningful way, the phenomenological distinction between past, present, and 
1140 Ibid., trans. mod. 
1141 Radcliffe and Broome, “Existential Phenomenology,” p. 379. 




Alphonse de Waelhens, too, finds himself admitting that, at least in schizophrenia, 
transcendence (in the Heideggerian sense just mentioned of being-in-the-world as relation to the 
structured whole) may be abolished; existence (again, in the technical sense) may cease.
 Heidegger, for his part, speaks of the failure of these significant differences 
as the fundamental mood of anxiety, but he does not seem sufficiently to consider what can 
happen if that anxiety ceases to be short-lived. 
1144 He 
thinks that psychotic mood disorders escape this fate, which amounts to a “challenge, in the most 
radical fashion, [to] a person’s being-in-the-world,”1145
To put all of this another way: we saw in chapter 5 that language, world, time, affectivity, 
and embodied spatiality all go haywire in psychosis, while anxiety stretches on beyond any 
bounds that could let it be disclosive. But these are precisely the modes of relation to being that 
Heidegger consistently evokes as most central, and for good reason. It follows, I think, that 
psychosis, in its acute form, is the destruction of a person’s relation to being. This does not mean 
that my being ceases to be at stake for me – that much of being-there does not seem to go away, 
although it may be affectively muted – but the very structures of being in which those stakes 
normally arise have disintegrated. This complexity indicates, I have tried to show, that we need to 
rethink Heidegger’s understanding of our relation to being in light of the intrinsic possibility of 
becoming overwhelmed, of having “an encounter with beings (or a loss of beings) that shakes 
being itself. In trauma, the way we are open is altered by something that we encounter within our 
 and he may be right – there are certainly 
marked differences – but I have tried to show that such disorders, in their radical disturbance of 
affectivity, also eject one from the world, at least for such a time as one remains in a psychotic 
phase. 
                                                 
1143 Ibid., p. 378. 
1144 Alphonse de Waelhens, Phenomenology and Lacan, p. 283. 
1145 Ibid., p. 247. 
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opening – something that shakes the very heart of our understanding.”1146
 
 Such vulnerability to 
what is encountered within the world, I propose, is just what it means to have one’s being at 
stake. 
II. Heideggerian Rebuttals 
 But to what extent can Heidegger’s philosophy accommodate these claims? Since my 
interrogation has proceeded in two major parts – the initial, immanent critique about modes of 
trust (chapters 2-4), and the second, external critique developed on the basis of psychoanalytic 
thinking about psychosis (chapters 5-6) – I will return to those parts in turn. However, I will do so 
in reverse order, so as to leave Heidegger’s positive engagement of trust for last. (Recall that a 
certain range of possibilities for his response has already been explored in chapter 3, as part of my 
argument for a tension internal to his work.) 
 
A) Psychosis vs. No Longer Being-There (Nicht-Mehr-Dasein) 
 First, then, the confrontation with Freud and with the question of psychosis as a proposed 
radical break with being-in-the-world. I have already dealt with some of Heidegger’s concerns 
about Freud in the Introduction and in chapter 5, so I will not cover that ground again. Instead, let 
me begin here with his brief discussion of the unconscious in 1929-30, then move on to his most 
interesting concerns about Freud in the Zollikon Seminars, and finally take up the question of the 
possibility of a radical break with being. 
 In the context of discussing what is involved in awakening a fundamental mood (or basic 
attunement, Grundstimmung) in us, Heidegger takes the unconscious as a convenient example of 
something that we think of as present-at-hand in us while still somehow being absent, i.e., absent 
from consciousness. But this relation of presence and absence is not adequate to the phenomenon 
                                                 
1146 Richard Polt, “The Burning Cup,” p. 6. Cf. de Waelhens, who takes psychoanalytic research to have 
established that “madness is an intrinsic possibility of human existence” (p. 304, original emphasis), a 
thesis that philosophy – including phenomenology – cannot afford to ignore. 
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he is after, for three reasons: first, and most obviously in his philosophy, phenomena that are 
basic modifications of being-there (like Grundstimmungen) are not faithfully interpreted within 
the present-at-hand mode of being. Being-there is not primarily a matter of objective presence. 
Second, ‘absent from consciousness’ is much too broad a category; sleep cannot be simply the 
absence of consciousness, for dreams burst the direct opposition between conscious and 
unconscious. Third, the phenomena of attention – i.e., of intentional directedness – allow for 
being-away as distraction despite (indeed, because of) being-there, and this version of presence 
and absence is not reducible to a simple opposition.1147
 Heidegger’s concerns here in 1929-1930 about the unconscious are both important and, 
ultimately, superficial. They are important exegetically, since he continued to think about the 
issue in roughly this way for many years;
 
1148
                                                 
1147 This discussion is found in GA 29/30:92-97/FC 61-64. 
 they are important philosophically, since it is true 
that Freud often seems to be thinking of the unconscious as something at-hand, spatially located, 
and so on (he even draws pictures!), and it is crucial not to get stuck understanding it this way. 
But these criticisms are also superficial, since, for example, even for Freud – who is pretty 
thoroughly wedged in metaphysical oppositions – the dream was a fruitful phenomenon precisely 
because it involved complex interrelations between consciousness and the unconscious. Indeed, 
the whole field of psychoanalysis is oriented toward such interweavings, moments in which 
conscious/unconscious cannot be understood as a simple opposition between presence and 
absence. Furthermore, it is often just those phenomena of attention that Heidegger wants to 
explore phenomenologically that alert Freud to the workings of the unconscious. For example, a 
person may be physically and actively there (standing with and speaking to her brother) and 
simultaneously somehow not there (speaking primarily to someone else who is far away, dead, 
1148 Cf. the second of the Country Path Conversations (from 1946): “Teacher: To this and this alone [i.e., to 
the representation of the human as an organism and subject of consciousness] belongs also the unconscious. 
The consciously maneuvered interest in the unconscious is a sign of the last triumph of the conception of 
the human as the subject of consciousness” (GA 77:183/CPC 119). 
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imaginary, etc.). But for Freud this goes beyond straightforward distraction, in which she would 
be here with the person and also away (with the object of her concern); for it is not necessarily the 
case that her conscious attention is drawn away from the conversation – she may be very attentive 
– yet she is somehow actively barred from recognizing to whom her speech is primarily directed. 
 More interesting are some of Heidegger’s later criticisms from the Zollikon Seminars 
(1959-1969), which we could see as developments of the worries just laid out. One set of such 
concerns has to do with method quite generally. As I mentioned at the beginning of chapter 5, 
Heidegger tries always to think from the perspective of the whole (which is also the Heil, the 
healthy), and he insists that this is both phenomenologically and philosophically required. So, for 
example, even his analysis of being-there in Being and Time continually emphasizes that all of its 
moments or aspects belong equiprimordially to a unified whole (care). And he says in the 
Seminars: “Every synthesis always occurs only in such a way that one has a unity in view already 
beforehand regarding which one joins things together. It is not the case that piecing separate 
things together could ever result in a synthesis.”1149
Freud, by contrast, proposes that we are precisely not primarily ordered and whole, but 
irreducibly conflicted. Thus he both begins from the unhealthy (psychopathology) and admits to a 
kind of personal inclination toward analysis over synthesis. It is no accident that he calls his 
method psychoanalysis; he tends to think that once the components are analyzed out, the 
synthesis, if there is to be one, will just follow on its own.
 One has to have a glimpse of the whole, the 
essence, in order to see how various aspects belong to it. 
1150
                                                 
1149 Zollikon Seminars 249/200-1. Specifically with regard to illness, Heidegger puts the genetic viewpoint 
into question, saying, “In order to give a genetic explanation of how a condition of illness originated, a 
clarification, of course, is needed beforehand regarding what this condition of illness is in itself. […] An 
explanation presupposes the clarification of the essence of what should be explained.” 
 He is also highly suspicious of 
phenomena that are too well-integrated. Thus, for example, his technique of dream interpretation 
1150 Or maybe that the ego is so fixated on defensive synthesis that it does not need any assistance in that 
direction. See Freud, “Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy,” SE 17:160-1. 
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paradigmatically involves breaking up the dream-report into its components, then having the 
analysand associate to each component. For especially important dreams, the analyst then wants 
to draw some of the details back together to see what the dreamwork has done in disguising them. 
This is supposed to overcome the disguising effects of what Freud calls ‘secondary elaboration’ – 
the work of censorship in weaving together the repressed wishes and connections into a more or 
less intelligible-seeming whole (the dream), which is then further worked over as the person 
recalls and reports it to the analyst.1151
 To respond to Heidegger’s line of objection here, we should begin by acknowledging 
that, philosophically, Heidegger may be right that one has ultimately to think from the whole. But 
I think he is on shakier ground in proposing that this is where one always has to start. Here I 
think his phenomenological conviction that being must always somehow appear gets him into 
trouble. This is not because he is just wrong – being mostly is faithful to appear – but because one 
does not have to get a grip on the whole phenomenon (its peculiar way of being) before beginning 
the analysis. That is especially true in relation to psychoanalysis, since as a way of being with 
another person that makes that person thematic, trying to begin by getting a grip on the whole 
phenomenon here might even be a kind of violence. To assume beforehand, for example, that the 
other person’s world is whole or adequately coherent, even if excessively closed off, would be to 
prevent radical fragmentation from showing itself, just as much as assuming irreducible conflict 
can prevent unity from showing up. So, when Heidegger claims that “explanation extends only so 




                                                 
1151 Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SE 5:488ff. 
 this seems true of a complete explanation, but not of what we might 
call research, the kind of tentative investigation that Freud mostly undertakes. It seems clearly 
untrue of something like pathology, in which of course one has to begin with a general familiarity 
1152 Zollikon Seminars 266/213. Cf. pp. 97-8/75-6. 
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with health (this is how the hermeneutic circle works), but one’s interpretation of health need not 
be fully worked out beforehand. Heidegger thus overstates his case when he claims that “only in 
the light of this projection [of human being as being-there] can what-is (the human being) be 
investigated [in a way that is] appropriate to being-there.”1153
 This issue is closely related to Heidegger’s other line of concern: his repeated worry that 
Freud (like other natural scientists) fails to attend sufficiently to the phenomenon before trying to 
explain it, i.e., to find its causes.
 
1154 A generic example would be the following: say several 
biochemists declare that they have isolated the physical causes of love. Journalists then proclaim 
that love just is set X of hormonal shifts. Now it may be quite right that the phenomenon of love 
always involves the hormonal interactions in set X, but that does not mean that set X is equivalent 
to love. The set X was discovered by correlating experimental results, but it is not as if the 
biochemists were just looking at sets of various experimental results one day, noticed a pattern, 
and decided to call that pattern ‘love’. Instead, they already had an everyday understanding of the 
phenomenon and looked for experimental unities that might correlate with recognizable 
manifestations of that. They had to be able to identify instances of the phenomenon in an 
everyday way in order both to produce and to interpret the experimental data.1155
Now Heidegger is worried that Freud systematically commits a version of our imagined 
biochemists’ reductive error. It is a bit more insidious because Freud has a greater sensitivity to 
human psychology, but it is essentially the same. So, instead of saying that love is a cascade of 
chemicals in the brain, Freud says (roughly) that love is an attempt to reenact the complete unity 
 
                                                 
1153 Zollikon Seminars 223/280, trans. mod. Heidegger continues: “The elimination and avoidance of 
inappropriate representations about this being, the human being, is only possible when the practice of 
experiencing being-human as being-there has been successful and when it is illuminating any investigation 
of the healthy or sick human being in advance.” 
1154 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 8/7 and 293/232. Cf. p. 282/224: “Were there even a trace of 
phenomenological-ontological determination present in Freud’s basic approach, then it would have 
prevented him from the aberration of his ‘theory.’” 
1155 The code word for this is ‘operationalizing variables’. 
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with one’s mother (or primary caretaker) that one fantasizes was once real. This, too, is an 
interpretive move in search of causes rather than a phenomenological interpretation. Heidegger 
does not wish to say that causal interpretation is just off the table, but only that it has to be 
philosophically secondary to an adequate interpretation of the phenomenon. 
As I hope became clear in chapters 5-6, I think Heidegger is right about the necessary 
priority of phenomenal accounts, but I also think that Freud is far more sensitive to this than 
Heidegger allows. It is not enough for Heidegger to accuse Freud of theory-laden interpretations, 
for example, since this is to some extent unavoidable in the hermeneutic realm. The question is 
whether Freud is open to having his theory upended by the phenomena. I think I have shown that 
he is, at least in some important instances, so that from there the question can simply be raised on 
a case-by-case basis. Even from Heidegger’s perspective, there should be no question of not 
reading Freud, but only one of reading Freud carefully, of giving some benefit of the doubt to the 
latter’s own claims to attend to the phenomena: “I learnt to restrain speculative tendencies and to 
follow the unforgotten advice of my master, Charcot: to look at the same things again and again 
until they themselves begin to speak.”1156
The other objection in this line is a specific case of the objection just discussed. 
Heidegger claims that Freud rushed to posit an entity (the unconscious, or maybe ‘unconscious 
thinking’) in order to explain the gaps [Lücken] in his therapeutic experience. Heidegger seems to 
think it would have been better to remain with the phenomenon and acknowledge that it might be 
proper to some phenomena to include gaps,
 
1157
                                                 
1156 Freud, “On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement,” SE 14:22. 
 the way it is proper to some membranes to be 
permeable. (There is, e.g., no need to posit a dynamic intramembranous struggle.) 
1157 Zollikon Seminars 260/207-8: “For conscious, human phenomena, [Freud] also postulates an unbroken 
chain of explanation [die Lückenlosigkeit in der Erklärbarkeit], i.e., the continuity of causal connections. 
Since there is no such thing ‘within consciousness,’ he has to invent ‘the unconscious,’ in which there must 
be an unbroken chain of causal connections.” Cf. p. 266/213: “an objective clarification of the essence of a 
471 
 
A first reply might be that while Freud is certainly inclined to move very quickly to 
aetiology,1158 I think I have shown (chapter 5, part II) that in fact it is attention to a human 
phenomenon that grounds the inference to the unconscious. As a further reply, however, we 
would have to think carefully about where Freud is grasping unities of experience (similar to, say, 
Heidegger’s claims about the history of beyng) and where he is just positing more or less 
temporary anchors for interpretation. We should at least listen to (though not immediately 
believe) his claim in the case history of the Wolf-Man that there are “narrow limits to what a 
psycho-analysis is called upon to explain. For, while it is its business to explain the striking 
symptoms by revealing [Aufdeckung] their genesis, it is not its business to explain but merely to 
describe the psychical mechanisms and drive processes to which one is thus led [by those efforts 
at revealing].”1159 We would also, I think, have to ask which things that he takes as entities need 
not be understood or described that way. The latter situation seems especially true of the 
unconscious, about which Freud was occasionally very cautious in his characterizations,1160
 Let me turn now to the question of whether Heideggerian thought can itself accommodate 
my appeal to certain Freudian insights in support of the claim that a person can suffer a radical 
break with being. I take this to be the most serious philosophical question for my project, and it 
arises from two different directions. 
 and 
which does not need to be interpreted as an entity any more than openness for Heidegger needs to 
be thought as the brain, although of course in both cases the entity is integrally involved. 
                                                                                                                                                 
condition of illness could lead [to the insight] that its essence rules out the possibility for the desired, 
causal-genetic explanation.” 
1158 Cp. Freud’s claim, against phenomenology, that “acts of consciousness are immediate data and cannot 
be further explained by any sort of description,” only by dynamic foundations (“An Outline of Psycho-
Analysis,” SE 23:151). This simply makes clear what most Freudian analysts are happy to admit, that Freud 
does not have much of interest to say about consciousness. But Heidegger is not exactly in search of 
accounts of consciousness, either. 
1159 Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis [Wolf-Man], SE 17:105. 
1160 See, e.g., Freud, Interpretation, SE 5:610-12, where he moves from a topographical account to a 
dynamic one. Cf. the Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, SE 15/16, in which he builds his account of 
the unconscious very gradually. 
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First, in defense of his own phenomenological work, Heidegger might simply claim that 
he has already given an interpretation of what it would mean to fall outside the relation to being, 
one which of course requires expansion but does not call for a rethinking of originary truth. At a 
certain point in the Introduction to Metaphysics, just when it seems as if being really might be an 
empty word – ‘a vapor and an error,’ as Nietzsche put it – Heidegger proposes that although we 
have a relation (Bezug) to what is, we “nevertheless have long since fallen out of being 
[herausgefallen sind].”1161
In order to delineate human being in its peculiar belonging to being, Heidegger turns to 
Greek tragedy, to an interpretation of one of the choral odes of Sophocles’s Antigone.
 But do we not belong to being, according to Heidegger? What kind of 
belonging is this, if we have fallen out of it ever since the ancient Greek beginning of philosophy? 
1162
As manifestations of the overwhelming in us, Heidegger mentions the existentials from 
Being and Time – language, understanding, and affectivity as mood and passion – as well as 
 Here he 
finds being figured as to deinon, the terrible, and the human being as to deinotaton, the most 
uncanny (unheimlich) entity. In his interpretation, Heidegger understands being’s terribleness as 
the overwhelming (das Überwältigende), that which governs and prevails (waltet) regardless of 
anything that any entity can do. (We just find things stubbornly showing up as real or essential, 
no matter what we wish.) As exposed to this overwhelming being, and as the very ones who 
violently (gewalttätig) use it to gather entities into intelligibility in our comportment, we are the 
most uncanny of beings: like Antigone herself, we are cast out of what would otherwise have 
been our homeliness (our unproblematic fit within the world) and thus violently step out of 
homeliness (as an orientation toward what is as a whole in terms of particular investments). This 
is the way in which being overwhelms us, brings us to calamity or ruin. 
                                                 
1161 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trs. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2000), p. 39/GA 40:40. Hereafter, IM. 




building in its relation to dwelling. These overwhelming ways of being are our being, that which 
we are called to take over explicitly, even though most of the time we merely take our own being 
for granted. They are what we must gather up into violent path-breaking, opening through them a 
coherent world amidst entities, but in such violence we get stuck on those paths and shut 
ourselves out (sich aussperrt) of an explicit relation to being. In other words, we take the paths as 
permanently and objectively open, rather than as opened up by our (somehow violent) 
investments. Creatively violent ones who seek to break new paths then risk “disintegration, un-
constancy, un-structure, and unfittingness.”1163
Here it sounds as if the strife between the violence-doer and the overwhelming, what 
could be called the struggle of existence (between thinking and being), could ultimately go very 
badly for the violence-doer in a way that would be irremediable. Heidegger speaks of the 
possibility of perdition (Verderb), and it is hard not to think of this initially as just the kind of 
break we have been trying to understand. But Heidegger then almost at once qualifies this 
shattering as necessary, as something needed by being in order to bring its own violence to 
appearance. As we have seen before (chapter 4, part II), even the finitude of death is thus 
recuperated as part of the structure of being’s self-showing in withdrawal. For such being-needed 
turns out to be the essence of being-there; the human being comes to be understood as “the breach 
(die Bresche) into which the excessive violence of being breaks in its appearing, so that this 
breach itself shatters against being.”
 Our violence-doing itself shatters (scheitert), 
Heidegger says, against death, the limit beyond all limits. 
1164
                                                 
1163 Das Auseinanderbrechen, die Un-ständigkeit, das Un-gefüge, der Unfug, all figured as articulations of 
the ancient Greek adikē, which in a less ontological register would mean ‘injustice’. We should not forget 
that Heidegger is giving this lecture course in 1935, only a year after resigning as National Socialist rector 
of the university, and that he still considered himself one of these creative ones “who sets out into the un-
said” (GA 40:170/IM 172). Indeed, he ventures on into the unsaid of the poem on the very next page. 
 Now we are back to the formulation of Being and Time 
(albeit transposed into a newly violent register), a formulation according to which being thrown 
1164 GA 40:172/IM 174. 
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into being-there as the place of being’s appearance means being projected toward my own death. 
The essence of the human being, then, is what Heidegger calls here a Zwischenfall, a falling in 
between being and what is, which falling first opens up this very difference and lets what is show 
up in its being. What was couched in the rhetoric of a radical break thus turns out to be, once 
more, the same structure of exposure to what-is via the intertwining of revealing and concealing – 
and it is precisely this structure that we have called into question earlier in this project (chapter 3). 
Let us now shift to the other side of the argument. In a more explicit defense of our 
irrevocable embeddedness in the world, Heideggerian thought seems to move away from thinking 
the self on the basis of the I (or of any personal pronouns) already in Being and Time, but 
especially in the private writings of the late 1930s and the thinking of mortals in the 1940s and 
onward. Instead, Heidegger shows repeatedly that there is a clearing for being to structure what 
is, and this clearing gets individuated whenever a person takes up a proper relation to finitude. 
That is to say, he might object that an argument about the possible disintegration of the self/world 
relation does not establish anything about what is more fundamentally at stake: beyng as it 
essences in the event, and being-there as the site for this event to take place. 
In the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger formulates the objection this way (against Ludwig 
Binswanger): “Being-in-the-world is not a condition for the possibility of Da-sein […]; on the 
contrary, it is the other way around.”1165 And “the understanding of being is the fundamental 
characteristic of Da-sein as such.” But the understanding of being means “ecstatic standing-
within the clearing of the Da as the opening into which what is present presences.”1166
                                                 
1165 Zollikon Seminars 239/192. 
 Therefore, 
standing within the clearing is the more originary matter, to which being-in-the-world belongs 
regardless of its internal modifications. 
1166 Zollikon Seminars 239/191-2. 
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I take it this is another way to develop being-there as the essence (or even the future 
essence) of the human being (cf. chapter 3, section III.C). Heidegger’s concern here is that 
identification of being-there with any particular human being (or even with human being as such) 
risks making it “only a more extensive and more useful characterization of the subject’s 
subjectivity,”1167 using it as a sort of transcendental argument. I agree that characterizing it that 
way would be to miss the insight into the self-showing of being, the making of the difference 
between being and what is, which we merely watch over or wait upon (more or less 
faithfully).1168 In other words, by contrast to a transcendental investigation into the conditions of 
possibility for human experience, Heidegger tries to think what takes place of its own accord (i.e., 
in one sense independently), which then catches the human up into it.1169 Transcendence is thus 
not something we do or fail to do, but is equivalent to being-in as such, or to what he sometimes 
calls, in a different register, “sojourning.”1170
 If ‘being-in’ means in this context being-claimed at all, in any sense, then I admit that 
psychosis involves no radical break with being-in. We have seen that it is usually a matter of too 
much meaning, of overwhelming demands and claims, rather than of no meaning at all. If 
suffering is only possible for the human being as being-there, then people suffering from 
psychosis surely remain, in some very attenuated sense, there. 
 
But the language of ‘sojourn’ (Aufenthalt) seems to me to imply an organized world 
within which I find myself standing – a world not of my own making (i.e., not delusionally 
rebuilt). And I take the projective understanding of being, or standing within the clearing, 
essentially to involve a structured being-claimed. This does not require, it seems to me, thinking 
                                                 
1167 Zollikon Seminars 236-7/189-90. 
1168 He calls the event (das Ereignis) in these seminars “transcendence as being” or as “the word for the 
being of what is,” which “in itself [opens] the difference from what is!” (Zollikon Seminars 240-2/193-5, 
trans. mod.)  
1169 Cf., for example, Besinnung, GA 66:210 (my translation): “Da-sein is because [it gets] appropriated by 
beyng as a staging area [Austrag], not only as [the] ground of human being.” 
1170 Zollikon Seminars 241/192. 
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being-there as a new version of the subject’s subjectivity. Rather, as we saw in chapters 3-4, it is 
no small matter for Heidegger that beyng needs (braucht) the human being. That need is precisely 
beyng’s givenness as finite, which correspondingly marks us out as historical (in that different 
characteristics of things appear as essential in different epochs). The question is, how are we to 
think this? 
 One way to understand it would be to say that, as mediating exposure to what is (beings), 
beyng opens its site (i.e., appropriates human beings) irrevocably. We are exposed; we cannot get 
out. For, even if we could make sense of ‘getting out’ of the world, there would then be no 
ontological possibility of re-entry – neither therapy nor drugs could be any help because 
foreclosure would be a death sentence, on this interpretation. That is just what it means for being-
there (or waiting, or sojourning) to be our essence – for it to constitute the ability-to-be 
(Seinkönnen) that structures us and does not disappear unless we do. This is why, in an 
interpretation of the recurrent question of pain in Heidegger’s late thinking (the 1940s and after), 
Andrew Mitchell writes that “to never be conquerable by pain means, at the same time, to never 
be conquered by pain, to be able to bear any pain or, rather, to have to do so, to be surrendered 
over to an endless pain that will never conquer us and never bring the desired relief of our 
demise.”1171
On one hand, Mitchell’s interpretation is an attempt to think pain as our ontological 
situation, i.e., to think the human being as exposed essentially. We can cover up our inherent 
painedness, forget about it, and reinterpret ourselves as Cartesian impenetrable fortresses, but that 
does not remove the fact of our being-in, the pain of exposed investment in what is. Thrownness 
is inexorable. Any defense of the possibility of a radical break would then be simply a return to 
the metaphysical opposition of presence and absence. On the other hand, the quotation from 
Mitchell is also quite a good description of the person situated between two deaths in psychosis; 
 
                                                 
1171 Mitchell, “Grace,” p. 315. 
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there seems to be nowhere to go in either direction, neither back toward the shared world nor 
forward into death, since the self is already (symbolically) dead, and not even this has removed 
the suffering. 
The difference in how one hears Mitchell’s description has to do, I suggest, with how 
much emphasis is put on involvement of people in the essencing of beyng. (We could also say that 
it has to do with the characterization of the relation to beyng.) The ‘I’, the ‘you’, and the ‘we’ are 
somehow at stake here, for Heidegger, but always derivatively.1172
Let me specify. For the sufferer, the possibility of a return is not at all evident. Even 
when he can recognize that he suffers in a way that others do not, this is insufficient to do more 
than deepen suffering, or (sometimes) motivate self-medication. He cannot, from within himself, 
see a way back into the shared world. For those of us who do not currently suffer such a break, 
we have no way to positively predict the outcome of any particular person’s attempt at recovery. 
We can say that it is statistically either decent or quite bleak, depending on our measurable 
standard for recovery; we can fall back on the ontological argument that this way of being is just 
 Thus, my reply to Heidegger’s 
objection is as follows: while it is true that the living individual is irrevocably exposed to the 
claims of things, it is not clear a) that I or we are so exposed, since the consistency and identity of 
the self may be radically lost, nor b) that being as the structured import of things irrevocably 
shows itself here, even in the mode of withdrawal, since all stable structure to experience may 
also be lost. If such a catastrophic expropriation (Enteignis) comes to pass, it may still be true that 
the individual is essentially being-there and thus has the possibility of return to health; but instead 
of being an existential possibility (a lived ability-to-be), this designation will be highly abstract. 
By ‘abstract’ I mean that, as a prognosis, it can only be offered from a position distanced from 
any experience of the matter itself. 
                                                 
1172 Heidegger, GA 65/Contributions, §§197-8. 
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another outworking of the constitutive incompleteness of the human essence.1173
We will be confronted with this question of the singular person’s role vis-à-vis the event 
of the truth of beyng once more – and rather insistently – if we now turn to a consideration of the 
places where interpersonal trust is most in evidence for Heidegger. But first, let us briefly sum up 
the negative path of our investigation. We have now considered Heidegger’s own dismissals of 
the unconscious, as well as three interrelated criticisms he advances against Freud’s work. We 
have also developed and confronted, at some length, two possible Heideggerian objections to my 
argument, one from each side, as it were. The first such objection proceeded by agreeing that a 
radical break with being is possible, but then claimed that Heidegger has already accounted for it 
in the Introduction to Metaphysics. I demonstrated that his account cannot fulfill such a promise. 
The second objection, then, tried to show that there could not be such a break, ontologically 
speaking. I acknowledged this at a certain level, then marked out the kind of break that might 
escape Heidegger’s thinking while still remaining below that level. Now we should consider 
Heidegger’s positive counterproposal concerning the relation of trust to originary truth. 
 We can to some 
extent indicate what approaches are very unlikely to promote recovery. But unlike even some 
other mental illnesses that are unpredictable due to their dependence on the sufferer’s will and 
resources (addiction, for example), if we take a person who had an iron will prior to the break and 
give her all the resources we can think of, we still cannot predict recovery with confidence, 
precisely because the contingency of the event is (as Heidegger establishes) a matter neither of 
will nor resources. 
                                                 
1173 See Zollikon Seminars 202/157, where Heidegger speaks of the human “capacity for being ill” as 
“connected with the Unvollkommenheit seines Wesens.” 
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B) Personal Trust for Heidegger 
“Those who properly understand are always the ones who come a long way on their own ground, from 
their own territory, the ones who bring much with them in order that they may transform much.”1174
 
 
 I have tried to show that, in interpreting our relation to being, Heidegger consistently 
understands that relation as a structural matter, one that shares the characteristics of assumption-
trust in a system or an institution, although in this case without positing any entity (other than 
myself) as the guarantor of that trust. I have further argued that this is a misleading path; we 
should interpret our relation to being on the model of interpersonal trust, although again 
phenomenologically, without necessarily positing any entity as its guarantor. But this seems to 
leave unaddressed Heidegger’s important emphasis on conversation, in which personal trust 
would appear to play a central role. What is there to be said about this? 
Because he is one of the most interesting (and provocative) interpreters of the history of 
philosophy we have known and someone whose most respected conversation partners were the 
historically great thinkers and poets of Western Europe, questions about the relationship between 
trust and truth as we find it in Heidegger must contend with his reading strategies. For although it 
may seem as if Heidegger’s insistence on attending to the philosophical matter at stake more than 
to a strict re-presentation of what the great writers have said exhibits a lack of charity, that 
insistence can also appear as precisely a kind of stubborn faithfulness to their vision, an effort to 
join them in considering what they also found important. 
Surely Kant, for example, would prefer that we work to figure out how the schematism 
genuinely mediates between intuition and understanding, rather than merely repeating ever more 
carefully what he has already said about it. In fact, Heidegger’s objectionable interpretations may 
not even be so different from the strategy behind more conventional calls to read charitably, in 
                                                 
1174 Heidegger, GA 6.1:361/Nietzsche II 142. 
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which one is supposed to construe others’ arguments in the most convincing way.1175
Furthermore, although it seems like, on Heidegger’s reading, every important philosopher 
turns out to be either helping or failing at Heidegger’s own project – this is even quite close to the 
way he interprets Socrates’s claim that all philosophers try to say the same about the same – yet 
he maintains (in a letter to Medard Boss from 1948) that “a conversation [Gespräch] still 
continues to be the right way to follow the paths of thought in their most subtle distinctions, 
thereby to examine each other’s views and thus to learn in a mutual way.”
 Maybe his 
strong readings are a matter of trusting his predecessors to have thought more creatively than we 
are inclined to give them credit for (or than we are usually able to recognize). Does he not also 
trust his readers or auditors to be already capable of understanding Kant in a more straightforward 
way (thus to be looking to Heidegger for something more than what is straightforward), and to 
use that ‘desire for something more’ to attend to the matter at stake? 
1176 In fact, Heidegger 
later radicalizes this practical privilege of the conversation for mutual learning, first into a sort of 
ethical ideal, then into an ontological structure. In 1966, he tells Boss: “Instead of always only 
speaking of the so-called I-Thou relationship [Verhältnis], one should speak of a Thou-Thou 
relation [Beziehung] instead. The reason for this is that an I-Thou is always only spoken from my 
point of view, whereas in reality we have a mutual relation [gegenseitige Beziehung] here.”1177
                                                 
1175 The most succinct version of this call comes from Jacques Lacan, who disparages a certain 
interpretation of some lines of Antigone with the following: “It’s not clear that it was the poet’s intention to 
emit such a platitude” (Lacan, Seminar 7: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, p. 275). Cp. Heidegger, GA 
6.1:123/Nietzsche I 122. 
 
Heidegger’s explicit reference is of course to Martin Buber’s work, but we can also hear in his 
call for ethical understanding an appeal to the Aristotelian friendship of equals. A year later, 
Heidegger echoes Hölderlin in claiming to Boss that “a conversation [Gespräch] with other 
1176 Heidegger, Zollikon Seminars 301/239, trans. mod., from a letter of June 14, 1948. 
1177 Zollikon Seminars 263/210, trans. mod. 
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human beings is what we ourselves are.”1178 And this is after he has already explained to the 
seminar participants that “[i]nsofar as the human being is being-with [Mitsein], as he remains 
essentially related to another human, language as such [i.e., language “as the original 
manifestness of what is”] is conversation.”1179
And yet… even if we cannot easily pin what is troubling about Heidegger’s interpretive 
strategy to lack of charity or to monological arrogance, I maintain that there is something 
legitimately concerning here. So as to justly consider Heidegger’s thinking of trust in the context 
of being with others as conversation – and, along the way, to locate what is legitimately 
problematic about this thinking – I will turn to the few things Heidegger wrote that could be 
called philosophical dialogues in the Platonic vein. These include the three Country Path 
Conversations, written between 1944 and 1945, as well as the “Conversation on Language” with 
a Japanese gentleman that was written 10 years later and published in On the Way to Language. 
 
If we look at this later conversation, we find confirmation for such an approach in 
Heidegger’s own words. A major concern of that conversation, as with most of his later work on 
language, is to avoid speaking about language, since this objectifies it and thereby overlooks the 
phenomenon. He thus tries to show that speaking about language is not the same as speaking from 
language. The Inquirer, who is Heidegger as a character, eventually concludes that this “speaking 
from language could only be a conversation.”1180
Every person is at every moment in conversation with his forebears, and perhaps even more and in 
a more concealed fashion with those who will come after. […] [F]or us today, it may become an 
 We should take this conversation to include 
attempts to interpret previous writers, since the Inquirer has already said: 
                                                 
1178 Zollikon Seminars 268/217, conversation of July 6, 1967, trans. mod. and emphasis added. See 
Hölderlin, “Friedensfeier,” in Sämtliche Gedichte, op. cit., pp. 338ff, line 92. 
1179 Zollikon Seminars 183/140, interpolated quotation taken from the same page. Although much has been 
said and still remains to be said about Heidegger and psychoanalytic experiences of language, I limit 
myself here to a discussion of language only insofar as it is involved in conversation and trusting 
interpretation. For an analysis that brings Heidegger and Lacan close together, see William Richardson, 
“Heidegger Among the Doctors.” 
1180 Heidegger, “Conversation on Language,” GA 12:41/On the Way to Language, p. 51, trans. mod. 
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In the present context, then, I want to read portions of these philosophical conversations 
in light of Heidegger’s own comments concerning his strategy for interpreting the thought of 
others. The focus will be on his interpretations of Nietzsche and of Kant, since in my view he is at 
his most methodologically reflective in those readings. My claims in response to Heidegger’s 
objection here are, first, that genuine, fruitful conversation integrally involves trusting another 
person, and, second, that although Heidegger implicitly recognizes that first claim, his emphasis 
on instead trusting the conversation itself as an event in which something comes to light is what 
gives rise to our unease about interpretive violence. In other words, although he tries to bring 
about what he calls a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with other thinkers by attending to the 
phenomenon at issue, and although he is at one level quite right to do so, he nonetheless fails to 
reach the kind of ‘Thou-Thou relation’ that he himself calls for. I will further try to establish that 
this failure is due to overlooking the singularity of the person with whom he is speaking. His 
concern is rather with the history of the understandings of being, a history that speaks regardless 
of the person’s choices or character, which presumably means that in principle it could speak 
through any given representative of that beyng-historical epoch. 
 
1. The Conversation is Prior to You and Me 
 One striking feature of these four written conversations is the extraordinary degree of 
explicit consideration of what happens in the course of the conversation. As we will see, the 
course (der Gang) or the path (der Weg) very nearly becomes another character. It is in this way 
that one thing becomes unmistakably clear: Heidegger is not seeking to produce realistic or 
representational art here. Self-reflection is surely far from rare in live philosophical 
                                                 
1181 GA 12:117/OWL 31, trans. mod. Cf. 144/52, trans. mod.: the Japanese gentleman adds that “it would 
remain of secondary significance whether the conversation lies before us as written or has at some point 
resounded as spoken.” 
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conversations, but here it is thematized at least as much and as strangely as in Plato (although 
sadly without much of Plato’s humor). Maybe unsurprisingly, then, this thematization itself is 
explicitly brought up at various points, and one of these reflective moments makes clear that the 
major axis of such reflection is a question of trust. 
In the “Triadic Conversation,” the Guide argues (against the Scientist) that they should 
not plan out the course of the conversation, on the grounds that they need to be “freed from the 
ties to everything thematic.”1182
The call to listen to the conversation itself as the latter brings its own topics into language 
suggests that along with a mistrust of what is thematic goes a corresponding trust in the course of 
the conversation as an event in its own right. We can confirm this hint quite rigorously from the 
text. The Scientist is eventually led to a conversion away from his desire for imposed order by 
“the course of the conversation, rather than the representation of any specific objects we 
considered.”
 (Here we have the general version of the earlier worry over 
speaking about language.) The Scholar then asks, “Why do you so mistrust [misstrauen] what is 
thematic?” The Guide explains that a theme, taken over from ancient Greek thema and thesis, are 
from the verb tithenai, to put, to set, or to posit. This kind of willful setting up and ordering is 
precisely what Heidegger hopes thinking can free us from. So, the Guide says that “what is 
spoken of may of itself bring itself to language” or raise itself as a discussion topic. This prompts 
the Scholar to conclude that “in speaking, a ‘listening into’ the conversation would almost be 
more essential than the ‘speaking out’” involved in making statements. 
1183 He characterizes this leading as a ‘compulsion without force,’ one which relaxes 
him and brings him to “trust [vertraue] the inconspicuous escort [unscheinbaren Geleit] who 
takes us by the hand, or, more aptly said, by the word in this conversation.”1184
                                                 
1182 All quotations in this paragraph from GA 77:75/CPC 47. 
 This 
conversational course, which is also the course they are walking along the country path, is 
1183 GA 77:117/CPC 76. 
1184 GA 77:107/CPC 69. 
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inconspicuous, non-apparent, because it is silent.1185
The escort shows up in the “Tower” conversation when the Warden contrasts “having a 
presentiment” (which relies on being capable of receiving this escort that arrives unforeseen) with 
sight (“which is all too sure of itself”
 Nevertheless, it comes up for discussion in 
all four dialogues. 
1186 in presuming that it has no need to trust). The path (der 
Weg) as what “leads [or escorts: geleitet] us into our own essence”1187 is emphasized once more 
by the Older Man in the “Evening Conversation.” Finally, at a crucial moment in the 
“Conversation on Language,” just when the two participants realize that the two guiding 
questions for that conversation – What is hermeneutics? And what is the Japanese word for 
language? – really ask the selfsame question (i.e., just when the European and the East-Asian 
discover between them a kind of fusion of horizons), the Inquirer says that they “may, therefore, 
calmly trust [vertrauen] to the concealed pull [Zug] of our conversation,”1188
I think we can make sense of this by keeping with Heidegger’s general project, one which 
he himself characterizes as a phenomenology of the inconspicuous, of the non-apparent. As we 
have seen, for Heidegger, unlike for Husserl, the phenomenological reduction is not something 
performed consciously by the subject in order to attend to appearances; instead, the world reduces 
itself and thereby implies or hints at what does not explicitly appear. This is true on the simplest 
level – the tool that breaks or goes missing – as well as on much more complex levels: anxiety 
reveals my thrownness; the forgottenness of the question of being reveals being’s own finitude; 
the breaking of the word reveals the essence of language. 
 which has brought 
them together so neatly. 
                                                 
1185 Cf. the Guide’s words on GA 77:118/CPC 76, as well as his naming of the escort at the very end of the 
conversation: the “course” is dubbed ankhibasiē, ‘going-into-nearness’ (GA 77:156/CPC 102). 
1186 GA 77:189/CPC 123. Cp. my discussion of self-assurance in chapter 3, section II.B. 
1187 GA 77:226/CPC 147. 
1188 GA 12:116/OWL 30, trans. mod. 
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It is in this way that Heidegger can reasonably claim that his violent interpretations of the 
history of Western thought form part of a strategy for avoiding arbitrariness in his own 
thinking.1189 In attending to the work of previous thinkers, especially where that work breaks 
down, the conversation across epochs and the phenomenon around which it centers are disclosed 
as important for human being as such, not only for us at this moment. Indeed, this very insight 
itself, the Inquirer says, “has been learned in turn by listening to the thinkers’ thinking.”1190 For 
Heidegger, since being always shows itself, even if only in a concealed, hinting manner, then the 
thought of those who preceded us is one form of the speech of being itself. As he asks in the Le 
Thor seminar many years later, “Does being speak? […] Who decided that only entities can 
speak? Who has so gauged the essence of the word?”1191
 
 
2. The Echo of Being’s Withdrawal 
When we listen into the conversation, receiving its course as an inconspicuous escort, we 
respond to the claim of being upon us, the way that it calls us to a certain way of seeing. The 
Guide tells us that “a conversation first waits upon [wartet auf] reaching that of which it speaks. 
And the speakers of a conversation can speak in its sense only if they are prepared for something 
to befall [widerfährt] them in the conversation which transforms their own essence.”1192
In the Tower conversation, in fact, the Warden explains that he and his companion, the 
Teacher, are not yet properly receptive, so as to be able to engage in a meditative pursuit of 
 But if 
what is primarily at stake in Heideggerian phenomenology is attending properly to the self-
reduction performed by the world as it transforms us, then phenomenology is understood here as 
a mode of receptivity to the event, a receptivity that seems to entail a kind of trust. 
                                                 
1189 The other part of the strategy, even more startlingly, is the use of the etymologies for which he has been 
pilloried. Cf. GA 12:114-15/OWL 28-29. 
1190 GA 12:117/OWL 30-31. 
1191 GA 15:346/Four Seminars 47, trans. mod. 
1192 GA 77:57/CPC 37, emphasis added. 
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something that would be other than metaphysics. “[W]e still lack the trust [or confidence: 
Zutrauen], or even the proper aptitude for this trust in what carries [Tragenden], [in] that by 
which nonmetaphysical thinking is claimed.”1193 The name in the “Conversation on Language” 
for the course of the conversation, that which claims us and carries us along, is simply ‘the 
undetermined – or even indeterminate – determiner,’ das unbestimmte Bestimmende.1194 Listening 
to and heeding or obeying this address, this claim, just is authentic conversation – in which (the 
Guide tells us) “an event takes place [sich … ereignet] wherein something comes to language”1195
 Note that this something that comes to language when we receive it is precisely the 
matter at stake, die Sache, the very phenomenon guiding the conversation. It is, perhaps 
appropriately, not the people involved. The Guide asks, “what if a conversation is only concerned 
with first of all finding the matter?”
 
for the first time. 
1196 This would be in line with authentic solicitude (Fürsorge) 
as delineated in Being and Time, where genuine Sachlichkeit, responsiveness to the matter at 
stake, is first enabled by authentic being-with-one-another (i.e., by conversation).1197
                                                 
1193 GA 77:187/CPC 122, trans. mod. 
 Heidegger 
distinguishes a range of positive modes of solicitude that is bounded by two extremes: leaping in 
(einspringen) for or standing in for someone is the misguided extreme, an attempt to do for 
someone what she can only do for herself – thus an attempt to dominate her. By contrast, leaping 
out ahead (vorausspringen) of someone involves recognizing that only she herself can take 
responsibility for who she is and helping her to see this for herself – thus liberating her from her 
entanglement in the crowd. 
1194 GA 12:106/OWL 22. The Inquirer and the Japanese gentleman soon specify this determining voice, 
which addresses us but is not determined by us, as the essence of language, at least (but not only) in their 
conversation. 
1195 GA 77:57/CPC 36. 
1196 GA 77:46/CPC 30, emphasis added. 
1197 BT 122/158-9. Heidegger’s whole discussion takes place on this one German page. 
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 We get an example of leaping out ahead in the “Conversation on Language.” There, 
because of appropriate concerns about translation, the Japanese gentleman hesitates for most of 
the discussion before revealing the Japanese word for language. When it does finally happen, the 
disclosive event only comes about, he makes a point of saying, because (the character) 
Heidegger’s patient listening to him has inspired the necessary confidence (or trust: Zutrauen). 
But even in saying this, the Japanese gentleman turns it away from the personal realm: “Since 
you listen to me, or better, to the probing intimations I propose […].”1198
Marking that shift in the text makes clear that the distinction between liberating and 
dominating solicitude is structured as a mode of response to (or receptivity for) the matter at 
stake. Already in Being and Time, Heidegger describes that mode of response as a question of 
trust. Competition between those who are merely employed for the same task breeds mistrust, he 
says, while those who are themselves invested (Sicheinsetzen) in a shared matter are each 
determined by a being-there that is gripped by the matter. He names this latter way of being-there 
“authentic unity [eigentliche Verbundenheit],” that which first makes possible an appropriate 
orientation toward the matter,
 This is the same shift 
urged by Heraclitus, when he calls us to “listen not to me but to the logos.” It is also the shift 
from listening to a person to listening to what else speaks through a person. 
1199
The role of this kind of trust is all too quickly upstaged for Heidegger by our relation 
directly to the matter at stake. As inconspicuous, die Sache is what goes unsaid in the 
conversation while nonetheless quietly guiding, escorting, or determining its course. If we are to 
attend to it, then, or even to encounter it, we must wait, letting go of our imagined control over 
the conversation so as to let what is be as it is (i.e., in its being). We saw in chapter 4 that 
 but we should recognize in it, at its heart, a certain trust of the 
other person with regard to the matter at stake. 
                                                 
1198 GA 12:134/OWL 45. 
1199 BT 122/159. 
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‘waiting’ is the designation of the human essence that shows up the most in the Country Path 
Conversations, and it is also here that Heidegger marks authentic waiting (i.e., explicitly owning 
up to one’s essence, to the essence of thinking) as ‘releasement’ (Gelassenheit).1200 It is a 
receptivity that precedes or escapes the scale of activity and passivity,1201 a receptivity understood 
as letting-come what approaches us, what has been entrusted to us. This letting-come of being in 
its self-showing is precisely waiting on it,1202 listening to it – what Heidegger elsewhere names 
the piety of thinking.1203 In this waiting receptivity, we become “gathered in attentiveness” to that 
in which we belong;1204
One aspect of such waiting, as inherently open to the future, is that one releases one’s 
own thought and work to other (unknown) contexts, in which what is unsaid in it can and will 
emerge. In a note to the “Triadic Conversation,” Heidegger asks, “Where else could the unspoken 
be purely kept [bewahrt], heeded [gehütet], other than in true conversation[?]”
 in other words, we are opened up to an experience of being itself through 
a certain submissiveness to the matter at stake. 
1205 In a similar 
context, he refers to “the most beautiful dialogues [Dialoge] of Plato,”1206
The uninitiated believe that the unsaid is only the remainder […]. Yet the unsaid has its place only 
in what is said, and only through the highest force of saying can it become and be such. Through 
the unsaid we first catch sight of the matter [die Sache] of thinking in its whole importance 
[Sachheit]. 
 which conceal their 
import from anyone who looks for a particular result or doctrine rather than attending to what is 
unsaid in them. 
  
It should not be surprising, then, that this inconspicuous, unsaid phenomenon is also what 
Heidegger seeks in his conversations with the thinkers and poets of the tradition. When Kant’s 
                                                 
1200 GA 77:116-24, 148/CPC 76-80, 97. 
1201 GA 77:109, 144, 172/CPC 70, 94, 112. 
1202 GA 77:217-18/CPC 140-1. 
1203 See “The Nature of Language,” GA 12:165-6/OWL 71-2, where Heidegger revises his previous 
characterization of questioning as the piety of thought (from “The Question Concerning Technology,” GA 
7:36/QCT 35). 
1204 GA 77:226/147. 
1205 GA 77:159/CPC 104. 
1206 This and the following taken from GA 79:164/Basic Principles of Thinking 154-5, trans. mod. 
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work comes up in the “Triadic Conversation,” the Guide points out that “[t]he thinker even says 
more than he himself can know, such that he is surprised and above all surpassed by the 
inexhaustibility of his own word.”1207 Similarly, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche’s thought is 
“wrapped in thick clouds – not just for us, but for Nietzsche’s own thinking.”1208
Hence when Heidegger seeks what is unsaid, he is most interested in what a thinker 
characteristically did not – and indeed could not – see. That is why we cannot be content to repeat 
Kant’s or Nietzsche’s words, nor even to come up with explanatory paraphrases. “Now, if an 
interpretation [Interpretation] merely gives back what Kant has expressly said, then from the 
outset it is not a laying-out [Auslegung] […].”
 
1209 Instead, laying-out the thought of someone like 
Nietzsche appropriately, according to Heidegger, requires “a prior glimpse of the essential 
questions”1210 that are raised by the phenomenon Nietzsche is thinking through. This independent 
attention to the matter at stake (i.e., to the things themselves) on the part of the interpreter opens 
up a way toward what is unsaid by Nietzsche, in the process doing a kind of violence to what is 
written. Heidegger speaks, for example, of “wringing” “what Kant ‘had wanted to say’” from 
what Kant really did say.1211 Such violence is both enabled (literally, driven: treiben) and guided, 
however, by “the power [Kraft] of an idea that shines out,” presumably from the text. Only under 
such power can an interpretation “risk what is always presumptuous: to entrust [anvertrauen] 
itself to the concealed inner passion of a work, so as by this passion to be placed into the unsaid 
and compelled to say it.”1212
                                                 
1207 GA 77:100/CPC 64, emphasis added. Cp. the end of part three of Kant and the Problem of 
Metaphysics, tr. Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997): “Kant himself, however, 
was not enabled to say more about this. For in general, with any philosophical knowledge, not what is said 
in uttered propositions but what it sets before our eyes as still unsaid, in and through what has been said – 
this must become decisive” (GA 3:201/KPM 140, trans. mod.).  
 Here there is a complicated mix of submission and self-assertion, for 
in seeking the unsaid, Heidegger also claims that “one can trust [Kant] without reservation [since] 
1208 Heidegger, GA 111/What Is Called Thinking? 108. 
1209 GA 3:201/KPM 140. 
1210 GA 6.1:283/Nietzsche II 69. 
1211 GA 3:201-2/KPM 141. 
1212 GA 3:202/KPM 141, trans. mod. 
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one has with Kant […] the immediate certainty that he does not cheat.”1213 While he might not 
say anything quite so strong with regard to Nietzsche, he does claim that an interpretation of 
Nietzsche “must allow itself to be guided by meticulous deference toward what Nietzsche himself 
did say.”1214
The fact that interpretation necessarily involves maintaining the tension between these 
two poles – between one’s own questioning of the phenomena themselves and what the other 
person really said of those phenomena – comes as no surprise. That is the perennial interpretive 
challenge. The puzzle for us is how specifically Heidegger understands the pole of ‘meticulous 
deference’. His interpretations of other thinkers are certainly meticulous – the line about trusting 
Kant absolutely comes at the end of some 400 pages of interpretation – yet sometimes in ways 
that not only break open the text but simply pass it by. He claims, for example, that Nietzsche’s 




This and other reading decisions are justified by Heidegger’s avowed attempt to take on a 
person’s thought at its strongest points, rather than picking on weaknesses.
 – and so Heidegger attends principally to the Nachlass for his interpretation of 
Nietzsche. 
1216 Those readings 
seek to “bring his thought out into the open and make it fruitful,”1217 and to do this above all for 
his “genuine philosophical thought.”1218
                                                 
1213 Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, trs. P. Emad and K. 
Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 293, trans. mod./GA 25:431. 
 They even remain explicitly tentative: in the 
“Conversation on Language,” the Japanese gentleman tells the Inquirer that “it had always 
1214 GA 6.1:283/Nietzsche II 69, trans. mod., emphasis added. Indeed, he comes close to saying that 
Nietzsche does cheat in calling truth an error. GA 6.1:558ff/Nietzsche III 125ff. For the previous 
discussions of Nietzsche’s “ambiguity” to which Heidegger refers here, see GA 6.1: 148ff, 213ff, 459ff, 
481ff/Nietzsche I 146ff, 211ff; Nietzsche III 34ff, 54ff. 
1215 GA 6.1:6/Nietzsche I 9. 
1216 GA 6.1:3/Nietzsche I 5. Cp. GA 65/Contributions §93, where Heidegger claims that the 
Auseinandersetzung is constructed so that “every philosophy, as something essential, comes to stand in the 
manner of a mountain among mountains and thereby gives standing to what in it is most essential.” 
1217 GA 6.1:65/Nietzsche I 68. 
1218 GA 6.1:21/Nietzsche I 24. 
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seemed amazing that people never tired of imputing to you a defensive or deprecating relation 
[abwehrendes Verhältnis] toward the history of previous thinking, while in fact you strive only 
for an original appropriation [or adoption: Aneignung].” The Inquirer, who answers for 
Heidegger, immediately adds that the “success” of this appropriation “can and should be 
disputed.”1219
Yet Heidegger understands a thinker’s ‘genuine philosophical thought’ as an event 
(Ereignis): “[s]omething other than he himself […], something that no longer belongs to him, the 
thinker, but to which he belongs,”
 
1220 something that he “properly wanted to think”1221 – and this 
something, as we have seen, is precisely the event of the truth of being. Thus, for Heidegger, it is 
possible to think a person’s ‘genuine philosophical thought’ when we take as a guide “the 
movement of thought which occurs when we ask the genuine questions,” i.e., when we try to hear 
the person precisely in order to ask after the innermost matter of Western thought – namely, the 
givenness of being.1222
This characterization echoes those given above of authentic conversations. We saw that 
such conversations, for Heidegger, are drawn along by their own gravity, guided by the 
happening of being. Thus it is not so much the other person he wants to listen to – or, in this case, 
the particular previous thinker – as it is the determining something else, that which speaks in the 
movement of the other person’s thought and the movement of one’s own thought. It is not so 
much the content of the thinking as the phenomenologically encountered happening – what takes 
 
                                                 
1219 GA 12:104/OWL 20, trans. mod. 
1220 GA 6.1:233/Nietzsche II 13, trans. mod., emphasis added. 
1221 GA 6.1:63/Nietzsche I 65: eigentliche Denkwille. 
1222 GA 6.1:21/Nietzsche I 24. 
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place in this thinking. That is why Heidegger suggests that when thinkers and poets speak to us, 
“another claim meet[s] us through them.”1223
The problem, I think, is something like this: the joint appeal to my own work of 
questioning and to the concealed work of being (both in and behind the back of my interlocutor) 
leaves me as the one who determines my interlocutor’s genuine thought, her strongest points, etc. 
I construct the confrontation, so (within certain limits) I determine what is most essential in her 
thinking. My deference is not to her but to the phenomenon as it gives itself to me in (and even 
as) her thought, and thus finally as I interpret it. I determine, for example, the essential questions 
that must be asked in such an interpretation. Such an approach does open up a third position in 
the conversation (that of being’s happening or of the course of the conversation itself), but, as we 
have seen, this turns out to be graspable as a unified structure of revealing and concealing. It is 
not a person who would be free either to thwart my understanding or to actively work with me. 
Instead of finding myself given over to another who might offer something radically different, I 
am stuck with my own ability to hear and interpret being’s claim. The authentic unity that is 
possible in being-with and that should subsequently orient us toward the matter at stake is passed 
over from the beginning in favor of moving directly into an engagement with that matter. 
 
While it seems like Heidegger’s picture does capture part of the excitement and wonder 
of a good conversation, we should pause over what is missed if we attribute that conversation 
simply to the complex phenomenon of being. It seems, rather, to be dependent on being-with, not 
only in the sense that Heidegger straightforwardly recognizes (being requires a there that is 
structured communally), but in a way that requires the ontic singularity of specific people. In 
other words, we should ask, as I have tried to throughout this project, how the third position in the 
conversation is given and what relation it bears to the other, human participants. We might say, 
                                                 
1223 Heidegger, GA 50:140/Thinking and Poetizing: 45. Cf. GA 10:37/Principle of Reason 24, trans. mod.: 
“What is great and lasting in the thinking of a thinker simply consists in its expressly giving word to what 
always already resounds.” 
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for example, that the very peculiarities of the other person are ontologically – and not only 
ontically – necessary for enabling the conversation, i.e., for allowing being to show up in the 
matter under discussion. They contribute to the shared world (Mitwelt) by opening up paths for 
me. In knowing and trusting a friend, I have a (non-determinative) sense of which direction he 
might go concerning the matter, and that orients my own thinking in a way that is more specific 
than being can grant. 
So, I want to say that what is legitimately troubling in Heidegger’s approach is something 
like this: Heidegger claims that a thinker’s thoughts are not most importantly the contribution of a 
particular person. Instead, they are, as he says in his discussion of Nietzsche, “reverberations of 
the still-unrecognized history of being[, sounding] in the word which that historical person speaks 
as his ‘language.’”1224 Although he adds that it is only in conversation that such a thought proves 
itself, since “here the speakers themselves must venture forth into what is spoken,”1225
 
 we have 
seen that it is quite clearly not so much the speakers themselves as what happens to them in such 
a venture that interests Heidegger. It is the latter – the happening, the phenomenon’s self-showing 
– in which he places his trust. 
3. Who (or What) Stages a Conversation? 
 This does not yet settle the matter. There are at least four ways in which this complaint 
might be answered in defense of Heidegger. 
1) First, it may be that I am selling Heidegger short on the importance of the 
interlocutor’s singularity. There is really a difference to be marked in this regard between the 
unpublished Country Path Conversations and the text published a decade later as “Conversation 
on Language.” In the latter, there is more clearly a single character in the role of Heidegger, and 
that character expresses joy over the visit of this specific Japanese gentleman because of his 
                                                 
1224 GA 6.2:34/Nietzsche IV 12, trans. mod. 
1225 GA 6.1:271/Nietzsche II 52. 
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peculiar qualifications for the conversation: he has translated some Kleist plays and some of 
Heidegger’s lectures on Hölderlin.1226 Furthermore, the conversation is presented contextually as 
stemming from a previous conversation between Heidegger and Count Kuki, who was also 
peculiarly qualified, having mastery of German, French, and English, in addition to Japanese.1227
All of this is important, yet it remains striking that all four conversations, including the 
“Conversation on Language,” often sound very much like Heidegger’s treatises and lecture 
courses, only with the various suggestions, objections, and false trails shared out among enduring 
characters. This feature is especially pronounced toward the end of each conversation, as the 
participants increasingly complete each other’s sentences, but it is not absent early on, where 
there is a disconcerting element of explicit guessing or surmising about what the other person 
means. The Japanese gentleman, for example, says at one point: “But then what does hermeneutic 
mean? I dare not give in to the suspicion, although it lies close at hand, that you are now using the 
word ‘hermeneutic’ arbitrarily [willkürlich].”
 
Looking more broadly, we could add that Heidegger consistently honors thinkers and poets above 
others, and Hölderlin above other poets. 
1228 I have re-translated this to make it sound as 
believable as possible, but it still strikes me as very forced: Heidegger is clearly responding to 
objections by using this character. Of course, this kind of guessing does go on in live 
conversations, but such guesses are usually asked as questions – while in Heidegger’s writing 
they are pronouncements.1229
                                                 
1226 GA 12:89/OWL 8. We should not forget Heidegger’s claim in those very lectures on Hölderlin that how 
one translates is a matter of who one is. Cf. Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister,” GA 53. 
 The resulting impression is that of an internal conversation, which 
is to say, of thinking understood Platonically as the dialogue of the soul with itself, only now 
made public. 
1227 GA 12:85/OWL 4. Of course, if the objection goes through as concerns the “Conversation on 
Language,” then it turns out to support my claim regarding the three unpublished conversations. 
1228 GA 12:93/OWL 11, trans. mod. 
1229 Compare natural language formulations like ‘Are you saying that… ?’ ‘You can’t really mean … , 
right?’ and ‘I take it you’re not serious about … ?’ to Heidegger’s written conversations. 
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 2) Second, it is of course true that Heidegger’s emphases on what happens in the 
conversation and on the unsaid in a person’s work are to some extent corrective. We are generally 
so focused on the actual saying, as failed or successful communication, that we easily miss what 
is given to but not under the control of the speaker. To the extent that Heidegger is primarily 
advocating a corrective, I think he is just right – but I also think he is doing more than that. The 
case is similar to that of his essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art,” where Heidegger both 
corrects the traditional focus on audience or artist by calling us back to the work as a thing and 
tries to rethink both things and the nature of truth on the basis of this work. 
 3) Third, we could take these emphases as Heidegger’s rethought version of the 
traditional attempt to grasp the universal at work in the particular. No philosopher wants a 
biography as an interpretation of a thinker’s work; one always wants to know what broader 
significance the work has. Nevertheless, I take it there is quite a range of possibilities between 
getting caught up in a thinker’s personality, on one hand, and starting out by looking for 
something specific to show itself in her thinking, something that one has already discovered to be 
‘the innermost matter of all Western thinking’, on the other hand. Similarly, there is in fact a 
considerable range between reducing Aristotle’s work to a psychological self-portrait, and 
Heidegger’s hyperbolic claim near the opening of a set of lectures on Aristotle that “[r]egarding 
the personality of a philosopher, our only interest is that he was born at such and such a time, he 
worked, and he died”1230
 4) Fourth, and most crucially: Heidegger might claim that a person only becomes herself 
in the event of the conversation. Phenomenologically, there is not a subject constituted in itself 
permanently or beforehand to which one could appeal. Rather, Kant is given as (and thus first 
becomes) Kant in the historical interpretations to which he released his work; the Scientist is only 
 – at which point genuine philosophical engagement may commence. 
                                                 
1230 Heidegger, Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, trs. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), p. 4, trans. mod./GA 18:5. 
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derivatively a character that would be constituted independently of the conversation in which his 
conversion takes place. Such a response would seek to take fully into account one’s temporal 
structure as a thrown projection that cannot ever take itself completely in hand (i.e., be fully 
present to itself or to anyone else). We are not only vulnerable to entities co-present with us; we 
are also (and more fundamentally) historically exposed. 
 Heidegger’s own articulation of this objection is found in his lectures on the Basic 
Principles of Thinking. In the course of making clear what is needed if we are to listen 
historically, he again labels the ‘I-Thou’ formula a relic of Cartesianism, since it remains stuck 
thinking the ‘I’ as a subject. One subject seeking to understand another is still inadequate. 
As long as one pays homage to this representation of the human as a subject or a person, thinking 
is closed off against the arrival of the dispensation avowed to us [des uns zugesprochenen 
Geschickes]. One can then logically proclaim that every speaking with history, since it is indeed 
arranged by a subject, would only ever be a self-made monologue. […] Liberation from this 
representation requires something simple, that we abandon it in favor of an experience in which 
we are already sojourning [aufhalten]. […] We only catch sight  of what has already sighted us, 
and indeed without our knowledge or effort. We only hear [hören] that to which we already 
belong [zugehören] insofar as we stand in its claim [Anspruch].1231
 
 
 I cannot answer this objection fully, since it would require its own study of selfhood 
(Selbstheit) in Heidegger, but I can gesture in the direction of an answer. In his conversations 
with Boss, Heidegger elaborates on the structure of comportment (Verhalten) as an essential 
relatedness (Verhältnis) of being-there. 
The ‘oneself’ in comporting oneself [Sichverhalten] […] is to be seen in a purely 
phenomenological sense, i.e., in the way I comport myself now. In each case the who is exhausted 
precisely in the ways of comporting itself in which it is involved just now. […] This constitutes 
my being-there in the present situation, at any given time. Nothing more can be said about it. One 
cannot ask about this comportment’s ‘porter’; rather, the comportment carries itself.1232
 
 
This sounds at first like Nietzsche’s attempt to leave behind the grammatical subject: there is not 
lightning plus a flash (constituted subject plus occasional deed); there is only flashing, which we 
                                                 
1231 GA 79:100-1/BPT 95, trans. mod. 




For Heidegger, however, any ‘just now’ is essentially shaped by the no longer and the not 
yet: I comport myself toward things in their possibilities, not just toward fully present things. 
Furthermore, since my self is only as temporalizing, gathering myself in comporting myself 
toward entities, something like an enduring or perduring ‘I’ does emerge. This is not, according to 
Heidegger, the Freudian I (ego) as present-at-hand represented object. As William Richardson 
puts it, the word self here “stands for Dasein as being-in-the-world insofar as as it remains the 
same throughout the entire historical [i.e., temporal] process.”
 If that were what Heidegger sought, then in one way my historical 
exposure would indeed be complete, but in another way there would be no sense in which it was 
‘my’ historical exposure. 
1234 Heidegger’s own 
characterization of the self as standing within or amidst (inständig) what is allows him to interpret 
its constancy (Ständigkeit) as belonging to or “proper to itself in the sense that the self is always 
able to come back to itself and always finds itself still the same in its sojourn.”1235 Unlike a 
substance that is constantly just there (vorhanden), the self has itself at issue: it actively relates 
itself to its own possibilities, including (though mostly not explicitly) its ability to return to itself. 
Phenomenologically, then, the self is encountered as a possibility of repetition that is of crucial 
import – iterability that matters to itself, we might say. Or, with Heidegger: “When a human 
being says ‘I’, this always designates the self insofar as he pays attention to it at any given time.” 
‘I’, the ego, thus means an aspect of the self, not the whole self, since the latter “can never be 
realized in one moment.”1236
There is, we can conclude, an enduring (as unfolding) self that is meant but not directly 
encountered in any use of the pronoun ‘I’. There is not space here for me to do more than suggest 
 
                                                 
1233 Cf. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, Essay 1, §13. 
1234 Richardson, “Heidegger Among the Doctors,” p. 55. 
1235 Zollikon Seminars 220/175. 
1236 Zollikon Seminars 220/174-5. Thus Heidegger can certainly deal with a philosophy of mind not rooted 
in consciousness, as Freud’s is not, even if the dynamic unconscious remains unacceptable to him. 
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that this self is what does not only emerge (although, as unfolding, it does emerge) in the event of 
the conversation. It would then be this singular self that can bear the weight of a conversation and 
be disclosed as trustworthy or not. That is not to interpret the singularized self as a subject, nor to 
declare that speaking with history is necessarily a monologue because arranged by a subject. 
Instead, it is this Kant or this Nietzsche to whom one might submit oneself in the work of an 
interpretation – in other words, a person one can trust, albeit under the modal limitation to the 
context of the philosophical matter at stake. That trust of the person, such that one’s own project 
can be upended or at least temporarily set aside, is in fact what it seems to me Heidegger aims at 
when he speaks of ‘authentic unity’ or a ‘Thou-Thou relation’. Nevertheless, his trust in the 
structure of being’s self-showing – that in which we already stand, which has sighted us 
independently of our own knowledge or effort – mostly overshadows this meaning by making the 
disclosure necessarily independent of this singular person. 
 To put that more succinctly: Heidegger claims that waiting is the essence of releasement, 
and that “the originary releasement [Gelassenheit] of Dasein [is] the trusting of the human to the 
Da-sein in him and to its possibilities.”1237
  
 Such trust, as a modification of our essential waiting, 
is primitive: finding oneself given over to the openness of world (Da-sein and its possibilities). 
That seems right, so long as we recognize that the phenomenal structure of this primitive trusting 
is primarily that of trusting a person rather than primarily of trusting the complex phenomenon 
concealment/unconcealment. 
III. Originary Fantasy Arises as an Event of Truth 
If my argument survives the variety of objections gone through above, then I think we 
must conclude a) that the phenomenon of psychosis at least gives us grounds for significant 
hesitation about the way Heidegger thinks our relation to being, and b) that it additionally calls on 
                                                 
1237 Heidegger, Introduction to Philosophy, GA 27:401. 
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us to think through originary truth again, beginning from the perspective of its trusting character. 
As reasons for (a), we have seen that Heidegger ends up phenomenologically reassuring himself 
about the relation of thinking and being, even if his own thinking can also be opened up in the 
direction of a possible radical break with being (chapters 3-4). We have also seen that the 
functional psychoses in fact involve such a radical break, one that neither Heidegger nor many of 
his compatriots in phenomenological psychiatry can quite countenance (chapter 5). In defense of 
(b), we have seen that the phenomenon of originary truth, which Heidegger interprets as the 
essential unity of a historical clearing for concealment, can also be addressed as primitive trust 
(chapters 1-2). Indeed, we have even seen that this gives us a fruitful way to think through the 
moves and tensions in Heidegger’s own texts (chapters 2-3). Furthermore, it seems clear that 
Freudian psychoanalysis has insights into world-entry (and world-exit) that we need as 
ontologists if we are to make sense of the way the human being is integrated into the shared world 
(chapters 5-6). Having thus dealt with both what might be called negative objections (section 
II.A) and positive counterproposals (section II.B), I want to close this chapter by leaving behind 
the Heideggerian response to my proposal in favor of now exploring that proposal’s further 
implications. 
While I have already considered trust on its own terms (chapter 1), trust in its relation to 
originary truth (chapter 2), originary truth for Heidegger (chapter 2), the role of trust for 
Heidegger (chapters 3-4 and section II.B in this chapter), and the role of trust in Freudian 
psychoanalysis (chapters 5-6), I have not yet dealt head-on with the thorny issue of truth for 
Freud. What might Freud and Heidegger contribute to one another in thinking the nature of truth? 
Most especially, what does psychoanalysis have to offer philosophy in this regard? I think that 
there is something important to be said here, and I would like to conclude with several 
considerations suggestive of further research. 
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In chapter 2, I characterized the question of originary truth for Heidegger as a problem of 
how things can show up as appropriately independent of us, yet still as important for us (where 
‘important’ means both mattering and partially intelligible). Heidegger corroborates this 
characterization in the “Triadic Conversation,” where the Guide claims that the “independence of 
truth from the human is after all […] a relation to the human.”1238 The participants do not work 
out what this means in any detail, but the Guide does emphasize that part of the reason why the 
human can be needed by beyng in order for beyng to show up in things (i.e., in order for there to 
be truth) is precisely that “the human by himself has no power over truth, which remains 
independent of him.” We are caught up into a clearing that we cannot simply opt into or out of, 
and this regime of criteria for what is essential allows entities (including statements) to be true or 
false independently of which we would like them to be. We are, in Freudian terms, submitted to 
the reality principle.1239 The Scholar summarizes the situation as follows: to be human is to be 
“the one who is required [der Gebrauchte] in the essencing of truth”1240
One way that the same problem arises for Freud is quite simply formulated: if things 
show up to us as mattering in a way shaped by the drives (as we saw in chapter 6), and the drives, 
for their part, are correlated with or oriented by fantasy, how can we still be knowingly submitted 
to real things that are properly independent of our desires? 
 – the one to whom things 
show up in a particular, minimally coherent, differentially important way. 
Note that in an important sense this is the same problem Kant faced; for his part, he 
solved it by taking the categories and the schemata to be inborn, while abandoning things as they 
are in themselves to the realm of the unknowable. But Freud recognizes that there is much less 
                                                 
1238 This and the next quotation from GA 77:147/CPC 96. 
1239 Reflection shows Freud that the reality principle functions only as a contrast term to the pleasure 
principle, i.e., to sexuality; it would be worth exploring in what way this is parallel to the discovery of 
phenomenological reflection (in Heidegger) that authenticity, embracing my belonging to reality, functions 
only as a contrast term to everydayness. 
1240 GA 77:148/CPC 96. 
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inborn than we might wish. (Things might go much more smoothly than they in fact do if 
everything were a matter of innate predisposition.) We need some account of a non-arbitrary 
constitution of human openness that can nevertheless arise from accidental (i.e., contingent) 
situations. In other words, we need a way to acknowledge that what is real shows up as it really 
is, yet only on the basis of our (contingent, historically concrete) involvements with it. The 
central such involvement is what I have been calling primitive trust. Or, as Heidegger puts it, 
originary truth emerges historically, in an event (Ereignis) that opens a world in which real things 
can appear. To such an event we can only respond, either appropriately (ent-sprechen) or 
inappropriately. 
I do not want to give the impression that Freud himself ever simply worked out this 
difficulty. What I do want to say is that he struggled with it in various guises and with varying 
levels of success, thereby offering to later analysts (and to us) material with which to think 
through the problem. My proposal is that when Freud turns to originary fantasy as the 
individual’s contingently structured opening onto a constitutively shared world, he comes quite 
close to some of Heidegger’s interpretations of the appropriative event (namely, as an Austrag – a 
staging or carrying-out – of the clearing). Freud’s version, however, is at the level of the 
individual, whereas Heidegger’s seems to remain at the level of the community.1241
                                                 
1241 For Freud’s brief accounts of originary fantasy, see “A Case of Paranoia Running Counter to the 
Theory” (SE 14), “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (SE 14), Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (SE 
15/16), From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (SE 17), and “A Child is Beaten [Ein Kind wird 
geschlagen]” (SE 17). For Heidegger’s discussions of Austrag, see Meditation (GA 66, esp. §§16, 80-87), 
The History of Beyng (GA 69, esp. §§27, 51-53, 71, 77, 95), On the Inception (GA 70, esp. §§1, 25, 77), 
The Event (GA 71, esp. §§255-70, 280-4, 289-90), and “Language” (esp. GA 12:25-7/Poetry, Language, 
and Thought 200-205). 
 Although (as 
we shall see) for Freud we can delineate a set of oft-encountered originary fantasies, and that is 
for structural reasons, we are nevertheless not all ontologically shaped by the same historical 
epoch, since we are not all responding to one event of clearing. 
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We saw earlier (chapter 5, part II) that a major turning-point in Freud’s thinking was 
prompted by the discovery that at least some his patients’ “memories” of early childhood 
seductions were not (ontically) true. To deal with this problem without giving up on those 
patients as simple liars, he decided that psychical reality (i.e., fantasy or imagination) could be 
just as important and meaningful psychically as shared reality is. In other words, he recognized a 
field in which truth is taken up by the subject, yet not always consciously. This is not merely a 
matter of private assent to what is publicly available; it is a privately undergone condition of 
access to what is publicly available. I encounter things only through a certain mediation, which is 
what lets the realm of truth and falsity (getting things right) matter, but this mediation is in part 
my idiosyncratic investment in or involvement in things. Most troublingly, it partially consists in 
my personal fantasies, over the most important of which I do not even have control. 
But this opens directly onto our present (ontological) problem: what then enables us 
reliably to distinguish between psychical reality and shared reality? How am I related to what is if 
my perceptions of the world are permanently distorted by fantasy? We have also seen (chapter 6, 
section II.A) that submitting to the reality principle as something that governs me (i.e., making 
the transition from pleasure-ego to reality-ego) presupposes contingent events of seduction, where 
this does not mean abuse but an initiation by a loved (and hated) person into a specifically 
oriented version of the shared world. This raises, once more, the same question: if I can only enter 
the shared world by being seduced (verführt: seduced, enticed, allured, but also misled, ensnared) 
into a particular perspective on that world, am I not always already betrayed, consigned to 
inescapable distortion? How can I have access to anything that is objectively the case (i.e., 
appropriately independent of me)? 
To work out this question more concretely, let us recall the example used in chapter 2: 
hearing a bear growl. One of the important observations made there was that I do not hear a 
representation of a growl, nor a set of sound-waves that I subsequently infer to be a growl, nor a 
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pure noise that I project as a growl. Of course, when we use certain instruments to analyze similar 
sounds, we find sound-waves in particular patterns; we can use other instruments to synthesize 
such patterns; we can listen to the same noise over and over until the context has been sufficiently 
modified that they become meaningless, pure noise. But what I hear, in the context given by the 
example, is from the ground up a bear growl. Even if I am wrong about its source, so long as I am 
integrated into the shared world, I can only be wrong within limits given by the nature of a bear’s 
growl – its source cannot really have been a soprano singing an aria. 
When Heidegger makes this point in the Introduction to Metaphysics, his claim is that 
under most circumstances we hear what the noise is, not only the noise. In fact, “it is hard and 
unusual for us to describe the pure noise, because it is precisely not what we generally hear. 
(Reckoned from the perspective of mere noise,) we always hear more.”1242 This receptivity to the 
being of things is what he calls an understanding of being, the principle feature of standing within 
a clearing.1243
                                                 
1242 GA 40:37/IM 36, trans. mod., his italics. His example is the roar of a motorcycle engine. Cf. GA 10:70-
1/The Principle of Reason 47: “[W]hat the ear perceives and how it perceives [vernimmt] will already be 
attuned and determined by what we hear […]. Of course our hearing organs are in a certain regard 
necessary, but they are never the sufficient condition for our hearing, for that hearing which accords and 
affords us whatever there really is to perceive [zu-Vernehmende].” For further discussion of Vernehmen as 
receptivity, see the Zollikon Seminars, passim. 
 But if we think about what it means to ‘hear more’ in a Freudian sense, we can 
recognize the extent of what might be included in the being of this noise. Not only do I rarely 
hear a pure noise (rather than the noise of something determinate, or a noise that sounds like 
something determinate but is a bit puzzling), I rarely even hear merely the noise of a particular 
thing. The context usually gives me much more than that. I hear my friend telling, asking, 
cautioning, or offering me something, but I do not only hear that – I hear overtones of another 
friend’s words, or of a popular TV show, or of the way my brother would say that same thing. I 
hear echoes of numerous contexts, with various shades of relevance to the current one. My ability 
1243 Heidegger clarifies: “What is meant is that what speaks to us [sich uns zuspricht] only becomes 
perceivable [vernehmbar] through our response [Entsprechen]. Our hearing [Vernehmen] is in itself a 
responding” (GA 10:71/The Principle of Reason 48). 
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to card those out one from another is never complete, and there are times when the overtones 
simply overwhelm the present context. I hear my cousin’s last words in a song lyric and have to 
turn off the music; when my friend offers a bit of useful advice, I respond out of weariness over 
my father’s oft-repeated refrain – that is, I respond to my father rather than responding (strictly 
speaking) to my friend. 
At what level are these simply mistakes? When I hear only what I want, expect, or fear to 
hear from someone, is that in every case not what the person really said? It may sometimes not be 
what he heard himself say – but does he not also hear himself through similar contextual filters? 
What about when I mishear what a close friend literally said because I hear accurately what she 
meant in the situation? We can be mis-attuned precisely because we are always already attuned in 
some concrete way, else we would hear nothing. Our investments in the situation (and in the 
contexts that echo through it) enable any hearing of things, rather than of meaningless noise, in 
the first place. The cost is that sometimes we hear too much, sometimes too little, and rarely just 
the right amount. Indeed, it is unclear what just the right amount would be. 
Freud’s psychoanalytic investigations are on behalf of people who find themselves mis-
attuned (not only in the realm of hearing, of course) with a frequency and to an extent that 
cripples their everyday living. His peculiar brand of listening, then, is an attempt to locate the 
contexts (the “other scenes”) that are dominating the current context and to figure out why those 
echoes are so powerful. Some of the echoing contexts that he comes across reverberate 
throughout most of a person’s experiences; some of them seem to be so wide-reaching and 
thoroughly incorporated that they appear as unnoticed patterns or stages (in the sense of staging a 
performance) for the person’s every relationship. They also show up in dreams and in conscious 
imagination, in unwary uses of words, and in bodily affective responses. 
Freud eventually gives the name fantasy to these psychical patterns of investment, on the 
basis of which the situation is disclosed to the person. The most thoroughgoing formative patterns 
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he calls originary fantasies (Urphantasien). His model for understanding them is daydreaming, in 
which something one wants but does not have is staged imaginatively, enjoyed in a certain way, 
albeit explicitly under the sign of unreality. (Part of the enjoyment is precisely being able to let go 
of pesky details that would make the scene impossible or less enjoyable in reality.) The difficulty 
with fantasy is that it is not always a matter of conscious imagination – as we just saw, one does 
not always have control over the synthesis of different contexts. In fact, Freud discovers that 
some fantasies start out as conscious imaginative productions, but when they tend in an 
unbearable direction, the person can repress them, drive them out of conscious imagination, but 
not necessarily out of their structuring influence on mental life. 
If fantasy is a matter of mental structure or patterns of meaningful investment, then, as 
Laplanche and Pontalis have observed,1244 fantasy “is not [itself] the object of desire, but 
[desire’s] setting. In fantasy the subject does not pursue the object or its sign: he appears caught 
up himself in the sequence of images.” Something plays out, either consciously in imagination or 
unconsciously in his actions, that is not intentional pursuit. “He forms no representation of the 
desired object” – it is not a matter of believing or not believing in it – “but is himself represented 
as participating in the scene.” In other words, he finds himself invested in the world (whether 
shared or only imagined) in very particular ways.1245
                                                 
1244 The following is from p. 17 of Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, “Fantasy and the Origins of 
Sexuality,” IJP 49 (1968): 1-18. The text is a translation of “Fantasme originaire, fantasmes des origins, 
origine du fantasme,” Les Temps Modernes 19.215 (1964). 
 Heidegger’s thinking of freedom as a kind 
of investment in the world as a whole, which first enables our encounters with things (chapter 2), 
can help us here, since that global investment, our relation to beyng, is investment in a particular 
1245 Jonathan Lear gives as example Freud’s Rat Man, who takes a “stroll along a road on which he expects 
his lady friend’s carriage soon to travel. He sees a boulder in the road and clears it out of the way; a bit later 
he turns around, goes back to that spot, and replaces the boulder. How are we to understand this? [… H]e is 
actively holding loved and hated representations of the lady friend apart, while in dynamic relation. […] 




pattern of what is essential and what is inessential, i.e., in a specific clearing. (This is given as 
what matters most about a thing.) 
The sense of fantasy as a setting for desire or the staging of a conflict between desires 
indicates both how closely bound up with the drives fantasy is and the structural role that it plays 
in a person’s life. When one ‘acts out’ in accord with the fantasy, one cannot recognize what one 
is doing. As Jonathan Lear puts it, such acting out puts something on display that the person 
cannot say (to herself or to another) – and that something is part of her psychic structure.1246
To be clear – and to emphasize the proximity to Heidegger – we should emphasize that 
the person is not necessarily caught up in the fantasy as a subject (i.e., as a character in the 
drama). Rather, she permeates the entire fantasy, appearing even “in the very syntax” – for 
instance, a person whose originary fantasy is articulated in the passive voice is constrained to 
occupy passive or onlooking positions in life.
 The 
drama that constitutes originary fantasy thus marks out possible and essential ways of relating, 
beyond which the person cannot see, by providing a sort of stage-setting for life. This does not 
mean that the person straightforwardly reenacts the drama (although sometimes that happens); 
rather, the drama stages a limited set of modes of relation, and it is this staging that also structures 
the person’s relationships. 
1247
                                                 
1246 Ibid., pp. 101-105, 117. 
 Claiming that entry into the shared world takes 
place mediated by originary fantasy is therefore not a description of how someone becomes a 
subject directed to objects so much as an account of what is philosophically prior to subjectivity: 
the emergence of a definite shape of possibilities for the exposed relationality that Heidegger 
names being-there. Since, as we have seen (chapter I, section II.B), it is fantasy together with 
emotion that shapes desire (and thus structures the world for us), we can recognize this definite 
shape of possibilities as part of what Heidegger names ‘disposition’ (Stimmung), or, more 
1247 The quotation is from Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy,” p. 17. For an example, see Freud’s article “A 
Child is Beaten [Ein Kind wird geschlagen]” (SE 17).  
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generally, thrownness. The discussion of originary fantasy could thus be seen as an attempt to 
specify how thrownness bears on projection. 
 We can then understand thrownness more concretely if we say that this claim about 
world-entry is an attempt to account for both the emergence of the drive and the motivation for 
repression. Why do we both want to know (at one level) and not want to know (at another)? Why 
do we both remember and forget the same content, just in different contexts? As we have seen 
(chapter 6, section II.A.3), repression is a strategy for (in one sense) removing intensely upsetting 
wishes by refusing to think the particular thoughts in which those wishes get invested. But why 
do we have wishes that are more than we can bear? Why would even conscious fantasies ever 
tend toward the horrifying or the unbearable? Would I not simply wish instead for something 
else? Ordinary repression, as we have also seen (chapter 5, section I.D.2), seems to presuppose 
some conflict in me that was temporarily dealt with by a more originary (primal) repression. 
As with all conflicts, Freud locates the emergence of this internal struggle in a problem of 
love. We have seen (chapter 6, section I.C) that the parents’ (necessarily sexualized) love for the 
child invites the child into a shared world enigmatically infused with or even structured by that 
love, a realm that the child is neither biologically nor experientially prepared to understand. The 
child is excited, and it wants to participate in this love – to belong to that world – but it cannot do 
so fully right away (if ever). In fact, according to Freud, its desire to participate (by, say, loving 
the parents in return) runs into what is not simply lack of understanding but positive 
misunderstanding, an ‘understanding’ that horrifies it (we shall see why shortly). Further, we saw 
that emergence into selfhood requires primal repression (chapter 5, section II.A.4), the painful 
giving up of full, immediate union with the object (a union which was never real but emerges in 
fantasy for the child as an explanation of the sense of loss or incompleteness). Hence the child 
both deeply wants to know about this adult realm of sexuality and emphatically does not want to 
know any more about it, since the costs of entry seem so high. 
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The difficulty here is structural: there is only one way into the shared world (through trust 
of parental figures that is broadened into trust of the world); the child must be invited in; but this 
invitation can only appear as a seduction. As Freud comments, after pointing out the mother’s 
(unintentional) role in inaugurating the child’s sexual drives, 
if the mother understood more of the high importance of the part played by drives in mental life as 
a whole – in all its ethical and psychical achievements – she would spare herself any self-
reproaches even after [she realized what she had done]. She is only fulfilling her task in teaching 
the child to love.1248
 
 
Originary fantasy, then, arises as a two-fold attempt: to answer questions about sexual 
life (which is always concerned with origins) and to replace the lost object that is given up along 
with the psychical emergence of the self (in primal repression). It is originary, according to 
Freud, both because it is a first attempt to understand one’s trusting relation to one’s parents as a 
consistent background for other satisfactions and because it was never simply conscious; it is 
fantasy because it fills in a consistency that may or may not be there (in the parents’ real care for 
the child), marking a qualified withdrawal from and substitution for the confusion of reality. As 
we saw (chapter 6, section II.A), sexuality emerges auto-erotically, but in response to the 
solicitations of the worldly situation (including the parents). The questions that need answering – 
what Freud calls “childhood sexual researches” – are thus universal, and even the answers that 
shape the fantasy are very common, although the fantasy itself is and must be individually 
inflected. 
These questions regard the origin of the individual (where do babies come from?), the 
origin of sexual desire (what are adults doing with each other and what do they want of me?), and 
the origin of sexual difference (is castration possible?). We could follow Laplanche and Pontalis 
in saying that “[w]hatever appears to the subject as something needing an explanation or theory, 
                                                 
1248 Freud, Three Essays on Sexuality, SE 7:223. 
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is dramatized as a moment of emergence, the beginning of a history.”1249
[C]hildren refuse to believe the stork theory [about where babies come from;] from the time of this 
first deception [Täuschung] and rebuff they nourish a distrust [Mißtrauen] of adults and have a 
suspicion of there being something forbidden which is being withheld from them by the ‘grown-
ups’ […]. With this, however, the child also experiences the first occasion for a ‘psychical 
conflict’, in that views for which he feels an instinctual kind of preference, but which are not 
‘right’ in the eyes of the grown-ups, come into opposition with other views, which are supported 
by the authority of the grown-ups without being acceptable to him himself.
 I would point out that 
we can read these as implicating basic philosophical questions: physico-temporal beginning, 
unity, and differentiation are philosophically at stake in these early researches. Significantly for 
the present inquiry, Freud points to these researches as a first cultivation of mistrust, the first 




We should note that this first emergence of psychical conflict – meaning a conflict that is thought 
about or minimally reflected on, not only directly lived – is more deeply a conflict of trust and 
mistrust. Am I betrayed? the child is asking, and, if so, to what extent? This would be an 
emblematic moment in the transfer of trust in one’s parents to trust in the stability of the world 
shared with them.1251
Each of these questions about origins gives rise to a misunderstanding, according to 
Freud, a childhood theory that is partially correct but hindered by inadequate information about 
sexual difference. Freud’s experience with children suggests the following, although these need 
 If my trust in my parents turns out to be upheld by primitive trust, then it 
can survive this first conflict; in the relatively rare case that it is not so supported, there is a 
psychical experience of abandonment and shattering. 
                                                 
1249 Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy,” p. 11. 
1250 Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” SE 9:213-14. Note that this conflict cannot simply be 
circumvented by the parents’ resolve to use literal language in explaining human sexuality; the child is not 
yet capable of understanding (and so even the simple truth will be unacceptable), but developmentally she 
must try to understand, and this inevitably bears the weight of her trust in her parents’ word. 
1251 More speculatively: perhaps it is this moment that is rendered especially problematic by sexual abuse, 
in which not only the adults turn out to be in some way untrustworthy, but the world does not provide a 
stable reality separate from that. Recall Wilma Bovink’s claim that it is “the threat and the betrayal that 
come with [abuse that] feed psychosis. The betrayal of the family that says, ‘you must have asked for it,’ 
instead of standing up for you. That […] forces the child to accept the reality of the adults” – or, we could 
say, reality itself is presented as a betrayal, not only particular people within it as betrayers (Bovink, “From 
Being a Disorder,” p. 18). 
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not be taken as exhaustive or normative: a cloacal theory of birth (babies emerge in the same way 
faeces does, so anyone can have a baby) due to ignorance of the vagina; a sadistic theory of 
sexual desire (sex is a violent attack) due to ignorance of genital maturity; and a ‘universal 
phallus’ theory (sexual difference emerges through castration – i.e., gender relations are a zero-
sum game) due to ignorance of genital differences.1252
Such childhood ‘theories’ arise upon the stage of originary fantasies, giving the latter 
concrete content. That is to say, these misunderstandings of very basic phenomena come to 
structure the child’s world, although which one is centrally formative for each person depends on 
the child’s contingent circumstances and investments. A concrete fantasy of being sexually 
seduced can arise from the answer I come to about individual origins (if my parents can have a 
baby, there is no reason why I cannot have one with them; this also dramatizes the child’s 
entrance into the enigmatic sexual sphere). A concrete fantasy of witnessing parental intercourse 
can arise from the answer I reach about sexual desire (which remains attractive, even if it is at the 
same time horrifying). And a concrete fantasy of being threatened with castration can arise from 
the answer concerning sexual difference (i.e., the castration complex, which may be quite 
obviously a matter of power, or only more immediately of physical integrity). Note that these 
three fantasies subsequently come to be elements of the universal Oedipus complex: wanting to 
have a baby with one parent, the child is both horrified and excited by the implicit sense that this 
would involve carrying out its sadistic sexual impulses, but this course of action is interdicted by 
that parent’s non-exclusive desire (i.e., the adult also desires objects other than the child). Such an 
interdiction threatens the child’s power and (in its seeming arbitrariness) the child’s physical 
integrity. The individual’s eventual solution to the Oedipal problem will thus be closely bound up 
with the way the problem is shaped for him by whichever fantasy is most formative. 
 
                                                 
1252 See Freud, Three Essays, SE 7:194-7, and “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” SE 9:215-23. Notice 
that all of these are at some level a question of sexual difference. 
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Freud consistently implies that there are other originary fantasies than these three, but he 
also consistently refers to these three so as to establish that it is not only the fact of being shaped 
by fantasy that is common to us as human beings but also the very possibilities for that fantasy’s 
content. As Laplanche and Pontalis explain, there are typical fantasies “because the historical life 
of the subject is not the prime mover, but rather something antecedent, which is capable of 
operating as an organizer.”1253 Freud takes this antecedent something to be phylogenesis, but we 
may think of it as the shared human condition. Just as every child has to negotiate the divided 
desire of the primary caretaker – i.e., pass through the Oedipus complex – so everyone has to sort 
out problems of origins, especially with regard to sexuality (which, as we saw in chapter 6, is 
structurally deceptive in this regard). Hence originary fantasy is “a structure, but activated by 
contingent elements”1254 – that is, an ontological frame initiated by an event. As Freud puts it, 
these occurrences (Begebenheiten) – these originary scenes that are incorporated fantastically, 
regardless of the degree of historical reality on which they are based – are necessary elements of 
neurosis.1255 Or, as I would rather say, are required by any possible response to the emergence of 
sexuality.1256
 Earlier (chapter 6, section I.C), I interpreted the emergence of the sexual drives for Freud 
as the stripping off of a desire for the activity itself (e.g., drinking) from a given desire for the 
result of a movement (e.g., satiation of thirst). That peeling away is a matter of the drive’s aim 
 
                                                 
1253 Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy,” p. 9. 
1254 Ibid., p. 10. 
1255 Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE 16:370. 
1256 Freud’s most explicit problem of truth shows up here, but it remains at the ontic level, rather than 
asking after the essence of truth. Namely, he agonizes over whether or not the childhood scenes, whose 
traces show up in psychoanalysis, really happened or not. He poses the problem in temporal terms – is 
fantasy only retrospective fantasy (Zurückphantasieren)? – and it forms the crux of his argument with Jung. 
(See especially the Wolf-Man case history, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis, SE 17.) I would 
prefer to say that understanding of reality is projective, processed fantastically, and so the question of what 
really happened to the infant is psychologically (and legally) important but not philosophically crucial. 
There is a continuum between an event that has been “produced from intimations [Andeutung can also 
mean ‘overtone’] and supplemented [or organized] by fantasy” and one that has “occurred in reality” and 
been interpreted by fantasy (Introductory Lectures, SE 16:370). Cf. Freud’s own admission of such a 
continuum, SE 16:364. 
512 
 
being distorted by the enigmatic influence of the parents’ loving provision for the child, a love 
that is sexually inflected and split by unconscious desires and demands (related to the parents’ 
own fantasies). Since, as we have just seen in more detail, this enigmatic influence is both 
seductive and overwhelming, the child initially withdraws into its own bodily surfaces, seeking 
pleasure by stimulation regardless of who provides it (i.e., regardless of the ‘object’). Laplanche 
and Pontalis interpret this as follows: 
The ‘origin’ of auto-erotism would therefore be the moment when sexuality, disengaged from any 
natural object, moves into the field of fantasy and by that very fact becomes sexuality. The 
moment is more abstract than definable in time, since it is always renewed, and must have been 
preceded by erotic excitation [prompted by the parent], otherwise it would be impossible for such 
excitation to be sought out. But one could equally state the inverse proposition, that it is the 
breaking-in of fantasy which occasions the disjunction of sexuality and need. [… H]owever far 
back one may go[,] they originate from the same point.1257
 
 
Here we see why I have been alluding to sexual drive and fantasy as belonging to one 
another. Fantasy both opens up and responds to (by sustaining) auto-erotic desire. In their co-
origination, we could say in a Heideggerian register that they are appropriated to one another as 
well as set apart from one another (dispropriated). The role the parent plays here is crucial, for I 
have argued (chapter 6, part I) that even auto-erotic drives are shaped in part as responses to the 
caretaker’s desire, where (we now see) that desire is interpreted questioningly, inadequately, and 
fantastically by the child. 
Freud generally characterizes fantasy as freedom from (the weight and tyranny of) reality, 
but originary fantasy seems to be originary in that it is also freedom for (a structured) reality. In 
struggling to articulate just how foundational it is, Freud appeals to both his Kantian and 
neurobiological backgrounds. These appeals emerge at the very end of the Wolf-Man case 
history, where he raises them as problems for further research. 
First, in a Kantian mode, he characterizes originary fantasies as schematized complexes 
(here including the Oedipal), “which, like the categories of philosophy, are concerned with 
                                                 
1257 Laplanche and Pontalis, “Fantasy,” p. 16. 
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subsuming [Unterbringung] the impressions derived from actual experience.”1258
Second, since there is an astonishingly complicated response (even if it is necessarily a 
misunderstanding) in very small children, Freud appeals to something like animal instinct 
(Instinkt, for once, not Trieb) in the child. He calls it a kind of knowing that is “something like a 
preparation for understanding,” or, we could say, an originary understanding, an understanding of 
being that enables understanding of particular entities.
 He specifies 
that if an experience does not fit with the schema, it is worked over in fantasy, then continues: “It 
is precisely such cases that are calculated to convince us of the independent existence of the 
schema. We are often able to see the schema triumphing over the [objective] experience of the 
individual.” Freud adds that childhood conflicts arise precisely as conflicts between the schema 
and individual experience, which I take to mean (in keeping with the foregoing analysis) a 
conflict of desires staged according to the schema – i.e., a complex – that runs into problems (i.e., 
into its own limits) trying to integrate individual experience. 
1259
We can say, then, that originary fantasy is that which most basically structures our 
interactions with others and shapes the space in which the drives play out their fates. It organizes 
the world by delimiting a set of possible relational positions, which we should understand as ways 
of belonging. What happens when none of these positions is accepted (or acceptable)? Perhaps 
this is another way of describing the sense of betrayal in psychosis. 
 Freud further designates this originary 
understanding, conflicted as it is, as “the nucleus of the unconscious [… that] would retain the 
power of drawing down to it the higher mental processes” in repression. 
If so, it is significant for my broader argument that the unitary origin of a drive 
(sexuality) and of the staging of that drive (fantasy) comes close to the way Heidegger speaks of 
the event of appropriation (das Ereignis) as the clearing that produces an open region, a 
                                                 
1258 This paragraph and the next from Wolf-Man, SE 17:119. 




structured world in which what is can appear. It is the origin of the mutual belonging of world to 
things and things to world. At a certain point, and among many other names, Heidegger calls this 
event Austrag,1260 which literally means to carry out or bear out (aus-tragen) but also means to 
stage, as when one holds or stages a competition. The latter sense is most clearly in play when 
Heidegger specifies that “‘what’ is staged are ‘encounter’ and ‘strife’,” i.e., encounter between 
gods and mortals, strife between earth and world.1261
To see the range of this word in Heidegger’s usage, let us look briefly at some important 
passages in which he employs it. He explains that Aus-tragen “says both to keep in custody until 
the ripeness of essential decision and to render the decision with regard to essence [….] Aus-
tragen as preserving and deciding thereby has, as its essential character, the grounding of the 
abyss that clears.”
 These are articulations of the opening up of 
world, the happening of originary truth. 
1262
Although Austrag can also mean ‘settlement’ and ‘discharge’ or ‘disposal’, Heidegger 
explicitly distinguishes his usage from these meanings, clarifying that it means instead “opening, 
clearing the clearing – event as staging [Austrag] – staging [is] essentially the abyss.”
 This is not far from what we have just seen in terms of originary fantasy, 
which, for Freud, both sustains (i.e., preserves) sexual desire and initially opens it up (i.e., decides 
a field or direction for it). 
1263 He 
adds that “beyng is the abyss […, i.e.], is the staging that clears.”1264
                                                 
1260 “Event is Austrag” (GA 66:307). Cf. “Clearing is: clearing ‘of’ the Austrag. Truth is clearing ‘of’ the 
Austrag, i.e., of the event” (GA 66:314). 
 As we saw much earlier 
(chapter 2, section I.B), beyng ‘is’ an abyss because it lacks an independent criterion, a 
foundation to which it could appeal to guarantee or measure its correctness. Instead, what is in 
1261 GA 66:307. 
1262 GA 66:307. 
1263 GA 66:84. Cf. GA 66:108: “The clearing is never what is empty, but rather the most originary 
pervasive essencing of the event as the staging of encounter and strife – the abyssal between.” 




question here is the very giving of such a measure. But our concern about access to things as 
mediated by the structure of originary fantasy is precisely this abyssal quality: we want a measure 
for that which grants measure in the first place. Correctness cannot be the criterion for the most 
originary truth. 
Finally, we should not take the giving of a measure to happen once for all of history, even 
when Heidegger speaks of it as inception or beginning (Anfang), since it is a staging or patterning 
that includes the sense of carrying-out: “[h]istory is the staging of the essence of the truth of 
being. Therefore, history is the essencing of being itself.”1265
Taken together, these passages indicate that whatever names Heidegger uses for the most 
originary phenomenon of integration of the human with being (event, clearing, beyng, essencing 
of being, history of beyng, inception) in his private writings, at some point he equates them with 
Austrag (as staging or carrying-out). Indeed, the whole complex historical (Geschichtlich) 
phenomenon that we explored in chapter 3, including both essential desolation and saving as 
essential preservation, is here characterized as a changing stage upon which what is real can show 
 One way to understand this would 
be that, on Heidegger’s account, there is one emergence of being itself into human concern (the 
event in which we are appropriated metaphysically, which we encounter as ancient, marking the 
entrance into history), but this is repeated with each philosophical, artistic, or political 
engagement. Hence, every such repetition includes the possibility of taking up the event properly 
– of explicitly belonging to it and thinking it more appropriately – which would constitute what 
he calls the other beginning. Every repetition also includes the possibility of metaphysically 
reifying the event, taking the world to be given once for all, out there over against us, and 
therefore perhaps impossible for us to reach. 
                                                 
1265 GA 70:180. Cf. GA 70:12: “The inception is staging.” 
516 
 
up: “The devastating, the abandoning of being, and the preserving of beyng in itself [that takes 
place] as the concealed Austrag [– this] is the history of beyng (essencing of its truth).”1266
  
 
These brief, suggestive considerations of Freudian originary fantasy (Urphantasie) and 
the Heideggerian event (Ereignis) indicate that both are trying to articulate our originary 
belonging to the world, the fundamental disclosure (or truth) that allows things to show up as 
mattering to us in an organized, potentially intelligible way. They do so in different registers, but 
we can see important parallels, especially if our thinking is guided by the phenomena of trust and 
betrayal. Originary fantasy shows up obliquely as a consistent betrayal or interruption of self-
possessed speech in the context of psychoanalytic therapy, while the event is thought 
phenomenologically, in response to the world’s self-reduction, when we grow existentially 
distressed about whether being has betrayed our assumptions. We might articulate the relation by 
saying that Freud has found a way to locate, within the life of being-there, the same ontological 
structure that Heidegger understands by originary truth. 
Though I have not defended it sufficiently here, if this turns out to be right, it would have 
two important ramifications for my broader project. First, if the happening of originary truth takes 
place as a formative element within the experience of the singular human being, then being-there 
is not coterminous with the human being, and we have a concrete way to understand what it 
would mean for the event to fail to happen (namely, psychosis), without losing the constitutive 
mystery of appropriation. This way of thinking the event would move in the direction of Richard 
Polt’s suggestion that we attend to the numerous re-interpretive events that mark the joints in a 
singular life. Some of these are more momentous than others, more formative of our very being-
there.1267
                                                 
1266 GA 69:45. 
 Without going that far in rethinking the event for Heidegger, I do suggest that we 
understand it as taking place (or failing to take place) at the level of the singular person and from 
1267 See Polt, The Emergency of Being, pp. 222, 248ff. 
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out of her relating. Heidegger seems to be thinking something like this in 1949, when he writes of 
his own thinking in Being and Time, “[t]hat and how being itself strikes a [particular] thinking [is 
what] brings this thinking to the leap by which it springs forth from being itself so as thereby to 
respond to being as such.”1268
Second, if the very configuration of my belonging to being emerges from my singular 
activity, albeit only in rare moments and not in a way I can control, then it will be possible to 
recognize the necessity of particular others to the very structure of my world. This is because my 
world, understood as my opening onto the shared world, arises only through an initiation by those 
with whom I belong. Such an initiation is necessarily marked by the peculiar shape of their access 
to the shared world, a shape that remains with me concretely in language, habits, subsequent 
fantasies, and neuroses. Not only that, but my very belonging to being, which usually survives 
transformations of those concrete peculiarities, nevertheless remains marked by its origin in trust 
of singular persons: it retains the phenomenal structure of personal trust, vulnerable to (but not 
oriented to) radical betrayal by the world. Should my world radically collapse, what hope there is 
for me to return to common sense will then lie in the complex, threatening possibility of 
rebuilding trust with a particular person, a representative of the shared world who may be able to 
seduce me into globally trusting for the first time. Of the constancy of this possibility there can be 
no guarantee. 
 He then adds a marginal note indicating that this response, elicited 
in a person’s thinking from the side of being itself rather than being, would be an event. If we 
follow this line of thought, we could then  seek to understand the event by thinking from the 
experience of belonging to being, a belonging that at the individual level (I have argued) can be 
thoroughly shattered. 
Heidegger understood this event of appropriation – the unifying (that is also a 
distinguishing) of being and thinking – to be his central thought, the single insight that marked 
                                                 
1268 Heidegger, “Introduction to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” GA 9:368/Pathmarks 279, trans. mod. 
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out his course as a thinker, but he also found it an agonizingly difficult (non-)phenomenon to 
think.1269 This is part of why we get very different accounts of it at different points in his life, 
from a sheerly contingent irruption to something like an a priori condition.1270
                                                 
1269 Boss provides this interpretation in “Martin Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars,” tr. B. Kenny, Review of 
Existential Psychiatry and Psychology 16 (1978-79), pp. 13-20. Quoted in Richardson, “Heidegger Among 
the Doctors,” p. 57. It is worth noting that Boss here understands (or perhaps misunderstands) the event to 
mean that being and the human essence belong together “in an indivisible identity.” See my discussion of 
danger in chapter 3, part III. 
 My proposal for 
further research, then, is this: far from Freudian psychoanalysis having nothing to say to 
Heidegger’s genuinely philosophical engagement with the world, perhaps the thinking of 
originary fantasy can aid us in making sense out of Heidegger’s most central thought. 




“Only in a context constituted by trust […] 
do truth and the making of statements have a place.”1271
 
 
 Let me bring this investigation to a close by briefly recapitulating its course. I shall paint 
in broad strokes, paying special attention to what we have gained and to the places where further 
research is needed. 
 Our task has been to articulate the shape of human receptivity, which is to say the 
determining characteristics of phenomenality as such. In what way is there anything at all for us, 
and not rather nothing? The ‘for us’ qualification here indicates both that things show up as 
minimally organized and variably important – i.e., in their being – and that our own investments 
are integrally involved in this showing up. It also raises the problem of who ‘we’ are and might 
be, especially as it involves constraints on our possibilities of disclosure. 
 To catch sight of this invested receptivity, which we have tried to understand as trust, we 
began by attending to three different levels of betrayal that emerge in experience (chapter 1). 
These levels or modes of betrayal – which I called disappointment, disorientation, and betrayal 
proper – are disclosed both affectively and cognitively. But they differ qualitatively from one 
another, depending on the intrinsic complexity involved in discovering oneself to be betrayed. 
Experiencing such a betrayal (finding myself betrayed) exhibits the specific way in which I was 
previously invested in whatever has betrayed me. This is not to say that we never recognize trust 
until it is gone, but it is a way of acknowledging that trust mostly operates in the background, as 
the condition for the appearance of other things. 
 Most importantly, this part of the investigation showed that the betrayal belonging to 
personal trust differs essentially from that pertaining to background assumptions. We found that 
interpersonal trust (or trusting proper) is vulnerable to a radical betrayal, one that can destroy the 
relationship and disclose even what had before appeared as evidence of faithfulness instead as 
                                                 
1271 Lars Hertzberg, “On the Attitude of Trust,” in The Limits of Experience, p. 115. 
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evidence of a more elaborate betrayal. Within this kind of trust, which we understood as the 
givenness of a certain kind of interpersonal relation, betrayal cannot simply be anticipated 
beforehand, nor can it necessarily be recovered from, although sometimes such trust turns out to 
admit of rebuilding. 
 By contrast, we saw that the betrayal of assumptive trust (including fundamental 
background assumptions) is undergone as disorientation, a sense of being suspended over an 
abyss. Yet, crucially, one does remain suspended – that is, one can still find a place to stand, a 
space from which to reorient oneself. Somehow, it is always possible to flee back into one’s 
previous assumptions, to convert to a new set of assumptions, or to step back and grasp a larger 
picture (a broader set of assumptions) within which one’s experience of assuming-and-
disorientation now makes sense. Its making sense then allows further such disorientation to be in 
one way predictable, and so enables a certain comfortable (or cynical) familiarity even with 
betrayal. 
 Although this initial foray in our investigation mostly dealt with the characteristics of our 
self-investments as static, the phenomenological mode of approach opened the door to further 
research concerning the genesis of those self-investments, particularly the mutual influence of the 
various levels on one another. Some of this was taken up later, in the discussion of the roots of 
madness, but much of it remains to be worked out. 
 I then proposed that what grants a place in which to reorient even one’s fundamental 
background assumptions is precisely a further, more primitive level of trust. This kind of trust 
(not a thing possessed but a way of being invested) is the abyss, as it were – at least, as we saw in 
part I of chapter 2, it cannot itself be grounded in any external criterion, since it is what first lets 
things be criteria for the correctness or incorrectness of our assumptions. It is our primary 
investment in the world as a minimally coherent, more or less stable place. It is also what 
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Heidegger names originary truth, or the essence of truth, or our belonging to the givenness of 
particular arrangements of being (i.e., belonging to beyng). 
 With this move, the further course of the investigation was set: we wished to determine, 
first, whether Heidegger is inclined to understand our relation to beyng (i.e., primitive trust) more 
as a matter of trusting proper (vulnerable to radical betrayal) or more as a kind of background 
assumption (vulnerable to disorientation, from which recovery is always possible); second, 
whether Heidegger’s interpretation is appropriate to the matter itself, i.e., which kind of trust our 
basic receptivity more resembles. Is primitive trust, as our most originary openness to an 
organized, shared world, more like assuming the unity of a phenomenological structure, or more 
like trusting a person? My thesis was that Heidegger’s account leans strongly toward interpreting 
this relation as one of background assuming, but that consideration of the extent of that relation’s 
experienced vulnerability should lead us to interpret it as more like personal trusting. In other 
words, I claimed that primitive trust is the abyss in a second sense, as well: if this trust is 
betrayed, one does not hang suspended over an abyss, with various possibilities of recovery; 
rather, something that is no longer coherently oneself plunges endlessly downward, grasping in 
terror at the oppressive remnants of the shared world. Recovery here – understood as rejoining the 
shared world – may turn out to be possible, if the trust is somehow rebuilt, but even the 
possibility of such recovery is never guaranteed. 
 To show, first, that Heidegger implicitly understands originary truth (or: our relation to 
beyng) as a kind of background assuming, the rest of chapter 2 involved a detailed treatment of 
his way of thinking the essence of truth. Here we focused on freedom as an involved openness for 
what is and for being. That is, Heideggerian freedom (as the essence of truth) appeared as the 
self-investment we previously called ‘primitive trust.’ By attending to originary truth as a 
complex phenomenon (as the ‘clearing for self-concealing,’ or the truth whose essence is un-
truth), our reading showed that Heidegger’s path of thinking here centrally turns around an 
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experience of betrayal: everyday unconcealment runs up against the resistance of concealment, 
which calls for thought, but then thoughtful unconcealment also encounters concealment, and at 
multiple levels. In this way, “betrayal” (as disorientation) comes to be understood by Heidegger 
as constitutive of the truth-phenomenon itself. But this meant that we recognized in Heidegger’s 
accounts of truth after Being and Time precisely an activity of reorientation, or an adjustment of 
background assumptions by grasping a larger picture. His work accomplishes this reorientation 
by locating the experience of assumption-and-disorientation within the unity of a complex 
phenomenon: namely, phenomenality itself, beyng’s self-givenness as a clearing for self-
concealment. 
In chapters 3 and 4, we then put into question Heidegger’s move to integrate betrayal into 
the very structure of phenomenality. This involved a first pass at addressing the question of trust 
as it arises explicitly within Heidegger’s corpus. By attending to Heidegger’s critique of Western 
metaphysics as shaped (ever more thoroughly) by a subject-centered trust in reason as the 
guarantor of truth, we were able to articulate his concerns about prior philosophy with some 
precision. Philosophical trust in the once-for-all givenness of being (as the a priori for beings, 
what is constantly present), according to Heidegger, really functions as self-assurance. That is 
why, he thinks, the essence of truth on the metaphysical picture must eventually be encountered 
expressly as self-certainty (as in the modern period from Descartes to Hegel), all the while 
remaining vulnerable to disorientation (in, for example, Nietzsche’s writings). 
We then characterized Heidegger’s own reinterpretation of the relation between beyng 
and thinking as an attempt to reorient our trusting self-investment toward the very phenomenon of 
originary truth articulated in chapter 2. This we took to be his philosophical response to Nietzsche 
and to the history of “metaphysics.” We saw that Heidegger understands our belonging to beyng 
within the framework of beyng’s intrinsic hiddenness, a hiddenness that is not simply absence but 
an essential withdrawal in favor of the disclosure of things. In this way, even our own 
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metaphysical assumption-and-disorientation is seen as constitutive of our relation to beyng, rather 
than as threatening a radical break from it. While Heidegger’s thinking of our being in the truth is 
indeed a move away from metaphysics – from the straightforward opposition between presence 
and absence – I claimed that it cannot twist free from some version of the self-assurance that he 
himself has criticized. 
Such a claim is not an obviously faithful interpretation of Heidegger’s work, but it is, 
upon reflection, a fair one, as we established (chapter 3, part III) through an extensive 
consideration of two conflicting strands of his thought. He consistently tries to do philosophy as 
hermeneutic phenomenology, but his hermeneutic claims about our situation in history (including 
the more or less apocalyptic essential danger of that situation) are just as consistently undermined 
by his phenomenological commitments to the unity of beyng and thinking, danger and saving. 
This means that the concerns that Heidegger does raise at various points about a radical break 
with being – a betrayal proper, the kind that one otherwise experiences only interpersonally – are 
in each case softened into promises that reorientation always remains a possibility. His ongoing 
concern about the lack of urgency in our thinking is compromised by his own way of thinking the 
possibility of salvation (in which, for example, this lack of urgency itself constitutes the 
situation’s urgency, and not in any merely incidental way). 
Since Heidegger ultimately understands our relation to beyng to take place as an event of 
appropriation (Ereignis), in which we emerge into the originary truth (a determinate clearing), we 
attended to various interpretations of this phenomenon, some more phenomenological, some 
more apocalyptic. We also returned to the discussion later, quite briefly, with regard to the 
individual or collective nature of such events (chapter 7, part III). But this difficult thought 
certainly calls for further research, especially to understand in what way the expropriation 
(Enteignis) that Heidegger finds integral to the event of appropriation (Ereignis) can have a 
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meaning on the individual level. (Does it, for example, simply identify a constitutive human 
situation: that we must always renew the effort to twist free of metaphysical thinking?) 
The first major part of the investigation, then, culminated in an immanent critique of 
Heidegger’s apparent attempts to think originary truth as something like assumptive trust. But we 
also attended, in chapter 4, to places in Heidegger’s texts that – as others have already indicated – 
point toward a surprisingly specific way to think a radical break with being: namely, as madness. 
This is not how Heidegger himself understands madness. But in his interpretations of death and 
anxiety, and to some extent even in his account of originary truth, we found reasons to think that 
his attention to the matter itself pushes him beyond his own thinking of it. We took this as a call 
to turn more carefully, in the second major part of the investigation, to the question of how secure 
our individual relation to beyng – my existential standing in the truth (and in the untruth, as 
Heidegger always understands it) – genuinely is. 
We were guided in this turn to the things themselves by a concern to understand, to 
whatever degree possible, what takes place (or fails to take place) in madness: whether it involves 
a kind of death that would be neither owning up to/fleeing from my own finitude (‘dying,’ as 
Heidegger understands it) nor physical cessation (‘demise’), and in what way anxiety (a mood 
that for Heidegger discloses our investments in the world as such) might be involved. Above all, 
we asked whether Heidegger’s interpretation of being-in-the-world as the human essence – his 
interpretation of freedom as exposure both to being and to what-is in its being – necessarily 
describes human beings, or if there are recognizably human situations in which we are radically 
cut off from our essence. In other words, having understood that for Heidegger being-away 
remains a privation or inauthentic mode of being-there, one that still consists of being-in-the-
world as he articulated it in Being and Time’s existential analytic, we wished to discover whether 




We thus proceeded dialectically through various attempts to understand psychosis 
(psychiatric, phenomenological, psychoanalytic, and philosophical), confronting these theories 
with various puzzles presented by case studies and by the testimony of sufferers. Our goal 
throughout was to articulate faithfully whatever intelligibility might be available, without 
arbitrarily reducing the strangeness of the phenomena. We discovered that medical models can 
provide a common language for initially organizing the bewildering array of data involved in 
dealing clinically with psychotics, but that a philosophical understanding requires more insight 
into the structure of the disturbance than psychiatric medicine can provide. We found that 
phenomenological psychiatry can take us quite a bit further toward such a structural account, and 
can do so without losing sight of the meaning of the individual human experience – the collapse 
of a particular world – that psychosis is. Nevertheless, we found these phenomenological 
accounts excessively static; apart from pointing us toward the prodromal phase, they proved 
inadequate to address the genesis of psychotic phenomena in an interpretive way. The question of 
why a particular person’s world collapses and gets more or less rebuilt in a particular form 
remained unanswered. Had we left the matter there, our investigation could only have concluded 
that being dramatically overwhelmed is one possibility of our being-there, a risk of our exposure; 
but whether this risk is universal or limited to those predisposed by faulty genes, we could not 
have said. That is, no conclusion with regard to the human relation to beyng could have been 
drawn. 
Although we had already been following Freudian insights, here we found ourselves 
abandoned wholly to the resources of Freudian psychoanalysis, which attempts to heal through 
interpretation of the individual’s personal conflicts as they emerge in speech (broadly construed), 
and to understand the universal structures involved in psychic disease and health through a study 
of these conflicts. On this basis, we were able to articulate psychosis as a multi-step (i.e., 
inherently temporal) betrayal of primitive trust. We saw that although even endogenous psychosis 
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may sometimes arise simply due to overwhelming situations (in what is medically called brief 
reactive psychosis), long-term psychosis typically requires a certain kind of prior resolution to 
childhood conflict. The individual has refused (or could not bring herself) fully to trust the 
linguistically mediated world; what analysts call primal repression has failed to take place. This 
produces a weak point in the system of language, which system is henceforth used more in the 
manner of a game than dwelt in as natural habitat, since it is allowed to structure the world only at 
the cost of (unconsciously) avoiding or excessively shoring up the weak point. In other words, 
although I may never know whether or not I am predisposed to madness, if I am, then there is 
some mode of relation (or some account of myself) that the world might demand of me that 
would radically undo my tentative investment in that world. I am not really all-in, to use an 
appropriate gambling metaphor, so the truth and falsity of things within the world does not matter 
to me in the same way as it does to others. 
Should that mode of relation or verbal account of myself be required at some point, in a 
way that I cannot evade, we saw that I defensively flee (regress) toward the point of the last 
secure psychic achievement. This constitutes the psychotic break, which does not appear to 
anyone else – nor, in a strict sense, to me – in the moment of its taking place, but only in the 
symptoms produced as desperate attempts to rebuild a place in a (now rigidly) coherent world. 
That reconstructed world, which is not shared and which cannot grant me stability of self through 
the appropriate relation to language (i.e., meaning) or to truth and falsity, nevertheless permits a 
kind of going-on in (severely restricted) life, always under the threat of its imminent collapse. 
This allows something like a negotiated stability, the non-acute duration of long-term psychosis, 
in which levels of trust that are not primitive can still take place to a certain, constantly 
threatened, extent. It is within that space of the patient’s conflicted attempt at recovery that 
treatment is often possible, if tremendously difficult. 
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I proposed this sketch of the structure of endogenous psychosis as an interpretation of the 
meaningful essential unity of the experience, despite variations in types (paranoia, schizophrenia, 
mood disorder, and so forth), although I am not yet fully committed to this. Further work remains 
to be done on the temporal structure involved here, particularly as it involves a complex failure of 
primitive trust. At any rate, we saw that this account gave us more insight into the disturbance 
than several other possibilities (medical, purely phenomenological, or purely philosophical). 
But we also saw that it caused problems for Freudian psychoanalysis, and at essential 
points. Freud himself seems to have been wrong in thinking that analysis could do nothing for 
psychotic patients, but he was far from stupid to think so. For this reason, in the balance of this 
second major part of the investigation (chapter 5, part II, and chapter 6), we turned more directly 
to Freud’s texts to take up the task of re-orienting his work toward psychosis. First, we 
recognized that the difficulties of producing, identifying, managing, and interpreting transference 
with psychotic patients put on display both the centrality of trust – in a strange configuration – for 
the functioning of the analytic relation generally, and the extreme vulnerability involved for both 
parties, but especially for the patient. We located what possibility of cure there may be for cases 
of psychosis in the rebuilding of the patient’s primitive trust through a certain transference: from 
interpersonal trust in the therapist to primitive trust in the world. Second, we found that Freud’s 
own trusts play a crucial role in philosophically linking his practice to his metapsychological 
theorizing, since those trusts in part justify his inference to the dynamic unconscious. Third, we 
saw that Freudian drive theory does not have to interpret either the infant or the (neurotic) adult 
as closed off from the world, sealed within a Cartesian container, since the drives are initially 
formed in part as responses to the shared world. 
This account of drive, finally, enabled us to take up once more the question of the genesis 
of psychosis in the individual. For although it is clear simply from the experience of introducing 
small children to the world that things come to matter to us originally through our dependence on 
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parental figures, nevertheless the ways in which this emergence into freedom can radically fail 
become intelligible only through the recognition of certain structurally necessary drive-conflicts. 
In other words, as children, we first come to understand what it means to have coherent reasons 
for acting or for holding some things as more important than others by trusting those who speak 
for or against certain things.1272
Our work on the possibilities for a radical break with the world thus indicated 1) that such 
a break is, from an existential standpoint, concretely possible for any of us, since our exposure to 
the world may at any time turn out to be radically overwhelming. I may succumb to reactive 
psychosis (if called upon to face what no one can face), or I may already have resolved the 
universal conflict over taking up my relation to the world in such a way that there is for me a 
weak spot at the core of that relation, a failure of trust that leaves me especially vulnerable to 
being fully betrayed by the world’s demands. Nevertheless, as we saw also to be true of 
interpersonal trust, in primitive trust we are quite appropriately not oriented toward this radical 
vulnerability but rather toward the object of trust (the person or the world) in its trustworthiness. 
The second major part of our investigation has also shown 2) that psychoanalysis sheds light on 
 But this does not simply proceed smoothly, for any of us. Thus, 
in the second part of chapter 6, we took up the question of the genesis of trust developmentally, 
locating the source of the predisposition to psychosis, understood as a refusal of primal 
repression, in one kind of response to a particular conflict. When trust in parental figures is 
insufficiently strong to carry over to the world as a whole, then despite those adults’ invitations, 
the shared world is disclosed as untrustworthy. The resolution to this conflict may then be to 
refuse (or foreclose) submission to the laws of language, the laws that provide both coherence of 
and mediation for our relations to things. For submission to those laws comes at the cost of 
immediacy, hence of (fantasized) oneness with what is loved, and this may be encountered as too 
great a price to pay. 
                                                 
1272 This point is from Hertzberg, “On the Attitude of Trust,” pp. 117-18. 
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the general problem of primitive trust (i.e., of our standing in originary truth) at two central 
points: a) in the therapeutic phenomena of transference, which consists of an odd and asymmetric 
kind of trust; b) in the conflicted root of our relation to the shared world, where we forge (or fail 
to forge) a trust that must be risked if it is to enable our full emergence into the freedom of being-
there. We saw that Freudian thinking provides some illumination of these matters precisely in 
finding itself challenged by the therapy of psychotic patients, for psychosis centrally afflicts both 
of these experiences – the capacity for affective openness to another person (transference), and 
freedom for a structured, shared world over which I have no absolute control. (What I do have, in 
primitive trust, is the security of a relation to independent yet meaningful things, which carry on 
even if I get them wrong. I am neither equivalent to the truth nor utterly alienated from it; rather, I 
live in it, as exposed to whatever is.) 
Our investigation wrapped up, in chapter 7, by clarifying the extent of my critique of 
Heidegger’s analytic of being-there. There we saw that although the psychotic does seem to have 
her own being still at issue, and although she still in some way encounters what is, that encounter 
is no longer structured by the system of language (Heidegger’s logos), and she does not seem to 
have an understanding of being in the concrete ways that Heidegger has laid it out. Existentially 
(i.e., for herself), she in some unstable and infinitely threatened way is, but no longer as in-the-
world. This claim certainly calls for more research. But if it is right, then we are justified in 
saying that our primitive trust in the world admits of a radical break – and that would align 
primitive trust with the phenomen of personal trusting. 
So as to attend to Heidegger’s own view of personal trust, we considered his trust in his 
interlocutors (history’s great thinkers), as it appears both in his interpretation of the conversation 
that we are and in his own composed dialogues. There, once again, we saw that his trust lies in 
being, as a third in the conversation that underlies and inconspicuously guides it, and we were 
concerned that this does not allow the specificity of the interlocutor to matter in a sufficiently 
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robust way. The person is important as an expression of or occasion for being’s unfolding to 
appear, and Heidegger the interpreter is the one who decides how it appears, rather than being 
given over to (hence trustingly guided by) the other person’s own concerns for what is important. 
That discussion of Heideggerian conversation calls attention to another avenue for further 
work: there was no space to do it justice here, but we would have to fill out the overall argument 
by close attention to the working of language, especially in psychosis (since this, as structuring 
the world and splitting us from ourselves, is what is foreclosed). Heidegger’s own discussions of 
ontological danger emphasize the role of language in it, and we would need to consider whether 
this can account for the disintegration involved in psychosis. He concludes the portion of the 
lecture course What Is Called Thinking? that was actually delivered by asking, “Is thinking 
enabled to receive this gift, i.e., to take it into its care [Acht], so as to entrust it – in legein, in a 
saying – to the originary speaking of language?”1273
Finally, as a last suggestion for further research, and as a way of addressing the problem 
of originary truth as it appears obliquely in Freud’s work, I offered the following proposal: 
Freudian psychoanalysis, especially in its concern with originary fantasy, might help us make 
sense out of Heidegger’s most difficult thought: the event of appropriation/expropriation by 
which we come originarily to stand in the truth. For this fantasy, according to Freud, arises in the 
context of trusting particular people, by whom we are seduced into appropriating our place in the 
shared world, a place inevitably shaped by a very particular clearing and thus caught up in the 
problem of originary truth. 
 We would have to ask (and we have already 
begun to do so in this investigation), what would we need to trust in order to undertake such a 
receptivity? Would it be language, or would it be the givenness of language? Could that kind of 
trust fail, such that we would be simply unable to entrust the gift to language? 
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